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## Are Religious Minorities More Militant than Other Ethnic Minorities?

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Since the Iranian Revolution and especially since the end of the Cold War, religion has come to be associated with militancy. Conflicts between groups of different religions are perceived by many as more intense. Similarly, religious groups involved in conflict are perceived as more militant. Ethnic conflicts that have fueled this perception include the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the ethnic rebellions in Chechnya, Sudan, Cyprus, India, and Indonesia and the civil wars in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia. Fundamentalist movements, especially Islamic movements, have also contributed to this perception. This article uses data from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR), as well as data collected independently, to ascertain whether this perception is correct for ethnic conflicts. That is, the article asks: are ethnoreligious minorities really more militant than other ethnic minorities?

The question is broken into two parts: First, are religious differences alone enough to make an ethnoreligious minority more militant? Second, does the fact that a conflict has religious overtones contribute to the militancy of an ethnic minority? These two questions highlight an important distinction in how religion can potentially influence a conflict. Whether the groups involved belong to different religions may, by itself, be enough; or it may be necessary that the conflict involve religious issues. There are trends within the literature that support both of these arguments, though only the latter is supported by the results of this study.

Rather than develop a full model of the influence of religion on militancy, the goal of this study is to find an answer to those two questions: To develop and test a model is beyond what could be

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accomplished in an article.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, no previous study using the same controls, compares the impact of these two potential religious influences on conflict. Thus, this study can clarify a basic and important aspect of the influence of religion on conflict: What type and level of religious involvement is necessary to influence that conflict?

The empirical portion of this study focuses on ethnic conflict as depicted by the MAR data. Thus, ethnic conflict means political tensions between a politically active ethnic minority and a state government controlled by another ethnic group or political competition between multiple ethnic groups for control of a state. While such conflict is often violent, this is not always the case, and conflicts can take place within the political arena. The variable used for militancy in the empirical portion of this study is active rebellion by an ethnic group.<sup>2</sup> However, the theoretical portion of this study draws on a much broader literature, much of which does not focus on ethnic conflict. Consequently, the concepts of conflict and militancy are treated more broadly in the theoretical section in order to discuss the diverse literature relevant to this study coherently.

### **Religious Differences or Different Religions?**

For the most part, the literature on religion and conflict does not directly address whether an ethnic minority's being of a different religion than the majority group is enough to cause increased militancy—that is, whether, on the other hand, the presence of religious issues in the conflict is necessary. However, the literature does indirectly address this question. There are two trends: one posits that being of different religions is enough; the other posits that the conflict must have some particularly religious element.

Perhaps the most prominent of those who imply that being of different religions is enough to cause increased militancy is Huntington.<sup>3</sup> His “clash of civilizations” theory posits that, in the post-Cold War era, most conflict will be between major cultural groupings that he calls civilizations. In practice, these civilizations are defined mostly along religious lines. Of his eight civilizations, all but one include specific mention of religion in their definitions.<sup>4</sup> Huntington also argues that the Islamic civilization will be the most militant. Based on all of this, it is fair to interpret Huntington's arguments as implying that conflicts involving groups of different religions will be more common and intense and thus that religious minorities are likely to be more militant than other minorities, especially if those religious minorities are Islamic.<sup>5</sup>

While it is not the intent of this article to provide a full discussion of Huntington's theories, it is important to note that many dispute his arguments. Many posit that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post-Cold War conflict.<sup>6</sup> Some argue that conflicts will be more common within civilizations than between them; that is, subcivilizational groupings such as the state, the nation, and ethnic groups will remain the major basis for conflict. Others believe that the world is uniting due to factors including economic interdependence and global communications, among others, and will rise above conflicts.<sup>7</sup>

Many specifically dispute Huntington's contentions regarding the militancy of the Islamic civilization. Bartley argues that Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction against modernity, not the West.<sup>8</sup> This argument is consistent with the general findings of Marty and Appleby's landmark study on fundamentalism.<sup>9</sup> Other arguments of this nature include: that the differences between the West and Islam are based on economic and political interests, not cultural ones;<sup>10</sup> that Islamic fundamentalism is more of a threat to Muslim authoritarian states than to the West;<sup>11</sup> and that the Islamic civilization is divided, especially along national lines, with internal conflict more common than civilizational conflict.<sup>12</sup> However, it is important to note that many agree with Huntington's theory.<sup>13</sup>

