

Pitt Latin American Series

Billie R. DeWalt, *General Editor*

Reid Andrews, *Associate Editor*

Carmen Diana Deere, *Associate Editor*

Jorge I. Domínguez, *Associate Editor*


International Security and Democracy

*Latin America and the Caribbean
in the Post-Cold War Era*



Edited by Jorge I. Domínguez

University of Pittsburgh Press

 Contents

List of Tables vii
Preface ix
Peter Hakim and Michael Shifter
List of Acronyms xi

1. Security, Peace, and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean
Challenges for the Post-Cold War Era 3
Jorge I. Domínguez
2. The Use of Force in Latin American Interstate Relations 29
David R. Mares and Steven A. Bernstein

PART I

The Transformation of Interstate Relations in Southern South America 49

3. Argentina's Security Policies
Their Rationale and Regional Context 51
Carlos Escudé and Andrés Fontana
4. Transition and Civil-Military Relations in Chile
Contributions in a New International Framework 80
Francisco Rojas Aravena
5. Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration
in the Southern Cone 102
Mónica Hirst

PART II

The Impact on Latin American Countries of Participation in UN Missions 119

6. Institutionalization, Cooperative Security, and Peacekeeping Operations
The Argentine Experience 121
Ricardo E. Lagorio

Created under the auspices of the Inter-American Dialogue

Published by the University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15261

Copyright © 1998, University of Pittsburgh Press

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

Printed on acid-free paper

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

International security and democracy : Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-cold war era / edited by Jorge I. Domínguez.

p. cm. — (Pitt Latin American series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8229-4054-X (acid-free paper). — ISBN 0-8229-5659-4 (pbk. : acid-free paper)

1. Latin America—Foreign relations—1980— 2. Caribbean Area—Foreign relations. 3. Security, International. 4. Civil supremacy over the military. I. Domínguez, Jorge I., 1945— II. Series.

F1414.2.165 1998

327.8—dc21

97-33897

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Security, Peace, and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean

Challenges for the Post–Cold War Era

Jorge I. Domínguez

The prospects for peace and security in the Americas improved as the cold war ended in Europe.¹ Peace settlements were reached in the civil wars in Nicaragua (1989–90), El Salvador (1992), and Guatemala (1996). The Cuban government stopped providing military support to revolutionaries in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile. And Colombia's M-19 movement, El Salvador's Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, and Guatemala's National Revolutionary Union transformed themselves from guerrilla organizations into political parties. Nonetheless, as David Mares's chapter in this book shows, Latin American countries have been involved in a militarized interstate dispute with a neighboring country on average nearly once a year for the past century.

The cold war had fogged the lenses needed to see Latin America's own security concerns.² The ending of the cold war in Europe³ left other long-standing regional peace and security issues essentially unchanged—a point made vivid by the war between Ecuador and Peru in early 1995. The centrality of the cold war for international relations since 1945 nearly monopolized the attention of governments in the United States and Europe. As a result, only some of Latin America's security concerns have received sustained scholarly and policy attention from international observers. On the other hand, the centrality of military coups for political stability, and the concern over democracy, focused decision makers and Latin Amer-

icanist scholars on the domestic aspects of the role of the armed forces and on civil-military relations, diverting their attention from international security issues.

This study proceeds at two levels. First, there are the issues that affect the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in their relations with each other. These include long-standing territorial disputes and subregional balances as well as new efforts to establish means for cooperation to foster peace and security; for some of the countries, there are also threats to their stability from nonstate and substate military forces. At another level, the concern over peace and security links the United States and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Nonstate violence, for example, facilitates drug trafficking from Latin America and the Caribbean into the United States. Moreover, the United States participates in inter-American military institutions, such as the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College, and takes the lead in the design and implementation of joint military maneuvers with various armed forces of the hemisphere. In addition, the United States, among others, is a formal guarantor of peace settlements between some Latin American countries (such as the "Rio Protocol" between Peru and Ecuador) and is sometimes perceived as an informal guarantor of settlements and balances in the region.

In this book, we focus our inquiry at the intersection of concerns between international security and democratization. We examine international peace and security issues in the hemisphere both to understand potential conflicts and also because international security issues, regimes, norms, rules, and procedures are among the factors that affect and shape civil-military relations and the consolidation of democracy.⁴

In this chapter, I argue that major transformations have occurred in the relations among countries of Central and South America that have for the most part improved the prospects of peace. The practice of cooperative security has spread throughout these regions and been consolidated in the Anglophone Caribbean. Nevertheless, an array of conventional and unconventional threats to security persists; some new threats stem from the unexpected consequences of otherwise worthwhile outcomes. Moreover, the development of cooperative security faces important obstacles in the hemisphere. One of these obstacles, regrettably, is the complex relationship between the prospects for improved interstate relations, on the one hand, and the consolidation of democratic constitutional government, on the other. At the same time, the persisting unreformed inter-American security institutions and procedures detract from the consolidation of constitutional government in Central and South America.

Four Security Dilemmas

1. Will my attempt to enhance my own international security so frighten my neighbor that we will both end up less secure at greater cost? The classic security dilemma that states face in an anarchic international system has also been a part, of course, of interstate relations in Latin America.⁵ The government of country X seeks to improve its national security by acquiring new weapons, professionalizing its armed forces, or otherwise improving its military capabilities. The government of country Y becomes alarmed and responds in kind—all of which may leave X and Y both better armed and less secure while incurring greater costs. Arms races are one result of the response of states to this security dilemma.⁶ In this book, the chapters focused on the southernmost countries of South America (the Southern Cone) illustrate the ways in which governments and scholars think about this enduring problem and try to find means to overcome it.

2. Will my attempt to consolidate the stability of my country's domestic democratic politics so frighten my neighbor that we will both end up less secure? This dilemma is much less self-evident, in part because there is now strong scholarly⁷ and policy⁸ agreement based on a statistical observation: stable democratic regimes do not make war against each other. Yet several of the chapters in this book explore whether there is a connection between attempts to consolidate democratic politics, on the one hand, and increased interstate tensions, on the other.

In the experience of Latin America and the Caribbean in the twentieth century, the principal threat to the stability of constitutional government has come from the armed forces. Revolutionary or guerrilla threats have been frequent and salient but rarely successful. In the midtwentieth century, the development of national security doctrines in nearly all Latin American states focused the professionalization of the armed forces on improving the capacity to respond to "domestic threats" to stability.⁹ These threats stemmed allegedly from the prospects of violence from communists or others; in time, these threat perceptions induced the armed forces to seek to shape the structure and management of the economy and civil society. By the late 1970s, only a handful of Latin American countries (plus most of the Anglophone Caribbean) retained constitutional governments in which civilians elected in free and competitive elections held the key posts. In the name of order, the armed forces of Latin America contributed to havoc.

