Gender Equality and Democracy

Ronald Inglehart
University of Michigan

Pippa Norris
Harvard University

Christian Welzel
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin

Direct correspondence to Ronald Inglehart, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106-1248; e-mail: RFI@umich.edu.

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Introduction.

Multiple factors have been found to determine the structure of opportunities for women's representation in elected office, including the institutional context like the electoral system and the use of affirmative action strategies within party lists, and the resources that women and men bring to the pursuit of fulltime legislative careers, such as their social and occupational networks (Rule 1987; Norris 1997; Karam 1998; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Caul 1999; Reynolds 1999). What this study seeks to demonstrate is that in addition to these factors, the trend toward gender equality is intimately linked with the broader process of cultural change and democratization. In a sense the link between women's representation and democracy should be self-evident, since women account for over half the population of most societies: if the majority doesn't have full political rights, the society is not democratic. But for much of history, this proposition did not seem at all self-evident; until well into the 20th century, women did not even have the right to vote. Winning the vote meant overcoming traditional norms that varied from culture to culture but nearly always excluded women from politics. Thus, women attained suffrage by 1920 in most historically Protestant countries but not until after World War II in most Catholic ones, and still later in other cultural zones (IPU 1999). Even after being admitted to the electorate, women continued to be excluded from most political leadership roles until the last few decades, and they are still heavily underrepresented in parliaments and cabinets (UN 2000).

Democratic institutions existed long before gender equality, but today, this article argues, growing emphasis on gender equality is an important factor in the process of democratization.

Furthermore, as we will demonstrate, support for gender equality is not just a *consequence* of democratization. It is part of a broad cultural change that is transforming many aspects of industrialized societies and supporting the spread of democratic institutions. Part I sets out a brief summary of the literature on the relationship between culture and women's representation. Part II demonstrates the association between levels of democratization and the proportion of women in parliaments in 65 societies worldwide. Part III establishes the reasons for this relationship, including the role of cultural change in values towards gender equality in public life, the process of modernization and economic development, cultural legacies represented by religious values, and democratic political institutions. Part IV considers how far growing support for gender equality in public life represents part of a broader shift towards Post-material values. The conclusion considers the implications of these findings, theorizing that the process of modernization drives cultural change, and in turn this leads towards both the rise of women in public life and the development of democratic institutions.

I: Cultural Theories of Barriers to Women's Representation

Traditional cultural attitudes have long been suspected to function as a major barrier to women's representation in elected office, although previous studies have been unable to establish conclusive evidence supporting this proposition. Theories of socialization have long emphasized the importance of the division of sex roles within a country -- especially egalitarian attitudes towards women as political leaders (Sapiro 1983; Carroll 1994). Cultural explanations hypothesize that in traditional societies, women will be reluctant to run and, if they seek the office, they will fail to attract sufficient support to win. Cultural attitudes may plausibly have a direct influence upon whether women are prepared come forward as candidates for office (the supply-side of the equation), and the criteria used by gate-keepers when evaluating suitable candidates (the demand-side), as well as having an

indirect influence upon the overall institutional context, such as the adoption of gender quotas in party recruitment processes (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris 1997).

The cultural hypothesis provides a plausible reason why women in elected office have advanced much further in some democracies rather than others, for example within the Nordic region rather than in comparable countries like Switzerland, France or Belgium, despite the fact that all these nations are relatively similar European societies, as affluent post-industrial welfare states, and all are established parliamentary democracies with similar proportional representation electoral systems (Karvonen and Selle 1995). Culture also seems like a major reason why many nations with a strict Islamic background have often ranked at the bottom of the list worldwide in terms of women in parliament, even the more affluent Arab societies like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon (Abu-Zayd 1998). Studies comparing post-industrial societies have found that the proportion of women in parliament is associated with the historical prevalence of Catholicism, understood as representing more traditional attitudes towards women and the family than Protestant religions (Rule 1987; Kenworthy and Malami 1999). A worldwide comparison of 180 nation states by Reynolds (1999) found that the greatest contrasts were between dominant Christian countries (whether Protestant or Catholic) and all other religions including Islamic, Buddhist, Judaic, Confucian and Hindu, all of which had lower proportions of women in legislative and Cabinet office. Political culture has therefore commonly long been suspected to be an important determinant of women's entry into elected office, but nevertheless so far studies have been unable to examine *direct* survey evidence of attitudes towards women in public life across a wide range of nations worldwide to examine this proposition more systematically.

II: The Relationship between Democratization and Women in Elected Office

The theory developed in this article suggests that the process of modernization leads simultaneously towards both democratization and a rise in the proportion of women in public life. It is well known that industrialization leads to occupational specialization, rising educational levels, and increasing levels of income. But economic development also brings unforeseen cultural changes that transform gender roles and make the emergence of democratic institutions increasingly likely. Determined elites can resist these changes, and a society's institutions and cultural traditions can facilitate or retard them, but in the long run, the underlying trend toward both gender equality and democratization becomes increasingly costly to resist. Evidence from more than 60 societies suggests that economic development propels societies in a roughly predictable direction, changing prevailing gender roles in virtually any society that industrializes.

