On July 1, 2012, Senegal held legislative elections to select
all 150 members of the twelfth National Assembly, the lower
chamber—and the only fully elected one—in this West African
country of approximately twelve million people. The
legislative elections followed a hotly contested presidential
election in which Abdoulaye Wade, president over the last
twelve years, sought a controversial third term and lost by a
historic margin. Wade and other leaders of his Senegalese
Democratic Party (PDS) sought a legislative majority that
would force the new president, Macky Sall, into cohabitation.Full PDF
“Ten years into its existence, the Euro is a resounding success. The single currency has become a symbol of Europe, considered by Euro-area citizens to be among the most positive results of European integration….” Barely five years after the European Commission issued this 2008 celebration of its new currency, the statement seems highly ironic. Europe is locked in a struggle for the survival of the euro—and indeed, for the prosperity of the continent and its people. German chancellor Angela Merkel does not exaggerate when she says that “the euro crisis is the greatest test Europe has faced since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957”—the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC).Across southern Europe, millions of families are living in misery, as rates of unemployment exceed 25 percent in Greece and Spain and approach 15 percent in Portugal (and, on the western periphery, in Ireland), while the salaries of teachers, nurses, and other public employees are slashed, and firms go bankrupt in unprecedented numbers. The suicide rate in Greece has doubled during the past three years. This economic stagnation is now depressing performance even in Germany, normally the engine of the European economy; gross domestic product (GDP) in the 17 Eurozone countries is forecast to contract this year.How did the Europeans get into this mess—and how are they going to get out of it? There are no obvious answers—indeed, the regional variation in the answers usually given across Europe is telling. But deeper analysis can be illuminating, not only about the euro crisis itself, but about that unique political construction that is the European Union (EU).“Rules Rule”: Putting a Theory into PracticeReading about the euro in the financial press is like watching Rashomon, that marvelous Japanese film about memory and forgetting. Many who once applauded the monetary union now condemn it. Today, everyone agrees that the institutional structure of economic and monetary union (EMU) is inadequate. Why then did the Europeans agree to it in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992?Monetary union was adopted as much for political reasons as for economic ones. The EU members were dissatisfied with the previous system that fixed their exchange rates within narrow bands—a system that provided monetary stability but required painful negotiations when current-account imbalances arose between the member states; moreover, some governments resented the dominant role played by the German Bundesbank in this process. Ironically (in retrospect), the move to EMU was in some respects an effort to escape this need for transnational negotiations about economic policy.There were also economic payoffs. Germany was to gain secure markets in neighboring countries that would no longer be able to devalue their currencies to increase the competitiveness of their goods vis-à-vis German ones, while the French imagined that the new European central bank would be more sensitive to their interests than the Bundesbank. But EMU was also conceived against the backdrop of German reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. There was never a strict quid pro quo, but the single currency was sold in France and Germany on the understanding that it would bind a newly powerful Germany to Europe. It matters for events today that EMU was ultimately a political construction, seen then as the crowning achievement of European integration.But the institutional design of EMU was highly technocratic. Authority over monetary policy was vested in a new European central bank (ECB) entirely independent of political control. Fiscal policy was to be guided by the minimalist rules of a Stability and Growth Pact that limited national deficits to 3 percent and national debt to 60 percent of GDP. There was no institutional provision for medium-term coordination of fiscal policy among countries, and the ECB was forbidden to issue debt to subsidize national governments—a capacity most national central banks have.Behind this design we can see the influence of the economic doctrines of the early 1990s. By then, the Keynesian view that growth depends on active governmental macroeconomic management had been discredited by the stagflation of the 1970s. A new “rational-expectations” economic orthodoxy specified that monetary policy has few effects on the real economy and fiscal policy is generally ineffective. Thus, monetary policy should be rule-based and targeted only on inflation, while growth was said to depend, not on the management of demand, but on structural reforms to the supply side of the economy—based on changes to regulations and tax rates designed to increase competition in markets for goods and labor. “Rules rule” ran the graffiti in the City of London at the time, and that is what EMU