Despite the retreat of military rule throughout the region, the armed forces exist everywhere in South and Central America except for Costa Rica and Panama. Only in the island Caribbean have armed forces been

abolished (or never been created) in several countries (see chapter 9, by Ivelaw Griffith). What, then, should be the mission of these armed forces? Given a history where a domestically focused military had been the principal threat to constitutional government, in the 1990s some civilian governments eschewed assigning internal missions to the armed forces if such could be avoided. The principal remaining option to safeguard domestic stability was to assign external missions to the armed forces: my neighbor may be my enemy. Thus the attempt to consolidate democratic politics in countries with residual but still important elements of domestic instability may enhance the likelihood of interstate conflict. Michael Desch's chapter calls attention to this theme; this theme echoes in the chapters dealing with the Southern Cone.

3. Will my attempt to reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict and consolidate the stability of my country's domestic democratic politics through military demobilization create a threat of domestic disorder? Or, what do you do with soldiers when they stop being soldiers? The swift demobilization of combatants in Central America in the absence of ready employment alternatives, as the chapters by Caesar Sereseres and Fernando Zeledón make evident, has contributed to the creation of armed gangs of former soldiers or former guerrillas who threaten the stability of various governments and contribute to a crime pandemic. The chapter by Carlos Escudé and Andrés Fontana also recalls military unhappiness with the downsizing of Argentina's armed forces and the persisting concern about the future activities of those who may yet be demobilized in the intelligence services.

4. Will my attempt to combat violent gangs and drug traffickers in my country threaten the stability of constitutional government? In some countries as different as Nicaragua and Colombia, the level of nonstate violence has remained very high. There is doubt that the police could cope effectively with this violent criminal activity. Consequently, it may be prudent to call the armed forces into combat against such nonstate forces.

Once this decision is made, the armed forces find themselves with an internal mission. This internal mission may improve relations with neighboring countries and with the United States because such violent nonstate forces might support drug traffickers while threatening a subregion and because this mission distracts armed forces away from conflicts with neighbors. Yet such an internal mission, in the 1990s as in the 1960s, might lead the military down the slippery slope toward politics. Even if military coups are avoided or, if attempted, fail, the armed forces may come to play a decisive role within a formally constitutional government. Certainly in many Latin American countries the armed forces have claimed very high prerogatives as

well as the right to veto, and to participate in the making of, key national policies.¹⁰



These dilemmas cannot be ignored; nor can they be easily resolved. On the other hand, their impact should not be exaggerated. From the early 1980s to the early 1990s, South America's aggregate military expenditures relative to the region's gross domestic product held roughly steady at about 2 percent. Except in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, the weight of military expenditures on the economy has been declining, most markedly so in Argentina. The number of soldiers in South America's armed forces has fallen from about 1.1 million in the early 1980s to below 900,000 in the early 1990s. (As Francisco Rojas's chapter makes evident, however, the spillover of the Peru-Ecuador war may exacerbate the problem: As Peru and Ecuador rearm in the wake of their 1995 war, Chile may believe that it must rearm to counter a strengthened Peruvian military establishment.)¹¹ In Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, and Haiti, both military expenditures and the size of the armed forces shrank considerably in the 1990s as a result of the end of civil wars in the first two countries and the change of political regime in the latter two cases. Guatemala's armed forces are being downsized as well, following the end of this country's civil war. Central America has undergone very substantial military demobilization since 1989. For Latin America as a whole (including Cuba), in the early 1990s military expenditures represented only about 1.5 percent of gross national product—the smallest proportion for any region of the world. The number of soldiers per thousand people fell from about 4.5 during the first half of the 1980s to about 3.5 in the early 1990s. Consequently, the impact of the classic security dilemma has certainly been constrained.¹²

Moreover, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile well exemplify dimensions of the classic security dilemma but their interstate relations perhaps have never been better, as we see below. The armed forces of Colombia have long been engaged in matters of domestic security but they have not overthrown a constitutional government since the 1950s. The armed forces of Peru have fought a brutal domestic war for fifteen years but that did not prevent them from fighting short wars against Ecuador as well in 1981 and in 1995 or from engaging in smaller-scale militarized interstate disputes at other times. A crime pandemic, regrettably, can be observed nearly everywhere in Latin America, whether there has been substantial military demobilization or not. In short, we should be appropriately concerned with the dilemmas sketched above but we ought also to explore the ways and the reasons why their effects can be constrained or overcome.

International Subregional Balances and Transformations

Since the 1880s, international subregional balances, that is, relatively stable distributions of military and other capabilities among key states, have helped to preserve the peace in South America. When balances are stable, a state is less likely to fear that the security-enhancing efforts of its neighbors will weaken its own security.¹³

There have been very few interstate wars in Latin America in the twentieth century, a period when, as Mares's chapter shows, only nine wars have had at least eight hundred battlefield deaths. On the other hand, militarized interstate disputes are not uncommon, occurring on average almost every year. Typically, force is actually used, not merely threatened, in these disputes.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, moreover, preparedness for war increased markedly in South and Central America. In those years, war broke out between El Salvador and Honduras, Peru and Ecuador, and Argentina and the United Kingdom. Argentina and Chile mobilized militarily against each other and came to the edge of war in 1978, as did Guatemala and the United Kingdom and Guatemala and Belize. Less severe but still serious disputes developed between Chile and Bolivia, Chile and Peru, Argentina and Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia, and Venezuela and Guyana. These interstate disputes were not "side-shows" put on by "out-of-control" military, nor did they occur only when authoritarian governments ruled. Instead, these issues represent the legacies of the histories of these states since their independence.

A Diplomatic Transformation in the Southern Cone

From the late 1970s to the early 1990s a diplomatic transformation in interstate relations occurred in the Southern Cone (see chapters by Escudé and Fontana, Mônica Hirst, and Rojas). Until 1979, relations between Argentina and Brazil were very tense. Military missions envisaged combat against each other. The two countries were engaged in the early stages of a nuclear arms race. In November 1979, the military dictatorships of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay signed the Itaipú-Corpus Treaty. At the simplest level, this agreement governed the distribution of waters in the Paraná River system to permit the construction of two large hydroelectric projects, one led by Brazil, the other by Argentina.

Yet this treaty engineered not just dams but peace. Additional agreements were reached between Argentina and Brazil that greatly reduced the probability of military confrontation, began a process to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear weapons race, and would lead in 1985 to important accords on economic integration. In 1990, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed

the Treaty of Asunción, committing themselves to the establishment of a common market (MERCOSUR), which was effectively launched on January 1, 1995, and dramatically lowered trade barriers. Argentine-Brazilian trade boomed from the late 1980s into the 1990s. Also in the early 1990s, Argentina and Brazil signed a nuclear safeguards agreement to provide for transparency and mutual guarantees in their respective nuclear power industries.

