

THE OTHER MIRROR

GRAND THEORY THROUGH THE
LENS OF LATIN AMERICA

*Miguel Angel Centeno and
Fernando López-Alves, Editors*

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Chapter Seven

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON AND THE LATIN AMERICAN STATE

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ

“THE MOST IMPORTANT political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.” So begins Samuel P. Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies*,¹ one of the most widely influential and insightful books on comparative politics ever written.² Its concern is normative as well as analytic. In a retrospective comment on his own writing, Huntington has noted, “I wrote [*Political Order*] because I thought political order was a good thing.” Moreover, he added, his “purpose was to develop a general social science theory of why, how, and under what circumstances order could and could not be achieved.”³

Huntington’s concern with order, and his apparent downgrading of the significance of the distinction between democracy and dictatorship, easily earned him a reputation as a conservative; some used much harsher epithets.⁴ Often lost in such crude labels was Huntington’s equally clear understanding that the quality of order also mattered. Order was, for example, a prerequisite for liberty. “Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited.”⁵ He demonstrated his very substantial interest in liberty and democracy by publishing a book on the subject, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, some two decades later.

The reputation for conservatism had one important effect, however. Among Latin Americanists, Huntington was read but, for the most part, not followed. At the time of the publication of *Political Order*, the subfield of the study of Latin American politics was about to be overrun by scholarship on international dependency. A great many scholars of Latin America at the time, moreover, were not enamored of the political order

prevailing in their own countries and thus were not instinctively attracted to a book for which order was both an analytic starting point and a key political value. And, as we shall see, the book does not feature one single approach to the study of politics but several, thus making it difficult to emulate—and most Latin Americanists did not try.

And yet, exclusive attention to Huntington's normative concerns, albeit appropriate in the assessment of the work of any scholar, can get in the way of appreciating the eclectic range embodied in *Political Order*. This book resists easy ideological classification. Depending on the chapter and its passage, Samuel Huntington could be called a Marxist, a Leninist, a Fabian, a modernizationist, an institutionalist, or, as some might say today, "whatever."

In this work, I seek to assess several of Huntington's key ideas especially in the light of pertinent experiences from Latin America.⁶ First, I argue that different segments of *Political Order* represent rather different intellectual approaches. Parts of the work are best read, indeed, as Marxist, Leninist, and Fabian, not as conservative tracts, though in each reading the concern for order endures. This "cafeteria" of academic approaches makes it difficult to emulate the book, to found a school of thought, or to develop a method for research according to its prescriptions. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, intellectual "open-mindedness" was not in vogue among Latin Americanists.⁷ Huntington's eclecticism made for a much more interesting and insightful book but, among Latin Americanists, a less influential one. His approach in this book, therefore, enhanced its intrinsic intellectual interest and value, but it reduced the likelihood of its impact on this subfield.

Second, I argue that the conceptual core of the book is both innovative and problematic. Huntington sought to be an iconoclast, breaking in significant ways with prevailing scholarly opinion. His emphasis and focus on politics and on the institutions of the political system turned a new page for scholarship on comparative politics. Nevertheless, he remained recognizably within a "modernization" approach through his emphasis on process and his surprising relative inattention to the institutions "inside" the state. The conceptual apparatus of the work leads away from the state toward the study of political conflict, not to an understanding of the state itself. His residual "modernizationism" did not endear him to a Latin Americanist community seeking to flee that school of thought. And his relative inattention to the state made his work less helpful to scholars seeking to understand the rise of powerful and repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s.

Third, I conclude with an analysis of Huntington's principal intellectual contribution, namely, the study of political parties—a contribution from whose recognition most Latin Americanists would gain much.

Huntington argued that it was parties, not just the clever, not just slowly changing structures, and not political culture that can give both continuity and motion to politics, and he specified how and under what circumstances various outcomes occur. In this regard, his work surpassed the prevailing literature and itself has not yet been surpassed.

THREE FACES OF HUNTINGTON'S SCHOLARSHIP

Huntington as Marxist

"Military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon . . . : the general politicization of social forces and institutions."⁸ Huntington argues that military coups are principally instances of raw social conflict. For him, it is "fallacious to attempt to explain military intervention in politics primarily by reference to the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officers doing the intervening."⁹ Instead, military coups and military rule are the product of changing social class coalitions.

In oligarchic praetorianism, he argues, the dominant social forces are the landlords, the upper clergy, and military officers. With the emergence of the middle class, however, a new coalition develops in which the middle class becomes the dominant actor; younger officers are the agents of this new class coalition. Huntington called these "breakthrough" coups. His examples of oligarchic and breakthrough cases are often drawn from the Latin American experience. For instance, he counts as breakthrough coups those in the cycle, begun in Chile in the mid-1920s, that continued in various countries until the eve of the cold war; his use of evidence is consistent with that of his Latin Americanist sources.¹⁰

Circumstances change with the rise of organized labor and its entry into politics, Huntington claims. To block the attempt to transform the structures of power, privilege, and society, the middle class calls on the armed forces to stage "veto" coups to overthrow labor-leaning governments or to prevent their consolidation of power. Huntington explains the difference in the effects of military coups as a function of a changed social structure: "The more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military." The change in the role and social effects of the military in Argentina from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century is his principal Latin American example.¹¹

This approach to the study of military intervention stands in some contrast to Huntington's own prior work on the military. In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argued that the likelihood of stable or unstable

civil-military relations hinges on relations of power, professionalism, and ideology.¹² Institutions and ideas help to shape and govern the pattern of civil-military relations. And yet, these concepts are absent from the comparable discussion in *Political Order*.

