

From: J. Rubin & B.H. Jernudd (Eds.), *Can language be planned?*
Sociolinguistic theory and practice for developing nations.
Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1971.

2. LANGUAGE AS AN AID AND BARRIER TO INVOLVEMENT IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM

HERBERT C. KELMAN

Department of Social Relations, Harvard University

The basic thesis that I would like to develop in this discussion is that language is a uniquely powerful instrument in unifying a diverse population and in involving individuals and subgroups in the national system. However, some of the very features of language that give it this power under some circumstances may, under other circumstances, become major sources of disintegration and internal conflict within a national system. These considerations should have some definite implications for language policy not only in developing nations but also in long-established nations marked by diglossia—whether officially recognized (as in Canada or in Belgium) or unrecognized (as in the United States). Specifically, I will try to argue that, while the development of a national language may be highly conducive to the creation and strengthening of national identity, the *deliberate* use of language for purposes of national identity may—at least in a multiethnic state—have more disruptive than unifying consequences.

Let me be clear from the outset that I bring to this discussion no background whatsoever in the field of linguistics—socio- or otherwise—nor have I engaged in any systematic empirical studies of language problems in various societies. Whatever qualifications I may have for discussing this issue are based on the fact that I have made some systematic efforts in recent years to deal with the more general question of individual and subgroup involvement in the national system. This paper, then, is essentially a theoretical exercise—an attempt to draw out the implications of my scheme for defining the role of language and for developing national language policies. If my conclusions appear reasonable as they are confronted with the data of sociolinguistics, then the exercise will have been worthwhile. It would reinforce the theoretical scheme itself, and it might,

at the same time, contribute to language planning by bringing a different perspective to bear on the problem—a perspective that might suggest some questions to be asked and perhaps some directions to be followed in the search for answers.

*SOURCES OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
OF THE NATIONAL SYSTEM
AND OF PERSONAL ATTACHMENT TO IT*

In this section and the next, I shall briefly review a scheme distinguishing different patterns of individual and subgroup involvement in the national system and indicate how one might assess these patterns and empirically explore their antecedents and correlates. I shall then turn to the implications of this theoretical scheme for the role of language in fostering involvement in the national system.¹

One of the ways of conceptualizing the involvement of individuals and subgroups in the national system is to examine the degree and nature of their acceptance of the system's ideology. The ideology of the modern nation-state (which is, essentially, my definition of nationalism²) has at least three generic features, shared by all its variants: (1) The ultimate justification for maintaining, strengthening, or establishing a political system that has jurisdiction over a particular population—that is, an internationally recognized nation-state—is that this system is most naturally and effectively representative of that population; in principle, the political entity corresponds with an ethnic, cultural, and historical entity with which at least large portions of the population identify. (2) The nation-state is the political unit in which paramount authority is vested and which is entitled to overrule both smaller and larger political units. (3) Establishing or maintaining—or both—the independence, integrity, and effective functioning of the nation-state is an essential task to which all members of the system are expected to contribute.

These three elements provide the basic set of assumptions that govern the relationship of a nation-state to other states in the international system and the relationship of the political leadership to the individual citizen. In addition, the ideology of any given nation-state has certain unique features, corresponding to the particular functions that it must perform in the light of its level of development, its international position, its power and success in the international arena, and its internal structure.

The way in which the national ideology is interpreted and incorporated into the belief systems of individuals and subgroups within a popu-

lation may vary widely. Depending on their demographic and personality characteristics and on their positions within the social and political structure, individuals may vary in the components of the ideology that they emphasize or deemphasize, the intensity of their commitment to the nation-state, their definition of the citizen role and the expectations that go with it, and the way in which they enact this role. It is essential to the effective functioning of the nation-state, however, that the basic tenets of the national ideology or at least its behavioral implications be widely accepted within the population. Acceptance of the ideology implies that the individual regards the authority of the state and hence its specific demands (within some broadly defined range) as legitimate. The state's ability to mobilize citizens in its support and to demand sacrifices from them in times of national crisis depends, in the final analysis, on its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

Two ultimate sources of legitimacy for the national system can be distinguished: (1) the extent to which it reflects the ethnic-cultural identity of the national population and (2) the extent to which it meets the needs and interests of that population. In the long run, a political system cannot maintain its legitimacy unless, at least, a significant proportion of the population perceives it as meeting their needs and interests (although it can, of course, retain power by relying on coercive means, even if only a small elite are adequately integrated into the system). In shorter runs, however, a system can maintain its legitimacy—even if it is not working effectively, is facing serious economic difficulties, or is torn by internal conflicts so that it can adequately provide for the needs and interest of only some segments of the population at the expense of others—as long as it is seen by wide segments of the population as representing their national (ethnic-cultural) identity.³

At the social-psychological level, the legitimacy of a political system is reflected in the sense of loyalty that its members have towards it. Perceived legitimacy implies that the individual member is in some fashion personally involved in the system—that he feels attached to it and is integrated into its operations. We can distinguish between two sources of loyalty or attachment to the nation-state, which correspond to the two sources of legitimacy at the system level: sentimental attachment and instrumental attachment. These two sources of attachment constitute the rows of Table 1 (taken from Kelman, 1969). This table summarizes the present scheme, which has yielded six patterns of personal involvement in the national system. It should be noted that these patterns are by no

Table 1: Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System

	<u>Manner of Integration into the System</u>			
	(Consolidation)	(Mobilization)	(Conformity)	
(System requirements conducive to this type of integration)				
(Influence process characteristic of this type of integration)	(Internalization of system values)	(Identification w. system roles)	(Compliance with system demands seen as legitimate)	
Source of Attachment (Loyalty) to the System	Ideological	Role-Participant	Normative	
Sentimental	Commitment to cultural values reflective of national identity	Commitment to the role of the national linked to group symbols	Acceptance of demands based on commitment to the sacredness of the state	
Instrumental	Commitment to institutions promotive of the needs and interests of the population	Commitment to social roles mediated by the system	Acceptance of demands based on commitment to law and order (principle of equity)	

means mutually exclusive; although different individuals, subgroups, and systems may differ in the emphasis they place on one or another of these patterns, various combinations of them are possible and indeed likely.

An individual is sentimentally attached to the national system to the extent that he sees it as representing him—as being, in some central way, a reflection and an extension of himself. The system is legitimate and deserving of his loyalty because it is the embodiment of a people in which his personal identity is anchored. Sentimental attachment may be channeled in three different ways, as given in the three columns of Table 1: (1) The individual may be committed to the values basic to the national culture, taking interest and pride in the special qualities of his people, its characteristic way of life, its cultural products, its national and often its religious tradition, and the goals for which it has stood in its historical development. (2) He may be identified with the role of the national in the sense that it enters importantly into his self-definition and that it constitutes a genuine emotional commitment for him, whenever group symbols bring that role into salience. (3) He may be committed to the state as an embodiment of the people, and, hence, as a sacred object in its own right, entitled to unquestioning obedience of its authoritative demands.