All of the above critics and supporters, as well as Huntington himself, have one thing in common, they are all based on anecdotal evidence and cite many examples to support their points. This debate is probably one of the best examples of a major flaw in qualitative research—that when one is dealing with a broad topic, such as all post-Cold War conflict, there tend to be enough examples out there to support both sides of an argument. This is especially so when many of the examples can be interpreted in more than one way. It is precisely for this reason that Deutsch implored that political scientists use behavioralist methods to test their theories.<sup>14</sup>

The few existing quantitative analyses of the "clash of civilizations" theory consistently refute Huntington's arguments. Several tests of Huntington's thesis using the MAR dataset found that there has been no post-Cold War increase in conflicts, both in general and with regard to the Islamic civilization,<sup>15</sup> and that religion provides a better explanation for ethnic conflict than does Huntington's concept of civilizations.<sup>16</sup> Other similar findings based on other datasets include (1) there is no substantial difference in ethnic conflict during and after the Cold War;<sup>17</sup> (2) political factors have a greater impact on civil wars than cultural ones;<sup>18</sup> (3) civilizational conflict decreases among militarized, interstate disputes from 1950 to 1992, and there is no support for the predictions regarding

Islam;<sup>19</sup> and (4) from 1946 to 1992, civilizational variables are not associated with international wars.<sup>20</sup> However, it is important to note that none of these studies directly address the questions asked by this article.<sup>21</sup>

Interestingly, many of Huntington's critics who make qualitative arguments that conflict will not be between civilizations still believe that conflict will be based along lines of identity, but those identities will be national or ethnic. It is undisputed that religion can be a source of these types of identity. Religion is linked to identity in general,<sup>22</sup> ethnic identities,<sup>23</sup> and national identities.<sup>24</sup> Given this, it is fair to say that the proposition that religious differences contribute to conflict is considerably less in dispute than Huntington's proposition that this will specifically manifest itself through his concept of civilizations.

Thus, both Huntington and many of his critics make arguments consistent with a primordialist view of religion. Primordialism is generally applied to ethnicity and nationalism and posits that shared culture leads to strong identity groups that see themselves as having common interests. Because of this, most conflict will be between separate primordial groups with diverging interests. Two major perspectives compete with the primordial perspective as explanations for ethnic and national conflict. The instrumentalist perspective posits that while culturally based identities exist, they become politically relevant only when political entrepreneurs make use of them to further their political goals. The constructivist perspective holds that group identities are often created in order to further political goals. While these three perspectives were developed mostly to explain national and ethnic conflict, they are applicable to religious conflict.<sup>25</sup>

One thing that these three perspectives, as well as the arguments of Huntington and most of his critics, have in common is the assertion that differences in identity, including differences in religion, are core causes of conflict, though they differ as to the path from identity to conflict. Either (1) identity itself is enough to cause conflict, (2) someone must actively invoke identity, or (3) an identity must be formed for political purposes before conflict will occur. The "civilizations" debate highlights that there is no agreement as to whether civilizational, national, or ethnic identities will be most important in the post-Cold War era.

It is important to note that this article is not intended to challenge Huntington's thesis directly; rather, it assesses what role, if any, religion plays in ethnic militancy. Huntington's arguments are relevant because they have implications for the questions asked here, and the results of the analysis presented here have a bearing on Huntington's arguments.

As noted above, the second trend in the literature posits that some aspect of religious belief can contribute to religious militancy. Many make arguments consistent with this supposition. The argument that religion is an important source of people's world-views, which clearly influence people's political opinions, is a common one. For example, Wentz describes this phenomenon as the "walls of religion": religious communities build psychological walls around themselves and defend them at all costs.<sup>26</sup> Many posit that religious beliefs influence political attitudes, sometimes toward militancy. For instance, Williams argues that this is because "religion forms deeply held values that are the basis for more ephemeral political attitudes."<sup>27</sup> Laustsen and Waever similarly argue that "religion deals with the constitution of being as such. Hence, one can not be pragmatic on concerns challenging this being."<sup>28</sup> Several survey-based studies bear out this assertion. People who are religiously affiliated are more likely to have conservative opinions in issues like abortion, working women, and support for religion in politics.<sup>29</sup> Fundamentalist Protestants are conservative on issues of morality and lifestyle and intolerant on issues of diversity.<sup>30</sup> Also Religiosity, in many cases, is associated with authoritarian attitudes.<sup>31</sup>