provided.The Theory DerailedWhat went wrong? The conventional answer, popular in northern Europe, is that the southern Europeans and Irish broke the fiscal rules of EMU. There is some truth to this. The crisis was sparked in December 2009 by a new Greek government’s revelation that its budget deficit was more than twice as large as previously reported. Because Greek national debt was already at 113 percent of GDP, these new figures sparked a crisis of confidence in the international bond markets that soon spread beyond Greece, raising the cost of borrowing for the Irish, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian governments (the other Eurozone members perceived to have weak economies or national balance sheets). After torturous negotiations, the member states of the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered long-term loans to bail out the Greek, Irish, and Portuguese governments, while the ECB pumped funds into their banking systems to assure their liquidity.If only these states had not violated the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact, so this narrative goes, there would have been no crisis. But that is only half of the story. Clinging to the illusion that monetary union had freed them from the need for serious negotiations about differing national budgets, the European governments were reluctant to enforce the terms of the pact—especially because the first countries to violate it were Germany and France. (Even on the brink of the crisis, Spain remained well within its terms.)Moreover, much of the lending that fueled the crisis had gone not to spendthrift governments, but rather to the private sector. The euro crisis is really Europe’s version of the global debt crisis (as the collapse of the housing market was in the United States). There was plenty of “irrational exuberance” to go around. During the past decade, for instance, Spain built more houses than Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined, and the Irish banks so inflated their balance sheets that rescuing them in 2010 briefly swelled the Irish budget deficit to 32 percent of GDP. In such instances, the lenders as well as the borrowers are to blame. With the advent of the single currency, international financiers treated all the member states as safe markets and flooded them with cheap money. Was it entirely unwise for firms and governments to take advantage of those funds to fuel their growth? Perhaps—but as we know in this country, they were not alone.Among those most eager to lend to the periphery were the financial institutions of northern Europe, which by the end of 2009 held more than €2 trillion in Irish and southern European debt. Thus, the crisis of confidence that occurred in 2010 was really a crisis for the European financial system as a whole. When they bailed out Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, the northern Europeans were also bailing out their own banks—although it was more politically expedient to blame the problems on southern governments.Those seeking deeper causes for the crisis often fasten on the rising imbalances in payments across Europe, as Germany built up large current account surpluses and the peripheral member states deficits. The southern Europeans were buying more from northern Europe than they sold there, and financing those purchases with loans from the north. Behind these imbalances was a growing gap in unit labor costs, a conventional measure of national competitiveness, as wages in southern Europe rose faster than those in much of the north. On this basis, many claim that southern Europeans used the first decade of the euro to live beyond their means without taking enough steps to keep their economies competitive.Asymmetrical EconomiesTaken literally, this is incontrovertible, but the reality is more complicated. What governments and firms can do is conditioned by the organization of the political economy. That is based on institutions that develop over long periods of time and cannot be changed overnight. The EMU joined together several different varieties of capitalism, each of which pursues economic growth in a different way. To simplify slightly, we can distinguish between northern and southern European economic models.Germany’s coordinated market economy exemplifies the northern model. That nation can hold down labor costs because its industrial-relations institutions encourage firms and unions to coordinate on modest wage increases. Its highly collaborative vocational training system, operated by strong employer associations and trade unions, provides firms with skilled labor that gives them comparative advantages in producing high-value-added goods and capacities for continuous innovation—enabling German enterprises to compete globally on quality as well as price. An economy organized in this way is ideally suited to mount the kind of export-led growth strategies that lead to success inside a monetary union.By contrast, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy entered EMU with political economies not well-suited to this type of growth strategy. They have fractious labor movements divided into competing confederations, and weak employer associations. As a result, they lack the capacities for collaborative skill formation and wage coordination central to northern European economic strategies. Instead, their governments have tended to rely on demand-led growth, in