In 1978 the military governments of Argentina and Chile mobilized for war against each other; Argentina's military government had refused to accept an international arbitration award concerning the lands and waters in the Beagle Channel, even though the Argentine government had been bound in advance to abide by the outcome. War was prevented thanks to the Pope's mediation. In 1984 Argentina (then under a democratic government) and Chile (still under military rule) signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship whereby Argentina accepted the award of the disputed Beagle Channel islands to Chile. Argentine-Chilean relations continued to improve across the board. Trade and other economic relations intensified also during the first half of the 1990s. And as Escudé and Fontana, and Rojas, show, twenty-three of the remaining twenty-four unresolved boundary disputes were settled in the early 1990s thanks to a joint decision by democratically elected presidents Patricio Aylwin and Carlos Menem.

Though problems remain, the transformation of interstate relations among the three major Southern Cone countries is unprecedented in their international history. In each case, through acts of statesmanship the governments of the three countries chose to eschew military conflicts for the sake of the wider long-term prospects of collaboration. In each case, decision makers responded to their analysis of the balance of power, military capabilities, and the capacity of each country to sustain war. They stepped back from the brink. These factors, not the type of political regime, were the key to the change in course. Clearly authoritarian regimes were just as capable of making peace or coming to the edge of war. Clearly the mere fact of having a democratic political system did not automatically cause peace.

An "Intermestic" Transformation in Central America and the Caribbean

In Central America and the Caribbean there have been intertwined changes at both the international and domestic levels regarding security issues—hence the neologism *intermestic*.¹⁴ The end of the cold war in Europe had a decisive impact on security issues in Central America and the Caribbean (in contrast to its negligible impact on security issues in South America).¹⁵ The Soviet Union collapsed, and none of its successor states was capable of continuing support for the Cuban government or for guerrilla or-

ganizations in the Americas. Already in the late 1980s, a much weakened Soviet Union curtailed its assistance to Nicaragua. In the 1990s, Cuba posed no conventional military threat to its neighbors; it also got out of the business of supporting revolutions in other countries. In 1983, the United States and several Anglophone Caribbean countries overthrew the Marxist-Leninist government of Grenada, making it easier to establish relations of political cooperation among the conservative Anglophone Caribbean societies of which Anthony Maingot has written.¹⁶

Faced with Soviet decline and collapse, and with Cuban decline, the United States under President George Bush's administration changed its policies in Central America, facilitating thereby negotiated peace settlements in Nicaragua and El Salvador.¹⁷ The Clinton administration, in turn, fostered the negotiated peace settlement in Guatemala. The changes at the international level were not the only reasons for these domestic settlements, of course, but they contributed to them powerfully.

As Sereseres and Zeledón demonstrate, however, new security issues arose within Central America.¹⁸ The demobilization of the armed forces and of guerrilla forces left many former soldiers and former guerrillas fully armed. The much less capable states of the region—weakened by years of war and the economic depression of the 1980s—did not succeed in retrieving all the weapons in the hands of former combatants. These weapons contributed to an illegal arms traffic; the specialists in violence added to the region's crime woes. The need to reincorporate demobilized troops and insurgents into society and economy places great burdens on government budgets and absorbs a significant portion of international assistance. In Central America, Sereseres argues, there is a security vacuum in which nonstate forces may disrupt social, economic, and political processes. The weapons beyond the control of the state threaten public order in every way. Various associations and institutions seek to foster cooperation in this subregion, among them the Central American Parliament, the Central American Security Commission, the association of police chiefs, and various interstate economic institutions, but their capacity is well short of the task.

Historically, to be sure, organized international nonstate military forces had been the scourge of Central America and the Caribbean. They were born in the age of international pirates. Beginning in the late 1950s, ideology and politics motivated many nonstate forces; instances of these motivations have become rare. In the 1990s, most nonstate military forces are no longer communist rebels but mainly the instruments of criminal organizations seeking enrichment, in a way returning to the age of the pirates.

In the Anglophone Caribbean, since the late 1970s criminal elements have

at some point severely threatened the security of Dominica and of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and, as Maingot points out, have seriously infiltrated various governments in this subregion. As Griffith and Maingot note, in the Caribbean (as well as in Central America) the growth of drug traffic poses substantial and varied security threats. Police and military forces as well as civilian government leaders can be corrupted. The use of force becomes routinized; levels of violence increase or remain high. Criminal organizations, Maingot reminds us, can purchase governments and intimidate critics, relying at times on assassination.

The Anglophone Caribbean's Regional Security System (RSS), Griffith tells us, has played a constructive role; there are other security-related organizations, several of which include the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The Anglophone Caribbean, moreover, is thick with political and economic institutions. But, Barbados excepted, these organizations have been no match for the equally thick array of criminal forces described in Maingot's chapter.

Because at the very core of the intermestic transformation is the weakening of most of the states of Central America and the Caribbean—they lack the domestic or international resources to govern effectively—the prospects for within-region cooperation are problematic. All of the governments that belong to their subregion's multilateral institutions are strapped for funds. Only Guatemala retains a large military establishment, and in the eastern Caribbean only Barbados's forces combine sufficient capacity, professionalism, and integrity. Faced with international organized crime that is well armed and funded by drug trafficking, and faced as well as with substantial substate violence (most of it criminal and some of it in Central America from demobilized soldiers), none of these governments or multilateral institutions can cope with security threats unless they receive substantial international backing from the United States and other countries.

Still, at this moment of intertwined international and domestic crises, the U.S. government has greatly cut back its economic assistance to all of these countries. The Soviet Union's successor states have stopped it altogether. The United Kingdom and Canada have reduced their aid to the Anglophone Caribbean. Other (though not all) donor countries have also scaled back their commitments to these subregions. Peace is not at hand.

Toward Cooperative Security?

One consequence of the diplomatic transformation in the Southern Cone has been the effort to anchor the relations among the states in the region on

bases other than the traditional balancing of power. To maintain the peace by means other than conventional balancing, states must cooperate over security.¹⁹

Cooperative security seeks to reduce the prospects and scope of international aggression through the preventive association of participating states to protect their joint security. Within geographic regions, cooperative security requires participating states to reconfigure their military establishments to reassure each other about their respective intentions. Governments reduce the likelihood of war or other severe conflicts in various ways. They foster transparency in the security policies of each country, thus reducing the probability of acting on rumor or false information. They strengthen international institutions to maintain the peace, resolve disputes, and promote collaboration to address joint problems, and they develop bilateral cooperation to address specific joint security concerns. Reciprocal confidence-building measures become an integral part of national strategies. As Paul Buchanan notes in his chapter, cooperative security strategies also reorient military missions toward external, multilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. Participating states supply peacemaking and peacekeeping forces when called upon by international institutions.