The literatures on many specific types of conflict include religious ideologies as one of the motivations. For instance, many argue that not only is religion a motivation for terrorism, religious terrorism is qualitatively different from other forms of terrorism, especially in the ability of religion to motivate and justify violence.<sup>32</sup> In fact, one's religious perspective can influence what one considers terrorism.<sup>33</sup> Religion is a source of discrimination, a major cause of conflict.<sup>34</sup> It can be a justification for genocide and ethnic cleansing.<sup>35</sup> Religion in its millenarian form is associated with violence.<sup>36</sup> Some even argue that violence is an inseparable element of religion.<sup>37</sup>

Another common argument is that indigenous religions in the Third World are the source of opposition to failed policies that are based on Western political ideologies; that is, promises of economic prosperity, social justice, and political freedom made by governments based on Western ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and communism have not been fulfilled, giving fuel to religion-based opposition movements.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, the literature on fundamentalism posits that fundamentalists often are ideologically opposed to major elements of modernity itself.<sup>39</sup>

The empirical literature supports both arguments: that being of different religions can increase conflict; and religious issues can increase conflict. Religious diversity within a state is linked to ethnic conflict.<sup>40</sup> States that have populations of different religions are more likely to go to war.<sup>41</sup> Also, a series of studies on ethnic conflict

using the MAR dataset connects both religious differences and religious issues to conflict. These findings include: that the dynamic of ethnoreligious conflicts are different from those of other ethnic conflicts; when religious issues are important in a conflict, the extent of both discrimination and rebellion increases; religious legitimacy influences both the extent and type of grievances expressed by ethnic minorities; religious institutions facilitate conflict when religion is an important issue in that conflict, but inhibit it when the conflict is not over religious issues; and while Islamic groups are not more conflict prone than other religious groups, religion tends to be more important in conflicts involving them.<sup>42</sup>

Latin, also using the MAR dataset, finds a correlation between religious grievances and ethnic rebellion. However, his study is limited by his reliance on one of the few religion variables included in the MAR dataset itself that measures only whether there are general religious grievances. As is shown below, the religion variables used here, which are supplemental to the MAR dataset, are more sophisticated. Also, the regressions presented in this study have r-squareds considerably higher than those of Latin's study, indicating that the variables used here are superior. To be fair, Latin's study focuses on the influence of language issues on ethnic conflict; hence, his study and this one are not fully comparable.<sup>43</sup>

In all, both being of different religions and differences over religious issues are associated with increased militancy and conflict. It is important to note, however, that these two claims are not mutually exclusive. However, I am aware of no single study that has quantitatively tested these two claims using the same data and controls as those used in this study. In addition, this study also examines whether, as Huntington posits, certain religions may be more prone to militancy than others.

### Research Design

As noted above, the variables used here come from two sources. The ethnic conflict variables are taken from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 dataset (MAR); thus, the same majority group may appear several times in the data,<sup>44</sup> but each time a majority appears, it is with respect to its relationship with a different minority group. For example, the Hindu majority in India appears in this study nine times, once for each ethnic minority in India.

In the MAR dataset, 275 minorities are coded. Of these, 101 are of religions different from the majority group in their state; an additional 32 are of different denominations. The 275 minorities

in MAR constitute only a small fraction of the number of ethnic minorities in the world. Gurr notes that there may be as many as 5,000 ethnic minorities worldwide, but the dataset is intended to focus on how ethnicity influences the political process. The MAR dataset contains those groups that meet one of two criteria: whether "the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in the state"; and whether "the group was the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests."<sup>45</sup>

Some (e.g., Fearon and Latin) have criticized the MAR data on grounds of selection bias.<sup>46</sup> Gurr addresses these criticisms. He argues that the MAR dataset is not intended to contain all ethnic minorities, just those that are politically active based on the criteria described above. In order to assure that the list of such groups is complete, groups that marginally meet the criteria are also included, and new groups are occasionally added based on suggestions from those who use the dataset.<sup>47</sup> As the project has been in existence since the mid-1980s and has received considerable attention, it is fair to argue that this process has led to a fairly accurate list.

