For over 20 years, political influential Israelis and Palestinians have met in private, unofficial, academically based, problem–solving workshops designed to enable the parties to explore each other’s perspective, generate joint ideas for mutually satisfactory solutions to their conflict, and transfer insights and ideas derived from their interaction into the policy process. Most of the work takes place in small groups, but the focus is on promoting change in the larger system. This article discusses 5 ways in which the workshop group serves as a vehicle for change at the macrolevel. It does so by functioning as a microcosm of the larger system, as a laboratory for producing inputs into the larger system, as a setting for direct interaction, as a coalition across conflict lines, and as a nucleus for a new relationship.
After the debates that raged during the 1960s and 1970s, sociologists lost interest in studying the material consequences of religious orientations. In this article, Alfred Darnell and Darren Sherkat use insider documents from conservative Protestant communities to reopen this issue. They begin by examining how fundamentalist Protestant cultural orientations discourage educational pursuits. Employing data from the Youth Parent Socialization Panel Study, they demonstrate that fundamentalist beliefs and conservate Protestant affiliation both have significant and substantial negative influences on educational attainment above and beyond social background factors.
One of the paradoxes of the contemporary world is the continuing and, in many places, growing strength of nationalist ideology at a time when the weaknesses and limitations of the nation–state are becoming increasingly apparent. Many observers agree that the basic conditions for achieving human dignity – for meeting human needs and assuring human rights – must be established on a worldwide basis, through cooperative transnational efforts. To this end, nation–states must be prepared to yield a degree of their national sovereignty, to expand their range of empathy, and to think in terms of global rather than entirely national interests. In short, the realization of human dignity in the contemporary world requires changes in the nationalistic assumptions that have dominated the international system and curtailments of nationalistic demands and aspirations. Yet, throughout the world, people continue to look to the nation–state as the primary provider of human dignity. The populations of established nation–states expect the state to ensure that their needs will be met and their rights protected. At the same time, the idea of the nation–state is repeatedly infused with new energy and vitality as movements of national liberation seek to establish independent states to assure dignity for oppressed populations.
The contradictions of ethnonational identity, which make it a prime force in both the promotion and the destruction of human dignity and social justice, have become more pronounced with the ending of the Cold War. It is necessary to reconceptualize national identity and develop new norms for accepting a group's right to national self–determination through establishment of an independent state expressing its national identity, and even for accepting its claim to national identity itself. This article proposes that (1) implementation of a group's right to self–determination cannot be left to the group alone, but must be negotiated with those who are affected by that decision, particularly minority populations; and (2) national identity itself must be "negotiated" – explored and discussed – with those who are affected by the group's self–definition.
The use of the term interactive problem solving as a metaphors for negotiation implies that conflicting parties have shared a problem – essentially a problem in their relationship – which needs to be solved by addressing the underlying causes and the dynamics of the conflict in an interactive process. The term has been used to describe an unofficial third–party approach to conflict resolution, which typically brings together politically influential representatives of two parties in conflict for direct communication in problem–solving workshops. The present article draws on the experiences from this micro–process to develop a framework for the macro–process of negotiation. Within this framework, it describes the ultimate goal of negotiation as transformation of the relationship between the parties, which requires an agreement that addresses the four fundamental needs and dears of both parties on a basis of reciprocity. It then discusses four components of negotiation – identification and analysis of the problem, joint shaping of ideas for solution, influencing, the other side, and creating a supportive political environment – and procedures that the metaphor of interactive problem solving suggests for each. Finally, it identifies vehicles for integrating the perspective of interactive problem solving into the larger negotiation process.
The breakthrough character of the Oslo agreement is attributed to the mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the PLO and the opening of direct negotiations between them. The parties were induced to go to Oslo and negotiate an agreement there by macro–level forces evolving over some time; Long–term changes, going back to the 1967 War, and short–term strategic and domestic–political considerations, resulting from the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War, created new interests that persuaded them of the necessity of negotiating a compromise; and unofficial interactions between the two sides over the course of two decades persuaded them of the possibility of doing so. Once the parties decided to negotiate, the micro–process provided by Oslo, with its peculiar mixture of track–one and track–two elements, contributed to the success of negotiations. Key elements included secrecy, the setting, the status of the initial participants, the nature of the third party, and the nature of the mediation process. Finally, what made the accord viable were some of its main substantive features, including the exchange of letters of mutual recognition, the distinction between the interim and the final stage, and the territorial base and early empowerment of the Palestinian Authority.
"Men make their own history," Karl Marx wrote in 1852, "but they do not make it just as they please." Scholars of Latin America have spent much energy understanding the second half of that sentence, namely, the importance of structures and their legacies... [W]e are mindful of that second half but call attention to its first half: the conscious choices made by some political actors in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America to foster freer politics and freer markets and, in that way, to reinvent Latin American history.