One indication that gender equality goes with democracy is the fact that democratic societies usually have more women in parliament than undemocratic societies. Figure 1 shows the relationship between a society's level of civil rights and political liberties, and the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament[1]. This figure includes 65 societies containing 80 percent of the world's population[2]. Countries that rank high on civil rights and political liberties, have much higher proportions of women in parliament than countries with low levels of freedom. A few authoritarian societies, such as China, have large numbers of women in parliament; while Japan, Ireland, France and the U.S. have high levels of democracy and relatively few women in parliament. But despite these exceptions, the overall relationship is strong, showing a .65 correlation. In democratic societies, women tend to be relatively well represented in parliament.

(Figure 1 about here)

III: Explaining the Relationship between Gender Equality and Democratization

Why does gender equality in elected office tend to go with democracy? A key cultural change involves the belief that men make better political leaders than women. This view is still held by a majority of the world's population, but it seems to be fading rapidly in advanced industrial societies. Evidence from the World Values Surveys demonstrates that in less-prosperous countries such as India, China, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria or Egypt, from 50 to 90 percent of the public still believes that men make better political leaders than women (see Figure 2). But in advanced industrial societies, an overwhelming majority of the public rejects this idea. Furthermore, we find large generational differences in advanced industrial societies, where older citizens are relatively likely to believe that men make better political leaders than women, but younger citizens (especially younger women) overwhelmingly disagree. The long-standing belief that "men make better political leaders than women" is changing, as younger generations replace older ones.

(Figure 2 about here)

This belief is not just a matter of lip service. It has important political consequences. As Figure 2 demonstrates, in countries where the public rejects the idea that men make better political leaders, relatively high proportions of women get elected to parliament. This relationship is substantially stronger than the one shown in Figure 1 (the correlation rises from .65 to .77). This suggests that cultural norms may have even more impact than democratic institutions do, on the percentage of women in parliament. Moreover, although richer countries have higher proportions of women in parliament than poorer ones, this is true mainly because economic development leads to cultural changes. Table 1 tests these claims, examining the relative impact of cultural factors, economic modernization and democratic institutions on the percentage of women in parliament.

(Table 1 about here)

Modernization seems to be an important contributing factor. Rich countries commonly have higher percentages of women in parliament than low-income countries. And since economic development is closely linked with erosion of the belief in male superiority, *and* with democratization, it might be argued that the findings in Figures 1 and 2 simply reflect the effects of economic growth: it transforms gender norms and brings democratization and rising numbers of women in parliament. Model 1 (see Table 1) confirms that richer countries (those with high per capita GDP) do, indeed, have higher percentages of women in parliament than poorer ones. But this factor explains only 30 percent of the variance, and when we add occupational structure and educational level to the equation (model 2), neither of them explains any additional variance.

A society's cultural heritage explains considerably more of the variance in the percentage of women in parliament than does economic development. Religion has long been found to be one of the factors predicting levels of female representation (Rule 1987; Reynolds 1999). We constructed a dummy variable that taps whether or not the society was historically dominated by Protestantism (regardless of how many practicing Protestants it has today); this variable alone explains 46 percent of the variance in the proportion of women in parliament—substantially more than all three modernization factors combined (model 3). Although most historically Protestant societies have higher proportions of women in parliament than historically Roman Catholic ones, Catholic societies generally rank above societies with Orthodox or Confucian or Islamic cultural traditions. Among the societies included in this study, in the median-ranking Protestant society 30 per cent of the members of the lower house were women; in the median Catholic society the figure was 13 percent; in the median Orthodox society it was 7 percent, in the median Confucian society it was 5 percent, and in the median Islamic society, only 3 percent of the members of the lower house were women. Even today, a society's cultural heritage has a surprisingly strong impact on gender equality. Societies with a

Protestant heritage have about ten times as many women in parliament as societies with an Islamic heritage.

Now let us examine the impact of another type of cultural variable: the extent to which the public believes that "men make better political leaders than women." While the religious traditions were established centuries ago, the norm of gender equality has become widespread only within recent decades. As Figure 2 demonstrates, this belief is strongly linked with the proportion of women in parliament. But does it have an impact of its own, or is it simply one more consequence of economic modernization, along with rising female representation in parliament? Model 4 analyzes the impact of belief in gender equality, while controlling for levels of economic development and religious heritage. The proportion of explained variance rises steeply, from .46 in model 3, to .70 in model 4. The extent to which the public endorses the norm of gender equality seems to have a major impact on the percentage of women in parliament. The society's religious tradition also has a powerful effect. Both of these cultural variables show statistically significant effects on the percentage of women in parliament, but GDP/capita does *not* show a significant relationship when we control for them. Economic development seems to be important mainly in so far as it is helps change prevailing gender norms: by itself, it has little direct effect.

