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Trends in Low Intensity Ethnic Conflict in Democratic States in the Post-Cold War Era: A Large N Study

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This study is intended to examine the influence of regime as well as the end of the Cold War on the intensity of ethnic conflict using data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. While it is the norm to discuss the issues at hand before proceeding to the findings, one finding of this study is so profound that it colors the entire study and, therefore, must be stated at the outset. Few of the ethnic conflicts examined in this study reach levels higher than low intensity conflict. That is, when ethnic conflict is violent, it almost always takes the form of low intensity conflict. Very few of the cases reach a level of violence beyond guerrilla warfare, which is considered a form of low intensity conflict. Also, many of the few cases that reach the highest level of conflict coded in the MAR data 'protracted civil war' are considered by most also to be low intensity conflicts.

Given this, the focus here is on which types of low intensity conflict are more common under which type of regime. The three categories analyzed here are terrorism, guerrilla war (which includes localized rebellions), and protracted civil war. More specifically, this study focuses on two questions. First, are there any differences in the type of conflict that occurs under different regimes? Second, if such differences exist, were they influenced by the end of the Cold War?

REGIME TYPE AND CONFLICT

While the focus of this study is on democratic states, it is not possible to understand the trends that occur within democratic states without a comparison with other types of state. As ethnic conflicts can be caused and influenced by a wide range of factors, of which regime type is only one, it is not possible to ascertain whether any trends in ethnic conflicts found within democracies are unique to democracies, or influenced at all by regime type, without a comparison with non-democratic states.

The nature of ethnic conflict is clearly different in democracies and autocratic states. The generally accepted wisdom has it that democratic states

are better able to deal with ethnic demands than are autocracies because they have institutions that are designed to allow grievances to be heard and addressed through a number of channels. They are also better at designing the means for coping with major ethnic cleavages in society through power-sharing arrangements and coalition politics.[1]

However, violent conflict does occur in democracies because the peaceful conflict resolution methods available to democracies do not always work. In a democratic setting, a group is unlikely to engage in collective violence as long as peaceful methods are believed to have a good chance of fulfilling the group's demands. It is only when the democratic mechanisms have failed or it is believed that they will be ineffective that violence occurs.[2]

Democracies are, in particular, vulnerable to low intensity conflict for several reasons. First, many of the world's democracies are powerful states and their challengers are relatively weak. Thus, challengers turn to low intensity conflict because that is all that they are capable of accomplishing. This creates an interesting dynamic where the existence of the democracies themselves is rarely threatened by these small wars, but the insurgents see their very existence riding on the conflict. Thus, the challengers often will have considerably more resolve than will the democratic governments. Consequently, losses and setbacks may deter the powerful democratic state but not its weak challengers and, as a result, the challengers may often succeed.[3] Second, strong actors often have inflated expectations of success which, when not forthcoming in a relatively short time, can result in domestic pressure to end the conflict. Thus democracies are more vulnerable to domestic pressure to end a conflict.[4] Third, one of the few decisive strategies against guerrilla warfare and terrorism is barbaric repression by the state, an option that is not in line with democratic ideals and likely to result in opposition within the polity.

Given all of this, it is clear that there are structural pressures on both increasing and decreasing the duration of ethnic conflicts in democracies. It is unclear which are stronger; thus an important additional question analyzed here is whether ethnic conflicts in democracies last longer than ethnic conflicts in other types of regime.

In addition to democracies and autocracies, another category of states must be addressed – democratizing states in transition between democracy and autocracy. Conflict is likely to rise in such states for three major reasons. First, regime changes are inherently unstable in that they change the status quo.[5] The political and economic pie is being divided anew. This inevitably causes conflict by many groups seeking to increase or retain their advantages under the new system. Second, democratization creates new freedoms that allow groups to mobilize to address grievances and demands that it had not been possible to address in the past.[6] Third, at the same time as groups are making more demands on the state, the state generally has fewer resources to meet them.[7] Thus, democratization can cause a volatile mix of increased demands for a shrinking pie. Furthermore, several empirical studies show that minorities in those states in transition to democracy engage in the highest level of conflict behavior.[8]

Thus, in all, we would expect several trends. First, ethnic conflict in democracies should be less intense than elsewhere, but whether it lasts longer or not in democracies is uncertain, based on this survey of the literature. Second, conflict in general and more violent types of conflict in particular should be more common in autocratic states. Third, periods of transition towards democracy should be associated with rises in the level of conflict in general.

PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Predictions regarding the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era revolve around the debate over Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis.[9] He argues that whereas during the Cold War world conflict revolved around the ideological conflict between the Western and Communist blocs, in the post-Cold War era most conflicts will be between civilizations. Huntington divides the world into eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian/Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and 'possibly' African.[10]

This prediction has two implications for this study. First, it implies that after the end of the Cold War, cultural conflicts that had been repressed by the East–West rivalry should increase. This would mean an increase in the extent of all types of conflict, as well as the escalation of conflicts from less violent types to more violent types. Second, all of these civilizations as defined by Huntington, save one, include religion in their definition and some seem to be wholly defined by religion.[11] This implies that religious conflict in particular should increase.

There is ample support in the literature for the argument that religion is linked to conflict. Religion is posited to influence most forms of conflict. Henderson demonstrates a quantitative link between religion and international conflict.[12] Fox and Rummel similarly demonstrate a quantitative link between religion and ethnic conflict.[13] Little shows religion to be a source of discrimination, one of the major causes of domestic conflict.[14] Religious ideologies have been linked to justifications for genocide and ethnic cleansing.[15] Some go as far as to argue that violence is an integral element of religion.[16] Christianity, under some circumstances, has been linked to intolerant attitudes.[17] Christian fundamentalism in the US has been shown to provoke negative reactions against it.[18]

Religion is, in particular, often linked to terrorism which, among other things, is a form of low intensity conflict. Drake includes religion as one of many sources of the ideologies, which are used to define terrorists' political aims.[19] Juergensmeyer similarly notes, 'What is distinctive about the international terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s is this combination of politics and religion'.[20] Hoffman and Rapoport take this one step further and argue that religion and nationalism have been the only major justifications for terror this century and that before the advent of nationalism, religion was the only justification.[21] Furthermore, religious terrorism is often posited to be qualitatively different from other types of terrorism with both higher levels of

violence and the greater willingness of religious terrorists to die in the name of their causes.[22] Finally, religion can play the opposite role and encourage peace and conflict resolution.[23]

Many dispute that civilizational/religious tensions elicit conflict in the post-Cold War era, and argue that the end of the Cold War has little impact on the nature of conflict. Rather, those factors that caused conflicts in the past will continue to do so in the future, particularly realpolitik and nationalism.[24] Furthermore, many argue that Huntington's civilizations are divided, and conflict within civilizations will be more common than conflict between them.[25] These arguments imply that the end of the Cold War has a marginal influence on the extent of both low- and high intensity conflict.

Another school of thought claims that rather than rising or staying at the same levels, conflict will decrease in the post-Cold War era because the world is becoming more integrated and interdependent. Accordingly, factors like economic interdependence, communications, and world integration will lead to a world civilization, which will rise above conflicts.[26] This argument implies that the level of conflict, both high- and low intensity, should decrease in the post-Cold War era.

It is important to note that this brief description of the debate over Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis is but a small summary of elements of what was perhaps the most voluminous debate in international relations during the 1990s. The purpose of the discussion of this debate is to highlight the three contradictory predictions that exist with regard to the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era. First, that conflict will increase. Second, that it will stay the same. Third, that it will decrease. One of the purposes of this study is to determine which of these predictions is true, especially with regard to low intensity conflict.[27]

METHODOLOGY

This study asks whether regime influences the types of low intensity conflicts, which occur within a state, as well as assesses whether the end of the Cold War has influenced the relationship between regime and conflict. The analysis relies on the MAR dataset, which contains information on 275 active ethnic conflicts between 1985 and 1998.[28] The unit of analysis in the MAR dataset is the minority group within a state. For each of the 275 cases there is a minority and a majority group. Thus, the same majority group and the same minority may appear several times in the dataset. What is unique to each case is that the same pair of majority and minority groups does not appear more than once. Thus, for example, the Kurdish minority is coded separately for Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Similarly, Iran contains several minorities in addition to its Kurdish minority, each of which are coded separately.

