Lightning may never strike twice in the same place, but the same cannot be said of sovereign default. Throughout history, governments have demonstrated that “serial default” is the rule, not the exception. Argentina has famously defaulted on ﬁve occasions since its birth in the 1820’s. However, as shown in Table 1, Argentina’s record is surpassed by many countries in the New World (Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador) and by almost as many in the Old World (France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey). At the same time, a
smaller and dwindling number of developing countries such as India, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, and Thailand have yet to default, despite being tested by severe turmoil, including the Asian crisis of the late 1990’s. What can explain such striking differences in default performance? State-of-the-art theoretical models of debt crises stress the importance of multiple equilibria where random investor panics can become self-fulﬁlling. The implication is that economists may never be able to precisely explain sovereign defaults, much less
predict them. Nevertheless, the fact that sovereign defaults tend to recur like clockwork in some countries, while being absent in others, suggests that there must be a signiﬁcant explainable component as well.
America is up to its neck in nation building - but the public debate, focused on getting the troops home, devotes little attention to why we are building a new Iraqi nation, what success would look like, or what principles should guide us. What We Owe Iraq sets out to shift the terms of the debate, acknowledging that we are nation building to protect ourselves while demanding that we put the interests of the people being governed - whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or elsewhere - ahead of our own when we exercise power over them.
Noah Feldman argues that to prevent nation building from turning into a paternalistic, colonialist charade, we urgently need a new, humbler approach. Nation builders should focus on providing security, without arrogantly claiming any special expertise in how successful nation-states should be made. Drawing on his personal experiences in Iraq as a constitutional adviser, Feldman offers enduring insights into the power dynamics between the American occupiers and the Iraqis, and tackles issues such as Iraqi elections, the prospect of successful democratization, and the way home.
Elections do not end the occupier's responsibility. Unless asked to leave, we must resist the temptation of a military pullout before a legitimately elected government can maintain order and govern effectively. But elections that create a legitimate democracy are also the only way a nation builder can put itself out of business and - eventually - send its troops home.
Feldman's new afterword brings the Iraq story up-to-date since the book's original publication in 2004, and asks whether the United States has acted ethically in pushing the political process in Iraq while failing to control the security situation; it also revisits the question of when, and how, to withdraw.
Pundits and social observers have voiced alarm each year as fewer Americans involve themselves in voluntary groups that meet regularly. Thousands of nonprofit groups have been launched in recent times, but most are run by professionals who lobby Congress or deliver social services to clients. What will happen to US democracy if participatory groups and social movements wither, while civic involvement becomes one more occupation rather than every citizen’s right and duty? In Diminished Democracy, Theda Skocpol shows that this decline in public involvement has not always been the case in this country—and how, by understanding the causes of this change, we might reverse it.
Many sociologists have considered the intersection of race and gender in the production of social life, but while works on “intersectionality” have offered a useful paradigm for analyzing the experience of individual persons, a model for understanding how structures interact remains unclear. Appropriating Sewell’s (1992) argument that structures consist of cultural schemas applied to resources, this article develops a more nuanced approach to intersectionality. It presents the argument that because the basis of race and gender as social structures is the inscription of cultural schemas on bodies, and because racial reproduction is predicated on the continued creation of these culturally inscribed bodies, race and gender as social structures necessarily intersect at the level of biological reproduction. The study uses this theoretical insight to analyze how physicians and suffragists contested the meaning of, and policy regarding, abortion in nineteenth-century America. While most histories of abortion argue that nineteenth-century abortion politics concerned gender relations, this article argues that what was at stake was Anglo-Saxon control of the state and dominance of society. Abortion politics contested the proper use of a valuable social resource, the reproductive capacity of Anglo-Saxon women.
Co-author Nicola Beisel is a professor of sociology at Northwestern University. Download PDF
Female participation in the Latin American paid labor force is increasing
dramatically. Building upon Fortes and Hoffman's (2003) model, we use occupational
data to measure gendered changes in Latin America's class structure
over the last two decades of economic restructuring and adjustment and to investigate
the causes and consequences of these regional patterns. Our results suggest
two important conclusions. First, economic adjustment and restructuring is
increasing women's parity with men in terms of class position largely as a consequence
of the deterioration of men's once-privileged location in the class structure.
Second, recent economic adjustment and restructuring has altered power
relations between social classes in Latin America in part because it has inspired
both qualitative and quantitative changes in the gendered composition of Latin
American labor. The number of women entering the workforce, and the labor
conditions suffered particularly by women workers, has resulted in both the literal
and figurative "emasculation" of the Formal Froletariat. These preliminary
findings make clear the explanatory benefits of including gender in analyses of
ehanges in the Latin American class structure.
Jennifer Leaning, just back from a taxing trip to Sudanese refugee sites, travels the world in the name of human rights
CAMBRIDGE—The after-lunch meeting has just begun—and snacks of broccoli rabe and ricotta pizza have been brought to tables draped in white linen—when Dr. Jennifer Leaning strides into UpStairs on the Square. She is recently returned from a harrowing two-week trip to the Chad-Sudan border, and the
gulf between that desperate place and here seems even greater than the 5,700 miles separating the two. Now she discusses the plight of Sudanese refugees
with 15 activists and congressional staffers convened by Physicians for Human Rights and Amnesty International. "There is a systematic attack on villages,
livelihoods, and people of the non-Arab population," Leaning tells them, "not just to terrorize them but to expunge them from that part of the earth."
Leaning is an emergency room physician who turned her political conscience and love of travel into an avocation of fighting for human rights, then turned
her avocation into her vocation when, in 1999, she was named director of the Program on Humanitarian Crises and Human Rights at Harvard's School of Public
Health. She is a pragmatic intellectual who believes Sudan is practicing genocide in Darfur. An official finding of genocide would trigger a legal
obligation for other countries to intervene, but Leaning doesn't want debate over labeling the crisis to distract from helping the more than 300,000 people
now at risk of dying. She is part of a cadre of doctors affiliated with PHR who interrupt comfortable lives to use their medical expertise to investigate
alleged violations of international law in far-flung places.
"I can see a line of sight between making a living here and making a difference," says Leaning, 59. "Maybe I could contribute to a public debate about
"She's very brave, very smart, and very effective," says John Shattuck, the former assistant secretary of state for human rights now at the Kennedy Library. "Not many people," says former PHR president Robert Lawrence, "combine her clinical capacity to understand the urgent health needs of a population in a
large refugee area and at the same time have a real thorough grounding in international human rights law and know the binding conventions and the universal
declarations and all the other things Jennifer could probably recite in her sleep."