An individual is instrumentally attached to the national system to the extent that he sees it as an effective vehicle for achieving his own ends and the ends of members of other systems. For the instrumentally attached, the system is legitimate and deserving of his loyalty because it provides the organization for a smoothly running society, in which individuals can participate to their mutual benefit and have some assurance that their needs and interests will be met. Instrumental attachment, again, may be channeled in three different ways, depending on the manner in which the individual is integrated into the system: (1) The individual may be committed to the ideology underlying the particular social and economic institutions through which the society is organized, typically because he regards these institutional arrangements as maximally promotive of the needs and interests of the entire population. (2) He may be committed to a variety of social roles (occupational roles, community roles, and roles in various other subsystems), whose continued and successful enactment depends on the maximally effective functioning of the larger national system. (3) He may be committed to law and order as an end in itself, being primarily concerned with keeping the fabric of ordinary life undisturbed.

Whether an individual's sentimental or instrumental attachment is mediated primarily through system values, roles, or normative demands

depends in large part on his position in the society. I would hypothesize, for example, that individuals high in socioeconomic status, education, and political power are more likely to be ideologically integrated, while those low in these areas are more likely to be normatively integrated. For the long run, the legitimacy of the system depends on the extent to which at least its major elites are ideologically integrated. This implies a periodic renewal of the system's cultural values and a periodic reassessment of the adequacy of its social institutions in meeting the needs and interests of the general population, particularly at times of internal division and intrasocietal conflict. Although legitimacy ultimately rests on ideological commitments, normative commitments are in a sense the most reliable in the short run. If these are shared by the masses of the population, political leaders can expect relatively automatic acceptance of their authoritative demands. Finally, role-participant integration provides the major basis for mobilizing a population—particularly its middle classes—for special efforts or sacrifices. It produces commitments that are more active and enthusiastic than those based on normative integration, but less selective and conditional than those based on ideological integration. In a well-integrated system, political leaders have at their disposal national symbols and subsystem roles that they can use for purposes of mobilization. National symbols can be brought into play to heighten emotional arousal, since emotional responses to such symbols are typically conditioned in the course of the child's socialization in the home, the school, and the church. Subsystem roles can be co-opted in the service of the state, since in the complex, bureaucratically structured, modern nation-state these roles are highly dependent on the central authorities.

Sentimental and instrumental attachments can, within limits, substitute for one another. Thus, if sentimental attachments are strong, the system can maintain its legitimacy even though it does not adequately meet the needs and interests of the population or does so only for a small proportion of the population. By appealing to the common national identity of the people, the leadership may be able to elicit their loyalty despite internal divisions and inequities. This is a particularly valuable resource in the initial stages of political development, when elites typically have to mobilize mass support without being able to offer many concrete benefits to the majority of the population. Similarly, if instrumental attachments are strong, the system can maintain its legitimacy even though it does not adequately reflect the ethnic-cultural identity of the population or does so only for a small proportion of the population.

Furthermore, sentimental and instrumental attachments can have a mutually reinforcing and facilitative effect on one another. If a population perceives the system as being genuinely representative and reflective of its identity, then it is inclined to place trust in the system for meeting its needs and protecting its interests. Supported by this initial confidence of the citizens and by their willingness to give them the benefit of the doubt, political leaders are in a stronger position to push for economic development and to organize the society in a way that will meet the needs and interests of the population. Similarly, a well-functioning society, which provides meaningful roles for its citizens, will develop a set of common values and traditions and a sense of unity that are tantamount to a national identity, even if the population was originally diverse in its ethnic and cultural identifications. This national identity need not displace the original ethnic-cultural identities of the component groups but can exist alongside of them. In the former case, then, we have a type of nationalism in which the primary push is from nation to state: an existing national consciousness is used in the process of state-building. In the latter case, we have a type of nationalism in which the primary push is from state to nation: an existing sociopolitical structure is used in the process of nation-building.⁴

Assessing Personal Attachment to the National System

Before we turn to the implications of the theoretical scheme for the role of language, it would be useful to concretize it somewhat by describing ways of measuring the different patterns it distinguishes and by citing variables to which these patterns are empirically related. Unfortunately, the scheme as outlined in the preceding section has not yet been put to an empirical test. It is possible, however, to illustrate the ways in which one might operationalize and validate such patterns by drawing on empirical studies of earlier versions of the present scheme.

In a study of national role involvement in an American community, DeLamater, Katz, and Kelman (1969) distinguished three types of commitment to the national system—symbolic, normative, and functional. Two of these correspond fairly closely to two of the cells of Table 1 and can, therefore, serve to illustrate the empirical possibilities of the present scheme: Symbolic commitment is more or less equivalent to the sentimental role-participant cell in Table 1; and functional commitment, to the instrumental role-participant cell. Differences between symbolic and functional commitments in the earlier study are, thus, relevant to the sentimental-instrumental distinction (rows of Table 1), on which the

present discussion focuses. That is, in terms of the scheme of Table 1, symbolic and functional commitments represent a difference in the source of the person's attachment to the system, keeping his manner of integration constant.

Data in the study by DeLamater et al. were obtained through intensive interviews, consisting of a variety of questions about the respondent's conception of his national role, as well as a series of attitudinal and demographic items. The interview included a number of items that were specifically designed to tap each of the three types of national commitment. Responses to the items deemed relevant to a given type of commitment were then intercorrelated, and a scale for that type of commitment was constructed out of those items that seemed to hang together statistically.

The scale for symbolic commitment included eight items that tapped the respondent's emotional involvement with national symbols—his personal attachment to these symbols and his sensitivity to any indication that they are being slighted. Thus, a respondent would receive positive points on this scale if he indicated (1) that anyone who criticizes the government in time of national crisis is not a good American; (2) that anyone who does not stand during the playing of the national anthem is not a good American; (3) that he owns an American flag and that he displays it on national holidays; (4) that he feels the American public pays insufficient respect to the flag; (5) that he disapproves of Americans who take no pride in America's armed forces; (6) that he would consider it an insult if a foreigner laughed at the Peace Corps; (7) that he would be insulted or angry if a foreigner criticized racial segregation in the United States and attacked the free enterprise system; and (8) that he feels that he is "first, last, and always an American." In terms of the present conceptual scheme, a high score on this scale would indicate a strong sentimental attachment to the national system, channeled through an identification with the national role and triggered by the presentation of national symbols.