which governments increase spending to encourage domestic consumption and then use periodic depreciations of the exchange rate to offset the inflationary effects of this strategy on the competitiveness of their products. Depreciation lowers the price of a country’s exports in foreign markets and raises the price of imports that compete with domestically produced goods.For these countries, entry into monetary union offered as many handicaps as advantages. By expanding education and initiating structural reforms to make labor and product markets more flexible, they could improve the competitiveness of their firms—and to varying degrees, all southern European governments undertook some such reforms. But in the face of strong producer groups defending vested interests, these reform processes are bound to be protracted. In the meantime, unable to operate export-led growth strategies, these countries continued to pursue growth led by domestic demand—but in a context where they could no longer offset its inflationary effects on the competitiveness of their products: they could no longer devalue their national currencies. The result was ballooning current-account deficits.At the root of the euro crisis, therefore, is an institutional asymmetry built into EMU from its inception. The northern Europeans entered monetary union with institutional frameworks well-suited to the export-led growth strategies that yield success in such contexts, whereas the southern Europeans entered with ill-suited frameworks—and lost the capacity to devalue on which some had relied. These issues escaped notice when EMU was designed (because it was widely assumed that the member economies would converge on a single set of best practices), and they are still ignored by those who think that the solution to the current crisis is for the southern European economies simply to become just like those in the north.Is There a Euro Future?So where does this leave the euro today? Can it survive continuing pressure in the international bond markets? What does the response to the crisis tell us about the European Union itself?The problems are certainly daunting, because the euro crisis is actually three crises in one: a crisis of confidence in the bond markets, a debt crisis in the European financial system, and a growth crisis for the continent as a whole.The crisis of confidence is reflected in the reluctance of international investors to purchase sovereign debt in parts of Europe, raising the cost of borrowing for some countries and firms to unsustainable levels. Although confidence could fall again at any moment, this crisis is abating. The ECB’s announcement last September that it was prepared to purchase unlimited amounts of sovereign debt from countries that met conditions imposed by the European Stability Mechanism (the Euro-area bailout fund) had a calming effect on the markets. With this step, Mario Draghi, the Italian president of the bank, was deftly skirting the rules of EMU to offer something close to a guarantee for these countries’ bonds.The underlying debt crisis, however, remains unresolved. A debt crisis arises when existing levels of debt are too high to be fully repaid. The key to resolving it is determining who will pay what—and who will not get paid. Economists often argue that such steps will be less painful if taken quickly. Aside from some restructuring of sovereign debt in Greece, and of bank debt in Spain and Ireland, however, the member states of the European Union have largely put off such decisions. At the outset of the crisis, this posture may have saved their financial system from even bigger problems, but the day of reckoning cannot be postponed forever.The ground has been laid for a resolution of this problem through a series of steps that put much of the questionable debt into the hands of national governments, the ECB, and European rescue funds. This suggests that some of the debt may be forgiven, with the public sector footing the bill. But negotiations about which governments will pay, and whether the ECB will pay as well, are bound to be painful. Not much will likely get done until after the German elections this fall, but governments will then be seeking solutions that obscure the precise distribution of costs and benefits, as they did in February when Ireland’s promissory notes were replaced by long-term bonds.From an electoral perspective, obscuring those costs is important because the initial response to the crisis by the northern European governments has made their long-term task more difficult. Instead of presenting the crisis as an existential dilemma for Europe, northern politicians reacted as if it were entirely attributable to the fiscal fecklessness of southern European governments. The media soon translated that into crude stereotypes about “lazy Greeks” that have evoked similar images in the south of “jackbooted Germans,” thereby eroding the pan-European solidarity the EU worked for so long to cultivate. The resulting ill will has made the problem of mobilizing political consent for any adjustment strategy more difficult.Unfortunately, there is no solution in sight for the growth crisis afflicting Europe. Its effects have been worst on the periphery. During the past five years, GDP has fallen by more than 20 percent in Greece and nearly 7 percent in Spain, Ireland, and Italy. Because 40 percent of German exports, and 60 percent of French ones, go