It is important to recognize that the 275 ethnic minorities contained in the MAR dataset constitute only a fraction of the 5,000 or so ethnic minorities existing worldwide.[29] These minorities were selected for analysis by the Minorities at Risk project because they are most likely to be politically active,

based on two criteria, one of which is sufficient for the group to be included in the dataset. The first criteria is whether 'the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment *vis-à-vis* other groups in the state'.[30] The second criterion is whether 'the group was the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests'.[31]

This study assesses one independent variable, whether a conflict is low- or high intensity. It is based on a more detailed rebellion variable (on the scale of 0 to 7) in the MAR dataset,[32] and coded for the purposes of this study on the following scale:

0. No Conflict (coded originally as 0).
1. Terrorism (coded originally as 1 to 2).
2. Local Rebellions and Guerrilla Warfare (coded originally as 3 to 6).
3. Protracted Civil Wars (coded originally as 7).

The most serious occurrence in any given year for a particular ethnic group is coded as the level of rebellion for each year from 1985 to 1998. For this reason this study focuses on these years.

An additional variable was created for this study to measure the duration of these conflicts. Since the yearly data on rebellion is only available from 1985 to 1998 this variable focuses on these years. Thus, conflicts that began before 1985 are still coded as beginning in 1985 and conflicts that continued in 1998 are considered to have ended in 1998. While this is clearly an imperfect way to measure, it is the best that can be done given the limitations of the available data. The variable measures consecutive years of conflict. If a conflict waned for one year then immediately resumed, it is not considered to have ended. However, a gap of two years is sufficient to consider the conflict ended. In cases where there was more than one outbreak of violence, the longer outbreak was coded.

States in this study are placed in one of three categories: democratic, autocratic, or democratizing states. This categorization is based on a democracy variable included in the MAR dataset, which was originally taken from the Polity dataset. It measures the level of a state's institutional democracy on a scale of 0 to 10 based on the following factors:

- Competitiveness of political participation;
- Competitiveness of executive recruitment;
- Openness of executive recruitment; and
- Constraints on the chief executive.

(A list of states with ethnic minorities included in this study and whether they are democratic, autocratic, or democratizing can be found in Appendix A.[33])

It is worth note that there is also a variable measuring autocracy from the Polity dataset available in the MAR dataset, which is constructed from the same components as the democracy variable with the addition of a measure for regulation of political participation, and also ranges from 0 to 10 but with 10

being the most autocratic. The democracy variable was chosen for this study because the variables are very similar (the correlation between the two variables in 1994 is –0.868, $p<0.001$). Other studies have used combinations of the autocracy and democracy variables, adding the two results in an inaccurate variable. For instance, a state which scored 10 on the democracy variable and a 0 on the autocracy variable would have the same score of 10 as a state which scored a 10 on the autocracy variable and a 0 on the democracy variable. Subtracting the two creates a variable that ranges from -10 to 10 but is statistically nearly identical to the democracy variable (the correlation between the autocracy minus democracy and the democracy variable in 1994 is -0.974, $p<0.001$).

First, this study assesses the extent of terrorism, guerrilla war, and protracted civil war between 1985 and 1998 for the entire dataset. Second, it assesses the extent of these types of conflict between 1985 and 1998 for democracies, autocracies, and democratizing states separately. Third, it asks what causes the changes over time in the extent of these types of conflict. Two potential explanations in particular are examined, whether the changes are due to religion or to civilizational conflict. That is, we assess whether the changes over time occur in particular in religious conflicts or in civilizational conflicts.

