Publications by Type: Book Chapter

Religion is often held up as a vessel of peace, both inner and social. How, then, to understand its violent currents? Given an uneven trend over the centuries toward cultural pluralism and freedom, modern theorists optimistically concluded that religion would either decline in significance or become a pillar of universalistic culture promoting a veritable community of mankind. Thus, as a flash point for violence, religion scarcely warranted attention in the metanarratives of modernity. Yet such a reading of historical development is far too optimistic, as the events of September 11, 2001, all too vividly demonstrate.

International institutions have become an increasingly common phenomenon of international life. The proliferation of international organizations (IOs) (Shanks et al., 1996), the growth in treaty arrangements among states (Goldstein et al., 2000) and the deepening of regional integration efforts in Europe all represent formal expressions of the extent to which international politics has become more institutionalized.

The scholarship on international institutions has burgeoned in response. Moreover, in the past decade, theories devoted to understanding why institutions exist, how they have functioned and what effects they have on world politics have become increasingly refined and the methods employed in empirical work more sophisticated. The purpose of this chapter is to draw together this divergent literature, to offer observations on the development of its various theoretical strands and to examine progress on the empirical front. We predict that a broad range of theoretical traditions – realist, rational functionalist, constructivist – will exist alongside one another for many years to come, and offer some suggestions on research strategies that might contribute to a better empirical base from which to judge more abstract claims.

American scholars and policy makers concerned with legal development in the People's Republic of China share a deep faith in the value of China developing a legal profession that operates as we would like to think our own does. Indeed, this idea is so deeply ingrained that it is rarely broken out for critical examination, but instead is treated as an obvious good, the attainment of which is essentially a matter of time. Virtually all such observers seem to assume that lawyers, whether out of idealism or self–interest or some blend thereof, will prove to be a principal force leading the PRC toward the rule of law and a market economy, while some go so far as to treat the development of an indigenous legal profession as crucial to the promotion in China of a more liberal polity.

The hidden assumptions regarding the Chinese legal profession found in both US academic writing and policy papers warrant a scrutiny they have yet to receive here or abroad. Lurking not too far underneath the surface of such portrayals are further assumptions about the inexorability of convergence along a common path, remarkably (surprise) similar to our own. Unexamined, such assumptions run the risk of leaving us with an impoverished understanding not only of the role that the emerging legal profession is playing in China, but also of both the complexity of legal development there more broadly and the limits of the ideology of professionalism in law. This, in turn, may generate unwarranted expectations on our part as to the manner in which change may come in China while reinforcing the inflated sense that far too many of us in the American legal world have of our own profession's historic importance.

This essay consists of three parts. After a brief discussion of the manner in which the PRC?s legal profession has been portrayed, Part One endeavors to depict, in more balanced terms, its growth over the past twenty years and its current situation, drawing in part on a series of interviews I conducted among Chinese practitioners between 1993 and 2000, as well as more conventional research sources. Part Two then seeks to explain why scholars and policy makers, particularly in the United States, have so misunderstood the development of the Chinese legal profession, suggesting that the problem may have as much to do with their appreciation of their own legal profession as with the difficulties of comprehending China's. The final part of the paper offers further thoughts regarding the challenges that we need to confront in thinking about the place of lawyers and legal development in the PRC.

The Holocaust has been a constant presence and a pervasive influence in my life and work. In this chapter, I reflect on my personal experience in confronting the Holocaust as a social scientist – which is, of course, my particular way of confronting it as a human being. The Holocaust has had an impact – in both obvious and subtle ways – not only what I chose to study as a social scientist but also on my very choice of this profession as my lifelong career.

Gravity–based cross–sectional evidence indicates that currency unions and currency boards stimulate trade; cross–sectional evidence indicates that trade stimulates income. This paper estimates the effect that common–currency regimes have, via trade, on income per capita. We use economic and geographic data for over 200 countries to quantify the implications of common currencies for trade and income, pursuing a two–stage approach. Our estimates at the first stage suggest that belonging to a currency union more than triples trade with the other members of the zone. Moreover, there is no evidence of trade–diversion. Thus currency unions raise overall trade. Currency boards have similar effects. Our estimates at the second stage suggest that every one percent increase in trade (relative to GDP) raises income per capita by at least one third of a percent over twenty years. We combine the two estimates to quantify the effect of common currencies on output. Our results support the hypothesis that the beneficial effects of such regimes on economic performance come through the promotion of trade, rather than through a commitment to non–inflationary monetary policy, or other macroeconomic influences.

This paper explores the impact of political economy factors on exchange rate policy in Latin America. It studies the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in Latin America, placing special emphasis on political, institutional and interest group explanations. The presumption is that differences in institutional and political settings, as well as differences in economic structure, can have an effect on the choice of regime and, more generally, on exchange rate policy. In addition to these structural elements, the paper examines whether such political events as elections and changes in government affect the pattern of nominal and real exchange rates.

(Revised version of "Politics and Exchange Rates: A Cross-Country Approach for Latin America")

My colleagues’ and my work as scholar–practitioners has focused on analysis and resolution of protracted, seemingly intractable conflicts between national, ethnic, or other kinds of identity groups, best exemplified by intercommunal conflicts, such as those in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, and apartheid South Africa. My own most intensive and extensive experience, over the past quarter–century, has been with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and my analysis draws primarily on that experience.