The Huntington of *The Soldier and the State* thus serves as the best critic of the Huntington of *Political Order*. In the latter book, Huntington's relative inattention to the role of institutions and ideas in his analysis of military coups left him somewhat unprepared to understand either the Peruvian military coup of 1968 and the "left-reformist" government that followed it or the right-wing bureaucratic-authoritarian coups that began in Brazil in 1964 and spread elsewhere in South America over the next decade. In Huntington's scheme, the "Peruvian experiment" begun in 1968 is difficult to explain because Peru's social structure already featured the class coalitions that are supposed to lead to veto coups. How, then, could a military government in Peru seek to change the social structure, overthrow a middle-class president and weaken middle-class power, and provide opportunities (albeit limited) for the participation of the urban poor?¹³

The Brazilian political regime established in 1964 had, to be sure, an important class character at its origin, but its establishment and development can be understood only through comparable attention to the important role of military socialization, professionalism, mission, and ideology—concepts relatively absent from the analysis of military coups in *Political Order*, though close to the heart of the argument in *The Soldier and the State*. Soon after the 1964 coup, the Brazilian military turned against many of its social class allies from the time of the coup. The new bureaucratic-authoritarian regime sought to establish its independence from Brazilian society and promulgate a set of rules and institutions derived substantially from preferences within the institution of the armed forces.¹⁴

The oddity, therefore, in Huntington's admittedly brief flirtation with intellectual Marxism is that, as an analyst of Latin America, he might have been more influential had he not changed his scholarly views. Nevertheless, Huntington's account of the pattern of Latin American military intervention was more complete and systematic than anything hitherto available. His scholarly discussion of coups in Latin America was superior to what Latin Americanists had been writing. Only subsequent to *Political Order*, and in dialogue with it, did other scholars improve on Huntington's analysis.¹⁵

Huntington as Leninist

"Revolutions produce little liberty, but they are history's most expeditious means of producing fraternity, equality, and identity." This is so,

Huntington continues, because "revolution . . . involves moral renewal"; indeed, "every revolution is a Puritan revolution" because of its commitment to ferret out corruption. As a result, "material deprivations, which would have been insufferable under the old regime, are proof of the strength of the new one. The less their food and material comfort the more people come to value the political and ideological accomplishments of the revolution for which they are sacrificing so much."¹⁶ To be successful, however, a revolution must give birth to a revolutionary party.

Huntington celebrates the efficacy of the Leninist party as a means to construct political order and subordinate social forces—the very forces that could otherwise promote military coups. "Lenin and Mao were right when they stressed the primacy of a political organization independent of social forces and yet manipulating them to seek its ends."¹⁷ Indeed, he notes, "The effectiveness of the Leninist model can also be seen comparatively in the two instances where it and alternative approaches were applied side by side to the same people with the same culture, with roughly the same level of economic development, and in adjoining territory: Korea and Vietnam." Huntington unequivocally asserts that the North in each case had achieved greater "real political stability . . . which led one to have confidence that when Ho and Kim passed from the scene neither country would suffer the political disruption and violence which followed the departure from office of Syngman Rhee and Ngo Dinh Diem."¹⁸ On that forecast, Huntington was analytically correct and prescient.

With regard to Latin America, Huntington compares the Mexican and Bolivian revolutions to make the point that the first succeeded but the second one failed to create political order. First, Bolivia's revolution involved too little violence. Violence is the midwife of order in Huntington's analysis; only after a "nasty, brutish" period of Hobbesian violence do citizens long for order, and only violence can eliminate the contending claimants for power who otherwise become sources of future disorder. Second, Bolivia lacked in statesmanship; every president maneuvered to retain or to return to power. Mexico's firm rule of no presidential reelection, in contrast, stabilized and institutionalized revolutionary power, he argues. Third, the ruling party in Mexico succeeded in subordinating social forces; the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia did not. Finally, Bolivia was relatively free of antforeign nationalism, while Mexico bristled in such feelings. Public support for revolutionary leaders can be mobilized more easily when it can be presented as a defense of the homeland.