The scale for functional commitment included six items that tapped the respondent's orientation to the economic benefits of American society and his emphasis on citizen participation. Thus, a respondent would receive positive points on this scale if he indicated (1) that the things that particularly remind him of being an American include factors relating to opportunity; (2) that, to be a good American, a person ought to participate in public affairs; (3) that apathetic persons are among those whom he regards as "not good Americans"; (4) that people refer to affluence and related matters when they talk about "the American way of life";

(5) that one of the most important things that makes America different from other countries is its level of opportunity; and (6) that one of the most important things that makes America different from other countries is its level of affluence. In terms of the present conceptual scheme, a high score on this scale would imply a strong instrumental attachment to the national system, channeled through the person's entanglement in various social roles that depend on the effective functioning of that system.

The symbolic and functional scales that I have just described do not represent the most appropriate measures of sentimental and instrumental role-participation, since they were, of course, derived from a different, though related, conceptual scheme. Nevertheless, they offer a concrete illustration of how we might go about operationalizing these two (as well as the other four) cells of Table 1. Moreover, differences between symbolically and functionally committed individuals on other attitudinal and demographic items, observed in the study by DeLamater et al. provide some suggestive evidence about the antecedents and correlates of sentimental and instrumental attachment, at least when these are channeled through identification with system roles.

Comparisons were made in that study between "pure groups," consisting of individuals with high scores on one of the three types of commitment and low or medium scores on the other two. The "high symbolic" group and the "high functional" group turned out to differ in many areas. Thus, in terms of their demographic characteristics, the functionally committed were younger than the symbolically committed; they were better educated; they had higher incomes; they were more often in professional or technical occupations; they had fathers who were better educated and more often in professional or technical occupations; they were more likely to describe themselves as "middle class" (rather than "working class"); and they were more bureaucratically oriented. The symbolically committed were more likely to have grown up in farming families, to have lived on a farm for ten years or more, and to have lived in the area for ten years or more.

The two groups also differed on a variety of attitudinal items. Thus, the functionally committed showed, in a number of different ways, their greater openness to other cultures and systems, their greater tolerance for deviant political positions, and their greater support for liberal causes. The symbolically committed tended to favor a more militant stance in American foreign policy and were much less willing than the functionally committed to turn over power to international organizations.

These findings are generally consistent with some of the hypotheses regarding sentimental and instrumental attachment that can be derived from the present formulation. Thus, on the antecedent side, we would expect sentimental attachment (in an established society) to be strongest among those individuals and subgroups who are geographically stable, who are rooted to the soil or to a particular region of the country, and whose occupations are traditional and local in focus. We would expect instrumental attachment to be strongest among those who are geographically and occupationally mobile, whose occupations are linked to bureaucratic and national organizations, and whose perspective is cosmopolitan. On the consequent side, we would expect sentimental attachment to lead to a more exclusive definition of nationality (e.g., of what it means to be an American or a good American), to a sharper dichotomy between own nation and other nations and a more suspicious and less open attitude towards other nations or international institutions, and to a tendency to conceive international conflicts in zero-sum terms. Instrumental attachment, on the other hand, should lead to a more inclusive definition of nationality, a greater openness to other nations and international institutions, and a greater readiness to conceive international conflicts in non-zero-sum terms.

These hypotheses about sentimental and instrumental attachments must be viewed as nothing more than first approximations. They do not take into account the primary mode of integration that characterizes a particular individual or group (i.e., the columns in Table 1). It is quite likely that the latter variable and the source of attachment interact in such a way that differences between sentimental and instrumental attachments differ, depending on whether these attachments are channeled through values, roles, or norms. Such more refined interaction hypotheses have not yet been developed. Furthermore, the hypotheses presented above do not deal with the case—which may indeed be quite prevalent in some systems—where strong sentimental as well as instrumental attachments coincide in the same person or group.

LANGUAGE AS A UNIFYING FORCE

Having explicated our conceptualization of personal involvement in the national system, particularly the distinction between sentimental and instrumental attachments, we can now turn specifically to the role of language in these processes. I would propose that a common language is a potentially powerful unifying force for a national population because it

strengthens both sentimental and instrumental attachments and, furthermore, because it plays a major role in the mutual reinforcement of these two processes.

At the sentimental level, a national language serves as a major object and symbol of attachment by bridging immediate loyalties with transcendent ones. It is through his mother tongue that the child is exposed to the songs, the heroic tales, and the traditional wisdoms of his people. The very language in which he communicates with his mother and with his immediate environment also serves to link him with a wider group, most of whose members are distant in time and place. Language thus provides a continuity and scope without which a sense of overarching nationality could not be constructed; it provides concrete, emotionally significant products that the individual received from previous generations and will pass on to the future ones and that, in the present, link him to a widely dispersed population, most of whose members he does not, and never will, know personally. Beyond that, those primordial bonds that tie the child to his mother and immediate kin are now extended to all those who share the same mother tongue. Thus, the attachment to a distant group takes on some of the emotional intensity and irreducible quality that are normally restricted to primary relationships.

Language may strengthen sentimental attachment to the national group by enhancing not only the continuity but also the authenticity of the national tradition. Here we are dealing with language in the form of a sacred tongue, rather than a mother tongue. It is the vehicle for transmitting the sacred documents of the people, in which its history and mission are spelled out. It is the raw material of poetry, in which the achievements of the people and the beauties of its land are described. It thus provides not only authentic evidence for the greatness of the people but also concrete cultural products that can be cherished and studied in their own right.⁵

The sacred tongue and the mother tongue, of course, are often different even for what Fishman (1968b) calls "Type B Nations"; i.e., nations characterized by a single great tradition. Typically, however, they represent two varieties (classical and vernacular) of the same basic language and may therefore have a cumulative effect on sentimental attachment. Alternatively, there may be differences within the population, with sentimental attachment for some elements being primarily rooted in the classical language; for others, in the vernacular; and for still others, in both.

At the instrumental level, a common language helps to integrate the system and to tie increasing numbers of individuals into it. In a society that does not have a common language—more precisely, a society characterized by diglossia without widespread bilingualism (cf. Fishman, 1967)—we are likely to find not only impairments in social planning and in the efficiency of institutional arrangements but also a limited access to the system for wide segments of the population and an allocation of resources that discriminates against minorities or other subordinate groups. On the other hand, with a national language, it is easier to develop political, economic, and social institutions that serve the entire population. Central authorities are in a better position to plan with greater scope and greater efficiency. Since the entire country can be treated as a single arena for purposes of economic planning, for example, there is less likelihood of unnecessary duplication of effort and there are more possibilities for working out a beneficial division of labor between different regions of the country. If there are several separate language groups, it may be necessary to develop separate administrative units for each, both to avoid language difficulties and to minimize suspicions of discrimination: the resulting arrangement is likely to be more wasteful and less flexible than one that is possible in a linguistically unified population. Furthermore, a common language facilitates the development of an educational system that offers mobility and opportunities for participation to all segments of the population.