to the Eurozone, continental growth is now depressed as well, and the ECB forecasts that GDP will grow by only 1 percent in the Eurozone next year. In response, the European Union claims it has a growth strategy based on two pillars: a fiscal compact that will commit most of the member states to balanced budgets, and a program of structural reform that will intensify competition in markets for products and labor. But neither step is of any real value in the short term. As the IMF recently confirmed, fiscal austerity is making the problems of the south worse: in some countries, budgetary cutbacks designed to reduce the share of the public deficit in GDP are depressing output so much that the debt share is in fact increasing. And even though structural reform can make some economies more efficient in the long term, the hope that it will regenerate growth in the near to medium term is a mirage. Sophisticated European policymakers know this, but because they have to have a growth strategy, in the absence of any agreement on an alternative, they keep repeating this mantra.Is there an alternative? In the immediate future, coordinated fiscal reflation, which would see austerity relaxed in the south and government spending increase in the north, would help. But because that could entail fiscal transfers from north to south, it is hard to sell to electorates, and northern governments fear that if they loosen their fiscal demands on the south, the reform process there will stop. Only when electorates across Europe realize that they are all in the same boat will they take turns rowing together. But the question is whether they will realize that before experiencing the kind of prolonged stagnation seen in Japan during the 1990s.The longer-term issues in the south are even more intractable. Most of the northern European countries have viable growth models, and Ireland can likely grow again as a low-tax site for multinationals in Europe. But it is unclear whether Spain, Portugal, and Greece can continue to prosper inside the single currency. They do not yet have a strong institutional base for high-value-added production, and their low-wage sectors face stiff competition from the world’s emerging economies. Monetary union is making it hard for them to pursue demand-led growth.The Political, European Union SolutionBut it would be premature to predict the monetary union will break up. For Europeans, the single currency is not simply a convenient economic arrangement. It is the symbol of an integrated Europe to which many are committed—and the EU has a history of making novel political arrangements work. This is a fundamental point often missed in dry economic analyses of the institutional requisites for monetary union. Where there is a will, the political elites of Europe have often found a way, even when it entails protracted negotiations and unwieldy compromises.The big question, therefore, is whether that will can be sustained and given effective political expression in the face of a debilitating austerity that has left southern electorates disillusioned and confused. Only with difficulty did Italy cobble together a coalition government after an election in which the third-most-popular party was led by a comedian incensed at political corruption, and the third-most-popular party in Greece is an anti-immigrant movement given to fascist tactics. It is not surprising that southern Europeans are fed up with their leaders. Many want monetary union without austerity. But that is not currently on offer from their northern neighbors or the bond markets. Even with more help from the north, it is not clear that the political systems of the south will continue to yield governments willing to take the measures that would make monetary union sustainable.Since monetary union has always been a political construction, perhaps it is fitting that its fate now turns on the political capacities of Europeans to reconstruct it. Unless national governments can mobilize electoral majorities in favor of burden-sharing, the prospects for EMU do not look auspicious. Watching them try has been a sobering and at times ugly spectacle. But, even on this side of the Atlantic, we know that democratic politics is an inefficient process, and Europe has a postwar record of reinventing itself that suggests the task is not impossible.
The contemporary standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands threatens to exacerbate Japan-China relations in the long
run. Despite their disagreement over the islands’ sovereignty, the two governments had successfully depoliticized the issue for nearly four decades
since their diplomatic normalization in 1972. The islands issue became politicized after the collision between a Chinese trawler and the Japan Coast
Guard in 2010, and has become increasingly militarized after the Japanese
government’s purchase of three of the five islands from their private owner
in 2012. China has boosted its civilian and military presence in maritime
and airspace around the islands, confronting their Japanese counterparts
regularly and raising the risk of an armed conflict which potentially involves the United States. What caused the intense politicization and increasing militarization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute? What are
the pragmatic steps which the two governments can take to depoliticize,
demilitarize, and deescalate the current situation?