Finally, let us examine the impact of democratic institutions on the percentage of women in parliament. Figure 1 showed that the two are closely linked—but why do they go together? Is it (1) because democratic institutions *themselves* tend to produce higher proportions of women in parliament, or (2) because of underlying cultural changes that bring rising female participation in parliament, and also favor democracy? Model 5 adds a measure of democracy to the analysis, the Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties.[2] The results indicate that cultural factors drive the process. When we control for them, we find that a society's level of democracy does not have a statistically

significant effect on the percentage of women in parliament, and the proportion of explained variance rises only slightly (from .70 to .72) when we take democratic institutions into account. Cultural changes seem to bring rising female representation in parliament regardless of whether or not democratization occurs. Accordingly, when we drop the Freedom House democracy ratings and GDP/capita from the analysis (model 6), the two cultural variables by themselves explain fully 70 percent of the variance in the percentage of women in parliament. Democracies have relatively large numbers of women in parliament, but democracy itself does not seem to cause it. Instead, both the trend toward democracy and the shift toward gender equality in parliament, seem to reflect underlying cultural changes that are transforming society.

(Figure 3 about here)

Democratic institutions, by themselves, do not guarantee gender equality. But does it work the other way around: does rising emphasis on gender equality improve the chances that democratic institutions will emerge and flourish? The answer seems to be yes. Figure 3 shows the relationship between support for gender equality in politics, and the society's level of political rights and civil liberties. The relationship is remarkably strong. Although the linkage between the percentage of women in parliament and democracy (shown in Figure 1) was a substantial .65, the linkage between support for gender equality and democracy is much stronger (r=.82). In virtually every authoritarian society, a majority of the public believes that men make better political leaders than women; in virtually every stable democracy, a clear majority of the public rejects this belief (Japan being the sole exception). This correlation could be taken to mean that 67 percent of the variance in levels of democracy reflects emphasis on gender equality. The reality is not that simple, of course. Growing support for gender equality is only one aspect of a broader process of cultural change that is transforming advanced industrial societies and contributing to democratization, as the multivariate

analyses presented below will demonstrate. But attitudes toward gender equality are a central element—arguably, *the* most central element-- of this cultural change. Let us examine this broader syndrome of cultural change, using data from the World Values Surveys.

IV: Gender Equality and Cultural Change

In a factor analysis of national-level data from the 43 societies included in the 1990 World Values Survey, Inglehart (1997) found that two main dimensions accounted for over half of the cross-national variance in more than a score of variables tapping basic values in a wide range of domains ranging from politics to economic life and sexual behavior. Each of the two dimensions taps a major axis of cross-cultural variation involving many different basic values; the first dimension taps a dimension referred to as "Traditional vs. Secular-rational values," while the second one taps "Survival vs. Self-expression values."

These two dimensions of cross-cultural variation seem robust. When the 1990-1991 factor analysis was replicated with the data from the 1995-1998 surveys, the same two dimensions of cross-cultural variation emerged from as from the earlier surveys—even though the new analysis was based on surveys that covered 23 additional countries that were not included in the earlier surveys (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). [1] Inglehart and Baker (2000) provide full details on how these dimensions were measured, together with factor analyses at both the individual level and the national level, demonstrating that the same dimensional structure emerges at both levels.

The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not. A wide range of other orientations are closely linked with this dimension. Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of

national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics.

(Figure 4 about here)

Figure 4 shows where each of 65 societies, containing most of the world's population, is located on these two dimensions, providing a cultural map of the world.[3] We find large and pervasive differences between the worldviews of people in rich and poor societies; their basic values and beliefs differ on scores of key variables, in a coherent pattern. Richer societies tend to be high on both of these two dimensions, while low-income societies tend to rank low on both dimensions. Does this mean that economic development brings predictable changes in prevailing values? The evidence suggests that it does: time series evidence shows that with economic development, societies tend to move from the lower left of Figure 4, toward the upper right—from the values prevailing in low-income societies, toward the values prevailing in high-income societies (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Subsequent analyses revealed that the first dimension is linked with the transition from agrarian society to industrial society: societies with secular-rational values tend to have a low percentage of their work force in the agricultural sector (r= -.49) and a high percentage of industrial workers (r= .65). The survival/self-expression dimension, on the other hand, is linked with the transition from industrial society to a service society or knowledge society, showing a .72 correlation with the percentage of the labor force in the service sector.

But economic differences are not the whole story. Religious traditions seem to have an enduring impact on the contemporary value systems of sixty-five societies, as Weber, Huntington and others have argued. The historically Protestant countries of Northern Europe form a distinctive cluster, reflecting the fact that their publics have relatively similar values on political, religious and economic questions, and also concerning gender roles, child-rearing and sexual behavior. The historically

Roman Catholic European countries also have relatively similar values, forming another cluster—as do the publics of all eleven Latin American societies. The English-speaking countries constitute still another cluster of culturally-similar societies, as do the three African societies. Similarly, the publics of the four Confucian-influenced societies show relatively similar basic values and beliefs, despite large differences in their levels of economic development. And the ex-communist societies also form a cluster (with the historically Orthodox ones falling nearer the "Survival" pole of the horizontal dimension, and the historically Catholic ones falling closer to the center).

Societies that experience economic development tend to move from the lower left toward the upper right of the map. But cultural change is path dependent. The fact that a society was historically Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist when one controls for the effects of economic development (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). A society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage, including religious traditions, colonial ties, the experience of communist rule and its level of economic development.