From the point of view of individuals, familiarity with the dominant language is a key to genuine participation in the system, to social mobility, and to enactment of a variety of social and economic roles. When there is a single national language, opportunities for integration of individuals are likely to be more evenly distributed within the population. Since there are no systematic barriers to participation on the basis of linguistic group, there is also likely to be less discrimination on the basis of ethnic and social-class differences, which are typically correlated with linguistic differences. In sum, a common language contributes to the development of social institutions that meet the needs and interests of the entire population and to the participation of all segments of the society in meaningful social roles. In so doing, it helps to create widespread instrumental attachment to the system.

A common language not only strengthens sentimental and instrumental attachments but also contributes to the mutual reinforcement of

these two processes. I mentioned earlier that a well-functioning **society** is conducive to the development of **sentimental attachments**, despite **initial** ethnic divisions. Language can **greatly facilitate** this development. Even in the absence of a common language, the functional interdependence that derives from successful instrumental interactions may have a "spill-over" effect. That is, when different segments of a population engage in productive and equal-status interactions around instrumental concerns, they are likely to discover common values and customs and to develop common traditions and communication habits. In the absence of a common **language**, however, this process becomes more difficult, and there is, thus, a **greater** tendency to restrict communication to its instrumental purposes. The existence of a common language, on the other hand, allows and encourages communications to **extend** beyond their strictly instrumental focus and to include the sharing of old and the development of new cultural values and orientations. In **effective** instrumental **interactions** between elites and masses, a common **language** is likely to have a similar binding effect, enhancing citizens' sentimental attachment to the system.

Conversely, I have proposed that sentimental attachment—based on the feeling that the system reflects the identity of the people—may promote the development of instrumental attachments and, in fact, of a well-functioning system that meets the needs and interests of the population. Specifically, citizens who are sentimentally attached are more ready to place trust in the system's ability to meet the needs and protect the interests of the population, even if this has not yet been demonstrated; and to participate in the society's political and economic processes, even in the absence of immediate payoffs. Again, a common language is useful in this process, since it is, to a large extent, through **language** that the gap between present reality and future promise must be **bridged**. Political leaders who share a common language with all segments of the population are in a better position to draw on traditional symbols of trust in their communications. The shared nuances of the common language make it possible to convey more readily not just the message itself but also the way in which this message is to be understood and the kind of credence that can be given to it. Similarly, interactions between different segments of the population are likely to benefit from the existence of a common language because of our general inclination to trust more readily those who "speak the same language" as we do.

In short, a common language helps to maintain a continuous cyclical

process of reinforcement between sentimental and instrumental attachments. By enhancing trust in political leaders and other subgroups within the population, a common language **strengthens instrumental attachments** to the system. These instrumental attachments, in turn, facilitate the development of sentimental ones by encouraging—again with the aid of a common language—the discovery of cultural commonalities. As sentimental attachments increase, a common language—by enhancing trust—can help to draw on these for the further strengthening of instrumental ones; and so the process continues to feed on itself.

LANGUAGE AS A DIVISIVE FORCE

The very factors that make language such a powerful, unifying force in nation-states that have a common language make it a potentially divisive force in multilingual states. It goes without saying that a common language is not a necessary condition for a unified state and that one or more major language groups can coexist in a system with minimal conflict between them. Switzerland, of course, is the example *par excellence*—though Kloss (1967) predicts that even there language problems “may some day become apparent in Ticino” (p. 43), since, in Switzerland, Italian does not have equal status with German and French. But even if we take Switzerland as an example of a successful multilingual system, there are many more examples of conflict in multilingual societies, with varying degrees of intensity in different **states at different historical junctures**.

The historical conditions and the language policies pursued in a state often conspire to cause one or more of the language groups to feel aggrieved—to feel that their rights are being violated and that their language and those who speak it are denied the opportunities and protection to which they are entitled. Differences in language are almost always correlated with other ethnic differences, **sometimes** with religious differences and often with socioeconomic differences between the groups, which may strongly affect the nature and intensity of the grievance. Typically, the aggrieved group is the one that speaks the minority language, irrespective of whether this language is officially recognized. Grievances may also focus, however, (1) on a language spoken by groups that are socioeconomically disadvantaged, even though they be in the majority; or (2) on a language that is spoken by a majority within the country but is lacking international status or a language shared with a lesser power in the international arena than the power that shares one of the minority languages.

Depending on the language policy, it is even conceivable that the group speaking the dominant language may feel aggrieved, for example, because it is persuaded that too much allowance is being made for the lesser languages.

In any event, given a language-related conflict within a national system, it may be greatly exacerbated by the fact that both sentimental and instrumental considerations are likely to become involved and, in particular, are likely to reinforce one another. First, the aggrieved group is likely to feel that its sense of group identity is being threatened—that its national (in the nationality rather than the state sense) language is being derogated, its cultural self-development and literary expression inhibited, and its educational efforts undermined. Secondly and probably most importantly, the group is likely to feel that, because its language is not given due recognition, it experiences discrimination at the instrumental level—that its members are denied equal opportunities, that they are excluded from full participation in the system, and that their socioeconomic mobility is stymied.

In most of the cases of which I am aware, in which language conflict in a multilingual society has become an explosive issue, the aggrieved group is by and large in a disadvantaged position. It tends to be less economically developed, and its access to many opportunities for participation and mobility is indeed limited—at least, in part, by the fact that political and economic power are concentrated in the hands of those who speak the more favored language. Cause and effect, of course, cannot be readily disentangled here. The group may be disadvantaged because it does not speak the dominant language, but it may be equally true that its language has remained subordinate because of the group's relatively lower level of development. Most probably, a cyclical process has been operating: As the society develops economically and becomes more centralized, the language of the dominant group takes on greater and greater importance, and the subordinate group—lacking facility in the dominant language—finds it more and more difficult to gain entry into the system. Typically, as Fishman (1967) has pointed out, the subordinate group is also internally split in such cases; its upper classes tend to be bilingual and thus able to participate fully in the system, while the masses are left behind. "Such polities are bound to experience language problems as their social patterns alter in the direction of industrialization, widespread literacy and education, democratization, and modernization more

generally. . . . The educational, political, and economic development of the lower classes is likely to lead to secessionism or to demands for equality for submerged language(s)" (p. 34).