Which competences enable problem solvers to successfully deal with complex real-world
challenges such as the current economic and financial crises and in so doing, inspire
innovation and sustainable development of society? Despite the importance of these
questions, and although competences have become more center stage in management
strategy, human resource development, and public policy/public administration
research, a general theory of problem solving competence has remained elusive, largely
because of insular single-disciplinary approaches. Embedded in a comprehensive review
of management strategy, human resource development, and public policy/public
administration theories, and by contrasting American and Central-European schools of
thought, I discuss the theoretical formulations of previous competence frameworks, the
empirical support for these frameworks, and their limitations in solving complex realworld
problems. I outline how constituents of competence such as abilities, knowledge,
and skills are entrenched within a multifaceted environment and influenced by the
individual’s mental model(s). Finally, I develop a five-dimensional framework of
competences needed to solve complex real-world problems, which considers both
individual and collaborative aspects. The five core dimensions of this new competence
framework are (1) personal competence; (2) professional domain competence; (3)
systemic competence; (4) creativity competence; and (5) sociocultural (collaborative)
competence. This paper is aimed at fostering further theory development and stimulating
future research in the field of competence development.
After more than a century of assorted dictatorships and innumerable fiscal crises, the majority of Latin America's states are governed today by constitutional democratic regimes. Some analysts and scholars argue that Latin America weathered the 2008 fiscal crisis much better than the United States. How did this happen? Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter asked area specialists to examine the electoral and governance factors that shed light on this transformation and the region's prospects. They gather their findings in the fourth edition of Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. This new edition is completely updated. Part I is thematic, covering issues of media, constitutionalism, the commodities boom, and fiscal management vis-à-vis governance. Part II focuses on eight important countries in the region - Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.Already widely used in courses, Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America will continue to interest students of Latin American politics, democratization studies, and comparative politics as well as policymakers.
The Cold War seemingly ended in a decisive victory for the West. But now, Noah Feldman argues, we are entering an era of renewed global struggle: the era of Cool War. Just as the Cold War matched the planet’s reigning superpowers in a contest for geopolitical supremacy, so this new age will pit the United States against a rising China in a contest for dominance, alliances, and resources. Already visible in Asia, the conflict will extend to the Middle East (US-backed Israel versus Chinese-backed Iran), Africa, and beyond.Yet this Cool War differs fundamentally from the zero-sum showdowns of the past: The world’s major power and its leading challenger are economically interdependent to an unprecedented degree. Exports to the US account for nearly a quarter of Chinese trade, while the Chinese government holds 8 percent of America’s outstanding debt. This positive-sum interdependence has profound implications for nations, corporations, and international institutions. It makes what looked to be a classic contest between two great powers into something much more complex, contradictory, and badly in need of the shrewd and carefully reasoned analysis that Feldman provides.To understand the looming competition with China, we must understand the incentives that drive Chinese policy. Feldman offers an arresting take on that country’s secretive hierarchy, proposing that the hereditary “princelings” who reap the benefits of the complicated Chinese political system are actually in partnership with the meritocrats who keep the system full of fresh talent and the reformers who are trying to root out corruption and foster government accountability. He provides a clear-eyed analysis of the years ahead, showing how China’s rise presents opportunities as well as risks. Robust competition could make the US leaner, smarter, and more pragmatic, and could drive China to greater respect for human rights. Alternatively, disputes over trade, territory, or human rights could jeopardize the global economic equilibrium—or provoke a catastrophic “hot war” that neither country wants.The US and China may be divided by political culture and belief, but they are also bound together by mutual self-interest. Cool War makes the case for competitive cooperation as the only way forward that can preserve the peace and make winners out of both sides.