Huntington's analysis of Bolivia is consistent with what Bolivianists have written.¹⁹ His analysis of Mexico, however, does not fit his own argument very well, though his comparison between Mexico and Bolivia is apt and illuminating. Contrary to the gist of his argument, the Mexican Revolution did not produce a Leninist party. Mexico's ruling party was

founded through a deal among military chieftains and other elites. It did not have party members in any meaningful sense for most of its history. It was never an exemplar of moral renewal, much less puritanism, and it never exalted the virtues of sacrifice.²⁰ Whatever the merits of Huntington's analysis of Leninism might be in Europe or East Asia, there is no clear correspondence between it and the one Latin American case (Mexico) that he discusses in greatest detail. Mexico's ruling party created political order by means other than those emphasized by Huntington in this study.

Huntington did not attempt to apply his analysis to revolution in Cuba, but, had he done so, it would have fit much better than it did for Mexico. The level of violence involved in the 1950s in Batista's overthrow was limited, but it rose much higher during the first half of the 1960s; relative to Cuba's population, the revolutionary government in the 1960s jailed more political prisoners and held them in prison longer than would any bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in Latin America. The creation of the new Cuban Communist Party was somewhat delayed, but by the mid-1960s this party had most of the attributes of ruling "vanguard" Leninist parties: it was small, selective, and mobilizational; commanded primacy over social forces; and brooked no opposition. In the 1960s, the Cuban revolutionary government certainly attempted moral renewal; it was strikingly and aggressively puritanical in its approach to homosexuals, for example. This revolutionary regime confronted the United States, was assertively nationalist, and exalted the virtue of sacrifice on behalf of the homeland and future generations.²¹

The legacy of the revolutionary 1960s and the role of the Leninist party are among the reasons that the Cuban political regime survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cuban leaders have also long been blessed with timely U.S. government actions that have helped them to rally patriotic Cubans to the leadership's side; these range from the 1961 invasion at Playa Girón (the Bay of Pigs) to the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996. You need not believe us, Cuban leaders have told their people, when we argue that the United States is ready to invade us (1961) or cares more about property rights than about your personal well-being (1996)—just look at the actions of its government! Huntington's variables, in short, explain well the consolidation and survival of Fidel Castro's government.

Huntington's faith in the Leninist party and his comparison of the two Koreas and the two Vietnams, cited earlier, also seemed to mark him as an anticulturalist. The point of the comparison, after all, was that culture did not lead to comparable institutions and comparable outcomes in the two Koreas and the two Vietnams; culture neither shaped their destinies nor prevented intracivilizational clashes. On the contrary, specific institu-

tions reshaped the life of each half of the nation to bring about quite different results. From a reading of these passages in *Political Order*, one would not have forecast Huntington's reincarnation in the mid-1990s as the author of *The Clash of Civilizations*, in which culture on a grand scale is a key explanation of human behavior.²²

Huntington as Fabian

"Revolutions are rare. Reform, perhaps, is even rarer. And neither is necessary. Countries may simply stagnate."²³ Notwithstanding such a gloomy initial assessment of the prospects for reform, Huntington provides a subtle account of the likelihood for and strategies of reform. In contrast to his structuralist and coalitionist analysis of military interventions and his paean to the Leninist party as an organization, Huntington's study of reform focuses, above all, on individuals who enact change, often through non-Leninist parties.

Although reform may be rare, would-be reformers can be found in quite different life circumstances. They could be Social Democrats or Christian Democrats; Huntington's Latin American examples include Venezuela's Rómulo Betancourt, Peru's Fernando Belaúnde, and Chile's Eduardo Frei Montalva. They could be military officers, among whom, however, he cites no Latin American. For most reformers, military or civilian, Huntington counsels a Fabian strategy, which he describes as "the foot-in-the-door approach of concealing his aims, separating the reforms from each other, and pushing for only one change at a time."²⁴

Huntington identifies a problem for reformers that, he suggests, was common in Latin America. Reform in highly urbanized settings may be a catalyst for revolution. The city is the permanent source of opposition to the government. University students are likely to oppose the government, Huntington argues—any government. The same is true, albeit to a less dramatic extent, for other urban middle-class groups. In this fashion, Huntington accounts for problems in establishing political order in the 1960s in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Reform should not be undertaken, therefore, to pacify urban demands, for such an endeavor will fail and will waste politically valuable resources.

Huntington's strongest case on behalf of reform, therefore, bypasses urban settings and focuses on the countryside, where reform is a substitute for revolution and, therefore, is more likely to foster political order. Huntington claims that land reform is the most likely means to create and sustain political stability. Peasants who do not fear that they would be evicted from their lands or suffer ruinous taxation and prices are likely to remain loyal to the country's rulers. He celebrates the conservatizing

results of land reform in Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela in the mid-twentieth century, and, indeed, his analytic point is impressive.

Huntington's general advocacy of land reform illustrates well why reform may be so rare. Land reform should appeal to conservatives who are the political heirs of Benjamin Disraeli, but often conservatives are the very landlords who may be dispossessed. The political and economic interests of such would-be reformers are at odds.