(Table 2 about here)

This article replicates Inglehart and Baker's factor analysis, and then examines the orientations that are closely correlated with the Survival/Self-expression dimension. The results demonstrate the central role that gender equality plays in the syndrome of beliefs and values tapped by the survival/self-expression dimension. Table 2 shows the wide range of beliefs and values that are strongly correlated with the survival/self-expression dimension. A central component involves the polarization between Materialist and Postmaterialist values. These values reflect an intergenerational shift from emphasis on economic and physical security, toward increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being and quality of life concerns (Inglehart, 1990, 1997). Postmaterialist values emerge among birth cohorts that grew up under conditions that enable one to take survival for

granted. During the past 25 years, these values have become increasingly widespread throughout advanced industrial societies, but they are only one component of a much broader dimension of cultural change.

Societies that rank high on survival values tend to emphasize Materialist values, show relatively low levels of subjective well-being and report relatively poor health, are relatively intolerant toward outgroups, low on interpersonal trust, and they emphasize hard work, rather than imagination or tolerance, as important things to teach a child. Societies high on self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences on all of these topics. Environmental protection issues are also closely linked with this dimension. Those with survival values have not engaged in recycling, have not attended environmentalist meetings or supported environmental protection in other ways; but they favor more emphasis on developing technology and are confident that scientific discoveries will help, rather than hurt, humanity. Those with self-expression values tend to have the opposite characteristics.

These are important issues. But arguably, the most important social change of the past few decades has been the revolution in gender roles that has transformed the lives of a majority of the population throughout advanced industrial society. Since the dawn of recorded history, women have been narrowly restricted to the roles of wife and mother, with few other options. In recent decades, this has changed dramatically. Several of the items in Table 2 (shown in bold face type) involve the role of women: the survival/self-expression dimension reflects mass polarization over such questions as whether "A woman has to have children to be fulfilled;" or whether "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women;" or whether "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl." But one item taps this dimension particularly well: the question whether "Men make better political leaders than women."

Responses to this question are very strongly correlated with the survival/self-expression dimension—indeed, they are almost as strongly correlated with it as is the Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery. This is remarkable, because Materialist/Postmaterialist values are measured by a multi-item battery that was explicitly designed to tap intergenerational value change and is one of the items used in the factor analyses that define this dimension. The question about whether men make better political leaders than women, on the other hand, is a single item that was not even included in the first two waves of the World Values Surveys, and consequently was not used in the analyses that define this dimension. It nevertheless taps the survival/self-expression almost as well as does the Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery, and better than any of the other variables included in the World Values Survey. To put gender equality of the same footing as the other values, we reran Inglehart and Baker's (2000) societal-level factor analysis, replicating it in every detail but one: we added the question, "Do men make better political leaders than women?" The resulting analysis produced essentially the same factor structure as that reported in their article, with one difference: the question about gender roles now shows the highest loading on the Survival/self-expression dimension (a loading of .91, slightly *higher* than that of the Materialist/Postmaterialist index).

Inglehart et al. seem to have underestimated the importance of changing gender roles when they set out to measure the cultural changes linked with the emergence of post-industrial society. During the past few decades, these changes have transformed the entire way of life for over half the world's population. Throughout history, women in virtually all societies have had their life options restricted to the roles of wife and mother. Today, increasingly, almost any career and almost any life style is opening up to them. These cultural changes have been important for men, but the transformation in the lives of women is far more dramatic, moving them from narrow subordination toward full equality. A revolutionary change is taking place in women's education, career opportunities, fertility rates, sexual

behavior and worldviews. With this in mind, it is not surprising to find that that gender issues constitute such a central component—arguably, *the* most central component-- of value change in post-industrial societies.

Gender equality and democracy

These same cultural changes seem to be closely linked with the rapid spread of democratic institutions that has occurred in the last two decades. The syndrome of survival/self-expression values shown in Table 2 reflects a set of coherent changes away from absolute social norms, toward increasing tolerance, trust, participatory orientations and self-expressive values. The shift from Materialist toward Postmaterialist values is a move from emphasizing economic and physical security as the top priorities, toward increasing emphasis on freedom of expression and a more participatory role in society in general and politics in particular. The syndrome reflects an increasingly activist role: societies that rank high on self-expression values also show much higher rates of participation in petitions, environmental activities, boycotts. Although relatively passive forms of political participation such as voting have stagnated, time series data show that these newer forms of behavior (that used to be called "unconventional political participation"[Barnes, Kaase et al., 1979]) have become increasingly widespread—so much so, that they are now a part of the standard political repertoire in advanced industrial societies. Emphasis on gender equality is linked with a broader shift toward increasing tolerance of outgroups, including foreigners, gays and lesbians. The shift from survival values to self-expression values also includes a shift in child-rearing values: from emphasis on hard work toward increasing emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. And it goes with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to an atmosphere of tolerance, trust and political moderation. Finally, societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust. This produces a culture of trust and tolerance, in which

people place a relatively high value on individual freedom and self-expression, and have activist political orientations. These are precisely the attributes that the political culture literature argues are crucial to democracy.