In a conventional approach to security, deterrence is achieved by acquiring the means to repel an attack from beyond the nation's borders and to inflict great costs on the attacker's forces and perhaps also on the attacker's country. In a cooperative approach to security, deterrence is achieved through the transparency of military procedures and information and through confidence-building measures that engage the armed forces of any given set of countries. In each case, the armed forces play a key role in the defense of the homeland, but they do so in quite different ways.

Ultimately, the goal might be to create what Karl Deutsch and his associates called pluralistic security communities.²⁰ Within a certain territory, a security community is achieved once people attain a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its populations. This sense of community requires a belief on the part of actors in a group that they have come to agreement on at least one key point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change, that is, by institutionalized procedures without resort to large-scale physical force. Within pluralistic security communities, separate governments retain their legal independence. The United States and Canada are part of a pluralistic security community, as are the members of the European Union.

Examples of Cooperative Security

Each of the major South American countries has pursued at least some aspects of cooperative security policies, but each has done so in distinctive ways. Rojas's chapter illustrates Chile's specialization in strengthening international institutions. Its government hosted the meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1991 that issued the Santiago Declaration, committing the member states to respond to interruptions of constitutional government anywhere in the Americas. Chile supports changes in the charter of the Inter-American Defense Board in order to subordinate it to the OAS and to enable the board to operate in the security field under civilian authority. Chile participates actively in the world economy and has made its own economy open and transparent. It played a leading role as a founder of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it participates actively in the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC), it has applied to join the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and it has promoted and signed trade expansion treaties with a great many countries.

Hirst's chapter illustrates Brazil's specialization in subregional affairs. Brazil has greatly improved its relations with Argentina through the creation of MERCOSUR (which also includes Uruguay and Paraguay), the signing of the quadrupartite nuclear safeguards agreement with Argentina and the International Atomic Energy Agency (in force since March 1994), and bilateral measures of cooperation in various fields including security. As both Hirst and Escudé-Fontana indicate, the armed forces of Brazil and Argentina have redeployed away from battle-readiness at their border and have frequent exchanges of military information and personnel to reassure each other. The armed forces of Argentina and Brazil have at times assisted each other and participated in one another's military exercises. And, for the first time ever, in September 1996 the armies of Argentina and Brazil undertook a joint exercise (Operation Southern Cross) in the Argentine province of Corrientes focused on planning and implementing a peacekeeping mission under UN auspices.

The chapter by Escudé and Fontana illustrates Argentina's own specialization in cooperative security: unilateral initiatives. Argentina unilaterally scrapped the *Cóndor 2* ballistic missile development project, submitted its nuclear industry to full-scope safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency, and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (In coordination with Brazil and Chile, it also ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco binding itself not to build nuclear weapons.) The Menem government also drastically cut the military budget, abolished military conscription, and launched a pro-

gram to privatize or shut down industries that had been operated by the armed forces.

Key disputes have also been resolved between Argentina and Chile. This process began through papal mediation over the Beagle Channel confrontation and was continued through bilateral negotiations between the governments of Argentina and Chile to settle most though not yet all of their boundary disputes. (International institutions have played no significant role in dispute resolution in the Southern Cone, however.)

Another example of successful conflict resolution was the treaty signed between Venezuela and Trinidad-Tobago in April 1990 to settle their dispute over jurisdiction in the Gulf of Paria waters.

The Anglophone Caribbean governments cooperate extensively with each other on many matters through formal institutions and informal means; most of the smaller island countries lack armed forces. As Griffith indicates, in October 1982 five Eastern Caribbean countries (Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) established the previously mentioned Regional Security System (RSS). St. Kitts-Nevis joined it soon thereafter. Some RSS forces participated in the 1983 invasion of Grenada led by the United States. (Grenada joined the RSS in 1985.) In the summer of 1990, RSS forces were deployed to Trinidad to assist the constitutional government in overcoming a coup attempt; and in November 1994, RSS troops and police were deployed to St. Kitts-Nevis following a mass prison riot. Anglophone Caribbean forces also joined other peacekeepers in Haiti following the September 1994 intervention authorized by the United Nations and led by the United States.

The Anglophone Caribbean best exemplifies the principles of cooperative security: transparency, participation in joint endeavors, and an external orientation under multilateral auspices. The problem for these countries is the lack of resources to address the principal threat to their security, namely, violence from nonstate forces.

In Central America, the principal instrument associated with the concept of cooperative security was the transparency created by United Nations and OAS personnel who helped to enforce and supervise the peacemaking processes in Nicaragua and El Salvador; observers from these organizations will monitor the Guatemalan peace process and may well have the same effect. As the armed forces of Nicaragua and El Salvador downsized, the threat to interstate peace declined. International institutions helped not just to monitor settlements but also to resolve disputes. Zeledón shows that the International Court at The Hague in September 1992 issued a definitive settlement of the territorial dispute between El Salvador and Honduras that had led to the so-called Soccer War between them in 1969. The court's ruling

dealt with both mainland boundary issues and maritime delimitation in the Gulf of Fonseca. Despite numerous practical difficulties, the two governments accepted the ruling and have been attempting to implement it.

In sum, Central and South America and the Caribbean illustrate various approaches to maintain and foster peace consistent with the principles of cooperative security. Yet these chapters show as well several obstacles to the consolidation of a cooperative security strategy.

The Obstacles to Cooperative Security

Many confidence-building measures were designed to reduce the level of tension and lower the likelihood of accidental conflict between adversaries. The broader concept of cooperative security, however, is designed to foster the conditions that would make war unthinkable between countries. Within a full framework of cooperative security practices, countries would not aim their armed forces at each other but only at wider threats in the international system, to be addressed by multilateral institutions. There are a number of obstacles to realizing this hope in Central and South America.

1. Is there an enemy and a risk of military conflict? Countries that consider each other potential enemies may make effective use of certain confidence-building measures but are not likely to create and participate in a dense network of cooperative security procedures.

Only President Menem's Argentina approximated a policy that nearly stated that the country had no enemies other than nonstate actors (e.g., terrorists). The principal exception remained Argentina's claim over the South Atlantic islands in dispute with the United Kingdom, though the Menem government was committed to proceeding by peaceful means to resolve this issue. Thus Argentina foresaw no likelihood of military conflict with its South American neighbors.