As applied to Latin America, Huntington proves prescient once again when he forecasts severe conflicts over land tenure in Guatemala and El Salvador. He foresees comparably severe conflicts in Peru and Brazil. It is not clear, however, which variables explain why this forecast was correct for the first two but less so for the latter two. Huntington does argue that land reform is more difficult in democratic regimes mainly because all reform requires a greater concentration of power than such regimes permit. In democratic parliaments, landlord forces can often stop or undermine a land reform program. "Latin American legislatures have also traditionally been the graveyards of land reform measures," Huntington wrote accurately.²⁵ This helps to explain the relative failure of land reform efforts in Brazil and Peru before the 1964 and 1968 coups (and in other countries) but makes it all the more intriguing why elites in El Salvador and Guatemala, which had concentrated power sufficient to carry out reform, failed to anticipate in timely fashion the severe conflict that would break out in their respective countries, in part over land tenure issues, and act according to Huntington's recommendations.

Huntington's analysis helps, indeed, to explain why reform has been rare in Latin America. And yet it is in part because of the way he defines reform that its rarity is highlighted. Huntington is interested in reform in this work only insofar as it consolidates or undermines political order. Reforms for other purposes—improving the quality of government services, reducing poverty, reorienting the direction of economic policy—are not pertinent to his book. These other kinds of reform did take place in several Latin American countries at various moments while Huntington was writing his book, or prior to it. In particular, he ignores important reform efforts that took place in Argentina and Chile under the Arturo Illia and Eduardo Frei presidencies.²⁶ Similarly, the economic reforms implemented in many countries in the 1990s, intended to improve the quality of economic performance, would not have been within the purview of Huntington's analysis; such reforms become pertinent in his analysis only when they are directly related to the consolidation of newly established democracies. For these reasons, Huntington's reforms are rare: he has defined the category so that examples are observable only infrequently.

BETWEEN MODERNIZATIONISTS AND INSTITUTIONALISTS

In 1965, Huntington published an article, on the subject that would lead eventually to *Political Order*, which brought him instant notoriety because he broke with the prevailing scholarly consensus in studies of comparative politics. Huntington feels especially proud that he punctured the optimism that, in his view, was undermining comparative scholarship at the time.²⁷

That scholarly consensus focused principally on behavior outside of the institutions of government. In the work represented best by Gabriel Almond, there was an attempt to specify the structures and functions of political processes. Almond, alone and in consecutive collaboration with James Coleman and G. Bingham Powell, also sought to understand the "input" and "output" capabilities of political systems, though there was much less attention to the processes within the black box of the state. "Political development" was the label given to the process of political change in countries outside Western Europe and North America.²⁸ A different scholarly tradition emphasized the importance of values, personality, and changes in them; Daniel Lerner and Lucian Pye were noteworthy exponents.²⁹ A third scholarly approach emphasized social processes and the complex and interrelated set of changes that they represented and brought about; Karl Deutsch was a main proponent.³⁰

These and other scholars were aware of the difficulty of bringing about change, of the resistance to change, and of the setbacks on the path to change once it had begun. Nonetheless, in each of these writings there was a clear sense of movement toward something called "modernization" or "development." In 1965, Huntington broke with that assumption in the very title of his article "Political Development and Political Decay," whose main point was disarmingly simple: decay was conceptually just as possible as development, and empirically no less frequent.³¹ This work launched a process of scholarly reexamination that would weaken the consensus in comparative politics that had come to be known as the modernization school. In *Political Order*, the words *political development* and *political decay* were for the most part quietly deleted, purged to avoid teleological temptations.³²

And yet Huntington's argument in *Political Order* retained substantial components of the modernization approach. In the first chapter, the analysis builds on the relationship between "social mobilization," identified as Deutsch had done, on the one hand, and economic development, on the other. If social mobilization outruns the growth of the economy, the result is social frustration. Should it, in turn, grow more quickly than the

opportunities for social mobility, then political participation will increase. Political instability will result if political participation spreads more quickly than political institutionalization. Only in these later stages of the analysis do political institutions come in, though they do so decisively.

Huntington's approach to institutions remained markedly processual, clearly responsive to the dominant perspectives of the modernization school. Just as students of society wrote about social mobilization and those of the economy about economic development, so he would focus on political institutionalization. This was an important and creative scholarly contribution at the time, but it also set a limit to his iconoclasm: he was interested in processes akin to those of the modernization school, often in the very terms framed by those scholars, even if he was much more skeptical than other scholars that these processes would generate institutionalization in most countries.

The first chapter of *Political Order* is a clarion call to study political institutions. Huntington identifies several concepts—adaptability, coherence, complexity, and autonomy—to assess the extent of institutionalization and writes at some length about them as a way to think about the problems of political order and disorder. He proposes operational measures for these concepts, but, surprisingly, for the most part they are not systematically employed in the rest of the book.