What Leaning and John Heffernan, a PHR staffer from Washington D.C., found on their June trip to Chad dovetails with what others have reported is going on
in Sudan's Darfur region. After government aircraft bomb non-Arab villages, Janjaweed militia, often on camelback, kill and rape, destroy dwellings and
livestock, and poison wells. The government has obstructed humanitarian aid to more than 1 million people displaced within Darfur, and the rainy season
will add more obstacles. An estimated 30,000 have been killed, and about 200,000 have fled to Chad. The physician group's conclusion that this constitutes
an unfolding genocide goes further than other human rights organizations and adds to pressure on the United Nations and individual countries to intervene.
"The issue of whether you call it genocide is a complicated one, but we're not letting it split us. There's unanimity that this is a colossal calamity, and
we have to act in the next month," Leaning says.
Leaning faced a challenge in Chad she never encountered on 14 missions to Afghanistan, Kosovo, Somalia, Soviet Georgia, and the West Bank. She suffered
life-threatening dehydration and gastroenteritis. "It was very chastening," Leaning says. "It made me appreciate how tough the people there are, and also
how vulnerable," she adds. "When you deracinate them from their life supports, although they will live longer than I would, the environment will still kill
In her office at Harvard's Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights in Boston, Leaning talks of the difficulties of doing research in such places as
eastern Chad. On the wall is a copy of a graph showing the number of Napoleon's troops marching to and from Moscow in 1812, its simple lines a stark
depiction of the cost of a campaign in which hundreds of thousands of soldiers died. Leaning is tall, with intense blue eyes and the habit of folding the
edge of the binding at the top of a pad of paper back and forth as she speaks. "You always have the feeling," Lawrence says, "that Jennifer has just had
three cups of coffee."
Getting from N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, to the first area Leaning and Heffernan visited took four days. They had to hire translators and a driver
they felt would slow down at a woman's behest. They inspected tires and brakes, but, in a fateful oversight, forgot to check for a cigarette lighter, a
crucial power source. Temperatures, Leaning says, hit 120, and sandstorms felt like smothering, swirling talc.
At dusk on their third day, the SUV got stuck on a rock. Finally, a lorry approached. Leaning waved a flashlight, and men armed with Kalashnikovs alit. "This was an area known to have bandits," Leaning says. "One of them said, `You're lucky we didn't shoot. We didn't know who you were.' " With their help,
the car was eventually dislodged. At the first refugee site Leaning's entourage reached, Goz Amer, the UN worker had too little food to share. "Goz Amer,"
says Leaning, "was much better than other parts."
Thus their trip began.
Though the temperature inside the air-conditioned SUV hit 90 degrees, they could keep windows closed and sand out. Quarters could be as spartan as a sheet
sack on a hard floor. They carried prepackaged cheese and biscuits and bottled water. Leaning is a vegetarian who often travels to places where cooked meat
is the safest food. "I've lived on bread and rice and PowerBars," she says. "The sanitation in rural Chad is really poor. Flies and sand and other elements
go into what's being cooked that I didn't want to identify."
They interviewed refugees about their experiences in Darfur and promised to use their stories to try to effect change. "It validates their private sense of
outrage," Leaning says. "It's not just a personal tragedy but a grave disruption of what the international community thinks is right."
One young man had a leg swollen from serious infection following a machete accident. Leaning tried, in vain, to convince him to come with them to get
medical care, then left him money for antibiotics. She met a woman who fled Darfur with a baby at her breast and three other children. The Janjaweed shot at
her, striking her in the elbow and side and taking a piece of her baby's finger. For 10 days, she walked and hid, wounded, scrounging for water and food.
"I will never forget either of those people," Leaning says. "The guy with the calf wound who was so courteous and brave but who could not organize his mind
to get the medical care he needed either because of his responsibilities or fear of the unknown. Or this young woman, who was so heroic in saving herself
and her four children. And these are two people of 200,000."
Near the end of the trip, Leaning got sick, probably from the carrot and beet salad she ate before they went to the desolate desert on Chad's northern
border with Sudan. "We felt a fair amount of pressure to cover a lot of ground despite the rainy season and poor terrain. We didn't have that much sleep and
we weren't eating that much. We were drinking, but the air conditioning can prevent you from realizing you're getting dehydrated," Leaning says. She was
hardly perspiring when they arrived at the Bahai area.
"It is an appalling place," Leaning says. Eighteen thousand refugees were there, many huddled under scattered, scraggly trees. Their animals were dying of
thirst. Here, feeling faint, Leaning had to lie down. By the time she started vomiting, she was already dehydrated. She needed intravenous fluids. She
carried sterile equipment, because of AIDS, but the rudimentary site had only a liter of rehydrating fluid and their sugar water wouldn't replace crucial
salts and electrolytes. "My pulse was 140, and it was hard to find," Leaning says. Afraid her veins would soon collapse, she quickly had the only other
doctor there at the time put in an IV. She asked to be evacuated that night.
Their satellite phone was low on power, and the car had no cigarette lighter. Nobody would fly in at night in a sandstorm. Land mines and bandits made it
too risky to drive four hours to a clinic in Iriba. They called Brigham and Women's Hospital to see if they could add oral rehydration salts to the IV sugar
water, but the phone died. So, for six hours, Heffernan gave Leaning a tiny cupful of the salts every 30 seconds, and Leaning willed herself not to vomit or
lose consciousness. At dawn they could drive to Iriba. "You have this animal sense when you know it's bad," she says. "I became entirely focused on finding
a way out."
The aborted call to Boston had been enough to get word to PHR, which, for the first time in its 18-year history, activated its emergency medical services.
Leaning was treated in Iriba, then airlifted to N'Djamena.
So ended Leaning's most recent mission, more than a half-century after her first. When she was in first grade in New Paltz, N.Y., she was one of six
children selected to deliver the chickens the class had hatched to poor, immigrant farmers from Eastern Europe. "I don't recall the encounter with the
farmers or the transmission of the chickens," Leaning says. "I just remember being part of this important charitable mission."
Thoreau may have been content to travel widely in Concord, but for Leaning, who lives in an expansive center-entrance colonial on a bucolic street in
Lincoln, staying close to home has never been enough. Her mother grew up in Japan, the daughter of YMCA missionaries. Her father was a former British
diplomat who had friends around the world. They split when Leaning was 6. "Current events, the news, and insights about the news were extremely relevant
and salient in our household," she says.