The religion variable simply measures whether the two groups in the conflict belong to the same religion or not. Groups belonging to different denominations of the same religion are considered to be of different religions. The civilizational variable measures whether the groups belong to different civilizations as defined by Huntington's theory.[34]

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

It is important to establish first the breakdown of cases in this study, which examines 275 ethnic minorities in 115 states. As noted above, since the unit of analysis is an ethnic minority within a state, some states have multiple minorities living within them and others have no minorities that meet the MAR criteria for being politically active. Of these minorities, 68 live in 30 established democracies, 59 live in 31 democratizing states, and 148 live in 54 autocratic states.

As stated at the outset of this study, few cases in the MAR data ever reach a level of violence higher than guerrilla warfare. The few cases that do are listed in Table 1. The vast majority of these protracted civil wars are low intensity conflicts with only Afghanistan between 1996 and 1998, Azerbaijan between 1990 and 1995 and the Russian rebellion in Georgia between 1992 and 1993 being the exceptions. For simplicity's sake, all these conflicts will be referred to in this study as protracted civil wars. Be that as it may, at no time during this period were there more than 13 current protracted civil wars and overall, only three percent of the ethnic conflict in the MAR dataset reaches this level between 1985 and 1998.[35] Furthermore, as measured in years of conflict, only 13 percent of these protracted civil wars are high intensity conflict. Thus, nearly all ethnic conflict (more than 99.5 percent) can be classified as low intensity conflict.

TABLE 1
PROTRACTED CIVIL WARS BETWEEN 1985 AND 1998

Country	Group	Years in which Conflict reached Level of Protracted Civil War
Afghanistan	Hazaras	1996–98
	Tajiks	1985–92, 1996–98*
	Uzbeks	1985–92, 1996–98*
Angola	Ovimbudu	1985–94
Azerbaijan	Armenians	1990–95*
Bosnia	Croats	1992–95
	Muslims	1995
	Serbs	1992–95
Croatia	Serbs	1991–95
Dem. Rep. Congo	Hutus	1996–97
	Tutsis	1996–97
	Afars	1992–94
Djibouti	Abkhazians	1992–93, 1998
Georgia	Russians	1992–93*
	Kurds	1985, 1987, 1991
Iraq	Shi'i	1991
Lebanon	Druze	1985, 1989
Morocco	Saharawi	1985–90
Russia	Chechens	1994
Rwanda	Hutus	1998
	Tutsis	1994
Somalia	Issac	1988–90
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils	1985–91, 1990–98
Sudan	Southerners	1991–98
Turkey	Kurds	1991–98
Uganda	Acholi	1998
	Baganda	1985–86

Note: * High-intensity conflict (in Afghanistan this applies only to the 1996–98 period).

Figure 1 examines the extent of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and protracted civil war between 1985 and 1998. The results show two trends. First, the most common type of ethnic conflict is guerrilla warfare, the least common is protracted civil war, and terrorism falls between the two. This is consistent throughout the period covered by this study. Second, there was a rise in all types of conflict with the end of the Cold War, but this rise was a temporary one. The number of protracted civil wars ranged from 6 to 9 during the 1980s, rose to as high as 13 in 1992, and dropped to 8 or 9 in the mid- to late 1990s. Minorities using terrorism ranged between 19 and 21 during the 1980s, rose to a peak of 27 in 1994 and dropped back to 19 by 1998. The number of guerrilla wars ranged between 33 and 35 until 1989, peaked at 49 in 1990 but dropped to 29 by 1998. Thus, in the short term the end of the Cold War caused a rise in conflict, but less than a decade later ethnic conflict was at its previous levels.

FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS, 1985–98 (ALL CASES)



Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 examine ethnic conflict rates in the more specific contexts of democracies, autocracies, and democratizing states between 1985 and 1998. Figure 2 examines the trends in democratic states. The results show that while like the rest of the world, protracted civil war is the least common form of conflict, unlike the rest of the world the most common form is terrorism, and not guerrilla warfare, except in 1996 and 1997. A closer examination of this trend shows that this short-term rise in guerrilla warfare in democracies is mostly due to an increase of instability and conflict by several ethnic groups in a single democratic state – India – and we therefore eliminated this from the analysis and represent the data for democracies in Figure 3. These adjusted results show a very clear trend that protracted civil war and guerrilla warfare are rare in democracies and most violent ethnic conflicts under this type of regime take the form of terrorism. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War saw a substantial drop in the level of terrorism by ethnic minorities in democracies. While there were as many as 14 ethnic minorities in democracies using terrorism in a single year during the 1980s, this number dropped to 5 by 1998. Also, the temporary rise in conflict that was found in the examination of all states does not manifest itself in this examination of long-term democratic states. Thus, conflicts in long-term democratic states mostly take the form of terrorist conflicts and the end of the Cold War is associated with a drop in even this type of conflict.

The indigenous groups in Bolivia and Columbia are good examples of the typical groups in stable democracies that engaged in violence. They engaged in terrorism during the 1980s and mid-1990s but by 1998 had stopped engaging in violent conflict. However, some groups, like the Basques in France and the Catholics in Northern Ireland, engaged in terrorism throughout the period covered in this study. Others like the African Americans in the United States and the French speakers in Canada are representative of the majority of groups (36 out of 68) in stable democracies that engaged in no organized violence at all.

FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN LONG-TERM DEMOCRACIES, 1985–98



FIGURE 3
NUMBER OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN LONG-TERM DEMOCRACIES
OTHER THAN INDIA, 1985–98



Figure 4 analyses the extent of ethnic conflict in autocratic states between 1985 and 1998. The results show that while terrorism and protracted civil war occur in these states, by far the most common type of conflict is guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare rose temporarily with the end of the Cold War. During the 1980s between 24 and 26 minorities in autocratic states engaged in guerrilla warfare in any given year. Guerrilla warfare in these states peaked at 32 in 1990, but dropped to 21 by 1998. Civil wars in these states rose from a level of 6 to 8 during the 1980s to a peak of 11 in 1992 and dropped to 7 by 1998. Terrorism, however, seems to have risen more permanently from a level of 4 to 5 during the 1980s, peaking at 14 in 1996 and remaining as high as 9 in 1998. Thus, ethnic conflict in autocratic states partially conforms to the general trend of a temporary rise in conflict with the end of the Cold War, with the one exception being terrorism.

FIGURE 4
NUMBER OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN AUTOCRATIC STATES, 1985–98



Many of the ethnic groups in Burma, especially the Karens, Shans and Mons, are typical of autocratic states, engaging in guerrilla warfare throughout the period covered in this study. The East Timorese in Indonesia are representative of those groups that de-escalated from guerrilla warfare to terrorism by 1988. The Chechen and Ingush in Russia are representative of those groups that escalated from no conflict in the 1980s to violent conflict in the 1990s. The Kurds in Iran are representative of those groups that ceased violent conflict by the late 1990s. Finally, the Chinese minorities in Indonesia and Malaysia are typical of nearly half (70 out of 148) of the minorities in autocratic states and engaged in no organized violent conflict between 1985 and 1998.

Figure 5 examines the extent of ethnic conflict in democratizing states between 1985 and 1998. There are three striking trends in this table. First, there are no occurrences of protracted civil war. Second, while until 1993, guerrilla warfare is clearly the most common type of conflict, from 1994 on, guerrilla warfare and terrorism are about as common as each other. Third, there is a steep rise in conflict with the end of the Cold War, followed by a drop to previous levels by 1998. From 1985 to 1988 the overall number of violent conflicts ranges from 6 to 7. They peak at 15 in 1994 and drop to 6 by 1998. This, combined with the finding that by 1998 a greater proportion of conflicts were terrorist conflicts, as opposed to the more violent guerrilla conflicts, shows that the rise in conflict in these countries was temporary and the 1998 levels of conflict are even lower than those of the mid-1980s. This is consistent with what we would expect in states making the transition from autocracy to democracy. In the 1980s, these states exhibited conflict properties similar to autocracies with guerrilla warfare being most the common form of conflict. By 1998 terrorism was becoming more common, as is the case with democracies.