After invading Tunisia in 1881, the French installed a protectorate in which they shared power with the Tunisian ruling dynasty and, due to the dynasty’s treaties with other European powers, with some of their imperial rivals. This “indirect” form of colonization was intended to prevent the violent clashes marking France’s outright annexation of neighboring Algeria. But as Mary Dewhurst Lewis shows in Divided Rule, France’s method of governance in Tunisia actually created a whole new set of conflicts. In one of the most dynamic crossroads of the Mediterranean world, residents of Tunisia -- whether Muslim, Jewish, or Christian -- navigated through the competing power structures to further their civil rights and individual interests and often thwarted the aims of the French state in the process.
Over time, these everyday challenges to colonial authority led France to institute reforms that slowly undermined Tunisian sovereignty and replaced it with a more heavy-handed form of rule -- a move also intended to ward off France's European rivals, who still sought influence in Tunisia. In so doing, the French inadvertently encouraged a powerful backlash with major historical consequences, as Tunisians developed one of the earliest and most successful nationalist movements in the French empire. Based on archival research in four countries, Lewis uncovers important links between international power politics and everyday matters of rights, identity, and resistance to colonial authority, while re-interpreting the whole arc of French rule in Tunisia from the 1880s to the mid-20th century. Scholars, students, and anyone interested in the history of politics and rights in North Africa, or in the nature of imperialism more generally, will gain a deeper understanding of these issues from this sophisticated study of colonial Tunisia.
They can—but mainly by doing things other than what we want and expect from them.
The 21st century began with an extraordinary imbalance in world power. The United States was the only country able to project military force globally; it represented more than a quarter of the world economy, and had the world’s leading soft-power resources in its universities and entertainment industry. America’s primacy appeared well established.Americans seemed to like this situation. In the 2012 presidential campaign, both major-party candidates insisted that American power was not in decline, and vowed that they would maintain American primacy. But how much are such promises within the ability of presidents to keep? Was presidential leadership ever essential to the establishment of American primacy, or was that primacy an accident of history that would have occurred regardless of who occupied the Oval Office?Leadership experts and the public alike extol the virtues of transformational leaders—those who set out bold objectives and take risks to change the world. We tend to downplay “transactional” leaders, whose goals are more modest, as mere managers. But in looking closely at the leaders who presided over key periods of expanding American primacy in the past century, I found that while transformational presidents such as Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan changed how Americans viewed their nation’s role in the world, some transactional presidents, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and George H. W. Bush, were more effective in executing their policies.Transformation involves large gambles, the outcomes of which are not always immediately evident. One of history’s great strategists, Otto von Bismarck, successfully bet in 1870 that a manufactured war with France would lead to Prussian unification of Germany. But he also bet that he could annex Alsace-Lorraine, a move with enormous costs that became clear only in 1914.Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman made transformational bets on, respectively, the nation’s entry into World War II and the subsequent containment of the Soviet Union, but each did so only after cautious initial approaches (and in Roosevelt’s case, only after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor). John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson mistakenly bet that Vietnam would prove to be a game of dominoes, whereas Eisenhower—who, ironically, had coined the domino metaphor—wisely avoided combat intervention. And Richard Nixon, who successfully bet on an opening to China in 1971, lost a nearly simultaneous bet in severing the dollar’s tie to gold, thus contributing to rampant inflation over the subsequent decade.George W. Bush most resembled not Ronald Reagan or Harry Truman, but Woodrow Wilson.