In 1965, when Leaning was an undergraduate at Radcliffe College, she took a leave to spend a year in Tanzania. She taught in Dar Es Salaam, then set up
child care in a village experimenting with rural agriculture. In 1967, she and the husband she later divorced (she just remarried) honeymooned with a trip
around the world. They hitchhiked from Nairobi to Cape Town, traveled steerage on a freighter between Singapore and Ceylon, now Sri Lanka. In 1969, she
visited Kabul, where her mother was teaching; in 2002, she returned to Afghanistan on a PHR mission during which she visited prisoners and uncovered a mass
"Consciousness and appetite for life and yearning for a future is something everybody is born with," she says. "I was fortunate that I was born in a time
and context that allowed me to thrive and prosper. I feel connected, and not intimately, personally responsible for everyone's grief and suffering, but in
a complex, organized social way, I feel responsible." The afternoon that starts with the meeting at the restaurant ends with Leaning participating in a
crowded public forum on Sudan at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. In the month since she's been home, an additional 12,000 refugees are estimated to
have fled to the Bahai site where she got ill.
"The chance is now," Leaning says. "It's almost slipping past us."
Jennier Leaning, a faculty associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, is professor of International Health in the department of Population and International Health at Harvard's School of Public Health.
IMAGINE the following speech explaining to the American people why we are in Iraq: "Why are we in Iraq?
"We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 2003 we offered support to the people of Iraq.
We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over the past year, we have made a national
pledge to help Iraq defend its independence.
"And I intend to keep that promise.
"To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that
must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.
"We are also there to strengthen world order . . .
"There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason
that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia,
and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom. . . . "
This speech sounds familiar, and not just because we hear many of the same sentiments from our leaders today.
Change the name of the country and the date, and you'll have a speech given by President Lyndon Johnson at
Johns Hopkins University in May 1965. The country in question then was Vietnam, and by the time of the
commitment of US ground forces in March of that year, the war to save South Vietnam's independence was
already lost. Furthermore, it had never been a war that could be won by military means alone. Although
many in the Johnson administration recognized this at the time, then as now, the weight of institutional
inertia restricted nonmilitary support to mere rhetoric.
President George Bush was wrong to commit US armed forces to the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.
Even had he been justified in doing so -- had Iraq possessed operational weapons of mass destruction -- the
lack of planning to manage post-Hussein Iraq, to balance military and nonmilitary approaches to reconstructing
Iraq, would have doomed our efforts there to failure. This is why we, along with more than 650 fellow academics
and former foreign policy practitioners of all partisan stripes have signed an open letter of protest to the
American people. (It is available online at
President Bush can no more succeed with our current approach in Iraq than LBJ did in Vietnam. This is true even
though Bush is not hindered by a superpower rival or an ambitious plan to eliminate domestic poverty.
President Johnson recognized the hopelessness of our position in Vietnam well before the failed Tet offensive
of 1968 and well before March of that year, when he declared he would not stand for reelection. Then as now,
the United States tried to train and equip a domestic armed force capable of providing security. But, with
little international support, the insurgents were able to portray South Vietnam's military as lackeys of
US imperial interests.
Then as now, the United States tried to use its unmatched technology to support combat missions to surround
and destroy insurgent strongholds, only to find their foes slip away, sometimes across international borders
to safe areas in neighboring states. Then as now, in spite of their best efforts, US forces continually injured
and killed noncombatants, thereby expanding the pool of supporters, informers, and future recruits for the insurgents.
In the end, the war in Vietnam became exactly what the North Vietnamese propaganda machine had always (at first wrongly)
claimed it to be: an antisocial war. It became a war that pitted the US military against the people of another country.
Whatever the justice of the original mission, the character of the war changed, and it became an unjust war.
President Johnson, to his credit, refused to preside over the continuance of that war.
It fell instead to President Nixon to manage "peace with honor": declaring a US victory and then abandoning South Vietnam
to its own compromised resources. This is now the Bush administration's best course in Iraq. The only other remaining policy
option is to expand military service, and if history is any guide, providing security in Iraq will require an army of at
least a million soldiers. Unfortunately, due to the more widespread and intensified threat we now face, a future Bush
administration may attempt to do both.
In the meantime, Al Qaeda remains dangerous, North Korea has nuclear weapons, and Iran is bent on acquiring them.
And until we rethink our policy, American men and women, along with the Iraqi citizens whose freedom Bush so doggedly
claims to defend, will continue to die in a war we never needed to fight.
Ivan Arreguin-Toft is a fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a lecturer at
Wellesley College. Monica Duffy Toft is an associate professor of public Policy at the Belfer Center and assistant director
of Harvard's John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies.
Not since the Vietnam war has international public opinion about America sunk so low. US officials praise "American values" when abroad, but they are
competing with images of prisoner abuse and torture, and even Fahrenheit 9/11, Michael Moore's wildly successful anti-Bush polemic.
The best way to counter such negative views has been to encourage others to come and see for themselves the strengths of American society. But in this
particular battle for hearts and minds, the US government is currently engaged in unilateral disarmament. By making admission of foreigners so difficult
and intimidating, America is depriving itself of a formidable strategic advantage.
The US State Department issued 36 per cent fewer visas in the 2003 fiscal year than in 2001—cutting total visitors by almost 1m. The fall is almost
universally attributed to the more stringent security procedures introduced after September 11, 2001. No one questions the need for measures to prevent
terrorists entering US territory, but many question whether new entry procedures meet even minimum standards of efficiency and cost effectiveness.
Foremost among the sceptics are US research and educational establishments. Some 560,000 student visas were issued in 2001, but only 474,000 in 2003. US
universities depend heavily on foreign graduate students and scholars - especially in mathematics, the sciences and engineering. In May, more than 20
professional associations representing some 95 per cent of the US research community made an unprecedented joint declaration describing the current
visa-processing logjam as a crisis. Larry Summers, Harvard's president, warned in April that if visa procedures remained so complicated and lengthy, "we risk losing some of our most talented scientists and compromising our country's position at the forefront of technological innovation".
American business has been somewhat less vocal than the universities, but the fact remains that immigrants accounted for half the growth of the US labour
force in the last decade. In addition, US companies are finding it harder to move international staff in and out of the US for meetings and assignments;
potential business partners are discouraged from visiting to make deals and start new ventures. US business leaders say the new obstacles have cost them
Casual visitors are also important to the US economy. The travel and tourism industry, catering to US residents as well as foreign visitors, employs one of
every eight people in the US civilian labour force. Visitors spend more than Dollars 80bn (Pounds 43bn) a year on travel to the US and once there generate
extra sales and tax revenue in excess of Dollars 90bn.
The State Department has moved to expedite visas for students and scholars. But a much more focused, government-wide effort aimed at all kinds of visitors
is needed. Special procedures for "low-risk" repeat visitors should be created. The visa process needs to be streamlined and properly staffed, its costs to
applicants reduced, its technological tools upgraded and its consistency assured through clear guidelines.
Issuing visas remains the classic entry-level job for young foreign service officers—a relic of the days when it was considered a function in which one
could do little harm. The US needs a professional corps of visa officers, who can accumulate knowledge and experience.