The minorities in Moldova are most typical of those minorities that engaged in violence in democratizing states. They began violent conflict in 1990 but stopped by 1998. Others like the Muslim Moro minority in the Philippines engaged in violent conflict throughout this period. However, most minorities

FIGURE 5
NUMBER OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN DEMOCRATIZING STATES, 1985–98



(37 out of 59) in democratizing states, including those in the Czech Republic and Estonia, engaged in no organized violence.

Table 2 analyzes the extent to which conflicts escalated and de-escalated by 1998 controlling for regime type, Huntington's civilizations, and religion. 1988 was chosen as the year for comparison because it was the last year before major changes in the extent of ethnic conflict began to occur. The results show that while conflict dropped in democracies and democratizing states, it remained about the same in autocracies. Both religious and non-religious conflicts de-escalated. However, while non-civilizational conflicts de-escalated, civilizational conflicts escalated slightly. However, this escalation is not nearly as high as what we would expect if, as Huntington believes, civilizations will be the primary basis for conflict in the post-Cold War era. Thus, in nearly all categories examined here, there is not significant long-term escalation of conflict with the end of the Cold War, and in many of them, as well as overall, there is a de-escalation of ethnic conflict.

Table 2 also examines the duration of conflicts controlling for democracy, religion and civilization. This examination includes the mean duration of conflict for those minorities that engaged in violent conflict as well as the mean duration of conflict for all groups, including those that did not engage in violent conflict between 1985 and 1998. When controlling for regime type, conflicts last longest in democracies and finish quickest in democratizing states, with the duration of conflicts in autocratic states falling between the other two. Religious conflicts last longer than non-religious ones, but only when examining cases where violent conflicts occurred. Finally, civilizational conflicts finish quicker, but this is only true when examining all cases.

CONCLUSIONS

This study examines the extent and intensity of ethnic conflict between 1985 and 1998 controlling for regime type, religion, and Huntington's concept of

TABLE 2
CHANGES IN LEVELS OF CONFLICT, 1988 TO 1998

Control Variable	Value of Control Variable	Escalation			Mean Duration	
		De-escalation	Same	Escalated	Only in Cases of Violent Conflict	All Cases
All Cases		38	205	32	7.19	3.46
Democracy	Stable Democracy	11	50	7	8.19	3.91
	Democratizing	5	51	3	6.14	2.29
	Autocracy	22	104	22	7.08	3.73
Religion	Same Religion	20	108	17	6.92	3.48
	Different Religion or Denomination	18	97	15	7.53	3.44
Clash of Civilizations	No	27	124	19	7.12	3.82
	Yes	11	81	13	7.33	2.91

civilizations. Perhaps the most important finding is that nearly all ethnic conflict is of low intensity. The few outbreaks of high intensity conflict are rare exceptions. Thus, studies of the causes and dynamics of low intensity conflict, as well as strategies for solving them are applicable to nearly all manifestations of violent ethnic conflict.

However, there is considerable variation in the types of low intensity conflict that occur under different types of regime. The lion's share of violent ethnic conflict in democratic states takes the form of terrorism. In contrast, in autocratic states most violent ethnic conflict takes the form of guerrilla warfare and local rebellions. Also, protracted civil wars, while rare in general, are considerably rarer in democratic states than they are in autocratic ones. On the other hand, violent ethnic conflicts tend to last longer in democratic states than they do in autocratic ones. The democratizing states in this study exhibited traits similar to autocratic states in 1985 but by 1998 the conflict dynamics in these states appeared to be changing to be more in line with the dynamics found in democratic states.

There are two factors that can explain this contrast between autocratic and democratic states. First, stable democracies tend to be powerful, developed states and their challengers relatively weak. Thus, there are often no places that state power cannot reach, making guerrilla warfare difficult. Furthermore, guerrilla warfare tends to be more feasible when the guerrillas have the support of a foreign state that is willing to provide or sell arms and training. A powerful state is more able to deter these supporters. This explains why violent ethnic conflict in democracies generally takes the form of terrorism.