I coded the religion variables separately for use with the MAR dataset (hereafter, this material is referred to as the Fox data). These variables are available separately at the MAR website.<sup>48</sup> The study performs two tests using multiple regression analysis and one using correlation analysis. The first examines whether religious differences alone are enough to contribute to religious militancy. This regression also includes variables for whether the minority involved is Muslim or Christian in order to test Huntington's claims regarding specific religions as well as control variables described below. The dependent variables in these regressions are two measures of ethnic mobilization and one of ethnic rebellion. The second test, using the same dependent and control variables, tests whether the presence of religious issues influences militancy by ethnoreligious minorities.

The variable that measures the presence of religious issues measures whether the minority itself feels religious issues are important. The second set of regressions is applied only to the 101 cases where the minority is of a different religion than the majority group (religious issues generally do not become important in ethnic conflicts where the groups are of the same religion). The correlation analysis evaluates whether the nonreligious factors that are found in the regression analysis to contribute to militancy are themselves influenced by religious factors.

Most of the variables described below are judgmental ordinal variables or composite variables created from several judgmental

ordinal variables; that is, the variables were assigned values by a coder using an ordinal scale based on specified criteria. Unless otherwise noted, these variables are part of the MAR dataset and all descriptions of the MAR variables are based on the MAR code book, which is available at the MAR website. The variables from the 1990 to 1995 period are used here because this is the only period where most of the relevant variables are available. In a few cases, variables from other time periods are used, either because of limitations on available data or for the purpose of testing time lags.

### *Dependent Variables*

*Number of militant political organizations* (milorg9) measures the number of group-supported militant political organizations that are actively pursuing group interests during the 1990s (until 1996) on the following scale: 0 = none; 1 = one; 2 = two; 3 = three or more. This variable is also used as an independent variable for the regressions predicting rebellion.

*Scope of militant political organizations* (milscop9) estimates the scope of support for the same organizations as the above variable organizations during the 1990s (until 1996) on the following scale: 0 = no political movements; 1 = no political movement is supported by more than one-tenth of the minority; 2 = the largest political movement is supported by one-quarter to one-half of the minority; 3 = the largest political movement is supported by more than half of the minority. This variable is also used as an independent variable for the regressions predicting rebellion.

*Rebellion* (reb95) is coded on the following scale:

- 0 = None
- 1 = Political banditry, sporadic terrorism
- 2 = Campaigns of terrorism
- 3 = Local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale (includes declarations of independence by a minority-controlled regional government)
- 4 = Small-scale guerrilla activity (includes three traits: fewer than one thousand armed fighters; fewer than six armed attacks per year; and attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group)
- 5 = Intermediate-scale guerrilla activity (includes one or two of the defining traits of large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity)
- 6 = Large-scale guerrilla activity (includes three traits: more than one thousand armed fighters; more than six armed attacks



per year; and attacks affecting large part of the area occupied by group)

7 = Protracted civil war, fought by rebel military with base areas

This study uses the 1995 coding of this variable.

### *Religion Variables*

The religion variables are taken from the Fox data.

*Religious differences* (reldif) measures the differences between the religions of the majority and minority groups in a conflict on the following scale: 0 = none; 1 = different denominations of the same religion; 2 = different religions.<sup>49</sup>

*Whether a minority is Islamic* and *Whether a minority is Christian* are derived from a variable that notes the religion of the minority group (relmin).<sup>50</sup>

*Religious grievances in 1990–1995* (relgr) measures whether a religious grievances are expressed by an ethnic minority. It measures the extent of grievances on several specific religious issues on the following scale: 0 = the issue is not significant; 1 = the issue is of lesser importance or of major concern to only one faction of the group; 2 = the issue is significant but its relative importance cannot be judged; 3 = the issue is important for most of the group.