In contrast, Chile has continued to perceive several potential enemies. Bolivia continued to claim some territory from Chile to permit its direct access to the Pacific Ocean. Attempts to resolve this dispute remained unsuccessful. For example, in 1993 Bolivian Foreign Minister Ronald McLean resigned because President Jaime Paz Zamora disapproved of the foreign minister's efforts to settle this long-standing dispute with Chile.²¹ Under Presidents Aylwin and Fujimori, Chile and Peru made substantial progress to address the legacies remaining from the territorial settlement and delimitation treaties of 1883 and 1929 but have yet to agree on important details mainly because of divided opinions in Peru. One by-product of the 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru was Peruvian rearmament (in 1996 Peru purchased at least fourteen MiG-29 combat aircraft from Belarus), which

provided one additional stimulus to Chile to allocate several billion dollars to purchase advanced aircraft as well. One territorial issue remained unsettled between Argentina and Chile—the delimitation of the Southern Cone's glaciers. The Chilean armed forces have also been more disposed to think that the near-war event of 1978 between Argentina and Chile might recur.

In Central America, Sereseres and Zeledón note the practical difficulties to settling some long-standing territorial and boundary disputes—even to demarcate the Honduran-Salvadoran boundary on the ground according to the agreed-upon judgment of the International Court. In 1997, five years after the Court's decision, only 81 of 234 miles of the border had been properly demarcated. Thousands of Salvadoran peasants, threatened with the loss of their lands and a forcible change of citizenship, have resisted the court's judgment; their protests in September 1994 led to Salvadoran and Honduran military re-deployments toward the common border. There is also some potential for interstate hostility, mostly between Guatemala and Belize, but also between Honduras and Guatemala regarding the Montagua River and between Nicaragua and Colombia over the San Andrés archipelago. Moreover, in the Caribbean, a long-standing territorial dispute continues to simmer between Guyana and Venezuela, whereby the latter claims over half of Guyana's national territory.

2. Is there a shared strategic vision? Governments that agree on their assessment of the nature of the international system, the sources of threats, the goals that must be pursued, the tasks to be achieved, and the means to reach objectives are much more likely to cooperate in matters of security.

There is a difference between Argentine and Brazilian views about the international role of the United States. In a sharp break with historic Argentine policies, the Menem government chose to bandwagon with the United States on nearly every international issue. Until the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency of Brazil in late 1994, the Brazilian government, in contrast, had perceived possible dangers to its international standing from the role of the United States. U.S.-Brazilian relations improved considerably since Cardoso's inauguration, though these suspicious views about the U.S. role linger within the Brazilian armed forces.

Brazil seeks a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in part to balance the perceived inordinate weight of the United States. Brazil aspires to substantial technological independence and has resisted international constraints on the development of its nuclear power industry. As Hirst reminds us, Brazil has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and it continued to insist on its right to access to missile technology for peaceful purposes. Brazil has been reluctant to endow the OAS with a pro-democratic

interventionist bias.²² The Brazilian armed forces have been concerned that the international environmental movements, with the support of the U.S. government, may infringe on Brazilian sovereignty over much of the Amazon River basin.

Similarly, as Sereseres makes clear, in Central America perhaps only Guatemala's armed forces have a strategic vision and, consequently, do not share it with anyone else in the subregion. The Guatemalan armed forces think of themselves as triumphant in the war against an insurgency that lasted for several decades; they are also proud to have achieved their success with virtually no international assistance.²³

3. What should be the role of formal procedures and institutions? Under cooperative security, governments must have similar or, at least, compatible policies toward international institutions in order to provide support, facilitate their operation, and lower the transaction costs of various activities.

In contrast to Argentine and Chilean emphasis on strengthening the role of various international institutions and formal procedures, the Brazilian government, as noted above, has been much more reluctant to follow this path. Specifically with regard to issues of bilateral cooperative security, Brazilian officers are prepared to practice transparency in bilateral relations with the Argentine armed forces but not to institutionalize such practices if they were to reduce their own margin of discretion. As a consequence, the institutionalization of confidence-building measures in the Southern Cone lags well behind the record between the former adversaries of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In Central America and the Caribbean, various governments and military establishments have rather different perspectives on the role of international institutions. Lacking armies, Panama, Haiti, Costa Rica, and various island countries of the Anglophone Caribbean necessarily emphasize and rely on international institutions and other forms of cooperation to provide for their own security. Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala are at the other end of the spectrum: at critical junctures their governments had no choice but to accept the decisive role of some international institutions on their domestic affairs, though Guatemala's army remained most skeptical of the role of foreign entities in the country.

4. Nontraditional sources of insecurity, Griffith, Maingot, Sereseres, and Zeledón note, require other forms of action. Confidence-building measures and most of the schemes concerning cooperative security were designed for relations between states. The threat from drug traffic-related violence or from substate forces (guerrillas, criminal gangs) calls attention to relatively new and complex problems. With regard to these matters, confidence building and transparency between states may well be irrelevant. At issue is the ca-

capacity of these states, with the support of stronger countries from outside the region, to mobilize resources to overcome rather novel but powerful threats that already erode their sovereignty and break the peace.

Curiously, although many confidence-building measures were developed during the cold war in Europe to ameliorate tensions and manage disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies, remarkably little confidence building has been constructed to address the one remaining severe cold war interstate dispute in the Americas, namely, relations between the United States and Cuba.²⁴

In sum, despite the widening practice of cooperative security, Central and South America do not yet have a cooperative security regime, that is, a set of agreed-upon norms, rules, and institutions to govern the security relations between them. They are still far from creating a pluralistic security community. Nonetheless, there are already partial security regimes. The creation of these nascent security regimes is a hopeful trend that deserves to be nurtured and supported.²⁵

The "Local" Effects of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

Antonio Palá's chapter describes the substantial Latin American participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.²⁶ He shows that Argentina alone accounted for half of the total Latin American contribution to such missions in the early 1990s through 1995 (because of budget constraints, however, Argentina's contributions to UN missions was cut in half in 1996). Sereseres calls attention to an important distinction between different forms of participation in these missions: Most countries in Latin America only contribute a small number of individuals to United Nations missions; their participation is unlikely to have much impact on the home forces. Argentina and Uruguay, however, have participated through relatively large units that are already having a substantial effect on the home armed forces. By 1997, nearly ten thousand people, just from the Argentine army, had participated in such UN missions. And, in 1996, Brazil for the first time became the largest contributor of forces to UN missions.²⁷

Ricardo Lagorio, Palá, and Escudé-Fontana all argue that Argentine participation in United Nations missions helps to secure international peace, contribute to stable civil-military relations in a democratic Argentina, and reduce the likelihood that the Argentine armed forces could threaten Argentina's neighbors, given that such large contingents are deployed in far-away lands. Participation in peacekeeping missions also provides experience for conflict resolution while it enables the Argentine armed forces to focus more on their professional capabilities for international missions than on

potential threats from their neighbors. Their arguments are telling and persuasive.