Typically, then, it is instrumental considerations of this sort, linked to linguistic divisions, that lead to such massive disruptions as language riots and separatist, nationalist movements. Sentimentally based grievances in and of themselves are unlikely to lead to major upheavals; they tend to arouse only a small proportion of the population who are particularly devoted to the maintenance of the group's cultural and educational institutions. The call for renewal of group identity and for cultural self-development in the face of external threat may, however, give added impetus to an instrumentally based struggle. It may help to mobilize and unify the group to engage in that struggle, by increasing its self-awareness as a separate entity with interests of its own. It would appear, for example, that the Gaelic League, as described by Macnamara (paper 4, this volume), played such a role in the Irish revolution—and it is interesting, in this connection, that the success of the revolution drastically weakened the League and the Irish language movement.

Assuming that the primary impetus for major linguistic conflicts is an instrumentally based grievance—a response by the weaker language group to discrimination, to exclusion, and to denial of its rightful share of power and resources—the conflict readily becomes intensified by sentimental elaborations. Since language is so closely tied to group identity, language-based discrimination against the group is perceived as a threat to its very existence as a recognizable entity and as an attack on its sacred objects and symbols. The issue is no longer merely a redistribution of power and resources, but it is self-preservation of the group and defense against genocide. The conflict becomes highly charged with emotion and increasingly unmanageable. Genocide, after all, is not a matter for negotiation but for a last-ditch defense.

This is not to say that these sentimentally based grievances are always devoid of any basis in fact. My point is simply that, since language is embedded in both sentimental and instrumental issues, language conflicts are readily susceptible to this kind of escalation—to a tendency to raise the level of the conflict to a battle about ultimates—not only in rhetoric but also in reality. This phenomenon, of course, can also be observed in ethnic conflicts, such as the Biafran independence struggle or the current black revolution in the United States, in which language plays a less obvious role, though not an entirely negligible one.

In short, the cyclical process of reinforcement between sentimental and instrumental attachments engendered by a common language has its negative counterpart in the case of language conflicts in a multilingual society. Language divisions increase the likelihood that, in an instrumental conflict between different groups, fundamental identity differences will be brought into focus, converting the conflict into a sentimental one. As the conflict is carried on at the sentimental level, language divisions increase the likelihood that mutual trust will be further eroded, thus making negotiated settlements ever more difficult to achieve.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR LANGUAGE POLICY

It is clear from what I have said that a common language offers many advantages to central authorities in their attempt to develop and consolidate a unified and cohesive political system. It does not follow, however, that central authorities in multilingual systems ought to direct their language policies towards the development or establishment of a common language. Because of the sentimental and instrumental considerations that I have discussed in the last section, such policies may well create inequities and meet with resistances and may hamper, rather than enhance, the unity and integration of the system. The wisdom of a policy aimed at establishing a common language depends on the needs of the particular society and on the possibilities for establishing such a language that are available to it. In assessing the available possibilities, it is of course necessary to take into account the cost of establishing a common language in terms of the probable loss in the regime's perceived legitimacy and the probable increase in social unrest.

I bring to this discussion a general bias against *deliberate* attempts by central political authorities to create a sense of national identity, whether by a policy of establishing a national language or by any other means. I bring such a bias not because I wish to minimize the importance of a sense of national identity to the effective functioning of a nation-state or to question policies designed for other purposes that, as a consequence of their operation, contribute to the development of national identity. What I am arguing is that a sense of national identity ideally ought to—and, in fact, is most likely to—emerge out of a well-functioning national system that meets the needs and interests of the entire population, rather than out of deliberate attempts to create it directly. Let me qualify my statement further by saying that I refer to the central political authorities, not to various agencies within the society—public or private—that have

a special interest in promoting one or another type of cultural or linguistic development. It is when such activities are carried out by (or are under the direction of) the agencies holding the primary political power and when they are tied in with the process of building the basic socioeconomic institutions that I become suspicious.

Clearly, I am expressing a value position here. In my view, the primary role of the central authorities is to promote and ensure the functional integration of the system. To that end, it is essential that they (1) establish and maintain institutional arrangements that adequately meet the needs and interests of the entire population and (2) provide maximal opportunities for all elements of the society—regardless of ethnic origin, language, religion, or social class—to participate in the running of the system and in its benefits. Policies following this principle can be expected to create instrumental attachments to the system, out of which sentimental attachments can gradually emerge. I am afraid that a concentration by central authorities on the direct manipulation of sentimental attachments may serve as a substitute for the work they should be doing at the instrumental level and as a cover for failures to create adequate socioeconomic institutions and to provide meaningful roles for all segments of the society. Although my bias against deliberate attempts to create national identity derives from my value position, I also believe that this is not a very effective way of promoting national identity. I would propose—and this, of course, is a proposition that can and must be put to an empirical test—that a sense of national identity is more likely to develop when it is not forced but allowed to emerge out of functional relationships within the national society.

So far, I have been speaking of national systems—particularly newly emerging systems—in general. My argument becomes clearer and stronger, however, when we focus on the effort to create a nation-state, not merely out of a population that is largely tied to local communities and not at all oriented towards a national center, but out of a population that is divided into separate ethnic groups, each engendering strong sentimental attachments and often with a history of intense conflict among them. In such a situation, deliberate attempts to create a common national identity are likely to face particularly great obstacles and may well increase the disintegration rather than the unity of the society. Such policies are likely to be perceived as attempts to force individuals to choose between loyalty to their own group and loyalty to the central authorities, who represent, at least in part, a foreign group. This threat to ethnic identity

is likely to arouse sentimental attachments to the group in their fullest emotional intensity and to create tremendous resistances to the policies designed to promote national identity. In short, I am hypothesizing that direct efforts to create national identity may bring the ethnic subgroup identities to the fore and lead to a structuring of the situation in competitive terms, in which the more primordial attachments are more likely to prevail.

Beyond mobilizing such resistances, direct efforts at creating national identity may actually strengthen the divisions within the society. The weaker ethnic groups may perceive them as attempts, not at creating an overarching national identity, but at imposing the identity of the dominant group on the rest of the society. An obvious example can be found in the reactions of weaker (though still major) ethnic groups, within a population, to a policy of establishing the dominant group's language as the national language; language policy, however, presents special complications to which I shall return shortly. More generally, direct attempts to create a national identity in a multiethnic state may have divisive consequences by reinforcing the ideal of correspondence between political units and cultural units. If, indeed, political authority is to be linked to the sense of group identity, then each ethnic or linguistic group is inclined to vest this authority, not in the central leadership, but in its own leaders, who reflect its identity in a more self-evident way. In other words, in a multiethnic society, a direct appeal to national identity may merely serve to focus attention on group identity and thus encourage polarization along ethnic lines.