(Figure 5 about here)

Is this cultural syndrome of self-expression values actually linked with the presence of high levels of democracy? As Figure 5 indicates, the answer is yes— and the relationship is astonishingly strong. A society's position on the survival/self-expression dimension index is very strongly correlated with its level of democracy, as indicated by its scores on the Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties, from 1981 through 1998. This relationship is remarkably powerful and it is clearly not a methodological artifact or an intra-cranial correlation, since the two variables are measured at different levels and come from different sources. Virtually all of the societies that rank high on survival/self-expression values are stable democracies. Virtually all of the societies that rank low on this dimension have authoritarian governments. The correlation of .88 between survival/self-expression values and democracy is higher than any of the correlations we have seen so far—higher even than the .82 linkage between support for gender equality and democracy shown in Figure 3. Gender issues constitute a central component of the cultural changes underlying this dimension, but the broader cultural dimension as a whole, involving emphasis on self-expression, tolerance of outgroups, participatory orientations, subjective well-being, health and interpersonal trust, as well as gender equality, is even more powerfully linked with democratization. The .88 correlation underlying Figure 5 is significant at a very high level, and probably reflects a causal linkage. But what is causing what?

One interpretation would be that democratic institutions give rise to the self-expression values that are so closely linked with them. In other words, democracy makes people healthy, happy, non-

sexist, tolerant and trusting, and instills Postmaterialist values. This interpretation is appealing and if it were true, it would provide a powerful argument for democracy, implying that we have a quick fix for most of the world's problems: adopt democratic institutions and live happily ever after.

Unfortunately, the experience of the Soviet Union's successor states doesn't support this interpretation. Since their dramatic move toward democracy in 1991, they have not become healthier, happier, more trusting, more tolerant or more Postmaterialist: most of them have moved in exactly the opposite direction. The fact that they are living in economic and physical insecurity seems to have more impact than the fact that their leaders are chosen by free elections.

Democratic institutions do not automatically produce a culture of self-expression values. Instead, it seems that economic development gradually leads to social and cultural changes that make democratic institutions more likely to survive and flourish. That would help explain why mass democracy did not emerge until a relatively recent point in history, and why, even now, it is most likely to be found in economically more developed countries— in particular, those that emphasize self-expression values over survival values.

(Table 3 about here)

Table 3 examines the factors linked with the emergence and survival of democracy. We hypothesize that economic development tends to bring a gradual shift from survival to self-expression values, and these values in turn are conducive to democracy. An extensive literature argues that economic development is conducive to democracy, and empirical research has demonstrated repeatedly that richer societies and "post industrial" societies (those with a relatively large percentage of the work force in the service sector) are likelier to have democratic institutions than poorer, largely agrarian or industrial, societies (Lipset, 1959, etc.). Moreover, there is strong evidence that causal connection works primarily from economics to politics: although economic development leads to

democracy, democracy is *not* necessarily conducive to economic development (Burkhardt and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Przeworski and Limogi, 1993). Model 1 is consistent with this interpretation: relatively high levels of real per capita GDP have a positive and statistically significant impact on a society's level of democracy, as indicated by the Freedom House scores on civil liberties and political rights. But cultural factors also seem to play significant roles, even controlling for the effects of modernization. Societies that rank high on self-expression values are significantly more likely to show high levels of political rights and civil liberties than societies that emphasize survival values. An Orthodox religious tradition shows a significant (negative) impact on the level of democracy, controlling for the other variables. But the proportion of women in parliament does not show a significant impact on the level of freedom. Although democracies tend to have relatively high percentages of women in parliament, both democracy and gender equality are linked with the broad underlying cultural changes tapped by the survival/self-expression dimension: the proportion of women in parliament is not a direct cause of democracy. Accordingly, when we drop this variable (Model 2), the remaining factors still explain fully 78 percent of the variance in levels of democracy.

A society's traditional religious heritage seems to influence its level of democracy, but these religious traditions were established long ago. We believe their influence today largely reflects the extent to which they help shape a society's position on the survival/self-expression dimension. Accordingly, Model 3, which drops the Protestant and Orthodox dummy variables, still explains fully 72 percent of the variance in levels of democracy. Moreover, in keeping with our interpretation, the significance level of survival/self-expression values rises sharply. This result suggests that a society's religious tradition has some impact on its level of democracy even today, but that the direct effect is relatively modest. The percentage of the work force in the service sector does not show a statistically significant effect, and Model 4 drops it from the regression. The percentage of explained variance

drops slightly, indicating that this variable does play a role, although a relatively modest one. The society's level of real per capita GDP and it position on the survival/self-expression dimension both show strongly significant effects in Model 4, accounting for 69 percent of the variance in levels of freedom.

Theoretically, economic development is the key driving force underlying democratization, but its impact is felt mainly in so far as it is conducive to a shift from survival to self-expression values. Accordingly, Model 5 drops GDP/capita from the regression equation— and a society's position on the survival/self-expression continuum by itself still explains fully 64 percent of the variance in levels of democracy. Democratization seems to be a complex multi-stage process in which the shift from survival to self-expression values plays the central role, but a society's religious heritage, the structure of its work force and its level of economic development all have some direct impact.