If the steps taken are inadequate, many more potential visitors undoubtedly will decide to go elsewhere—to Australia or Canada or Europe—for leisure,
study or business. Universities in the English-speaking world, in particular, have a serious opportunity to fill the gap left by America's obstacle course.
Rather than ratcheting up fees for foreign students, they should be courting the world's best and brightest to join their science and engineering faculties
and then move on to research institutions and companies.
After the second world war America grew to world-beating prominence in part by attracting talent from all over the world to its critical nodes of
scientific research, entrepreneurship and industry. Its post-September 11 failure of nerve may be a moment of high opportunity for Europe and other
countries. The US is not the only country to have suffered at the hands of terrorists, but it seems to be uniquely intent on supplementing them with wounds
of the self-inflicted variety.
Kathleen Newland is director of the Migration Policy Institute in Washington; Adrian Fortescue, a visiting fellow at Harvard University, was director-general for justice and home affairs of the European Commission until 2003.
The expansion of the European Union this week, as well as elections to the European Parliament in June, make 2004 a crucial year for the EU. In many ways it was also supposed to be Tony Blair's year.
For many Europeans, the British prime minister was the top contender for the political leadership of Europe. The position of president of the European Union, whose creation he advocated, was meant to be his. However, the past 12 months have had a devastating impact on Britain's position in Europe. Blair's support of the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq has compromised his European ideals and ignored the views of European public opinion.
Just like Italy's Silvio Berlusconi or Australia's John Howard, Blair now faces the risk of an electoral fiasco. Many of his Labor voters still have not fully digested the implications of going along with the US "preemptive strike" against Saddam Hussein's regime. The elections to the European Parliament in June will most probably give a warning to the British leader.
As for his U-turn announcement on a possible referendum on the EU's new constitution, British and European commentators have unanimously condemned it as an opportunistic move by the prime minister in order to outplay his Conservative opponents during the upcoming electoral campaign. Fellow European politicians such as the former Irish premier John Bruton accused Blair of showing "no leadership on European issues."
From his 1997 landslide victory to the fall of 2002, Blair was the dream politician of many Europeans who saw in him the hope of their generation. In Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France, known for their conservative if not old-fashioned politicians, people were fascinated with this cosmopolitan British prime minister. He had promised to put his country at the "center of Europe" in order to end 50 years of misunderstandings between Britain and its continental neighbors.
French members of Parliament remember Blair's March 1998 pro-European speech and are still struck by the fact that he was praised by both right and center-left parties. In Germany, the ruling SPD party had had strong links with the Labor government until last year. Meanwhile, the Blair administration was filled with ambitious foreign affairs specialists open to the world, especially to Europe.
Blairites then started to play a larger role in European institutions; not only the UK Representative Office in Brussels but also European Commission directorates, and even the European Parliament's main political groups became powerful instruments of Blair's dynamic policies. In less than five years, the number of British bureaucrats increased in senior EU positions in Brussels. That was before last year's Iraqi diplomatic crisis, the most serious rift within the EU since Britain joined in 1973.
Meanwhile, Britons have become more pro-European. They have traveled more extensively across the continent and bought property. Moreover, they are encountering more and more Europeans in their own country. Whether in lifestyle, business, or the way public services are run, they realize they have a lot more in common with their continental cousins. In addition, the spread of the English language is now making them particularly comfortable with communications across Europe. It is likely that the arrival of 10 new EU members will help to unify the continent even more under a common banner.
Sadly, by splitting Europe and not calling for a British referendum on the European currency in the spring of 2003 (as originally planned), Blair has failed to recognize his countrymen's ideological and emotional proximity with continental Europe. Despite attempts to reconcile with President Jacques Chirac of France and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany on issues such as European defense and economic reforms, Blair may well have missed his chance to play a major leadership role in the new Europe.
Many pro-European British diplomats, politicians, and businessmen—not to mention pro-British Europeans—are disillusioned. In the eyes of many Europeans, Blair is now no more than an interesting politician unwilling to chose between the two sides of the Atlantic.
WASHINGTON.- "Con las crisis recurrentes que ha vivido en los últimos años, la Argentina no se ha convertido en latinoamericana. Se convirtió en sublatinoamericana."
Este concepto, duro para la estima de los argentinos, parte del profesor Jorge Domínguez, uno de los politicólogos más reconocidos de Estados Unidos sobre cuestiones de América latina, que dirige el Centro de Asuntos Internacionales Weatherhead, de la Universidad de Harvard.
Desde su oficina en el campus de Harvard, ubicado en la ciudad de Cambridge, a pocos kilómetros de Boston, Massachusetts, Domínguez dijo a LA NACION que "debería ser un objetivo optimista de la Argentina llegar a tener resultados tan buenos como Brasil, Chile o México".
"Si se hubieran latinoamericanizado a lo Brasil, Chile o México, las cosas no estarían tan mal", sostuvo el politicólogo respecto de la idea de que, después de las crisis económicas, la Argentina comenzó a parecerse más a los países de América latina que a Europa, como buena parte de la dirigencia argentina repitió por décadas.
"Lo triste del caso argentino es que es peor. El país puede ser comparado con los de la región andina, como Bolivia y Ecuador, que han tenido una experiencia similar a la argentina", dijo el profesor de Harvard.
Domínguez, ciudadano norteamericano de origen cubano, considera que el gobierno del presidente George W. Bush desatendió los problemas de América latina. "La prioridad de Bush para la defensa de los regímenes democráticos y constitucionales en el continente ha sido débil", dijo. Y cuestionó el apoyo norteamericano al derrocamiento de Jean-Bertrand Aristide, en Haití, este año, y la fallida promoción del golpe en Venezuela, en 2002.
"Los últimos dos o tres años han sido un período muy difícil, prácticamente, en todo el continente. Sin embargo, no veo la situación como para llegar a un nivel de pánico, que a veces cunde en discusiones sobre el tema", señaló.
En una radiografía de la región, Domínguez dijo que en Brasil "el proceso electoral introdujo una innovación en América latina, que fue el hecho de que hubo, antes de las elecciones, una negociación entre el FMI y la oposición. El primer caso de ese tipo de negociación ocurrió en Corea del Sur, después de la crisis financiera en 1997. En Brasil tuvo un par de consecuencias importantes. La primera fue la consagración de Lula, porque le ayudó a quitarle su única carta al candidato oficialista, José Serra. De pronto, Lula podía ser elegido con el respaldo del FMI", expresó Domínguez.