One reason may be that the concepts are more difficult to employ than it appears at first sight. Arguably, for example, an increase in an entity's complexity may well reduce its coherence. If so, the two concepts cannot both be part of one and the same process of institutionalization. Adaptability and autonomy, in turn, are not the exclusive property of an organization but are relational variables. Only in the relationship between an organization and something outside it can we tell whether the organization is adaptable and autonomous. The problem thus arises that adaptability and autonomy may include within each concept the behavior that they seek to explain. In order to know whether X is independent from Y, for instance, we need to know something about both X and Y; the concept of autonomy is not a sole property of X, nor can autonomy explain the relationship between X and Y.

Each of the four concepts, nonetheless, is analytically valuable. The ensemble of four focuses scholars on different aspects of a process of institutionalization, and some scholars have attempted to apply these ideas empirically.³³ The difficulty characteristically arises when one attempts to use them jointly and systematically as part of one and the same multifaceted concept.

Huntington does not merely drop after the first chapter the conceptual apparatus that he builds therein; he also drops attention to the institu-

tions of the state. In subsequent chapters, he explores contrasting politico-cultural traditions, the role of leadership in reform of both traditional polities and other forms of regimes, the likelihood of military coups and revolutions, and the role of political parties. The institutions of the state are notable for their absence. To be sure, there is sporadic attention, to the bureaucracy but no sustained study. The armed forces are not analyzed in their own terms but only, as already noted, as potential politicized praetorian actors. Constitutional organs such as courts, legislatures, or the role of executives (as distinct from the role of individual leaders) are also discussed only in the context of commenting on other matters. Formal electoral procedures are not addressed in any depth. The word *state* does not appear in the index, nor is it employed as a concept. The word *government*, much more in vogue at time, appears often but it is not the object of Huntington's theorizing.

Political Order is a child of its times. As Almond, Pye, and Deutsch did in their own work in their own fashion, *Political Order*, too, emphasizes processes that poke at, provoke, envelop, threaten, bolster, weaken, or strengthen "the state" but without much looking inside the black box. Huntington's *Political Order* might be described as "closet modernizationism."

Its principal difference from the then prevailing scholarship, and its signal merit, was its sustained attention to the *political*, not just to processes that impinge on politics, and specifically to political leaders and political institutions. As I will note in a later section, its emphasis on political parties is innovative and in many ways pathbreaking. Its concern with the institutions of the political system, even if not necessarily those of the state, was a major advance over the sociologicistic and economic tenor of the scholarship then produced by political scientists. And his insistence on the need to study institutions would assist other scholars in years to come to give greater attention to the institutions of the state itself.³⁴

THE SURPRISINGLY MISSING VARIABLES

Huntington first made his reputation as a student of the military; soon he would add the study of international security and defense to his scholarly laurels.³⁵ And yet international variables are virtually absent from *Political Order*, which includes only one brief discussion of the impact of war on state formation: "War was the great stimulus to state building."³⁶ Had Huntington in this book developed this theme, with which he was so familiar from his previous work, he might have come much closer to a theory of the state in *Political Order*. And he would have formulated a more complete theory of revolution.

As noted earlier, Huntington writes about the eventual utility of revolutionary war to consolidate political order in Mexico. He might have speculated on whether the wars of late-nineteenth-century South America contributed to the consolidation of states while the "long (interstate) peace" of twentieth-century Latin America permitted the armed forces to become politicized, depriving central state leaders and institutions of the means to build national cohesion, in contrast to the experiences in Europe. He might have wondered whether greater international threats to the survival of the state might have stimulated quicker improvements in literacy, in health care, or in the development of manufacturing, as well as military professionalism, as did occur in European countries subject to interstate war.

Nor does Huntington pay much attention to the impact of international variables in the areas of trade, finance, or direct foreign investment. He leaves that intellectual terrain unoccupied—fertile ground for the writings of the "dependency" school that were already under way.³⁷

Had Huntington paid more attention to international factors, he might have had greater impact on Latin Americanist scholarship, whose focus was then turning sharply to privilege international variables as the key to explain the hemisphere's condition. And because Huntington would probably have emphasized the impact of international war more than the impact of the international economy for state building and its consequences, he would have provided a valuable, early, and sensible correction that might have helped to prevent the fall of much Latin Americanist scholarship into economistic international dependency arguments.

Political Order, moreover, is principally a work of comparison among countries at different moments in their histories, not a historically driven comparative work.³⁸ This is, of course, an important difference between Huntington, on the one hand, and Barrington Moore³⁹ or Alexander Gerschenkron,⁴⁰ on the other, for the latter two—writing at approximately the same time—formulated historically rooted explanations as the core of their analysis. This book and some of Huntington's others show, of course, stunning historical learning.⁴¹ But in eschewing the formulation of historical explanations—in contrast to simply employing historical examples to make other points—Huntington also may have missed the opportunity to fashion a theory of government or a theory of the state. A historically grounded discussion of political institutionalization—more than a listing of abstract concepts—might have led him more directly to the black box of the state. *Political Order* shows the analytic power of comparisons in the hands of a master; it would have been even more masterful had it also featured more historical explanations.