(Table 4 about here)

Survival/self-expression values are strongly correlated with a society's level of development, as Figure 5 demonstrates. And the multivariate analysis just performed suggests that the shift from survival to self-expression values has a significant causal impact on democracy, one that persists when we control for economic modernization and cultural heritage. But we still need to address the question, is culture causing democracy, or does democracy transform culture? The relationship could, conceivably, work in both directions, but according to our theory the main effect is one that moves from economic development to culture, to political institutions, with economic development bringing cultural changes that are conducive to democracy. In order to test this argument, we carried out another set of regression analyses—this time, using survival/self-expression values as the dependent variable. The results in Table 3 suggest that self-expression values are conducive to democracy. The

analyses in Table 4 address the question: to what extent are democratic institutions conducive to self-expression values?

Model 1 analyzes the impact of economic development and cultural heritage on the society's level of self-expression values—but it also includes the society's level of democracy as a predictor. The five independent variables included in this model explain fully 86 percent of the cross-national variation in survival/self-expression values, and all but one of them show effects that are statistically significant, or nearly so. The percentage of the work force in the service sector shows weak effects, so it is dropped from Model 2, which still accounts for 86 percent of the variance—with all four predictors now showing statistically significant effects.

There is no question that the two religious indicators are historically and causally prior to democracy: it would be absurd to argue that a society became Protestant or Orthodox several hundred years ago because it was democratic in the late 20th century. So any overlapping causal variance that they share in this analysis can more plausibly be attributed to the religious heritage than to the level of democracy. Similarly, convincing evidence already cited (Burkhardt and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Przeworski and Limogi, 1993) points to the conclusion that economic democracy is conducive to democratization, but that it doesn't necessarily work the other way around: here, too, economic development seems to have a prior causal status. Accordingly, when we drop the level of democracy from the regression, in Model 3, we find that our indicators of economic development and religious heritage account for almost as much of the variance in self-expression values, as is explained in Model 2: the explained variance drops from 86 percent to 83 percent. Although democracy is very strongly correlated with self-expression values, it seems to account for only 3 percent of the variance in these values. In short, we find indications of a modest reciprocal effect in which democratic institutions help reshape culture, but the main causal sequence is one that starts from the society's traditional cultural

heritage, which is then transformed by economic development into relatively high or low levels of emphasis on self-expression values.

Conclusions: Changing Values and Changing Gender Roles

We have examined the impact of economic and cultural variables on the proportion of women in parliament, and on a society's level of democracy. Although relative gender equality in parliament is closely linked with democracy (r = .65), neither variable seems to be a direct cause of the other. Instead, both women's representation in parliament and a society's level of democracy seem to reflect an underlying cultural shift linked with economic development. Although a given society's traditional cultural heritage still has significant impacts on both the percentage of women in its parliament, and its level of political rights and civil liberties, rising levels of GDP and the shift toward a knowledge economy tends to transform virtually all societies in a predictable direction. It does so largely by producing a cultural shift from survival values toward increasing emphasis on self-expression values. Multivariate analyses indicate that this cultural shift is the main direct cause of both rising proportions of women in parliament, and of higher levels of democracy. A society's traditional cultural heritage and its level of economic development also influence its levels of gender equality and democracy, but their main effect seems depend on the extent to which they contribute to, or resist, the shift toward self-expression values. In regard to democratic institutions, for example, 65 percent of the variance can be attributed to the shift toward self-expression values; economic development and cultural heritage also show some direct effects, but they explain relatively modest amounts of variance (5 percent and 6 percent, respectively). Figure 6 depicts these relationships.

Although the percentage of women in parliament shows no direct impact on a society's level of democracy, the norm of gender equality is intimately involved in the process of democratization. For emphasis on gender equality constitutes one of the central themes of self-expression values—arguably,

the most central component of all. This aspect of cultural change has been underemphasized in previous research, and seems to merit more attention.

Figure 6. Factors conducive to women's representation in parliament and democratic institutions.



In advanced industrial society, authority patterns seem to be shifting from the traditional hierarchical style toward a more collegial style that parallels the differences between stereotypically "male" and "female" styles of social interaction. While men are relatively likely to emphasize competition, women tend to emphasize cooperation; and while men tend to stress domination, women tend to have a more supportive leadership style. For reasons that are deeply rooted in the nature of advanced industrial society, the "female" leadership style tends to be more effective in these societies than the hierarchical, bureaucratic (and masculine) style that prevailed earlier. And as we have seen, the cultural changes associated with changing gender roles and the "feminization" of leadership styles are closely linked with the spread of democratic institutions

FOOTNOTES

1. The estimate of the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament in the latest election available is derived from the International Parliamentary Union. www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.

2.In order to be consistent with the survey-based analyses in this paper, the countries examined here are the ones included in the World Values Surveys. The World Values Surveys (WVS) measure people's basic values concerning politics, religion, economic life, gender roles, sexual norms and child-rearing. They have been carried out in 66 societies containing almost 80 percent of the world's population. In order to analyze social changes, they have conducted multiple waves, with a first wave in 1981-82, a second one in 1990-199, a third wave in 1995-1997 and a fourth wave being conducted in 1999-2001. For detailed information about these surveys, see the WVS web site at http://wvs.isr.umich.edu.