"La segunda consecuencia es que en el gobierno de Lula se ha venido cumpliendo el acuerdo con el FMI, que ha tenido dimensiones muy positivas. Por ejemplo, la reforma del sistema de jubilación. Es una especie de matrimonio entre el saneamiento de las cuentas fiscales y la posibilidad de desarrollar un programa de un presidente socialdemócrata", añadió.
Entonces, surge de inmediato la pregunta sobre la Argentina. "En el caso argentino, en el que parecía que todo salía mal, hay cosas que dentro de un contexto terrible no salieron tan mal. No hubo un golpe de Estado. Por la experiencia argentina, no era algo descartable, ya que, en circunstancias parecidas, hace rato que hubieran venido ocurriendo múltiples golpes de Estado. Cuando la frase que pedía «que se vayan todos» calaba en la opinión pública, los únicos que se fueron fueron los radicales, aunque hay un proceso de reconstrucción del Partido Justicialista que no ha terminado, porque el justicialismo siempre se está reconstruyendo. No es posible gobernar sin partidos políticos. Me sorprendería mucho que no se produjera la reconstrucción del radicalismo, ya sea con la forma de la vieja UCR o bajo alguna otra que le permita hacer su tarea opositora de una forma más efectiva."
-¿Cómo hace América latina para salir de estos períodos de estabilidad e inestabilidad, que parecen ser cíclicos?
-Donde, lamentablemente, los ciclos se observan más es en la Argentina. En el caso brasileño, veo que hay un paso al frente. Que el principal candidato de la oposición de izquierda, que había sido derrotado en consecutivas elecciones, de pronto gane y adopte políticas eficaces, tanto en términos económicos como sociales, no es repetir un ciclo: es un paso adelante. En Perú, si bien son lamentables algunos aspectos del comportamiento personal de Toledo, hay pasos institucionales importantes, como la reforma del Poder Judicial, el restablecimiento del poder civil contra la prepotencia de las fuerzas armadas, el crecimiento de la economía, la contención de los niveles de violencia… No veo esto como un ciclo. La expresión cíclica sí les pega a la Argentina y a Bolivia, dos casos en los que se dan estas circunstancias trágicas, y también Ecuador. En los casos de la Argentina y de Bolivia es algo particularmente lamentable, porque si hubiéramos tenido esta conversación hace diez años ambos hubiéramos pensado que por fin esos países habían salido de esos ciclos.
-En el caso argentino, ¿cuál es la raíz de estas repeticiones? ¿Es económica, es un problema de la dirigencia política?
-Lo que voy a decir parecerá, a lo mejor, una gran tontería, aunque no creo que sea así. Parte de lo que ocurre en la Argentina, aunque no es todo, es producto de la mala suerte. Y mala suerte quiere decir algo relativamente preciso: la coincidencia de una serie de factores, no vinculados entre sí, pero que ocurrieron en un mismo instante histórico. La Argentina ejecutó una reforma en su sistema de jubilaciones, con un costo importante, como ocurre en cualquier país del mundo que lo hace. Esto coincide, y no es más que una triste coincidencia, con un retraimiento de la financiación internacional, porque los inversores prefirieron poner sus ahorros en la Bolsa de Nueva York y no en los países en vías de desarrollo, tras la crisis asiática de 1997 y de la rusa de 1998. Otro aspecto coincidente, que no tiene que ver con lo primero, pero sí con lo segundo, es la crisis brasileña de enero de 1999, que azota a la Argentina. Otro factor, analíticamente independiente de los demás, es el aumento del gasto fiscal en las provincias y en el nivel nacional, que tuvo un elemento político, que fue el intento del presidente Menem de buscar otra reelección. Si hubiera ocurrido uno solo de estos distintos elementos coincidentes en el tiempo, no creo que la crisis argentina hubiese sido tan grave. La coincidencia de estos factores, independientes uno de otro, desembocó en una catástrofe.
-El presidente Néstor Kirchner planteó que América latina necesita un Plan Marshall. ¿Es posible o es sólo una quimera?
-No creo que vaya a haber un Plan Marshall. Tampoco creo que sea una retórica presidencial inútil, porque es un buen llamado de atención. Lo que, sin duda, ni la Argentina ni el resto del continente requiere es lo que se podría llamar el Plan O’Neill, que fue otro de los elementos coincidentes y lamentables de la reciente experiencia argentina. Le tocó un secretario del Tesoro de los Estados Unidos que, aun en sus declaraciones públicas, innecesarias, socavó cualquier tipo de medida internacional adoptada por la Argentina en aquel momento. Esto sigue siendo insólito para mí. No porque fuera incorrecto, contrario a los hechos observables de la Argentina en los diez años anteriores, sino porque no parecían servir a ningún propósito de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos. No es menos cierto, por otra parte, que O’Neill era ministro del presidente norteamericano y, por lo tanto, lo suyo sí tuvo un costo real para la Argentina.
-¿Esto no es, entonces, el cambio en el paradigma frente a la asistencia de los países en crisis financieras, del que habla el ministro de Economía, Roberto Lavagna? ¿Era sólo el pensamiento de O’Neill o era una estrategia del gobierno de Bush?
-Me sentiría feliz si pudiera afirmar que hay una estrategia del gobierno de Bush con relación a estos temas en América latina. No creo que haya una estrategia; sí una falta de atención. Bush es un presidente, lógicamente, distraído: una guerra en Irak que no se termina; una elección presidencial que parece ser muy reñida. Creo, y en esto Lavagna tiene razón, que ha ocurrido un cambio de política de Bush con relación a la política tradicional de Estados Unidos, no solamente bajo el mandato de Clinton, sino del padre del actual presidente, George Bush, y, en algunos aspectos, en la segunda presidencia de Ronald Reagan. La segunda presidencia de Reagan tuvo el Plan Baker, para intentar resolver algunos problemas de financiación en América latina y la presidencia del primer Bush arrancó con lo que se llamó el Plan Brady. Si comparamos a Brady con O’Neill, estamos frente a las dos caras de la luna. El primero asumía que, en efecto, la crisis financiera latinoamericana es real, que no puede resolverse sólo pidiéndoles a los países que hagan mayores esfuerzos, sino que parte de la solución debe ser compartida. Ese fue el Plan Brady. Y esto no lo hemos escuchado recientemente.
-¿Qué otras diferencias hay?