HUNTINGTON'S LATIN AMERICANNESS

Huntington has never claimed to be an expert on Latin America; indeed, he has never presented himself as an expert on any one of the world's geographic regions. (Arguably, he is a leading "area studies" expert on the United States.)⁴² And yet, as should already be evident, *Political Order* is significantly informed by research on Latin America, much more so than has often been the case for leading comparativists.

Huntington's study of Latin America contributed to several important features of *Political Order*. Latin America, and those who wrote about the region, celebrated the "twilight of the tyrants" in the late 1950s,⁴³ only to mourn the rise of new tyrannies in the 1960s. Latin America's political experience in the 1960s contributed to Huntington's general worry about the prospects for political order; in particular, the breakdown of Latin America's democratic regimes in those years led him to insist, as already noted, that there cannot be "liberty without order." Certainly the Latin American cases educated Huntington to understand the weakness of mediating institutions between state and society, the feeble differentiation in many instances between state and party, and the porousness of the state to many powerful forces in society and economy.

Latin America's experience also contributed greatly to Huntington's understanding of praetorianism, that is, the politicization of all social forces including, but not limited to, the military. Many of Huntington's examples are drawn from the region. He shows a keen understanding of both specific military coups and general aspects of the relations between the military and society more generally. Even his general underemphasis of the importance of military ideas, missions, professionalism, and institutions is quite faithful to his Latin Americanist sources.

Latin America figures prominently in Huntington's reasoning as an example of both the possibility and the difficulty of reform. Rómulo Betancourt and Eduardo Frei appear often as committed and effective political leaders, but so, too, do landlords and the legislatures they control as obstacles to reform, opposing even reforms that might make it more likely that order would endure. Five of Huntington's seven examples of countries where conservatives should most clearly have understood that land reform was in their own long-term interest are in Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru). Of the next eleven countries for which the same generalization would apply, though with less urgency, all but two are Latin American.⁴⁴ Latin America made Huntington keenly aware of the significance of marked inequality for politics and the fate of peoples.

Closer attention to Latin America might have led Huntington, however, to think more about the institutions of the state itself, and specifically about the impact of bureaucracy. Such reflection might have helped him consider whether bureaucratic traditions were best understood as cultural legacies from the colonial past or as constructions and reconstructions in each country's history with the passing of time. Such work would have helped him as well when his interests turned toward greater attention to cultural factors in the years that followed.

Similarly, a closer dialogue with the Latin Americanist literature emerging at the same time as he was preparing his book would have alerted him to the significance and impact of international variables not just in the world of scholars but also in the experiences of the countries he sought to understand. In what ways did international factors weaken or strengthen the prospects for order? That question remained unasked; Latin Americanists would have asked it perhaps too often but were certainly right in raising it. (Huntington himself would return to this analytic concern with international explanations when he sought to understand the reemergence of democratic politics worldwide in the 1970s and 1980s.)⁴⁵

THE FOCUS ON POLITICAL PARTIES

Political Order is, above all, a sustained comparative study of the role of political parties. It is a measure of Huntington's regrettable lack of influence on the study of Latin American politics that the dominant scholarly works of the 1970s and 1980s in this subfield paid so little attention to political parties.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as a working politician, would rediscover political parties, but his most famous work (written with Enzo Faletto) accords little analytic significance to parties.⁴⁶ Guillermo O'Donnell's rightly famous work on the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism focuses, above all, on structural economic variables. Political parties are subsumed under the vague catchall category called "populism," but they are not analyzed in their own terms in detail.⁴⁷ O'Donnell's subsequent pathbreaking work with Philippe Schmitter on transitions to democracy called attention to the skill of politicians, not to partisan organizations through which many of them would work.⁴⁸ In the 1980s and 1990s, a vast scholarly literature arose on social movements; much of it ignored political parties, and, to the extent that it did not, it saw parties as malignant forces that subvert or thwart the consolidation of civil society.⁴⁹

Of course, there have always been scholars who have studied political parties in Latin America,⁵⁰ but their work never captured the imagination and attention of the profession as a whole, in contrast, for example, to work by other scholars on political parties in western Europe, North America, or India. One reason, no doubt, is the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in Latin America from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s—precisely the years of the "takeoff" of Latin American studies in the United States. Parties could not function legally in many countries; many elections were fraudulent, and in a number of countries no elections were held at all. The subject was difficult to study, to say the least.