Hundreds of thousands of Cuban troops deployed to nearly every corner of the globe – that seemed to be the nightmare of every US administration from the mid–1970s to the end of the 1980s. From its own perspective, President Fidel Castro's government attempted to use its activist foreign policy first to protect itself from hostile US policies, and second to leverage support from the Soviet Union and other communist countries for Cuba's own domestic development.
The first proposition had been articulated by Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the 1960s when he called on revolutionaries to create "two, three Vietnams" in order to confront and weaken the United States and its allies. Even as the Cuban government gradually edged away from ample support for many revolutionary insurgencies, the strategy of global engagement as the best defense against US offense persisted. The second proposition developed in the 1970s. Although Cuba's decisions to deploy troops or to undertake other internationalist missions were characteristically its own, it also furthered a long–term tendency to coordinate such policies with those of the Soviet Union, demonstrating thereby that Cuba was the Soviet Union's most reliable foreign policy ally in the Cold War, and providing a basis for a substantial claim on Soviet resources.
The recent experience of the European Monetary System has once again brought the problem of international monetary instability to scholars’ and policymakers’ attention.
In 1992, German interest rate hikes meant to address growing inflationary pressures within Germany sparked speculation against the pound and lira that eventually led England and Italy to devalue their currencies and to leave the European Monetary System’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). A year later, the fluctuation bands linking the participating currencies of Europe were widened from 2.5 percent to 15 percent, rendering the system almost as loose as floating exchange rates.
In the 1998 and 1991 national elections, Mexican voters asked themselves above all whether they continued to support the long–ruling official party. Voter behavior was not well explained by attachments to social cleavages, attitudes on policy issues, or general assessments about the present circumstances and the prospects for the nation's economy or personal finances. In both elections, moreover, the parties of the Left failed to mobilize voters that had chosen to abstain in past elections. Once voters were ready to oppose the ruling party, however, differences by issue, prospective economic assessments, and social cleavages shaped their choice between opposition parties.
Since the widely publicized signing of the accord between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in September of 1993, there has been general recognition of the role that unofficial efforts have played directly or indirectly – in making this agreement possible.
The Oslo, Norway talks themselves, from which this accord emerged, cannot be characterized as an instance of "unofficial" of "track two" diplomacy. Rather, the Oslo talks were a form of back–channel negotiations, which contained a mixture of official and unofficial – track one and track two – elements. The Oslo negotiations demonstrated dramatically, however, that private, nonofficial individuals and settings can play a significant role in advancing a negotiating process that had reached an impasse at the official level. The heightened awareness of the potential contributions of unofficial inputs served to remind observers of the contacts and interactions between Israelis and Palestinians that had been organized over the years by a variety of unofficial third parties and that helped lay the groundwork for the recent developments.
Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall it became common in Washington and Miami to bet on the date that Fidel Castro would fall. Those bets were based on the premise that the Cuban regime could not survive without Soviet support. Gone was the Soviet economic subsidy worth no less than one–sixth of the island's total gross product; gone were the weapons transfers free of charge. From 1989 to 1992 the Cuban economy contracted sharply, with imports shrinking from $8.1 billion to $2.2 billion. Yet the Cuban regime remains with Fidel Castro firmly at its helm. How has Cuban communism managed to survive?
The essential phenomenon of torture, however is that it is not an ordinary crime, but a crime of obedience: a crime that takes place, not in opposition to the authorities, but under explicit instructions from the authorities to engage in acts of torture, or in an environment in which such acts are implicitly sponsored, expected, or at least tolerated by the authorities. Lee Hamilton and I have defined a crime of obedience as "an act performed in response to orders from authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community." Torture is clearly considered illegal and immoral by the international community; it is prohibited by international declarations and conventions that have been unanimously adopted by member states of the United Nations. Yet it is the authorities of these very states that order, encourage, or tolerated systematic policies or sporadic acts of torture.
Theories of the development, maintenance, and adaptation of international institutions have been at the center of scholarship in international political economy in the past decade. Functionalist logic, often based on game–theoretic representations of strategic state behavior, has been especially influential in explaining the demand for international institutions. These theories point to the role of international institutions in infusing international relations with a greater degree of certainty, to the general longer–term benefit of cooperating nations. This article draws on a distinct but parallel development in the economic literature on international finance: dynamic contracting and rational expectations approaches to capital market suboptimality. Like functional theories of international cooperation, this approach focuses on the dynamics that lead to inefficient outcomes and provides a theoretical rationale for the development of international institutions to overcome these inefficiencies. When applied in the context of the policy preferences of the key actors (the governments of the major powers, their central bankers, and the dominant international bankers of the day), this approach makes it possible to explain not only the impetus for international financial cooperation, but also why this effort converged on an international financial institution such as the Bank for International Settlements.