Second, while democracies, as noted earlier in this study, may be better at dealing with ethnic grievances than are autocracies, they are worse at ending violent conflicts. Autocracies are freer to use repressive tactics to quell violent

opposition, while democracies are often hampered by moral concerns. Also, if a conflict becomes violent in a democracy, this generally means that the peaceful options available to address the grievances that caused the conflict did not work. Thus, violent conflicts in democracies are more likely to involve intractable issues. This explains why violent conflicts last longer in democracies.

The influence of the end of the Cold War also differed between regime types. In democracies conflict simply dropped. In autocracies and democratizing states it rose temporarily but then dropped by the late 1990s, with this trend being stronger in democratizing states. The temporary rise in both autocracies and democratizing states can be explained by a temporary instability caused by the change in the international regime. That this trend was stronger in democratizing states can be explained by the instability caused by domestic regime change.

This leaves us with the question of why democracies did not experience a similar temporary rise in violent ethnic conflict. One potential answer is that these countries are inherently stable but the Cold War itself was a cause of instability in these states. As part of the Cold War the Soviet Bloc often supported opposition movements in democratic states. With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, this source of agitation no longer existed, resulting in a drop in conflict.

This finding is inconsistent with Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' argument. If he were correct there would have been a permanent escalation of conflict, especially between ethnic groups of different civilizations. While there was a very slight escalation of this type of conflict between 1988 and 1998, it was nowhere near the level of escalation one would expect if this type of conflict were the new basis of conflict in the post-Cold War era.

Religious conflicts, which have also been receiving more attention of late, also conformed to the general pattern of de-escalation. However, unlike Huntington's theory, this does not disprove the assertion that religion is an important element of ethnic conflict. Those who make this assertion generally assert that it has always been an important element of ethnic conflict so the end of the Cold War should not have any disproportional influence on religious conflicts.

Be that as it may, the findings regarding democracies show that there is a need for further research on the relationship between regime type and low intensity conflict. For instance, are the findings here also true of non-ethnic conflict? Also, these findings show a need to explore facts rather than paradigms when seeking information on the dynamics of low intensity conflicts. Clearly any study using Huntington's paradigm would have unacceptably colored the views of the researcher and possibly obscured the patterns of conflict discovered in this study. Finally, this study shows that low intensity conflict itself should be a major topic of future research as it is, by far, the most common form of violent ethnic conflict.

APPENDIX A
STATES IN THE 1985–98 SAMPLE

Stable Democratic	Democratizing*	Autocratic	
Argentina	Albania	Afghanistan	Lebanon
Australia	Bangladesh	Algeria	Morocco
Bolivia	Belarus	Angola	Malaysia
Botswana	Bulgaria	Azerbaijan	Mauritania
Canada	Brazil	Bahrain	Mexico
Colombia	Chile	Bhutan	Nigeria
Costa Rica	Czech Republic	Bosnia	Peru**
Cyprus	Estonia	Burma	Romania
Ecuador	Guyana	Burundi	Russia
El Salvador	Hungary	Cameroon	Rwanda
Fiji	Kyrgyzstan	Cambodia	Saudi Arabia
France	Latvia	Chad	Senegal
Germany	Lithuania	China	Sierra Leone
Greece	Macedonia	Croatia	Singapore
Honduras	Madagascar	Congo Dem. Rep.	Somalia
India	Mali	Dominican Rep.**	Sudan
Israel	Moldova	Djibouti	Syria
Italy	Namibia	Egypt	Tajikistan
Japan	Nicaragua	Eritrea	Togo
New Zealand	Niger	Ethiopia	Uganda
Nordic	Pakistan	Georgia	Uzbekistan
Papua New Guinea	Panama	Ghana	Vietnam
South Africa	Paraguay	Guatemala	Yugoslavia
Spain	Philippines	Guinea	Zimbabwe
Sri Lanka	Slovakia	Indonesia	
Turkey	S. Korea	Iran	
UK	Taiwan	Iraq	
USA	Thailand	Jordan	
Venezuela	Turkmenistan	Kazakhstan	
	Ukraine	Kenya	
	Zambia	Laos	

Notes: * Based on changes in regime between 1984 and 1994.
** States which became autocratic between 1984 and 1994.