Compare Woodrow Wilson, a failed transformational president, with the first George Bush, a successful transactional one. Wilson made a costly and mistaken bet on the Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of the First World War. His noble vision of an American-led League of Nations was partially vindicated in the long term. But he lacked the leadership skills to implement this vision in his own time, and this shortcoming contributed to America’s retreat into isolationism in the 1930s. In the case of Bush 41, the president’s lack of what he called “the vision thing” limited his ability to sway Americans’ perceptions of the nation and its role in the world. But his execution and management of policy was first-rate.Consider, too, the contrast between the elder Bush’s presidency and that of his son, George W. Bush, who has been described as having been obsessed with being a transformational president. Members of the younger Bush’s administration often compared him to Ronald Reagan or Harry Truman, but the 20th-century president he most resembled was Wilson. Both were highly religious and moralistic men who initially focused on domestic issues without an eye toward foreign policy. Both projected self-confidence, and both responded to a crisis boldly and resolutely. As Secretary of State Robert Lansing described Wilson’s mind-set in 1917: “Even established facts were ignored if they did not fit in with his intuitive sense, this semi-divine power to select the right.” Similarly, Tony Blair observed in 2010 that Bush “had great intuition. But his intuition was less … about politics and more about what he thought was right and wrong.” Like Wilson, Bush placed a large, transformative bet on foreign policy—the invasion of Iraq—and, like Wilson, he lacked the skill to implement his plan successfully.This is not an argument against transformational leaders in general. In turbulent situations, leaders such as Gandhi, Mandela, and King can play crucial roles in redefining a people’s identity and aspirations. Nor is it an argument against transformational leaders in American foreign policy in particular. FDR and Truman made indelible contributions to the creation of the American era; others, such as Nixon, with his opening to China, or Carter, with his emphasis on human rights and nuclear nonproliferation, reoriented important aspects of foreign policy. But in judging leaders, we need to pay attention both to acts of commission and to acts of omission—dogs that barked and those that did not. For example, Ike refused to follow numerous recommendations by the military to use nuclear weapons during the Korean, Dien Bien Phu, and Quemoy-Matsu crises, at one point telling an adviser, “You boys must be crazy. We can’t use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than 10 years.” In 1954, he explained his broader thinking to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Suppose it would be possible to destroy Russia, he said. “Here would be a great area from the Elbe to Vladivostok…torn up and destroyed, without government, without its communications, just an area of starvation and disaster. I ask you, what would the civilized world do about it?” George H. W. Bush likewise largely eschewed transformational objectives, with one important exception: the reunification of Germany. But even here, he acted with caution. When the Berlin Wall was opened in November 1989, partly because of a mistake by East Germany, Bush was criticized for his low-key response. But his deliberate choice not to gloat or to humiliate the Soviets helped set the stage for the successful Malta summit with Mikhail Gorbachev a month later.Transformational leaders are important because they make choices that most other leaders would not. But a key question is how much risk a democratic public wants its leaders to take in foreign policy. The answer very much depends on the context, and that context is enormously complex, involving not only potential international effects, but the intricacies of domestic politics in multiple societies. This complexity gives special relevance to the Aristotelian virtue of prudence. We live in a world of diverse cultures, and we know very little about social engineering and how to “build nations.” And when we cannot be sure how to improve the world, hubristic visions pose a grave danger. For these reasons, the virtues of transactional leaders with good contextual intelligence are also very important. Good leadership in this century may or may not be transformational, but it will almost certainly require a careful understanding of the context of change.Decline, for example, is a misleading description of the current state of American power—one that President Obama has thankfully rejected. American influence is not in absolute decline, and in relative terms, there is a reasonable probability that the country will remain more powerful than any other single state in the coming decades. We do not live in a “post-American world,” but neither do we live any longer in the American era of the late 20th century. No one has a crystal ball, but the National Intelligence Council may be correct in its 2012 projection that although the unipolar moment is over, the U.S. most likely will remain primus inter pares at least until 2030 because of the multifaceted nature of its power and the legacies of its leadership.The U.S. will certainly face a rise in the power of many others—both states and nonstate actors. Presidents will increasingly need to exert power with others as much as over others; our leaders’ capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will be an important dimension of our hard and soft power. The problem of America’s role in the 21st century is not the country’s supposed decline, but its need to develop the contextual intelligence to understand that even the most powerful nation cannot achieve the outcomes it wants without the help of others. Educating the public to both understand the global information age and operate successfully in it will be the real task for presidential leadership.All of which suggests that President Obama and his successors should beware of thinking that transformational proclamations are the key to successful adaptation amid these rapidly changing times. American power and leadership will remain crucial to stability and prosperity at home and abroad. But presidents will be better served by remembering their transactional predecessors’ observance of the credo “Above all, do no harm” than by issuing stirring calls for transformational change.