-La defensa de la democracia, que fue un elemento importante en la segunda presidencia de Reagan—no en la primera—, en la de Bush padre y en la de Clinton. Limitémonos a los dos Bush y tomemos un político que no es de mi agrado: Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Cuando fue derrocado, en 1991, por un golpe militar en Haití, Bush padre condenó el golpe militar, aplicó las normas de la OEA, impuso sanciones económicas a los golpistas y le dio asilo a Aristide. La actual presidencia de Bush públicamente le dijo a Aristide que se vaya. El apoyo a la democracia bajo la presidencia de Bush padre también se vio con el autogolpe de Alberto Fujimori en Perú. Le dijo que no estaba a favor de esas maniobras y Fujimori tuvo que dar marcha atrás e, inclusive, garantizar el proceso electoral futuro. Esta vez, lo menos que se puede decir con el intento de golpe de 2002 para derrocar al presidente Hugo Chávez es que el gobierno de Bush fue incompetente. Otro caso: la renuncia obligada de Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, en Bolivia. Un presidente sudamericano más cercano a los criterios políticos y económicos del actual gobierno de Estados Unidos sería difícil de encontrar. Lo único que Sánchez de Lozada requería era un poco de ayuda financiera y lo que le dieron fueron migajas.
-Es decir que la presidencia de Bush desatiende a América latina y cuando se mete genera problemas…
-Así es. Y la comparación la hacemos con su padre. Si comparamos a Bush uno con Bush dos y observamos el comportamiento frente a la deuda latinoamericana, el apoyo a la democracia, ¡caray!, son dos presidencias muy distintas, a pesar de que muchos de sus integrantes sean los mismos. Uno puede ir repasando los hechos y se da cuenta de que las reglas han cambiado.
-Frente a este esquema, ¿cuál es el futuro que ve en la relación de América latina con Estados Unidos, gane Bush o gane el demócrata John Kerry en noviembre?
-No veo raíces institucionales o políticas para imaginar que una segunda presidencia del actual mandatario sería distinta de la actual. La guerra en Irak tendría otros matices, pero seguiría ocupando buena parte de las prioridades de este presidente. La amenaza terrorista no está por terminar.
-¿Qué cambiaría con un presidente demócrata?
-No supongo que los cambios serían dramáticos. Kerry parece más propenso a acudir a los organismos multilaterales, buscar consensos, la construcción de coaliciones y de ser fiel a sus amigos internacionales. Kerry no ha sido un político que haya dedicado mucha atención a los aspectos financieros internacionales, como el tema de la deuda. De manera que sobre ese tema en particular no estoy muy seguro de que cambie considerablemente, pero tampoco me sorprendería si hubiera un intento de retorno a lo que fue la política de Clinton, del primer Bush y de la última parte del mandato de Reagan. Tendría cierta sensatez decir que ésa es una manera de hacer las cosas mejor de lo que ha ocurrido en los últimos tres años. Sobre la defensa de los regímenes constitucionales, Kerry criticó el comportamiento del gobierno de Bush con relación al derrocamiento de Aristide, no por la defensa de él sino por la decisión de tumbar un régimen democrático.
-Kirchner y Lula han hecho un llamado para que haya cambios en los parámetros de la discusión de los organismos internacionales con los países de América latina. ¿Tiene futuro o es sólo un llamado de atención?
-Parte de lo que se observó en la relación entre el Fondo y Lula, cuando era el candidato de la oposición, sugiere la posibilidad de que el FMI en particular y otros organismos en general estarían dispuestos a discutir diversos aspectos de la relación entre las instituciones financieras internacionales y los países en vías de desarrollo. No creo, sin embargo, que se trate de cambios dramáticos, pero sí de sentarse a discutir sobre temas concretos. La señal más importante fue la negociación del FMI con la oposición brasileña antes de las elecciones.
The idea that the periphery suffered de-industrialization during the first global century before
1914 has a long pedigree, and every country writes its own independent history of that shared event.
While that literature is immense, it has three shortcomings that are serious enough to invite this new
attack on an old question. The first shortcoming is that the de-industrialization literature rarely makes a comparative
statement. The second shortcoming of the de-industrialization literature is that when it is quantitative, it
relies almost entirely on output and employment evidence, while it rarely exploits price and wage data. The third shortcoming of the de-industrialization literature is that it assumes that deindustrialization
causes underdevelopment while industrialization causes development, rather than
offering any evidence confirming the connection. What follows here is only a report on work in progress. There is much more left to be done.
What determines tariff policy? It can’t be conventional economics, since every mainstream
economist agrees that free trade is a good thing (Smith 1776; Mill 1909; Bhagwati 2000). Yet, the politics
of free trade have been surrounded by controversy ever since Alexander Hamilton tried shoving his
protectionist policies down the throats of a new United States congress after 1789, and since Robert Peel
ruined his political career by shoving free trade down the throats of the British Parliament in 1846.
Political leaders have never been solely, or even largely, interested in maximizing national income, let
alone maximizing world income. Rather, their main goal has always been “to get a larger slice [of the pie]
for their supporters” (McGillivray et al. 2001: p. 2). Protection and free trade have always been for sale in
the political market place (Grossman and Helpman 1994), but having said so doesn’t make the question—what determines tariff policy?—any easier to answer. After all, nations will adopt different tariff policies
to the extent that there are different economic interests lobbying for those policies, to the extent that the
economic environment impacting on those interests is different, and to the extent that different political
institutions dictate which economic interests have the most votes.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel is seeking US support for his government's planned unilateral steps to address the current Israeli-Palestinian crisis, including the construction of a barrier around and within the West Bank and the removal of Israeli settlements and troops from the Gaza Strip. Such unilateral steps would have disastrous consequences.
They would divide the West Bank into disconnected, fenced-off enclaves and further erode the Palestinian economy and quality of life. They would make Gaza ungovernable and probably put it under the control of Islamic extremists. They would make it impossible to form a viable Palestinian state and to resolve the deadly conflict between the two peoples.
The US administration should strongly discourage these unilateral steps and promote a return to serious negotiation of a comprehensive, final agreement between the parties. Negotiations are the only way to develop a formula for ending the conflict that meets the basic needs of both parties, that engenders their commitment, and that is conducive to stable peace, mutually enhancing cooperation, and ultimate reconciliation between the two societies.
Sharon's argument in favor of unilateral steps is that there is no partner for peace on the other side. This view has been widely shared within the Israeli public since the breakdown of the Camp David talks in 2000 and the onset of the second intifada. Indeed, this view is mirrored on the Palestinian side, where there is an equally strong belief that there is no Israeli partner for a solution that would establish an independent, viable Palestinian state.
These mirror images are dangerous because they justify acts of violence and unilateral steps that create self-fulfilling prophecies: The belief or claim that there is no negotiating partner on the other side—that the only language “they” understand is force—leads to actions that destroy the possibility of negotiations. There is ample evidence that these images are not only dangerous, but unwarranted.
Public opinion data on both sides continue to show majorities in favor of negotiations and of a compromise based on a two-state solution (while believing that the other side is not ready for such a compromise). Furthermore, in recent months, politically influential Israelis and Palestinians have issued joint proposals for resolving the conflict on the basis of a mutually acceptable two-state formula.