Palá and Lagorio show that participation in UN missions improved the professional competence of the Argentine military, enhanced the interoperability of the Argentine armed forces with those of many NATO countries, and gave substantial combat (in the Gulf War, 1990–91) and semicombat (in Croatia in the early 1990s) experience to Argentine military personnel. Palá demonstrates that Argentine participation under United Nations auspices in several operations of particular interest to the United States (the Gulf War, the intervention in Haiti in 1994) helped to improve the nature and extent of military collaboration between the United States and Argentina and contributed to the upgrading and modernization of Argentina's armed forces. He also shows how the Argentine military budget, and the income received by Argentine military personnel, was bolstered by participation in these missions.

What is to prevent any country that improves its military capabilities to serve in United Nations missions from using these assets to gain advantage over its neighbors, however? Argentina's engagement in international military activities has featured two processes. One has been participation in UN collective security and peacekeeping activities. The combat and semicombat field experience Argentine forces gained under United Nations auspices in the Gulf War against Iraq (an example of collective security) and in Croatia (an example of peacekeeping) could, in principle, be applied closer to home. The second process has been the construction of a wartime military alliance with the United States in the Gulf War and in the blockade of Haiti in 1994. In 1997, the U.S. government announced its formal intention to designate Argentina as its extra-NATO ally, a distinction it will share just with Israel and Egypt. This can be a concern for the armed forces of Brazil and Chile, each of which has at times disagreed with preferred U.S. security policies in the Americas.

Argentina's praiseworthy response to the calls for peacekeeping participation far from home could indirectly and unintentionally heighten a neighboring country's insecurity, particularly Chile's. In this fashion, an unexpected consequence from Argentina's contribution to generate international public goods may be the recurrence of the classic "security dilemma" between Argentina and some of its neighbors. Brazil's increased participation in UN missions in the mid-1990s could pose similar concerns for its neighbors.

In its relations with the United Kingdom, Argentina has addressed this worry with creativity. It deployed substantial forces to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cyprus where Argentine personnel worked alongside British forces. Similarly, the Menem government worked effectively to

develop a full panoply of confidence-building measures with its neighbors. Were these policies to continue, in the medium and long term they ought to overcome the residual fears that its neighbors may harbor from Argentine participation in overseas UN missions.

The decision to participate in cooperative security arrangements poses a second risk, which is exactly the opposite of the one just discussed. Many peacekeeping tasks are closer to policing than to truly military tasks. The more an armed force redesigns its mission, training, and equipment to respond to peacekeeping operations, the fewer resources it will have to maintain the more traditional aspects of military professionalism. Tension may develop within the armed forces or between them and civilian governments for these reasons.

At issue more generally is whether the armed forces of Latin American countries would be comfortable with defining their missions to resemble those of the armed forces of Canada. The Canadian armed forces participate in collective security and peacekeeping missions under NATO and UN auspices. The Canadian armed forces have substantial experience with confidence building and many cooperative security measures. They are among the most professional and competent armed forces in the world. But Canada is not threatened militarily by its powerful neighbor to the south, and the Canadian armed forces are not designed to deter an invasion by its neighbor. The armed forces of most Latin American countries are unwilling and unlikely to give up this last mission.

Internationalist peacekeeping service under United Nations auspices—a public good—may provoke tensions between the sending country's civilian government and its armed forces. This suggests a third risk of participation in such missions, as highlighted by Carlos Romero's chapter. Romero calls attention to the critical importance of securing the domestic bases of support for an activist foreign policy before as well as while engaging in such a policy. He demonstrates that Venezuela's international engagement lacked sufficient support within the country. The civilian government had paid insufficient attention to explaining its activist foreign policy to its own military and it had failed to equip its own armed forces for the tasks they would be asked to perform.

In 1989 and 1990, Romero shows, the Venezuelan armed forces deployed hundreds of military officers and troops to Honduras and Nicaragua as peacekeepers under United Nations forces to help monitor a cease-fire in the Nicaraguan civil war and, eventually, to help to disarm the Nicaraguan Resistance (the "Contras") in the aftermath of the Sandinista electoral defeat and the inauguration of President Violeta Chamorro. They were part of an important mission—the first time that a Military Observer Group operated in

the Americas and the first time worldwide that such a group would be used to demobilize and disarm irregular forces. Nonetheless, the Venezuelan officers and soldiers lacked the equipment necessary to carry out their mission; they had to ask other countries for assistance.

As professional Venezuelan officers reflected on this experience, some wondered about the competence and even the legitimacy of a government of Venezuela, and its high military command, that would send the nation's military on a mission for which they were unprepared and which required "begging" from others to carry it out. These circumstances fed into the unhappiness of some Venezuelan military officers with the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez and contributed to their participation in the two failed military coup attempts carried out in Venezuela in 1992. The destabilization of Venezuelan democracy was, therefore, in part the unintended consequence of having generated an international public good—service in Nicaragua under UN auspices.

The estrangement of the Venezuelan military from civilian authorities did not begin with Venezuela's deployment of hundreds of soldiers to secure the peace in Nicaragua, nor was the deployment in itself the decisive factor in launching the subsequent coup attempts, but the decision to deploy troops and the practical operational problems of the implementation of this deployment contributed to military estrangement.

The Venezuelan case is sobering. Cooperative security and UN peacekeeping missions begin at home. Civilian governments require the professional advice of their own armed forces to be able to serve overseas in any mission, and above all they must explain and seek to persuade the military that such engagement is in the nation's interest. Absent such crucial steps, participation in United Nations missions may undermine democratic political stability, as it nearly did in Venezuela.

Latin America's experience with substantial participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions is too recent and too limited to shed sufficient light on a key question: does such participation help to consolidate democratic institutions in the sending country? At present, the evidence is inconclusive. Such participation contributed to weakening constitutional government in Venezuela but seems to have helped to strengthen it in Argentina. The relationship between security, democracy, and peace, of course, goes beyond participation in UN missions; we turn now to examine it.

Democracy and Peace: A Bias for the Status Quo?

Rare as war typically is between countries governed by civilian constitutional governments, and rare as war has been in South America, Ecuador and

Peru fought each other for a week in 1981 and for several weeks in 1995 while they were both governed by constitutional presidents—civilians who won free and competitive elections. Short of war, severe militarized interstate disputes have also occurred between democratic regimes (Venezuela and Colombia over maritime demarcation in the late 1980s, for example). As David Mares puts it, countries in Latin America that we commonly define as democratic are unaffected in their decision to use force in their foreign policy by whether or not the country with which they have a dispute is democratic. In South America, republics do go to war against each other.

As the chapters by Mares and Desch make clear, therefore, the spread of democracy throughout Latin America may have an indeterminate relationship to the maintenance of the peace. The infrequency of war in this region cannot be explained in terms of long traditions of consolidated democratic polities; on the contrary, the reduction in the incidence of war was first achieved in the 1880s—prior to the extension of the suffrage and the generalized acceptance of the practice of free and competitive elections. Democracy alone does not guarantee the peace of the region; democratic and nondemocratic governments have engaged in practices that make war less likely, as noted, for example, in the discussion of South America's diplomatic transformation. Nor are democracies any less likely than nondemocracies to engage in militarized interstate disputes with each other.