3. The indicator of democracy used in this Figure is based on the sum of the Freedom House scores from 1981 to 1998, in order to reflect *stable* democracy, and not just the momentary surge or decline that may occur from one year to the next. Since this article examines the role of cultural factors in democratization, it focuses on reasonably long-term patterns, rather than short-term fluctuations. These scores are given reversed polarity, so that high scores indicate high levels of democracy. The data in this figure are based on the latest available survey for each society. It should be noted that female representation is one of the many criteria used by Freedom House when establishing their measures of political rights and civil liberties, but this item alone is highly unlikely to determine the overall ranking for each state. Data for the following 59 societies are from the 1995-1998 World Values Survey: U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Bangladesh, China, India, Iran, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, Turkey, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Great Britain, East Germany, West Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Canadian data are from the 1990 World Values Survey. Data for

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal are from the 1990 European Values Survey. Data for Egypt, Ghana, Iran and Jordan are from small pilot surveys, and these estimates cannot be considered as reliable as those from the other societies. The data from these surveys are available from the ICPSR survey data archive.

3. To avoid dropping an entire society from our analysis when one of these variables is not available, the nation-level aggregate dataset sometimes uses results from another survey in the same country. For example, the Materialist/Postmaterialist battery was not included in the 1981 surveys in the U.S. and Australia; but this battery *was* included in the 1980 national election surveys in both countries, and the results are used in these cases. When this option was not available, we ranked all societies on the variable most closely correlated with the missing variable, and assigned the mean score of the two adjacent countries in this ranking. For example, the 1997 Bangladesh survey omitted V197 homosexuality; but it did include V60 homosexuals, among the groups one would not like to have as neighbors. Nigeria and Georgia were the two closest-ranking societies on V60, so Bangladesh was assigned the mean of their scores on V197.

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Table 1. The impact of socioeconomic modernization factors, cultural factors and democratization on the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament (OLS regression)

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)	(Model 4)	(Model 5)	(Model 6)
Modernization factors:						
Real GDP/capita, 1995 ($1,000s)	.862*** (.189)	.445 (.302)	__	-.403 (.204)	-.386 (.244)	__
% in service sector, 1990	__	.157 (.154)	__	__	__	__
% Educational enrollment	__	.125 (.173)	__	__	__	__
Cultural factors:						
Historically Protestant (1=Protestant, 0=not)	__	__	16.91*** (2.69)	11.51*** (3.39)	11.49*** (2.62)	9.45*** (2.45)
Believe that men do NOT make better political leaders	__	__	__	18.48*** (3.19)	18.73*** (3.81)	14.56*** (2.57)
Level of democracy:						
Freedom House scores, (sum from 1981 to 1999)	__	__	__	__	.0037 (.030)	__
Adjusted R2	.30	.29	.46	.70	.72	.70
N	46	43	46	46	46	46

Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Source: Latest available survey from 1990-91 or 1995-97 World Values Surveys.
Percentage of women in lower house of parliament is taken from International Parliamentary Union web site, www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.
Real GDP/capita purchasing power parity estimates in 1995 are from World Bank
Belief that men do NOT make better political leaders than women is scored: 1=strongly agree that men make better leaders, 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree that men make better political leaders than women.

Table 2. Orientations linked with Survival vs. Self-expression Values

Item	Correlation	
SURVIVAL VALUES emphasize the following:		
R. gives priority to economic and physical security over self expression and quality of life [Materialist/Postmaterialist Values]	.87	
Men make better political leaders than women	**.86**	
R. is not highly satisfied with life	.84	
A woman has to have children to be fulfilled	**.83**	
R. rejects foreigners, homosexuals and people with AIDS as neighbors	.81	
R. has not and would not sign a petition	.80	
R. is not very happy	.79	
R. favors more emphasis on the development of technology		.78
Homosexuality is never justifiable	.78	
R. has not recycled something to protect the environment	.76	
R. has not attended a meeting or signed a petition to protect the environment	.75	
A good income and safe job are more important than a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you like	.74	
R. does not rate own health as very good	.73	
A child needs a home with both a father and a mother in order to grow up happily	**.73**	
When jobs are scarce, a man has more right to a job than a women	**.69**	
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl	**.67**	
Government should ensure that everyone is provided for	.69	
Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child	.65	
Imagination is not of the most important things to teach a child	.62	
Tolerance is not of the most important things to teach a child	.62	
Leisure is not very important in life	.61	
Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity		.60
Friends are not very important in life		.56
You have to be very careful about trusting people	.56	
R. has not and would not join a boycott	.56	
R. is relatively favorable to state ownership of business and industry		.54
SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES take opposite position on all of above		

The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to this values index.
Source: 1990 and 1996 World Values Surveys.

