Dark-skinned blacks in the United States have lower socioeconomic status, more punitive relationships with the criminal justice system, diminished prestige, and less likelihood of holding elective office compared with their lighter counterparts. This phenomenon of “colorism” both occurs within the African American community and is expressed by outsiders, and most blacks are aware of it. Nevertheless, blacks’ perceptions of discrimination, belief that their fates are linked, or attachment to their race almost never vary by skin color. We identify this disparity between treatment and political attitudes as “the skin color paradox,” and use it as a window into the politics of race in the United States over the past half-century.
The varieties of capitalism literature has put skill systems at the center of comparative politics. Yet its claims about skill specificity are driven by two large coordinated economies, Germany and Japan. This article examines political change of skills in two small coordinated economies. Switzerland has expanded its general skills orientation, whereas Austria retains a highly specific skills system. The cause of this divergence is the different interests of small and large employers: Small employers are more cost sensitive than are large employers, which leads them to oppose the introduction of more general education. The study also shows that the primary measure of skill specificity used in quantitative work—vocational training share—is unreliable. It fails to distinguish between secondary and tertiary vocational training, which have opposite effects on skill specificity. The article develops and justifies an alternative measure—tertiary vocational training—that better predicts the skills clusters observed in advanced capitalism.
Social-psychological concepts and findings have entered the mainstream of theory and research in international relations. Explorations of the social-psychological dimensions of international politics go back at least to the early 1930s. Research on foreign policy decision making and the cognitive, group, and organizational factors that help to shape it, negotiation and bargaining, enemy images, public opinion in the foreign policy process, deterrence and other forms of influence in international politics, and reconciliation draws extensively on social-psychological research and theory.
Using a rare representative sample of grassroots activists and nonactivists,
this study identifies three paths that consistently led Salvadoran
women to involvement in the FMLM guerrilla army: politicized
guerillas, reluctant guerillas, and recruited guerillas. These
mobilization paths arose from the patterned intersections of individual-level biographies, networks, and situational contexts. The
implications of these findings extend beyond studies of revolutionary
activism to analyses of microlevel mobilization in general. Activists
are heterogeneous and often follow multiple paths to the same participation
outcome. Capturing these multiple paths is imperative for
generating theoretically sound explanations of mobilization that
are also empirically effective in distinguishing activists from
This article draws on anthropological research conducted with communities in Ayacucho, the region
of Peru that suffered the greatest loss of life during the internal armed conflict of the 1980s and 1990s.
One particularity of internal wars, such as Peru’s, is that foreign armies do not wage the attacks: frequently,
the enemy is a son-in-law, a godfather, an old schoolmate, or the community that lies just across
the valley. The charged social landscape of the present reflects the lasting damage done by a recent past
in which people saw just what their neighbors could do. The author contributes to the literature on transitional
justice by examining the construction and deconstruction of lethal violence among "intimate
enemies" and by analyzing how the concepts and practices of communal justice have permitted the development
of a micropolitics of reconciliation in which campesinos administer both retributive and restorative
forms of justice.
In this article Theidon draws upon research conducted with communities in Ayacucho, the region of Peru that bore the greatest loss of life during the internal armed conflict of the 1980-1990s. The fratricidal nature of the conflict means that in any given community,former enemies live side by side. What is it like to live in such a context? What is it like knowing just who one lives with-and living with what oneself has done? As a way of thinking about these questions, Theidon focuses on a figure that appeared incessantly in her conversations: the masked ones. What lies behind the masks that haunt these narratives, particularly in those communities in which the "masked ones" were frequently neighbors and family members? Theidon demonstrates that talk about masks, faces, and "facelessness" is talk about morality and immorality, and about the challenges of forging co-existence among intimate enemies.
As scholarly interest in the concept of identity continues to grow, social identities are proving to be crucially important for understanding
contemporary life. Despite—or perhaps because of—the sprawl of different treatments of identity in the social sciences,
the concept has remained too analytically loose to be as useful a tool as the literature’s early promise had suggested. We propose to
solve this longstanding problem by developing the analytical rigor and methodological imagination that will make identity a more
useful variable for the social sciences. This article offers more precision by defining collective identity as a social category that varies
along two dimensions—content and contestation. Content describes the meaning of a collective identity. The content of social
identities may take the form of four non-mutually-exclusive types: constitutive norms; social purposes; relational comparisons with
other social categories; and cognitive models. Contestation refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of the
shared category. Our conceptualization thus enables collective identities to be compared according to the agreement and disagreement
about their meanings by the members of the group. The final section of the article looks at the methodology of identity
scholarship. Addressing the wide array of methodological options on identity—including discourse analysis, surveys, and content
analysis, as well as promising newer methods like experiments, agent-based modeling, and cognitive mapping—we hope to provide
the kind of brush clearing that will enable the field to move forward methodologically as well.