In the early 1960s, fewer than five percent of Japanese owned automobiles, China’s per capita income was among the lowest in Asia, and living standards in South Korea’s rural areas were on par with some of the world’s poorest countries. Today, these are three of the most powerful economies on earth. Dwight Perkins grapples with both the contemporary and historical causes and consequences of the turnaround, drawing on firsthand experience in the region to explain how Asian countries sustained such rapid economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century.
East Asian Development offers a comprehensive view of the region, from Japan and the “Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea) to Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and China - a behemoth larger than all the other economies combined. While the overall picture of Asian growth is positive, no single economic policy has been effective regionwide. Interventionist policies that worked well in some countries failed elsewhere. Perkins analyzes income distribution, to uncover why initially egalitarian societies have ended up in very different places, with Japan, for example, maintaining a modest gap between rich and poor while China has become one of Asia’s most unequal economies.
Today, the once-dynamic Japanese and Korean economies are sluggish, and even China shows signs of losing steam. Perkins investigates whether this is a regional phenomenon or typical of all economies at this stage of development. His inquiry reminds us that the uncharted waters of China’s vast economy make predictions of its future performance speculative at best.
Democratic states guarantee free movement within their territory to all citizens, as a core right of citizenship. Similarly, the European Union guarantees EU citizens and members of their families the right to live and the right to work anywhere within EU territory. Such rights reflect the project of equality and undifferentiated individual rights for all who have the status of citizen, but they are not uncontested. Despite citizenship's promise of equality, barriers, incentives, and disincentives to free movement make some citizens more equal than others. This book challenges the normal way of thinking about freedom of movement by identifying the tensions between the formal ideals that governments, laws, and constitutions expound and actual practices, which fall short.
This book is a comparative study which aims to answer the question: under what circumstances does the EU undertake military operations?
Since 2003, the EU has carried out six military operations. What accounts for this historic development? The EU and Military Operations examines the dynamics behind the EU´s collective use of force and situates the EU in the context of a global division of labour with regard to military crisis management. It centres on the study of two main cases of EU military operations: the non-case when an operation was planned in the Lebanon war 2006 but did not occur, and the positive case of EUFOR RD Congo that same year.
Drawing upon these findings, the author creates an innovative analytical framework based upon the techniques of defence planning, and applies this to the cases studies with the purpose of identifying the main driving and inhibiting factors behind the operations. Key findings derived from this analysis include the growing importance of local actors in facilitating or impeding the EU´s deployment of military force and the enhanced role of regional organisations as security providers.
The book will be of much interest to students of European security, EU politics, strategic studies, humanitarian intervention, security studies and IR in general.
Why do some armed groups commit massive wartime rape, whereas others never do? Using an original dataset, I describe the substantial variation in rape by armed actors during recent civil wars and test a series of competing causal explanations. I find evidence that the recruitment mechanism is associated with the occurrence of wartime rape. Specifically, the findings support an argument about wartime rape as a method of socialization, in which armed groups that recruit by force—through abduction or pressganging—use rape to create unit cohesion. State weakness and insurgent contraband funding are also associated with increased wartime rape by rebel groups. I examine observable implications of the argument in a brief case study of the Sierra Leone civil war. The results challenge common explanations for wartime rape, with important implications for scholars and policy makers.