Chileanists, not surprisingly, have written the most about political parties (even when they have been writing more generally, not just about Chile). A distinguished intellectual trajectory connects, for example, Federico Gil, James Petras, Robert Kaufman, Timothy Scully, Arturo Valenzuela, and J. Samuel Valenzuela.⁵¹ Venezuelanists are a close second, including such scholars as John Martz, Daniel Levine, and Michael Coppedge,⁵² to mention in both instances individuals from different scholarly generations and points of view. A general comparative, intellectual argument about political parties in the region, comparable to, building on, modifying, or rebutting what Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan did for the study of parties in western Europe, has yet to be written, however.⁵³ The intellectual ferment for such eventual work is being sown at long last thanks to the work of David and Ruth Collier and the fine collective work led by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully.⁵⁴

Huntington formulated an important assessment of the role of political parties and their impact on the prospects for social change. He discussed at some length the problems of what he called "the fragility of the no-party state." Such a political system is less likely to foster social change and more likely to be victim to repeated military coups. The long-term experience of Central American countries comes to mind. Political order, in contrast, is most likely where political parties are strong. I have already discussed Huntington's celebration of the efficacy of Leninist parties from the perspective of increasing the odds for political stability, and his favorable comments about the contributions of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party to political order in that country. But his approval of the utility of political parties is much more extensive.

Huntington argues that one- and two-party systems are much less likely to suffer from military coups than are multiparty systems. In Latin America, the longest-lived actual or virtual one-party systems (Mexico and Cuba) have, indeed, been remarkably free from coups. Both of Latin America's historic two-party systems in Uruguay and Colombia have also been much less vulnerable to military coups than multiparty systems. I

have argued elsewhere that the advantages that these party systems once had disappeared in the 1990s, but this contemporary observation does not detract from the historical value and accuracy of Huntington's analysis.⁵⁵

Political parties make an especially valuable contribution to political order, Huntington argues, when they become the vehicle for a lawful and peaceful "green uprising," that is, the incorporation of the peasantry into the political system. He presents a comprehensive analysis of this problem worldwide. In the Latin American context, he cites the important contributions of Mexico's ruling party under President Lázaro Cárdenas and of Venezuela's Acción Democrática under Rómulo Betancourt. And he assesses the shortcomings of other Latin American parties that were unable to generate comparable results.

More generally, Huntington indicates that, especially at their foundational moments, one-party systems are quite effective at concentrating power, two-party systems compete to expand the suffrage and the connection of individuals to these parties, while multiparty systems distribute power and impede both the concentration and the expansion of political power, including the expansion of effective suffrage rights. For example, at the foundational moments for polyarchy in Uruguay and Argentina early in the twentieth century, and for Colombia in the mid-twentieth century, their respective two-party systems generated intense political mobilization. In contrast, until the 1960s a principal trait of the Chilean multiparty system had been the slow pace of the extension of effective citizen rights to many Chileans and the protection of the inherited partisan architecture from additional competition.

The discussion of the significance of political parties permeates the book. Parties ward off military interventions, are the agents of effective reform, are the key to understanding whether a revolution would give birth to a new political order, and are the best instrument for a society's achievement of its goals. The defeat of authoritarians is not just the product of "fortuna" and "virtù" but of politicians building and channeling effective support through parties. The enactment of reforms is not just the result of clever leaders, or the technically talented, but the outcome of prolonged processes of persuasion, disciplining, and commitment that parties can perform best. Revolutions often fail to accomplish their objectives; only parties can deliver on a promise of a revolutionary future. Democratic politics, as Huntington would argue at much greater length in a subsequent book, is unthinkable without parties.

Political Order builds up to its final chapter, which is devoted exclusively to the assessment of political parties. The book concludes with a short section on the organizational imperative, in which Huntington quotes both Lenin and Eduardo Frei on the importance of partisan orga-

nization in bringing about either concentrated power or representational gains, respectively: "In the modernizing world he controls the future who organizes its politics."⁵⁶

In its analysis of the evolution, role, and effect of political parties, *Political Order* had no peer when it was published. Nor has it been overcome. Parties are the premier institutions of concern to Huntington in this work. He did not give us a theory of the state applicable to Latin America, but he produced a subtle, comprehensive analysis to enable us to understand a vital intermediary political institution between the state and society. That is the book's central intellectual achievement. Scholarship about Latin America would have been much better had the book's impact among Latin Americanists been greater.

NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 1.

2. I believe that this assessment of the work's influence is not controversial. Nonetheless, I should state that Samuel Huntington chaired my dissertation committee and has long been a colleague and a friend. We have co-taught the Comparative Politics Field Seminar to Ph.D. students in the Harvard Department of Government and coauthored "Political Development," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), xv.

4. For a short intellectual biography, see Robert D. Putnam, "Samuel P. Huntington: An Appreciation," *PS* (fall 1986): 837-45. A lifelong activist in the Democratic Party, Huntington even voted for George McGovern for president. In the 1968 presidential elections, he was one of Hubert Humphrey's chief academic advisers; in 1977, he worked on the National Security Council staff for President Jimmy Carter.

5. Huntington, *Political Order*, 7-8.

6. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the XX International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, April 17-19, 1997, and at a conference, "The Other Mirror: Comparative History and Latin America," held at Princeton University, February 20-21, 1998. I am grateful to the participants for many helpful comments. I am also grateful to Samuel Huntington and Thomas Ertman for their comments. I alone am responsible for mistakes in interpretation, analysis, or facts.