The complaints over the following issues are so coded: restrictions on public observance of religious services, festivals and/or holidays; restrictions on building, repairing and/or maintaining places of worship; forced observance of religious laws of other group; restrictions on formal religious organizations; restrictions on the running of religious schools and/or religious education in general; restrictions on the observance of religious laws concerning personal status, including marriage and divorce; restrictions on the ordination of and/or access to clergy; restrictions on other types of observance of religious law. The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 24.<sup>51</sup>

### *Control Variables*

The control variables were selected based on those Gurr found to be significant causes of ethnic rebellion.<sup>52</sup> All of the variables below are part of the MAR dataset and are described more fully in the MAR dataset users' manual.<sup>53</sup>

*Cultural differences* measures the extent to which the groups are culturally different, excluding religious differences. It was created

by adding five variables that measure specific types of cultural differences on the following scale: 0 = none; 1 = some intermediate differential; 2 = significant differentials. The following factors were included in this variable: ethnicity or nationality (culdifx1); language (culdifx2); historical origin (culdifx3); social customs (culdifx5); area of residence (culdifx6). The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 10. It is important to note that a variable measuring religious differences (culdifx4) was not included in the version of this variable in order to avoid covariance with the religion variables described above.

The MAR dataset codes all of the following grievance variables, as well as the variable for international support, separately for the 1990–1991, 1992–1993, and 1994–1995 periods. The variables used here take the highest of these three codings.

*Autonomy grievances in 1990–1995* measures the extent to which a minority expresses grievances over autonomy issues. It was constructed by adding variables measuring the following specific types of grievances on the same scale as religious grievances: general concern for greater autonomy (autgr1); the desire for union with kindred groups (autgr2); the desire for political independence (autgr3); the desire for widespread autonomy (autgr4); the desire for limited autonomy (autgr5). The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 15.

*Autonomy grievances \* Religious grievances* measures the interaction between religious and autonomy grievances using the following formula:  $\text{Autonomy grievances} * (\text{Religious grievances} + 1)$ . It is included because a previous analysis of the MAR dataset found that the combination of religious and autonomy grievances was more highly correlated with ethnic conflict than either of the two individually.<sup>54</sup> The reason for this specific formulation is discussed below.

*Economic grievances in 1990–1995* measures the extent to which a minority expresses grievances over economic issues. It was constructed by adding variables measuring the following specific types of grievances on the same scale as used for religious grievances: diffuse economic concerns (ecogr1); desire for a greater share of public funds (ecogr2); desire for greater economic opportunities (ecogr3); desire for improved working conditions (ecogr4); desire for protection of existing land, jobs, and/or resources (ecogr5); other economic grievances (ecogr6). The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 18.

*Cultural grievances 1990–1995* measures the extent to which a minority expresses grievances over cultural issues other than religion. It was constructed by adding variables measuring the following

specific grievances on the same scale as used for religious grievances: desire for promotion of the group's language and culture (culgr2); desire for education in the group's language (culgr3); desire for the group's language to be used in official settings (culgr4); protection from attacks by other groups (culgr5); other cultural grievances (culgr6). The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 15. It is important to note that a variable for general religious grievances (culgr1) was not included. This was in order to avoid covariance with the religion variables described above.

*Political grievances in 1990–1995* measures the extent to which a minority expresses grievances over political issues. It was constructed by adding variables measuring the following specific types of grievances on the same scale as used for religious grievances: diffuse political grievances (polgr1); the desire for greater communal political rights (polgr2); the desire for greater participation in decision making (polgr3); the desire for greater civil rights (polgr4); the desire for changes in official policies (polgr5); other political grievances (polgr6). The resulting variables ranges from 0 to 15.

*International military support, 1990–1995* measures the extent of international military support for the minority group on the following scale: 0 = none; 1 = funds for military supplies or direct military equipment supplies; 2 = military training or provision of military advisors; 3 = rescue missions, cross-border raids, or peace-keeping; 4 = cross-border sanctuaries or in-border combat units.

*Democracy in 1994* is included in the MAR dataset, but it is taken from the Polity dataset. It ranges from 0 to 10.<sup>55</sup>

*Repression in 1996* is a composite measure that adds variables for specific types of repression, including a few group members arrested (rep0196); many group members arrested (rep0296); leaders arrested or they disappear (rep0396); show trials (rep0496); torture used to intimidate or interrogate (rep0596); group members executed by authorities (rep0696); group leaders executed by authorities (rep0796); reprisal killings by civilians (rep0896); reprisal killings by paramilitaries (rep0896); property confiscated or destroyed (rep1096); restrictions on movement (rep1196); forced resettlement (rep1296); interdiction of food supplies (rep1396); ethnic cleansing (rep1496); systematic domestic spying (rep1596); states of emergency (rep1696); saturation of police or military (rep1796); limited use of force against protestors (rep1896); unrestrained force used against protestors (rep1996); military campaigns against armed rebels (rep2096); military targets and destroys rebel areas (rep2196); military massacres of suspected rebel supporters (rep2296); other government repression (rep2396).