NOTES

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28. A copy of the MAR dataset as well as an explanation of all the variables contained in it is available at the project's website at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar. For a further discussion and analysis of the data, see Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*; Ted R. Gurr, *Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).
29. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 5–7.
30. Ibid., p. 6.
31. Ibid., p. 7. There has been some criticism of the MAR3 dataset based on its inclusion only of groups that meet the above criteria. For example, James D. Fearon, and David D. Latin have criticized the MAR data on grounds of selection bias, 'A Cross-Sectional Study of Large-Scale Ethnic Violence in the Postwar Period', unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Sept. 30, 1997; Gurr, *Peoples Versus States*, pp. 10–12, addresses these criticisms. First, it can be argued that 'the project's roster of groups is not "complete"... Therefore ... the study includes some groups that are in the zone of indeterminancy ... and new groups are added from time to time, based on suggestions by users and information from our Web searches.' Given that the project has been in existence since the mid-1980s and has received considerable attention, it is fair to argue that this process has led to a fairly accurate list of the groups, which meet the criteria described above. Second, it can be argued that the study focuses only on those

groups engaged in collective action and ignores those groups that are more 'politically quiescent'. Gurr, *Peoples Versus States*, pp. 12–13, argues that 'This criticism is misplaced because the Minority project's principal objective is to identify and analyze only the groups that meet its criteria for political significance, that is, differential treatment and political action.' The presence of either of these factors means, for the purpose of this study, that a conflict is taking place. Conversely, it is hard to argue that if these factors are not present that any conflict is occurring. Thus, it is argued here that the MAR data contains a reasonably accurate list of all instances of ethnic conflict. This means that while the MAR data does not address the treatment of all minorities in all places, it does accurately represent the treatment of all *politically significant* ethnic minorities.

32. The coding of the rebellion variable in the MAR dataset:

    0. None.
    1. Political banditry, sporadic terrorism.
    2. Campaigns of terrorism.
    3. Local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale. If they prove to be the opening round in what becomes a protracted guerrilla or civil war during the year being coded, code the latter rather than local rebellion. Code declarations of independence by a minority-controlled regional government here.
    4. Small-scale guerrilla activity. [Small-scale guerrilla activity has all these three traits: fewer than 1,000 armed fighters; sporadic armed attacks (less than six reported per year); and attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales).]
    5. Intermediate-scale guerrilla activity. [Intermediate-scale guerrilla activity has one or two of the defining traits of large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity.]
    6. Large-scale guerrilla activity. [Large-scale guerrilla activity has all these traits: more than 1,000 armed fighters; frequent armed attacks (more than six reported per year); and attacks affecting large part of the area occupied by group.]
    7. Protracted civil war, fought by rebel military with base areas.

33. The MAR dataset contains codings for this variable once every five years, with the relevant codings for the purposes of this study being those for 1984, 1989, and 1994. For the purposes of this study, democratic states are those states that are coded 6 or higher on the democracy scale for all three codings. Autocratic states are those that are coded 5 or lower for all three codings. Democratizing states are those that were autocratic in 1984 but by 1994 were coded as democratic. It should be noted that in four cases, democratic states became autocratic ones, but none of these cases involved violent ethnic conflict between 1985 and 1998 (see Appendix A). For more details and reliability tests on this variable, see Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr, 'Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1995), pp. 469–82.
34. Both of these variables are supplemental to the MAR dataset and can be found in Dataset 2 of Jonathan Fox, 'Civilizations Data for Use with the Minorities at Risk Dataset', which is available at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/links.html.
35. The figure of three percent was reached by adding the total number of years minorities were involved in protracted civil wars (117) by the number of groups multiplied by the number of years covered by the data (275 * 14).