There are additional indications that democratic procedures in Latin American and Caribbean countries may make it more difficult to settle longstanding territorial disputes. Consider the effects of certain procedures and institutions that are central to the notion of constitutional democracy: the role of Congress, parties, and elections. In the 1980s and 1990s, several attempts to settle territorial disputes failed in Congress because of the adversarial competitiveness of political parties.

Venezuela's democratic politics, for example, has made it much more difficult to resolve the boundary dispute with Colombia.²⁸ The Venezuelan Congress has helped to derail several attempts to negotiate and settle this dispute.²⁹

In May 1993, Chile and Peru signed the Lima Convention to resolve all outstanding disputes related to their boundary. In Peru, the democratic opposition to President Fujimori seized on this agreement to weaken Fujimori's political standing during the early stages of his campaign for reelection. In 1994, Fujimori had to withdraw the treaty from parliamentary consideration to prevent its defeat.

In 1991, Presidents Aylwin and Menem agreed to settle the twenty-four outstanding boundary disputes between Chile and Argentina. Twenty-two were handled readily through executive action; the Laguna del Desierto dis-

pute was submitted to binding international arbitration, won by Argentina in October 1995. The delimitation of the Southern Cone glaciers had to be submitted to Congress, however, because the treaties in force did not cover the subject. In the Argentine Congress, the Radical Party opposed ratification; it obtained enough support from Peronist members of Congress to prevent it. This dispute remains unsettled.

Similar problems concerning the relationship between democratic institutions and procedures, on the one hand, and the making of peace, on the other, are evident in Central America. Consider the example of relations between Belize and Guatemala.³⁰ After years of formal and informal negotiations, on August 15, 1991, Guatemala recognized Belize's independence, which had been declared nearly ten years earlier. In tacit exchange, Belize agreed to some changes in its maritime boundaries to satisfy Guatemalan desires for access to the Caribbean Sea. The changes would allow Guatemalan ships to use a navigation channel in the Gulf of Honduras that would otherwise have been exclusively Belizean. In May 1993, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano, who had reached the settlement with Belize, was forced to resign from office after his attempt to stage a coup against the Congress, the courts, and the political parties failed. In the weeks that followed, the successor civilian government publicly considered revising the settlement with Belize, though the issue subsequently subsided. In the meantime, an election campaign was under way in Belize.

On June 30, 1993, the opposition United Democratic Party won the Belizean national elections and assumed office. As he had promised during the election campaign, the new prime minister, Manuel Esquivel, moved to suspend the Maritime Areas Act that had given Guatemala the previously negotiated unimpeded access to the Caribbean Sea. Alarmed, the U.S. and British governments pressured the Esquivel government not to cancel the act outright; the United Kingdom threatened to pull out of its defense agreement with Belize if Esquivel were to proceed. Esquivel backed off. He appointed a study group to look into the issue. This incident was contained thanks to the coercion of the U.S. and British governments. Nonetheless, the democratic electoral process destabilized the security relationship between Belize and Guatemala. And the problem remains unresolved: In August 1997, troops from Belize crossed into territory claimed by Guatemala, and peopled by Guatemalans, to destroy crops.³¹

Some democratic procedures have served to make and consolidate the peace. Consider the most dramatic example. The 1984 Argentine-Chilean Treaty concerning the Beagle Channel faced considerable opposition from the armed forces and from others in Argentina. President Raúl Alfonsín chose to submit the treaty to a national plebiscite. The overwhelming sup-

port for the treaty, registered in that plebiscite, was decisive; it enabled the Argentine government to accept its "loss" in the Beagle Channel for the sake of a far greater long-term gain in interstate security and the prospects of cooperation with Chile.

Paradoxically perhaps, the fact that the military governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile began the rapprochement with their neighbors augurs well for the prospects of the consolidation of peace. Democratically elected civilian presidents were able to continue and build on the decisions of the armed forces to shy away from war. In Argentina, the policy of improving relations with Brazil, begun by the military government, has been subsequently developed by governments of the two major parties, the Radicals and the Peronistas. In Brazil, the policy of improving relations with Argentina, also begun by the military government, has been developed thereafter by four civilian presidents who span a broad spectrum of political opinion. And in Chile, the rapprochement with Argentina, begun by the government of General Augusto Pinochet, was advanced further by the successive governments of the Concertación Democrática, a coalition constituted of parties of the Center and Center-Left. The process of democratization, and the results of electoral turnover, confirmed the policies begun by the military governments and converted what could have been narrowly based decisions of specific political leaders or parties into the policies of the respective states toward each other. Democratic procedures made interstate commitments to peace more credible.

These observations suggest the hypothesis that, with regard to interstate security issues in Latin America and the Caribbean, democracies exhibit a status quo bias: they find it difficult to alter the status quo. They find it difficult to make the peace (though as the Beagle dispute settlement illustrates, not impossible). They find it difficult to break the peace (though as the Ecuador-Peru conflicts of 1981 and 1995 show, not impossible either). The most successful pattern of peacemaking and peacekeeping since the 1970s, evident especially in the Southern Cone, has begun with a military government and been continued by a civilian government. For a secure peace, in still fragile democracies the armed forces must be included in the consensus agreeing to make and keep the peace; once this has occurred, constitutional governments sustain the peace. In this fashion, democracy has contributed in a more subtle way to the consolidation of peace and to reduce the likelihood that democratic governments would wage war against each other.

The examples of partially frustrated efforts to settle all outstanding territorial disputes between Chile and Peru, Argentina and Chile, and Guatemala and Belize, moreover, call attention to an additional factor that might make it more feasible for democracies to contribute to ensure the peace: the need

for government and opposition parties to agree to the broad outlines of a settlement in advance of its formal submission to Congress. Such agreements have become fairly common with regard to economic policy decisions but have yet to become the norm with regard to interstate security. Interpartisan agreements "commit the future." In supporting the settlement, today's opposition effectively guarantees that the accord will endure even if the opposition were to win the next national elections.

In the Western Hemisphere, democracy alone does not make or keep the peace. Democratic contributions to the maintenance of peace require active political efforts to obtain the support of the armed forces and the civilian opposition in order to engage neighboring countries in a diplomatic process that may in due course secure the peace.