Proponents and critics alike agree that the policies spawned by the Washington
Consensus have not produced the desired results. The debate now is not over
whether the Washington Consensus is dead or alive, but over what will replace it. An
important marker in this intellectual terrain is the World Bank’s Economic Growth
in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (2005).With its emphasis on humility,
policy diversity, selective and modest reforms, and experimentation, this is a
rather extraordinary document demonstrating the extent to which the thinking of the
development policy community has been transformed over the years. But there are
other competing perspectives as well. One (trumpeted elsewhere in Washington) puts
faith on extensive institutional reform, and another (exemplified by the U.N.
Millennium Report) puts faith on foreign aid. Sorting intelligently among these
diverse perspectives requires an explicitly diagnostic approach that recognizes that
the binding constraints on growth differ from setting to setting.
The belief that outbreaks of politicized religion
are temporary detours on the road to secularization
was plausible in 1976, 1986, or even 1996.
Today, the argument is untenable. As a framework
for explaining and predicting the course of
global politics, secularism is increasingly unsound.
God is winning in global politics. And modernization,
democratization, and globalization have
only made him stronger.
We examine one of the channels through which financial integration can help promote growth. We study the effects of capital account liberalization on the imports of capital goods paying particular attention to equity market liberalization. We find that for the period 1980–1997, after controlling for trade liberalization and other macroeconomic policies and reforms, stock market liberalization leads to a significant increase in the share of imports of machinery and equipment and the varieties of capital goods imports. Hence, this paper provides evidence that increased access to international capital allows countries to enjoy the benefits embodied in international capital goods.
This paper extends contemporary theorizing on national income inequality to the possible role of regional integration in explaining the recent increase in income inequality in Western European countries. Regional integration is conceptualized as the construction of regional political economy through intensified political and economic interaction and exchange. It is argued that political integration increases inequality through welfare state retrenchment, while economic integration increases inequality by exposing labor to international competition but later decreases inequality as welfare states adopt social protections to compensate for this competition. These arguments are assessed with data from 12 Western European countries for the 1969-1999 period. Results from random—effects and fixed—effects models support these arguments. Also consistent with these arguments are the findings that the welfare state dampens the effects of political and economic integration, and that the effects of political integration weaken at higher levels of economic integration. This study suggests that European integration is an important factor in understanding income inequality in Western Europe.
The current debates in and about the veil in Europe carry with them not only the terms of the emergence of political Islam in the past several decades, but also this historical memory and that of the earlier cultural encounters and colonial wars between Europe and the domains now named the Middle East and North Africa. While I do not mean to collapse these projects into a singular entity, the historical legacy of fixing the meaning of a Muslim woman's veil as the sign of her gender oppression has remained with us to this very day.
The second half of the twentieth century was marked by dramatic changes in women's economic participation in the United States and other Western industrial countries (Bergmann 1986; Davis 1984; Oppenheimber 1970, 1994). The most important departure from previous decades was the rapid rise in labor force participation among married women. In the United States, this trend began in the 1940s and early 1950s; in each subsequent decade, white married women's labor force participation increased by about 10 percentage points, reaching 60 percent by the end of the century (Blau and Kahn 2005).
This paper begins with a summary of a model, developed half a century ago, that distinguishes three qualitatively different processes of social influence: compliance, identification, and internalization. The model, originally geared to and experimentally tested in the context of persuasive communication, was subsequently applied to influence in the context of long–term relationships, including psychotherapy, international exchanges, and the socialization of national/ethnic identity. It has been extended to analysis of the relationship of individuals to social systems. Individuals' rule, role, and value orientations to a system—conceptually linked to compliance, identification, and internalization—predict different reactions to their own violations of societal standards, different patterns of personal involvement in the political system, and differences in attitude toward authorities and readiness to obey. In a further extension of the model, three approaches to peacemaking in international or intergroup conflicts are identified–conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation– which, respectively, focus on the accommodation of interests, relationships, and identities, and are conducive to changes at the level of compliance, identification, and internalization.
Why were capital controls orthodox in 1944, but heretical in 1997? The scholarly literature, following the conventional wisdom, focuses on the role of the United States in promoting capital liberalization. Although the United States encouraged capital liberalization bilaterally, US policy makers never embraced multilateral rules that codified the norm of capital mobility. Rather, European policy makers wrote the most important rules in favour of the free movement of capital. Paradoxically, French policy makers in particular played decisive roles. For the debates that mattered most—in the EU, OECD, and IMF—the United States was, respectively, irrelevant, inconsequential and indifferent. Europe did not capitulate to global capital. Rather, French and other European policy makers created today’s liberal international financial regime. French and European policy makers have promoted a rule-based, "managed" globalization of finance, whereas US policy makers have tended to embrace an ad hoc globalization based on the accumulation of bilateral bargains. Once liberal rules were codified in the EU and OECD, they constituted the policy practices of "European" and "developed"’ states, for which capital controls are no longer considered a legitimate policy tool. During the middle of the 1990s, the IMF debated new, universal rules in favour of capital freedom, but the proposal was defeated, primarily by the US Congress, after the financial crises of 1997–98. By then the vast majority of the world’s capital flows were already governed by the liberal rules of the EU and OECD.