The most elaborate of these proposals is the Geneva accord, developed under the leadership of Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo, Cabinet members and leading negotiators of the Israeli and Palestinian governments, respectively. The Geneva initiative represents a particularly significant contribution to the peace process.
Given the character, background, and experience of the prime movers of this initiative and of the people who joined them in the effort, it suggests very strongly that there is a credible negotiating partner on each side. Given the specific and detailed agreements it achieved on many of the most contentious issues in the conflict, it suggests very strongly that there is a mutually acceptable formula for a two-state solution that can be successfully negotiated.
The Geneva accord itself is not a negotiated agreement in any formal sense of the term, but it is a first-class simulation of such an agreement. As such, it offers a powerful demonstration that a mutually acceptable agreement can be negotiated. It does not substitute for official negotiations, but it provides an impetus for renewed negotiations, by highlighting the principles on which an agreement must and can be based.
Moreover, it should help speed up the negotiation process because it offers concrete ideas for dealing with many of the difficult practical and political issues that a final agreement would have to encompass. Above all, it breaks through the pervasive pessimism, mistrust, and despair that have hampered return to the negotiating table.
The Geneva initiative has already gained considerable support around the world, including the United States. The possibilities for successful negotiations that it demonstrates can serve as an effective counterweight to Sharon's argument that he has no partner for peace and hence no alternative to the unilateral use of force.
But gaining American and international support is only part of the problem faced by the architects and promoters of the Geneva initiative. The critical challenge they confront is to garner public support for the principles and terms of the accord within their own societies. The compromises envisaged by the Geneva accord entail high costs for the two peoples.
In particular, there is strong resistance to provisions requiring them to relinquish claims heavily laden with emotion and symbolic meaning and central to their national identities and associated narratives—such as those touching on the right of return of Palestinian refugees or sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem. Even among the majorities in each public who support compromise to achieve a two-state solution, there is great reluctance to bear these costs in the face of profound distrust in the other side's willingness or ability to reciprocate and to conclude a genuine, acceptable agreement.
These concerns are exacerbated by a structural problem in the way proponents of the Geneva accord present it to their respective publics. For understandable reasons, they may emphasize to their own constituencies how favorable the accord is to their own interests and how much the other side has conceded.
What may encourage their own public, however, may well discourage the public on the other side—who inevitably also hear these messages—and may reinforce the prevailing distrust. For example, when Palestinians hear Israelis stress that Palestinians have in effect given up the right of return, and Israelis hear Palestinians deny that this is the case, both may come to feel that the accord is a bad deal or that it is sufficiently ambiguous to allow the other side to exploit it to their own side's disadvantage.
There is a need, therefore, for common messages, jointly constructed by thoughtful and credible representatives of both sides, and brought to both populations. Joint construction is essential to ensure that proponents of the Geneva initiative avoid working at cross-purposes as they seek to mobilize their own constituencies—to ensure that their messages are responsive to the concerns and sensitivities of each side without unduly threatening the other side.
Furthermore, to build on the enormous achievement represented by the Geneva accord, its provisions must be communicated in a way that captures the publics' imagination and generates trust and hope. The two publics must be persuaded that a solution along the lines envisioned in the Geneva accord is not only necessary, but that it is possible, that it is safe, that it is fair, and that it promises a better future.
To this end, the Geneva initiative—as inserted into the public debate—should be framed in terms of a principled peace that represents, not just the best available deal, but a historic compromise, which meets the basic needs of both societies, validates the national identity of each people, and conforms to the requirements of attainable justice.
I envisage three central elements to a jointly constructed framework for a principled peace:
Acknowledgment of the other's nationhood and humanity, through explicit recognition of each people's right to national self-determination in a state of its own, acceptance of each other's authentic links to the land, and rejection of language that denies the other people's political legitimacy and historical authenticity; and through words and actions demonstrating that the other side's lives, welfare, and dignity are considered to be as valuable as one's own.
Affirmation of the meaning and logic of a historic compromise, by framing the agreement as a commitment to end the conflict and share the land both sides claim through the establishment and peaceful coexistence of two states, in which the two peoples can fulfill their respective rights to national self-determination, give political expression to their national identities, and pursue independent, secure, and prosperous national lives; and by clearly spelling out the implications of such a commitment in terms of both the costs that the logic of the historic compromise imposes on each side, and the benefits provided by a principled peace.
Creating a positive vision of a common future, by framing the agreement as an opportunity for the two peoples to build a common life in the land they share and to which they both have emotional attachments, rather than as an arrangement being forced on them by outside pressure and the unending cycle of violence.
Consistent with the high degree of interdependence between the two societies, the agreement should be presented to both publics as the foundation of a future relationship based on mutually beneficial cooperation in many spheres, conducive to stable peace, sustainable development, and ultimate reconciliation.
Globalization today is as much a problem for international harmony as it is a necessary condition of living together on our planet. Increasing interconnectedness in ecology, economy, technology, and politics has brought nations and societies into ever closer contact, creating acute demands for cooperation. Earthly Politics argues that in the coming decades global governance will have to accommodate differences, even as it obliterates distance, and will have to respect many aspects of the local while developing institutions that transcend localism.
This book analyzes a variety of approaches to environmental governance approaches that balance the local and the global in order to encourage new, more flexible frameworks of global governance. On the theoretical level, it draws on insights from the field of science and technology studies to enrich our understanding of environmental and development politics. On the pragmatic level, it discusses the design of institutions and processes to address problems of environmental governance that increasingly refuse to remain within national boundaries.
The cases in the book display the crucial relationship between knowledge and power—the links between the ways we understand environmental problems and the ways we manage them—and illustrate the different paths by which knowledge-power formations are arrived at, contested, defended, or set aside. By examining how local and global actors ranging from the World Bank to the Makah tribe in the Pacific Northwest respond to the contradictions of globalization, the authors identify some of the conditions for creating more effective engagement between the global and the local in environmental governance.
El libro intenta rastrear una genealogía de la violencia en siete comunidades ayacuchanas con trayectorias distintas durante el conflicto armado interno. Propone una psicología social de la violencia política y la reconciliación, a partir de un acercamiento etnográfico y hermenéutico. Intenta ir más allá de la filosofía trascendente de la verdad, la justicia y la reconciliación, para examinar la vida social de estos conceptos tal y como son puestos en práctica en las comunidades campesinas ayacuchanas, cuyas prácticas culturales e iniciativas locales ofrecen un ejemplo de reconstrucción de la sociedad y de la sociabilidad, familia por familia y comunidad por comunidad.