Inter-American Security Relations

Inter-American military institutions and procedures are legacies of international wars that have ended and of threats to domestic order whose significance has vanished or declined greatly.³² Founded in January 1942 to contribute to the defense of the Americas during the Second World War, the Inter-American Defense Board precedes both the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) and the Organization of American States (OAS).³³ The board has had an ill-defined relationship to the OAS. The board's members are military officers on active duty. In 1962, the Inter-American Defense College was founded. Its curriculum focuses on the strategic social, economic, political, and military problems of the Americas. The students are colonels and lieutenant colonels (or equivalent ranks) from the board's member countries.³⁴ The service chiefs of the various countries also meet on a regular basis around a common theme. These fora include the Conference of American Armies, the Inter-American Naval Conference, and the System of Cooperation of American Air Forces. Another forum is the Joint U.S.-Mexican Defense Commission. In addition, there are regularly scheduled routine military exercises for the air forces and the navies; Operation UNITAS for the navies of the hemisphere has been a major, visible operation for many years. (See the discussion in Buchanan's chapter.)

In democracies, the armed forces should be subordinate to civilian authority, but none of the multilateral institutions and procedures mentioned above are formally subordinate to their proper civilian authority: The Inter-American Defense Board and College are not subordinate to the Organization of American States.³⁵ The OAS, alas, bore some responsibility for this failure; not until 1992 did the OAS establish a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security (its first president was Argentine Ambassador to the OAS

Hernán Patiño Meyer). Similarly, the army and air force chiefs from various countries meet, but not until July 1995 had the defense ministers ever met. Though the United States has civilian secretaries of the army and of the air force, they do not even attend the inter-American conferences of the respective military services they lead.

Earlier in this chapter, I note that the mechanisms for cooperating over security issues are still underinstitutionalized in the Southern Cone and underfunded in Central America and the Caribbean. The inter-American military organizations and procedures may be overinstitutionalized, however. They have successfully resisted efforts to change them even when the case for change is compelling.

The fate of these institutional and procedural legacies was off the formal agenda at the first-ever Defense Ministerial meeting held at Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1995. For example, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry referred to the need to "support an expanded role for the Inter-American Defense College for the education of civilians in national security studies," but the six principles agreed to at Williamsburg did not address these issues.³⁶ The second Defense Ministerial, held at Bariloche, Argentina, in October 1996, once again touched on the role of the college in fostering defense studies, but the Bariloche declaration failed to grapple with a key question: how to properly subordinate this college to international civilian authority.³⁷

Holding these Defense Ministerial meetings, nonetheless, has been important and useful. In many countries that have recently adopted the policy of appointing civilians as defense ministers, the meetings contributed to the legitimacy and standing of this new practice. In Brazil, which lacks a defense ministry, the meetings added to the urgency of considering the utility of effecting a change in the organization of the cabinet and in the government's relation to the armed forces. Everywhere, the meetings required the military services to cooperate to prepare for the event, and nearly everywhere as well the military services and the defense ministry had to cooperate with the foreign ministry.³⁸

Thus even modest changes in procedures can generate important consequences. Further changes in inter-American institutions and procedures (subordinating the Inter-American Defense Board to the OAS, altering the curriculum of the Inter-American Defense College to empower civilians to govern, inserting civilian participation in other hemispheric meetings where security issues are discussed) may well have salutary effects for the consolidation of security and democracy.

Yet these institutions and procedures are unlikely to be reformed unless the U.S. government is prepared to commit substantial attention and effort to such changes. Desch's chapter argues forcefully and persuasively that U.S.

policy attention, interest, and commitment over security issues in Latin America are likely to decline substantially in the years ahead as a consequence of the end of the cold war in Europe.

In the short run, however, there has been considerable U.S. attention to security issues in the Americas. As the cold war was ending, in December 1989 the United States invaded Panama. In September 1994 the United States intervened in Haiti under authorization from the United Nations. U.S. and hemispheric concern over the timing and form of a political transition in Cuba has heightened. The United States continues its military presence in Honduras through Joint Task Force-Bravo, as Sereseres reminds us.³⁹ The U.S. government strongly supports Latin American participation in confidence-building measures and in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Defense Secretary Perry even committed the scarcest of all resources—his own time—to focus U.S. military attention on Latin America (he stepped down in January 1997 as the second Clinton administration began).

There remains, nevertheless, a mismatch between several U.S. objectives and the self-perceptions of most Latin American armed forces (except, perhaps, those of Argentina). Most of the armed forces of the region are not yet ready to sign on to the stated U.S. preference for cooperative security and participation in United Nations missions as the key defining features of the military establishments of Latin America and the Caribbean.⁴⁰ Indeed, some of the armed forces in Central and South America are not even fully committed to civilian supremacy over the military within the context of constitutional democracy. Which vision of the future will prevail remains uncertain, though much still depends on the willingness of the United States to make a sustained commitment to foster security and democracy in the Americas.

Conclusions

"The primary function of Latin American armed forces has always been the maintenance of internal order." This was the operative sentence of the December 1955 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate for Latin America, the first since the end of Harry Truman's presidency and the last before Fidel Castro's landing in eastern Cuba to begin an insurgency.⁴¹ It was accurate in many ways, but it underestimated—as similar attitudes have always underestimated—the self-perception of the armed forces of Latin American countries that they play a fundamental role in the defense of the homeland. More importantly, these typical U.S. views have contributed over time to U.S. unpreparedness for events such as the Ecuador-Peru war in 1995.

The diplomatic transformation in the Southern Cone and the intermestic transformation in Central America and the Caribbean have closed as well as

opened chapters of insecurity and violence in the history of these subregions. Especially in Central America and the Caribbean, international nonstate and domestic substate violence have risen dramatically to threaten international and internal stability, while some legacies of territorial and boundary disputes remain evident in these subregions and in South America.

Giant steps have been taken in Central and South America since the late 1970s to promote international security and consolidate the peace. These policies have occurred concurrently with the region's democratization but they preceded it; their enduring success is not guaranteed by the fact of democratization alone. The consolidation of the peace continues to require sustained political attention to build civic-military coalitions to support it.

In its early stages, however, the attempts to consolidate democracy may increase the risk of interstate conflict. As democratic governments seek to reduce the likelihood of military interference or coups, they urge their armed forces to look for missions beyond the country's boundaries. In so doing, they risk international conflicts even as they hope to reduce the risk of domestic conflict. In order to make the consolidation of democracy compatible with the consolidation of peace, the Americas require domestic and international leadership to resolve extant disputes and to secure the bases for civilian supremacy over the armed forces within countries and in the governance of inter-American security institutions.

Contrary to the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate just quoted, in order to secure democracy the U.S. government should recognize the continuing, perhaps rising importance of the external missions of Latin America's armed forces, to collaborate with them professionally, and to help focus them on a sustained basis on addressing cooperatively the joint problems of international security within and beyond the hemisphere. Only then will it be possible to break out of the security dilemmas that still face the region, and only then will security, peace, and democracy stand a good chance of success throughout the Americas.