If national policies in a multiethnic society are to keep from arousing and mobilizing subgroup identities, they may have to go beyond the mere avoidance of direct manipulation of national identity. In situations in which one or more of the weaker ethnic groups are suppressed, central authorities may actually have to take positive steps to protect their subgroup identity—to assure their freedom to develop their own cultural institutions, maintain their own schools, and preserve their own language. Such actions, interestingly, would enhance these citizens' instrumental attachment to the central system by servicing their sentimental attachment to their subgroups. Furthermore, the central authorities, in a situation in which certain ethnic groups are or feel suppressed, must assure that ethnic status does not limit any group's access to the power and the resources of the system. If polarization along ethnic lines is to be avoided, they must see to it that ethnic variations are not correlated with variations

in socioeconomic status and in political power—in other words, divisions based on sentimental and on instrumental loyalties cut across each other. This may create the anomalous situation in which ethnic characteristics may, in fact, have to be taken into account deliberately in order to assure access to the system by groups that have in the past been systematically excluded—as has been true, for example, for Negroes in the United States.

The implications of the above remarks for language policy are fairly straightforward. I would be inclined to raise serious questions about the deliberate use of language policies for the purpose of creating a national identity. Macnamara's discussion (paper 4, this volume) of the failures of the Irish language movement provides an excellent illustration of the difficulties in restoring a national language for purely sentimental reasons, in a situation in which such a language served no functional purpose. These difficulties arose despite the fact that there is no major ethnic division within the country and that the movement aroused no sentimentally based resistances. In multilingual societies, such an effort may create far stronger resistances and contribute to internal conflict and disintegration for the reasons that I have already spelled out.

In terms of general principles, I would argue, very simply, that language policies ought to be based entirely on functional considerations. That is, in selecting languages for various purposes, in influencing the population's language behavior, and in planning the educational system, central authorities ought to be concerned primarily with two issues: (1) how to establish and facilitate patterns of communication (both internally and internationally) that would enable its socioeconomic institutions to function most effectively and equitably in meeting the needs and interests of the population; and (2) how to assure that different groups within the society, varying in their linguistic repertoires (for either ethnic or social-class reasons), have equal access to the system and opportunities to participate in it. Out of these processes, a national language, evoking sentimental attachments, may gradually emerge. I would seriously question, however, any policy designed to promote such a language on a sentimental basis and to suppress other languages in the hope of establishing the national one in their stead.

Stating these general principles, however, leaves unanswered the most important questions in developing a language policy. Although one may agree that a common language should not be promoted for strictly sentimental (national identity) reasons, there remains the fact that a common language usually has a great deal of instrumental value as well.

It may well be true, in a given situation, that the best way to assure the adequate functioning of socioeconomic institutions and to provide equal opportunities for participation in the system to all segments of the population is to institute a common national language. Thus, even if we subscribe to the principle that language policies should be based on functional considerations, we must ask, in each case, whether these purposes can be best served by establishing a common language and, if so, on what basis such a language is to be selected. In making such decisions, of course, one must weigh the instrumental value of a common language—and any particular common language—against the costs entailed by the establishment of such a language. One must take into account the sentimentally based resistances that such a policy would generate. One must consider the extent to which this policy—compared to various possible alternatives—can assure subgroups of the protection of their ethnic identities and of access to the system. In each individual case, of course, different issues are involved and different policies are, therefore, indicated.

Let me look briefly at the kinds of considerations that are likely to arise in the three types of new nations distinguished by Fishman (1968b). The problems would appear to be least complicated in the case of Type B nations. The solution of modernizing the traditional language—usually in its classical version—so that it can replace whatever Language of Wider Communication may have been in use for administration, higher education, and other purposes; and such a solution would seem, in most cases, to have the greatest functional utility and, at the same time, to contribute to national identity. It would clearly be easier to spread this language among wide segments of the population than it would be to spread the European language that it would be replacing, thus making communication between the central authorities and the population more effective, facilitating the educational process, involving more citizens in the system, and giving the masses of the population **greater access** to system roles. Such a policy does have several possible disadvantages from a functional point of view, which—though usually outweighed by the advantages—ought to be kept in mind:

(1) The use of a European language as the national language would have an advantage in terms of facilitating international contacts, which are crucial to the development of all new states. Giving up this advantage, however, would usually seem to be a price worth paying for the contribution of an indigenous national language to the functional integration of the larger society and to bridging the gap between elites and masses. The

elites, particularly those with extensive international involvements (including the scientists and scholars), will have to continue to use a Language of Wider Communication for many purposes, but their problems in this respect are no greater than those found in the **smaller European** states, whose national languages are not widely spoken—such as the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries. Elites of these countries inevitably have some disadvantage in that they have to do much of their work in a language not their own. For example, in Scandinavia, I have felt considerable empathy with my fellow social scientists because they have to do most of their reading, much of their scholarly discussion, and a good deal of their writing in a language in which they normally do not do their thinking. I have been impressed, however, with the way in which the large majority have **managed** to overcome this obstacle. In some respects, I feel that they have an advantage in that they are less likely to allow their professional jargon to invade their everyday language. They have learned their jargon in English and their own languages, therefore, remain relatively uncontaminated by it. The shift in language may make them more effective in communicating scientific ideas to wider audiences in their own societies. Perhaps this is one of the reasons (though I know it is not the only one) why Scandinavian academics seem to be more likely to write and speak for the mass media in their own countries than, for example, their American counterparts.

(2) The use of the classical version of the indigenous language still accrues to the advantage of the more upper-class, more urbanized segments of the population, who are more likely to have had contact with it and whose children have far more opportunities to master it. Thus, such a policy helps to perpetuate existing discrepancies by making it more likely that those who are already well off—and their offspring—will have greater access to system roles. This is indeed a serious problem, but it probably cannot be solved by way of language **selection**. The **selection** of a national language must be accompanied by **other deliberate** efforts to open up educational, occupational, and political opportunities to those segments of the population that are not already in favored positions. If these other steps are taken, language is unlikely to be a major barrier when the national language is not a completely foreign tongue but merely a more classical variety of the language everyone speaks.

(3) Fishman (1968b) and others have pointed out that efforts to modernize the classical language may arouse resistance from its traditional caretakers, who regard the language as sacred and want to keep its original

form intact. This may be particularly troublesome where the classical language is associated with religious traditions, as in the Arab world. Here, of course, we are dealing with one aspect of the larger struggle between modernizing and traditional elites, which inevitably accompanies the modernization process. It seems to me that language is probably among the less intractable aspects of this struggle, since it should be possible to modernize the language and yet maintain a field of classical scholarship centering on the traditional literature.