Using the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a case in point, this chapter examines the way in which issues of national identity can exacerbate an international or intercommunal conflict and the way in which such issues can be addressed in conflict–resolution efforts. The chapter starts out with a brief history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, setting the stage for the identity issues at the heart of the conflict. It then proceeds to describe the struggle over national identity between the two people, which has led them to perceive their conflict in zero–sum terms, with respect to not only territory and resources but also national identity and national existence. Next, it argues that long–term resolution of this and similar deep–rooted conflicts requires changes in the groups’ national identities, such that affirmation of one groups’ identity is no longer predicated on negation of the other’s identity. Such identity changes are possible as long as they leave the core of each group’s national identity intact. Furthermore, the chapter proceeds to argue, such changes need to be and can be "negotiated" between the two groups. One venue for negotiating identity, described in the next section, is provided by the problem–solving workshops between Israeli and Palestinian elites that my colleagues and I have convened for many years. Finally, the paper concludes with an illustration of the possibilities and limits of the negotiation of identity, based on a joint Israeli–Palestinian exploration of the problem of Palestinian refugees.

Social protection does not always mean "politics against markets." In this chapter we argue, as did Polanyi (1994), that social protection rescues the market from itself by preventing market failures. More specifically, we contend that social protection aids the market by helping economic actors overcome market failures in skill formation. We show, in this chapter, that different types of social protection are complementary to different skill equilibria.

This chapter examines the role of international legal approaches to the settlement of territorial disputes. What are the conditions that make resort to negotiations inadequate for the settlement of a territorial dispute? Why do governments make legal commitments that bind their future behavior with respect to how a territorial agreement is to be resolved? That is, what conditions make a formal legal commitment to arbitrate a dispute an attractive alternative? And, finally, why do states sometimes actually go through with such commitments to submit to third–party review of their territorial claims?
Motivating this study is the question of the role that international quasi–judicial processes can play in the resolution of territorial disputes among states. Previous research suggests that international law may play an important role in reducing the incidence of territorial disputes. Paul Huth (1996), for example, has found that clear legal agreements reduce the probability that a dispute will arise in the first place. By his estimate, some 142 border agreements were concluded between 1816 and 1990, and 126 of these were still in force and honored by both states in 1995 (Huth 1996, 92; see also Kocs 1995). If supranational authoritative rulings contribute to such agreements, then there are good reasons to expect them to make a positive contribution to settling the dispute peacefully.

In this chapter, I examine the process of reconciliation within the framework of interactive problem solving, an approach to conflict resolution anchored in social–psychological principles. Interactive problem solving is a form of unofficial diplomacy, derived from the work of John Burton and epitomized by the microprocess of problem–solving workshops. These workshops are unofficial, private, confidential meetings between politically influential member of conflicting parties, designed to develop new insights into their conflict and new ideas for resolving it, which can then be infused into the political process within each community. My work in this genre has focused primarily on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but the approach can be – and has been – applied to other protracted conflicts between identity groups.

During the past two decades or so, capital controls have been lifted, national capital markets have been liberalized and international capital markets have exploded among the advanced industrial economies and beyond. As major players with significant stakes in the smooth operation of international capital markets, the United States and Europe have common interests in the emergence of a regulatory framework that enhances market stability, minimizes systematic risks, and allows for the efficient operation of markets. Yet despite the growth in cross border capital movements, regulatory cooperation is at times plagued by differences in national approaches and preferences, difficulties coordinating rules where multiple regional or international organizations are involved, and regulators' reluctance to cooperate fully with foreign jurisdictions...

A single chapter cannot do justice to the range of rules and agreements that have been made among the banking and securities regulators of Europe and America over the past decade. Rather than strive for exhaustiveness, this chapter selects three issue areas that illustrate particular dynamics of rule development: capital adequacy standards for internationally active banks; anti–money laundering efforts; and international accounting standards for foreign listings on local stock exchanges. There are two key dimensions that these cases illustrate: the problem of defection (which demands stronger rules of surveillance and sanction than mere coordination problems), and the issue of the scope of agreement (systematic problems demand multilateral solutions).

Today, as in the past, Mexico's foreign policy is guided by reasons of state and shaped by the will of its presidents, but the content and style of implementation of Mexican foreign policy has changed substantially. The convergence of elite beliefs and experiences in the United States and Mexico has increased the likelihood that bilateral negotiations will be less adversarial and seek, instead, the "term" outcome. Moreover, the Mexican government's foreign policy institutions and practices have changed. Many more Ministries and agencies, including Consulates, now play a significant role in policy implementation. Mexico resorts proactively to new international institutions and procedures to cushion the new impact of the United States on Mexico and to channel the conflicts between contentious private actors from both countries. Some issues remain riddled in conflict, however, legal and illegal immigration especially. And, because the beliefs and experiences of non–elites have not converged, the political foundations for future intergovernmental conflict are also in place. Though the powerful in each country proclaim that the ideals and interests of the United States and Mexico coincide, a great many people in both countries do not believe it.