In the past twenty years, the field of science and technology studies (S&TS) has made considerable progress toward illuminating the relationship between scientific knowledge and political power. These insights have not yet been synthesized or presented in a form that systematically highlights the connections between S&TS and other social sciences. This timely collection of essays by some of the leading scholars in the field attempts to fill that gap. The book develops the theme of "co-production", showing how scientific knowledge both embeds and is embedded in social identities, institutions, representations and discourses. Accordingly, the authors argue, ways of knowing the world are inseparably linked to the ways in which people seek to organize and control it. Through studies of emerging knowledges, research practices and political institutions, the authors demonstrate that the idiom of co-production importantly extends the vocabulary of the traditional social sciences, offering fresh analytic perspectives on the nexus of science, power and culture.
From Kosovo to Kabul, the last decade witnessed growing interest in "electoral engineering". Reformers have sought to achieve either greater government accountability through majoritarian arrangements or wider parliamentary diversity through proportional formula. Underlying the normative debates are important claims about the impact and consequences of electoral reform for political representation and voting behavior. This study compares and evaluates two broad schools of thought, each offering contrasting expectations. One popular approach claims that formal rules define the electoral incentives facing parties, politicians, and citizens. By changing the rules, rational choice institutionalism claims that we have the capacity to shape political behavior among politicians and citizens. Reformers believe that electoral engineering can solve multiple social problems, whether by mitigating ethnic conflict, strengthening voter-party bonds, generating democratic accountability, or boosting women?s representation. Alternative cultural modernization theories differ in their emphasis on the primary motors driving human behavior, their expectations about the pace of change, and also their assumptions about the ability of formal institutional rules to alter, rather than adapt to, deeply embedded and habitual social norms and patterns of human behavior.
To consider these issues, this book compares the consequences of electoral rules and cultural modernization for many dimensions of political representation and voting behavior, including patterns of party competition, the strength of social cleavages and party loyalties, levels of turnout, the gender and ethnic diversity of parliaments, and the provision of constituency service. Systematic evidence is drawn the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems based on surveys of parliamentary and presidential contests held in over thirty countries. The study covers elections held from 1996 to 2002 in newer and established democracies ranging from the United States, Australia and Switzerland to Peru, Taiwan and Ukraine. The book concludes that formal rules do matter, with the social cleavages and partisan identities of voters, and the diversity and behavior of elected representatives, shaped by the incentives generated by majoritarian, combined, and proportional electoral systems.
This book offers a most up-to-date account of the changes in women's, children's, and minority rights in Japan in the past decade. Since the late 1990s, several legal and political changes took place in Japan including the revision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, the legalization of the pill, the first Basic Law on Gender Equality, the Child Prostitution and Pornography Prohibition Law, the Child Abuse Prevention Law, the Anti-Stalking Law, the Law to Promote Human Rights Education, and finally the Domestic Violence Prevention Law. Predominant conceptions of the Japanese state, focusing on bureaucratic dominance, party politics, and interest groups, fail to explain these extensive changes.
This study ties the global to the local and examines how Japanese nongovernmental networks have been able to effect change through issue reframing, advocacy education, and leverage politics. This book situates the Japanese state in a larger international community and looks at the impact of global human rights norms on civil society development. Few international norm studies are precise on the actual mechanisms of diffusion on the ground. This book analyzes the impact of discourses from four world conferences in the 1990s, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and the 1996 First World Congress Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Stockholm on the redefinition of five issues of sexuality in Japan, the pill, sexual harassment, military sexual slavery, domestic violence, and child prostitution. It further provides a contrasting case of the limited advancement of minority rights for Burakumin, Ainu, Okinawans, Koreans, and migrant workers in Japan. The absence of global frames on caste discrimination, indigenous peoples' rights, reparation for colonization and slavery, as well as migrants' rights makes leverage politics difficult despite substantial grassroots mobilization.
Through examining gender, children, and minority issues, this study discusses the tensions between universalism and cultural relativism within the human rights and feminism debates in Japan. Instead of assuming traditional Japanese culture being at odds with the individualistic and legalistic orientation of international human rights standards, this book looks at how Japanese civil society as well as state actors grapple with the rise of the individual, a new saliency of the law in solving conflicts, the emergence of horizontal networks of cooperation, and the practice of postnational citizenship.
The events of September 11, 2001, confronted the United States and the rest of the World with the reality of a new dimension of international terrorism. This new dimension did not start nor end with the attacks against the World Trade Center or the Pentagon, but began in the 1990s. This study examines the new dimension of international terrorism, contrasting it with the classical terrorism, the predominantly left-wing terrorist movements of the 1960s-1980s in Europe, which were a subset of the bipolar geo-political arena. The author establishes the relationship of radical Islamist movements to the terrorist groups of the new dimension (principally focusing on Al-Qaeda) in providing the motivation for committing catastrophic terrorist acts, looks at the shadowy world of terrorist financing and makes suggestions regarding international counter-terrorist strategies.
Seminal thinkers of the nineteenth century—Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud—all predicted that religion would gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with the emergence of industrial society. The belief that religion was dying became the conventional wisdom in the social sciences during most of the twentieth century.
During the last decade, however, the secularization thesis has experienced the most sustained challenge in its long history. Critics point to multiple indicators of religious health and vitality today, from the continued popularity of churchgoing in the United States, to the emergence of New Age spirituality in Western Europe, the surge of fundamentalist movements and Islamic parties in the Muslim world, the evangelical revival sweeping through Latin America, and the widespread ethno-religious conflicts in international affairs.
The traditional secularization thesis needs updating. Religion has not disappeared and is unlikely to do so. Nevertheless, the concept of secularization captures an important part of what is going on. This book develops a theory of secularization and existential security, building on key elements of traditional sociological theories and revising others. This book demonstrates that: (1) The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years; but (2) The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before—and they constitute a growing proportion of the world's population. Though these two propositions may seem contradictory, they are not. The fact that the first proposition is true, helps account for the second?because secularization has a surprisingly powerful negative impact on human fertility rates.
The critiques of secularization draw their evidence mainly from the United States (which happens to be a strikingly exceptional case) rather than comparing systematic evidence across a broad range of both rich and poor societies. This book draws on a massive base of new evidence generated by the four waves of the World Values Survey executed from 1981 to 2001 in eighty societies, covering all of the world's major faiths. Examining religiosity from a broader perspective and in a wider range of countries than ever before, this book demonstrates that religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those in poorer nations and in failed states, facing personal survival-threatening risks. Exposure to physical, societal and personal risks drives religiosity. Conversely, a systematic erosion of religious practices, values and beliefs has occurred among the more prosperous strata in rich nations.
Sacred and Secular is essential reading for anyone interested in comparative religion, sociology, public opinion, political behavior, political development, social psychology, international relations, and cultural change.