Date Published:
Oct 1, 2007
Abstract:
Models of nomination politics in the US often
find "gridlock" in equilibrium because of the super-majority
requirement in the Senate for the confo
rmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers
to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present paper we explore the
possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences
through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and con
forming the
nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules
are conditioned on the entire voting pro
file, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several
extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may
find it more productive
to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce
senators to vote for or against a given nominee.
Notes:
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