Table 3. The impact of socioeconomic modernization factors, cultural factors and the percentage of women in parliament on level of democracy, as indicated by sum of Freedom House scores, 1981-1999 (OLS regression)

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)	(Model 4)	(Model 5)
Modernization factors:					
Real GDP/capita, 1980 ($1,000s)	7.26*** (2.03)	7.65*** (2.01)	4.90* (2.06)	6.64*** (1.58)	—
% in service sector, 1980	.819 (.589)	.715 (.584)	.846 (.651)	—	—
Cultural factors:					
Historically Protestant (1=Protestant, 0=not)	- 29.061 (15.77)	-26.03 (14.98)	—	—	—
Historically Orthodox (1=Orthodox, 0=not)	-40.99* (18.25)	-47.95** (16.80)	—	—	—
Survival/self-expression Values	21.36* (10.17)	22.07* (9.98)	28.57*** (8.05)	38.97*** (4.98)	60.02*** (5.41)
Women in Parliament:					
% women in lower house	.202 (.608)	—	—	—	—
Adjusted R2	.77	.78	.72	.69	.64
N	46	49	49	52	52

Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)
Source: Values from earliest available survey from World Values Surveys (mean year = 1988).
Percentage of women in lower house of parliament is taken from International Parliamentary Union web site, www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.
Real GDP/capita purchasing power parity estimates in 1980 are from Penn World tables.

Table 4. The impact of socioeconomic modernization factors, cultural factors and level of democracy on Survival/Self-expression values (OLS regression)

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Modernization factors:			
Real GDP/capita, 1980	.052	.135**	.076***
($1,000s)	(.032)	(.020)	(.027)
% in service sector, 1980	.004	—	—
	(.008)		
Cultural factors:			
Historically Protestant	.653**	.575**	.537**
(1=Protestant, 0=not)	(.180)	(.178)	(.187)
Historically Orthodox	-1.07***	-1.09***	-1.50***
(1=Orthodox, 0=not)	(.236)	(.228)	(.188)
Level of democracy:			
Sum of Freedom House	.006**	.005**	—
Scores, 1981-1999	(.002)	(.002)	
Adjusted R2	.86	.86	.83
N	49	52	53

Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)
Source: Dependent variable is based on the latest available survey from 1990-91 or 1995-97 World Values Surveys. Real GDP/capita purchasing power parity estimates are from Penn-World tables

Figure 1. Percentage of women in lower house of parliament by Freedom House democracy ratings r= .65 N=66 p < .00



Figure 2. Percentage of women in lower house of parliament by percentage DISAGREEING that "men make better political leaders than women"
r= .77 N=55 p < .00



Figure 3. Gender Equality and Democracy. r = .82, N=55, p <.000



Figure 4. Self-expression values and democratic institutions
r=.88, N=67, p < .000



Table 1. The Persistence of a Society's Cultural Heritage: Percentage of women in the lower house of parliament, by historically dominant religion.

Sweden	43	**(Protestant)**
Denmark	37	**(Protestant)**
Finland	37	**(Protestant)**
Netherlands	36	**(Protestant)**
Norway	36	**(Protestant)**
Iceland	35	**(Protestant)**
Germany	31	**(Protestant)**
New Zealand	31	**(Protestant)**
South Africa	30	**(Protestant)**
Venezuela	29	(Catholic)
Spain	28	(Catholic)
Argentina	27	(Catholic)
Austria	27	(Catholic)
Belgium	23	(Catholic)
Switzerland	23	**(Protestant)**
Australia	22	**(Protestant)**
China	22	(Confucian)
Canada	20	**(Protestant)**
Britain	18	**(Protestant)**
Mexico	18	(Catholic)
Lithuania	18	(Catholic)
Estonia	18	**(Protestant)**
Portugal	17	(Catholic)
Latvia	17	**(Protestant)**
Dominican Rep	16	Catholic
Czech	15	(Catholic)
Slovakia	14	(Catholic)
U.S.A.	13	**(Protestant)**
Poland	13	(Catholic)
Ireland	12	(Catholic)
Uruguay	12	(Catholic)
Azerbaijan	12	***(Islamic)***
Colombia	12	(Catholic)
France	11	(Catholic)
Italy	11	(Catholic)
Chile	11	(Catholic)
Bulgaria	11	(Orthodox)
Peru	11	(Catholic)
Philippines	11	(Catholic)
Slovenia	10	(Catholic)
India	9	(Hindu)
Moldova	9	(Orthodox)
Bangladesh	9	***(Islamic)***
Hungary	8	(Catholic)
Russia	8	(Orthodox)
Ukraine	8	(Orthodox)
Croatia	8	(Catholic)
Romania	7	(Orthodox)
Georgia	7	(Orthodox)
Serbia	7	(Orthodox)
Macedonia	7	(Orthodox)
Brazil	6	(Catholic)
Japan	5	(Confucian)
Belarus	5	(Orthodox)
Albania	5	***(Islamic)***
South Korea	4	(Confucian)
Turkey	4	***(Islamic)***
Armenia	4	(Orthodox)
Iran	3	***(Islamic)***
Nigeria	3	***(Islamic)***
Pakistan	2	***(Islamic)***
Egypt	2	***(Islamic)***
Jordan	0	***(Islamic)***



Figure 1. Locations of 65 Societies on two dimensions of cross-cultural variation. The scales on each axis indicate the country's factor scores on the give dimension.

Source: The data for the following 50 societies are from the 1995-1998 World values Survey: U.S., Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Great Britain, East Germany, West Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela. Data for Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania are from the 1990 World Values Survey. The positions of Colombia and Pakistan are estimated from incomplete data.