7. The *LASA Forum* has been publishing the reminiscences of past presidents of the Latin American Studies Association. In generally cautious language, they reveal the rise of intellectual intolerance in the association in the 1970s and early 1980s. See Henry A. Landsberger, "When a LASA President Was Only 66 Percent

'P.C.': Secrets from LASA's Past—Keys to the Future," *LASA Forum* 26, no. 4 (1996): 7–8, 22; Thomas Skidmore, "The LASA Presidency in the Early '70s," *LASA Forum* 27, no. 2 (1996): 10; and Jorge I. Domínguez, "Presidency in the Early 1980s," *LASA Forum* 27, no. 3 (1996): 11–12. See also Robert A. Packenham, *The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

8. Huntington, *Political Order*, 194.

9. *Ibid.*, 193.

10. Huntington relies on various sources but most heavily on Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents* (New York: Praeger, 1964); John Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964); and Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review* 60 (1966): 616–26.

11. Huntington, *Political Order*, 221.

12. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), chap. 4.

13. See Abraham Lowenthal, ed., *The Peruvian Experiment* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Cynthia McClintock and Abraham Lowenthal, eds., *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); and Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

14. See Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); and Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973).

15. See various essays in Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, eds., *Armies and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986).

16. Huntington, *Political Order*, 309, 311, 312.

17. *Ibid.*, 338.

18. *Ibid.*, 343.

19. See, for example, James Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970); and Christopher N. Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule* (New York: Praeger, 1977).

20. Mexico did have a brief period of commitment to socialist education in the 1930s, but it did not last long, and it stopped well short of the revolutionary sweep evident in other countries. For analyses of the history of Mexico's ruling party, some of which were available to Huntington as he wrote, see, among others, Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Nora Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-revolutionary Mexico* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Kevin Middlebrook, *The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Robert Scott, *Mexican Politics in Transition*, rev. ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

21. See Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978). For a comparison between Cuba and

Bolivia that is consistent with Huntington's analysis, see Jorge I. Domínguez and Christopher N. Mitchell, "The Roads Not Taken: Institutionalization and Political Parties in Cuba and Bolivia," *Comparative Politics* 9 (January 1977): 173–93.

22. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

23. Huntington, *Political Order*, 344.

24. *Ibid.*, 346.

25. *Ibid.*, 389.

26. See, for instance, William Ascher, *Scheming for the Poor: The Politics of Redistribution in Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).

27. Personal communication, Samuel Huntington, January 1998.

28. Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

29. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958); Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

30. Deutsch's most famous formulation appeared as "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 55 (1961).

31. Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics* 17 (1965).

32. See Huntington's own explanation for the quiet deletions in "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," *Comparative Politics* 3 (1971): 304 n. 42.

33. I have employed Huntington's concepts repeatedly, though with the mixture of success and difficulty that these observations suggest. See two of my books, *Cuba: Order and Revolution*, and *Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). See also Domínguez and Mitchell, "The Roads Not Taken."

34. For a loud call that the time to pay attention to the state itself was overdue, see Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

35. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

36. Huntington, *Political Order*, 123.

37. Particularly influential in the United States was André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

38. This is especially noteworthy in the most self-consciously historical of the chapters, namely, chapter 2, entitled "Political Modernization: America versus Europe." Each of the two entities, "America" and "Europe," seems frozen in time.

39. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon, 1966).

40. Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962).

41. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*; Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981).

42. See, most especially, his *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*.

43. Tad Szulc, *The Twilight of the Tyrants* (New York: Holt, 1959).

44. Huntington, *Political Order*, 382.

45. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 85–100.

46. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. Marjory M. Urquidí (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

47. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973).

48. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

49. Many of these writings are excellent, to be sure, which is one reason that I have collected many of them in Jorge I. Domínguez, *Social Movements in Latin America: The Experience of Peasants, Workers, Women, the Urban Poor, and the Middle Sectors* (New York: Garland, 1994). See also Jorge I. Domínguez, *The Roman Catholic Church in Latin America* (New York: Garland, 1994).

50. For fine journal articles published over the years, see Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *Parties, Elections, and Political Participation in Latin America* (New York: Garland, 1994).

51. Federico G. Gil, *The Political System of Chile* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966); James Petras, *Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Robert R. Kaufman, "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin American Countries," in James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Timothy R. Scully, *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992); Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and J. Samuel Valenzuela's chapter in this volume and the citations therein.

52. John D. Martz, *Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Michael Coppedge, *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).

53. See Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1967). There have been some limited attempts.

The first, by Federico G. Gil, preceded the Lipset-Rokkan efforts by fifteen years; see Gil's "Responsible Parties in Latin America," *Journal of Politics* 15 (1953): 335–48. Two subsequent efforts were Douglas A. Chalmers, "Parties and Society in Latin America," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 7 (1972): 102–26; and Robert H. Dix, "Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 22 (1989): 23–35.

54. David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995).

55. Jorge I. Domínguez and Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, "Parties, Institutions, and Market Reforms in Constructing Democracies," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

56. Huntington, *Political Order*, 461.