Type A nations, in terms of Fishman's distinctions, present, in my view, a somewhat more difficult problem. There the population has neither a single "great tradition"—as in Type B nations—around which they can rally nor several such traditions—as in Type C nations—that make conflicting demands. In such nations, Fishman points out, the European language of the former colonial power is usually selected as the national language, under conditions that are relatively free of conflicts. The great advantage of this state of affairs, from a functional point of view, is that it permits continuity and facilitates international activities, which are so vital to the developmental process. In other words, on the one hand, the disadvantages of selecting an indigenous language that I mentioned under point (1) above are avoided in this situation. On the other hand, the disadvantages discussed under point (2) are greatly exacerbated. The use of a Western language as the national language clearly points in an elitist direction and makes it even more likely that the discrepancies and the distance between the educated, urbanized, Westernized few and the masses of the population will be perpetuated and perhaps increased. The very distant Western language would set up a formidable barrier to the participation of wide segments of the population in modern system roles.

It seems to me that this is a problem of such dimensions that it may outweigh the functional advantage of selecting a European language. If a "compromise" *lingua franca* with indigenous roots—such as Swahili in Tanzania (cf. Whiteley, paper 7, this volume)—is available, it would, in my view, have much to recommend itself, since it would be more accessible to the masses of the population. Of course, if such an option is not available, a European language may be the only solution; but constant attention to the problem of bridging the gap between elites and masses would, in that case, be more than ever imperative.

Fishman's Type C nations present the most perplexing problems for language planning, as I have already pointed out in some of my earlier remarks about multiethnic states. Type C nations contain several

ethnic groups, each with its own language and with strong sentimental attachments to it. The appropriate language policies in such situations depend, among other things, on the number of major languages that enter into the competition. In discussing the possible ways of handling multiple languages, Kloss (1967) points out that "complete equality of status seems possible only in countries that have two or at most three languages. No country could conduct its affairs in four or more languages without becoming hopelessly muddled" (p. 42).

From a functional point of view, of course, a single national language has many advantages, but the selection of such a language is beset with innumerable problems. Selection of one of the competing indigenous languages as the national language arouses resistance on both a functional and a sentimental basis, since the other language groups feel that this choice places them at a disadvantage (as it very likely does) and, at the same time, degrades their own "great traditions." The problem may be eased when the languages involved are closely akin (see Kloss, 1967, p. 44), most probably because the disadvantages experienced by the minority language groups are less severe when a language related to their own is adopted as the national language. But even this is not necessarily true. For various sentimental reasons, small differences between two languages that are objectively very similar may be magnified (just as, on occasion, large differences may be ignored). Such reactions are often linked to the names assigned to languages: two highly similar languages may be given different names and perceived as quite distinct, while two very different languages may bear the same name and be perceived as versions of the same language.

One possible solution in a situation marked by competition between a number of indigenous languages, each cherished by its own group, is to choose as the national language one that places all groups at a more or less equal disadvantage. This criterion can be met by selecting a European language for that purpose. Such a choice, however, presents its own problems, as I have already indicated. While it may not create unequal advantages on an ethnic-linguistic basis (at least for the elites), it exaggerates inequalities on a class basis. It is likely to perpetuate elitism and a lopsided class structure and to weaken the links of the population with the center. In Type C nations the problem is further complicated by the fact that use of a European language is resented on sentimental grounds, since—unlike Type A nations—they have "great traditions" with which various segments of the population are strongly

identified. Thus, to take a major example, **neither Hindi nor English** has proven satisfactory as a national language for India—the former, because of the violent objections of non-Hindi speakers (particularly Tamil speakers, whose language belongs to a different family from Hindi and who have generally been further removed from the **centers** of power); the latter presumably because it went counter to an **evolving** sense of national self-awareness.

The choice of Swahili as a common national language in Tanzania, which **seems** to be meeting with some success (see Whiteley, paper 7, this volume), represents another example of a solution that is widely accepted, at least in part, because it places almost everyone at an equal disadvantage. Since Swahili is the indigenous language of only a very small proportion of the population, none of the groups that might otherwise be in competition are unduly disturbed by its selection. At the same time, Swahili does not have some of the drawbacks that English, as a Western language, would have. This may be an instructive example in that it **suggests** that a minority language may, under certain circumstances, **represent** a more functional choice than a dominant language. Of course, it must be kept in mind that Swahili, though it is the first language for only very few Tanzanians, is the second language for many and, in any event, is closely related to the Bantu languages spoken by the majority of the population. Thus, it has the advantage of facilitating communication and participation without the disadvantage of giving undue benefits to one or some of the major language groups as compared to others. Whiteley also discusses some of the structural factors in the pre-independence period—involving both the political structures of the peoples living in Tanganyika and the administrative structure established by the British—that inhibited the development of strong language loyalties. These historical conditions, again, created a receptive atmosphere for instituting Swahili as the national language.

In sum, in situations in which the vast number of competing languages makes it impossible to assign official status to all of them, there may be no alternative to instituting a single national language. It is essential that the language selected be such that the majority of the population can readily master it and that it does not give an undue advantage to some groups at the expense of others. Of course, if the majority of the population is sentimentally attached to a single language for historical, ideological, or perhaps religious reasons, as is true for Hebrew in Israel, then the task of selecting a national language is made easier, despite the

fact that the population speaks many unrelated languages. Often, however, it is precisely the language to which there are no strong sentimental attachments that provides the optimal compromise because, although its selection may not arouse tremendous enthusiasm, it also does not arouse threat and resentment. If no satisfactory way can be found to equalize advantages and disadvantages across the population, then the major solutions may have to be sought not so much in language planning as in educational and political planning. Educational planning would have to be directed at systematically compensating for the disadvantages of the excluded groups; political planning may have to be directed at reducing the significance of linguistically based disadvantages by appropriate arrangements to decentralize power.

In those multilingual states in which the number of competing languages is two or three—to adopt the cut-off point suggested by Kloss (1967)—it may well be reasonable from a functional point of view to abandon the goal of a single national language. The mere decision, however, to assign official status to two or three languages does not necessarily eliminate language conflicts with potentially very disintegrative effects. Such a policy seems to be working well, for example, in Switzerland, but not at all well in Belgium. Thus, it is not enough to assign official status to two or three languages; it is also necessary to consider the specific conditions that will make such a policy effective and equitable.

A major source of complication is that two languages that are equally official do not necessarily occupy the same status within the society. One of the languages may well be dominant, partly because it is spoken by a larger proportion of the population but more importantly because of differences in the level of economic development of the two groups. Language may help perpetuate and magnify long-standing discrepancies between the groups. The problem may become exacerbated by the fact that the elites of the subordinate group, fluent in the dominant language, achieve mobility for themselves and become increasingly alienated from their own group. It is this kind of correlation between language and the level of development that contributes to the language problems of Belgium and Canada, and its apparent absence that partly accounts for the relatively problem-free situation in Switzerland (cf. Fishman, 1967, p. 34). It is apparent, from these considerations, that language planning must be closely linked with economic planning. Educational efforts—including systematic learning of the dominant language within the subordinate group—can help in bringing larger proportions of that group

into the system. Beyond that, however, language problems are likely to persist until that group *as a group* is brought into the system through its economic development.