For some years now, my colleagues and I have been evolving an unofficial third–party approach to the resolution of intense, protracted conflicts between identity groups at the international and intercommunal levels. Within that category, I have worked extensively on the Arab-Israeli conflict, with primary emphasis on the Israeli–Palestinian component of that conflict. I have also done work over the years on the conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus and have followed other protracted identity conflicts around the world.
This occasional paper is an edited version of a briefing book that was designed by members of Harvard University's Avoiding Nuclear War Project and distributed among newly appointed officials in the Bush administration. Originally designed to help combat the lack of institutional memory on nuclear issues in the American government, these fourteen chapters also provide an interesting overview of these issues for a broader audience. ""A Primer for the Nuclear Age"" addresses the danger, effects, development, strategy, and force structure of nuclear weapons as well as assessing the influence of domestic and international politics on nuclear weapons policy. Co–published with the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.
Since the early years in their histories as independent nations, the United States and its southern near–neighbors have been linked through their foreign policies and the movements of their peoples. In the nineteenth century, the acquisition of the Floridas and the conquest of northern Mexico by the United States led to substantial movements of people. Later in the same century, the U.S. conquest of the remnants of Spain's American empire contributed to the hispanization of the population of the United States.
In the twentieth century, U.S. immigration policy turned generally restrictionist. Foreign policy concerns, however, led the government to permit and even, for a time, to stimulate Mexican immigration to the United States. Consistent with its policies toward the Soviet bloc, the U.S. government also stimulated migration from Cuba for a certain period. These U.S. policies have been supplemented by those determined and ingenious people who, drawn by the promise of the words inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, have entered the United States illegally. As a result, the United States is already the fifth largest Spanish–speaking country in the world.
Six political–psychological assumptions are presented as the basis for this paper's argument that direct Israeli–Palestinian negotiations are necessary and possible and for its delineation of the requirements of such negotiations. The last of these assumptions – that neither party will enter negotiations that leave its right to national existence in doubt – is linked to the psychological core of the conflict: its perception by the parties as a zero–sum conflict around national identity and existence. This view has led to a mutual denial of each other's identity and right to exist and systematic efforts to delegitimize the other. Such efforts have undermined the steps toward negotiation that leaders on both sides have in fact taken because each defines the negotiating framework in ways that are profoundly threatening to the other. Negotiations are possible only in a framework of mutual recognition, which makes it clear that recognition of the other's rights represents assertion, rather than abandonment, of one's own rights. Such negotiations can be facilitated through a prenegotiation process conducive to differentiation of the enemy image, including a breakdown of the monolithic view of the enemy camp, a distinction between the enemy's ideological dreams and operational programs, and a differentiation between negative and positive components of the other's ideology and symbols of legitimacy.
Over the last ten years, international regimes emerged as a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations. The interest in regimes sprang from a dissatisfaction with dominant conceptions of international order, authority, and organization. The sharp contrast between the competitive, zero–sum "anarch" of interstate relations and the "authority" of domestic politics seemed overdrawn in explaining cooperative behavior among the advanced industrial states. The policy dilemmas created by the growth of interdependence since World War II generated new forms of coordination and organization that fit uneasily in a realist framework... We begin by briefly surveying the contending definitions of international regimes, which range from patterned behavior, to convergent norms and expectations, to explicit injunctions. We then suggest a number of dimensions along which regimes vary over time or across cases; these dimensions have been or might be used to operationalize "regime change." They include strength, organizational form, scope, and allocational mode. The third section examines four theoretical approaches to regimes – structural, game–theoretic, functional, and cognitive – and attempts to clarify what each theory can and cannot tell us about regimes. In the conclusion, we ask how and whether regimes "matter..."
The Chinese have a long–standing tradition of using history to comment upon contemporary events. This article attempts to advance our understanding of the formal criminal justice process in late imperial China by reconstructing from archival materials and analyzing one of the most celebrated criminal cases in Chinese history — that of Yang Nai–wu and Hsiao–pai–ts'ai. It is a sign of the state of our explorations of the Chinese legal tradition that no Western scholar has ever written about the case, that no Chinese scholar has produced a definitive account of it and its overall significance, and that no scholar, Chinese or foreign, has yet charted in meaningful and explicated detail the full course of any imperial Chinese case that traversed the entire formal criminal justice system from the level of the district magistrate to the highest reaches of the imperial government...In addition, fluid had started to seep into the corpse's eyes and ears, further complicating the autopsy laid out in Hsi-yuan lu, the classic Chinese coroner's manual... In his memorial, Pien Pao-ch'uan did not restrict his criticism to Yang Ch'ang-chun and Hu Jui-Ian...