Another condition that plays a major role in the integration of an officially multilingual society is the nature of the political structure. In Switzerland, for example, power is highly decentralized, which makes control of the center a less desperate issue. The relative dominance of different language groups has fewer political implications. Moreover, the subdivisions are not based on language per se. Although each canton ~~does~~ have a dominant language (and this is probably more readily ~~accepted~~ by the minority because it is the majority in other cantons), the operative units in the system are the cantons rather than linguistic groups. Thus, there is little tendency for polarization along linguistic lines. The division does not exactly cut across linguistic lines (although there are some linguistically mixed cantons), but it does not follow linguistic lines either. There are obviously many special circumstances in the Swiss case, but it at least suggests the importance of language planning in the context of political planning. One direction that certainly merits attention by those who are concerned with the integration of multilingual societies is the search for political arrangements in which power is decentralized (thus reducing the magnitude of potential conflict) but not distributed along strictly linguistic lines (thus reducing the drift toward polarization).

CONCLUSION

I have presented a framework for analyzing the involvement of individuals and subgroups in the national system, which distinguishes, among other things, between two sources of attachment to the system: sentimental and instrumental. These two types of attachment can potentially reinforce and facilitate each other. By the same token, the correspondence of the two may well have dysfunctional consequences. For example, a state that has adequate resources to meet the needs and interests of its entire population and, thus, to generate instrumental ties for its various subgroups may be prevented from doing so by the existence of ~~powerful~~, sentimentally based divisions within the population.

A common language may help to unify a population because it strengthens both sentimental and instrumental attachments to the system and, moreover, contributes to the mutual reinforcement of the two. Conversely, the lack of a common language in a ~~multiethnic society~~ may increase divisiveness and conflict by producing resistance and threats at

both the sentimental and instrumental levels and by contributing to the mutual reinforcement of these two types of friction.

What are the implications of this analysis for language policies in multilingual societies? Although a common language would obviously make for a more unified and cohesive society, efforts to create such a language where it does not already exist may have precisely the opposite effect. In determining whether a common language would be helpful and, if so, what form it ought to take, policy makers and language planners must consider not only the potential of such a language in binding the population to the nation-state, sentimentally and instrumentally, but also the sentimentally and instrumentally based resistances that the proposed policy would call forth in different subgroups within the population.

My speculations about criteria for language planning—and I must stress that they are only speculations—start with the proposition that the deliberate use of language policies for the purpose of creating a national identity and of fostering sentimental attachments is usually not desirable. Rather, language policies ought to be designed to meet the needs and interests of all segments of the population effectively and equitably, thus, fostering instrumental attachments out of which sentimental ones can then gradually emerge. This proposition is based in part on my value preferences and my concern that the direct manipulation of sentimental attachments may serve as a substitute for efforts at the instrumental level of creating adequate socioeconomic institutions and of providing meaningful roles for all subgroups within the society. The proposition, however, is also based in part on certain empirical assumptions, such as the assumption that a sense of national identity is more likely to develop out of functional relationships within the society than out of deliberate attempts to promote it; or that direct efforts to promote a national identity in multiethnic societies will bring subgroup identities to the fore and thus generate resistance and strengthen internal divisions. These assumptions can and should be put to an empirical test. The validity of my recommendations clearly depends on how well these assumptions stand up to such a test.

Even if one accepts the proposition that language policies should be designed to meet the needs and interests of all segments of the population in the most effective and equitable way, he has to determine what specific policy is most likely to be conducive to this end in a given society at a given point in time. In some situations, a common national language may be most appropriate; in others, the recognition of two or more official

languages; and in yet others, the combination of a national administrative language, with officially recognized local languages. Where a common language is indicated, the particular language most appropriate for that purpose may be the language spoken by the majority of the population, or a language spoken by a minority group, or a Language of Wider Communication, or a modernized version of a classical language. Whatever language policy is developed, its success may depend on careful co-ordination with educational planning and with economic and political development.

In evaluating these and other alternative policy options, it is important to assess the integrative and disintegrative effects that each policy is likely to have on both the sentimental and instrumental levels. These effects, in turn, will depend on the strength and nature of the attachments of various segments of the population to the national system and to their own subgroups. Thus, for example, so far as resistances to national language policies are based primarily on instrumental considerations, planners have greater freedom to select the most efficient solution, provided such a solution is combined with educational, economic, and political arrangements designed to overcome systematic inequities between different ethnic groups. If, on the other hand, resistances are largely based on sentimental attachments to the separate ethnic groups, it may be preferable to adopt a less efficient solution that is designed to protect the integrity of cultural minorities. It should be possible to derive more specific hypotheses about the probable effects of different policies under various conditions as the theoretical framework presented in this paper is refined and subjected to empirical tests.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper was prepared for the Conference on Language Planning Processes, East-West Center, Honolulu, April 7-10, 1969. The work was supported by U.S. Public Health Service Research Grant MH 07280 from the National Institute of Mental Health.

NOTES

1. The approach is presented in more detail in Kelman (1969), and some of its additional features and implications are discussed in Kelman (1968). The assumptions behind this approach bear striking resemblance to Fishman's formulations (see, for example, Fishman, 1968a, 1968c, and paper

1, this volume). Although his approach and mine, in my view, are fully compatible with one another and are intended to highlight the same phenomena, there are some differences in the precise distinctions that are drawn and in the way certain terms—like “nation”—are defined. I shall use the distinctions and definitions that I have been working with, but I hope that the similarities in the basic approach and purpose will be apparent.

2. Fishman (1968a) suggests the term “nationism” for this purpose, which has many advantages and avoids certain ambiguities. On the other hand, my usage is consistent with my argument that the correspondence between state and nationality is central to the ideology of the modern nation-state.
3. The sources of legitimacy distinguished here are similar to, though not completely isomorphic with, Fishman’s distinction between sociocultural integration and political-operative integration (cf. Fishman, paper 1, this volume).
4. Compare Fishman’s distinction between nation-state and state-nation (Fishman, paper 1, this volume).
5. I am grateful to Professor Chaim Rabin for pointing out to me that sentimental attachment may be intensified not just by the existence of a common language *per se* (in the structural sense) but also by the existence of a common “manner of being addressed.” He cites the Austrians and the German-speaking Swiss as an example: They speak the same language as the Germans, but they attach a great deal of importance to the uniquely Austrian or Swiss way of using that language. Thus, it is the use of the language rather than its structure that serves as a national symbol and object of sentimental attachment. Perhaps the continuity of national tradition is enhanced by a common language in the sense of the accustomed manner of being addressed, while the authenticity of the tradition is enhanced by a common language in the structural sense.

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