These variables are all measured on the following scale: 0 = no repression reported; 1 = tactics used against group members who are engaged in collective action; 2 = tactics used against group members in both kinds of circumstances (engaged in collective action and not engaged in collective action) or in ambiguous situations; 3 = tactics used against group members who are not engaged in collective action. The 1996 variable was selected (not one for 1990 to 1995, which would have been preferable) because this is the earliest year for which the repression variables were included in the MAR dataset and because it is reasonable to assume that there is a strong correlation between repression in 1990–1995 and 1996.<sup>56</sup>

*Contagion of rebellion in the 1980s and 1990s* (iconreb8 and iconreb9) is the mean level of rebellion in the groups's region during the given period. These variables are used to measure both the long- and short-term instability of a region.

*Diffusion of rebellion in the 1980s and 1990s* (isegreb8 and isegreb9) is the highest incidence of rebellion by kindred groups in adjoining countries during the given period. These variables are included because conflict by similar groups living elsewhere, both in the long- and short-term, can inspire militancy by a group.

### Data Analysis and Discussion

The first set of tests, shown in Table 1, uses regression analysis to examine the influence of whether the minority is of a different religion than the majority group, as well as whether the minority is Christian or Islamic, on the extent of militant ethnic mobilization and ethnic rebellion. The results show that none of these variables have a significant influence on either rebellion or mobilization for rebellion.

Given that result, it is fair to conclude that religious differences alone do not contribute to ethnic militancy, which runs directly counter to those who argue that religious differences alone are enough to cause conflict. This includes Huntington's predictions that religiously different civilizations would be the basis for post-Cold War clashes. That whether a minority group is Christian or Islamic does not contribute to the extent of ethnic militancy also contradicts Huntington's predictions regarding Islamic militancy and the primacy of Islam versus the West conflicts.

The second set of tests, shown in Table 2, uses regression analysis to examine whether religious factors contribute to the extent of ethnic militancy among minority groups that are religiously different

Table 1 The Influence of Different Religions on Ethnic Militancy

Independent Variables	Regression for		
	Number of Militant Organizations 1990–1995	Scope of Support for Militant Organizations 1990–1995	Rebellion in 1995
Religious differences	(.036)	(–.026)	(–.070)
Minority Islamic	(.055)	(–.060)	(–.066)
Minority Christian	(.009)	(.050)	(.056)
Autonomy grievances	.175***	.130*	(.042)
Cultural differences	(–.004)	(–.025)	(.015)
Cultural grievances 1990–1995		(.037)	(.043)
Economic grievances 1990–1995	(.010)	(.018)	(–.054)
Political grievances 1990–1995		(.043)	(.004)
Democracy 1994	(.070)	(–.052)	(.047)
Repression 1996		.270***	.332***
International military support	(.010)	.386***	.328***
1990–1995	(.030)	.135*	–.162*
Contagion of rebellion 1980s	.211***	(.041)	.180*
Contagion of rebellion 1990–1995		(–.096)	(–.047)
Diffusion of rebellion 1980s	.374***	.117*	(–.066)
Diffusion of rebellion 1990–1995		—	(.072)
Number of militant orgs. 1990–1995	.247***	—	.303***
Scope of support for militant orgs. 1990–1995	(.058)		
	(.060)		
	(.067)		
	—		
	—		
df adjusted-r-squared	240.407	240.434	236.591

Notes: All values in the table are beta values. Values in parentheses indicate that the variable was not included in the regression and are the beta value had the variable been included in the regression (obtained in SPSS from the list of excluded variables).

\* = significance (p-value)  $\leq$  .05

\*\* = significance (p-value)  $\leq$  .01

\*\*\* = significance (p-value)  $\leq$  .001

from the majority group in their state. The results show that while religious issues alone do not contribute to ethnic militancy, the presence of a combination of religious and autonomy issues do increase the extent of ethnic militancy. The variable that shows this is an interaction variable that multiplies the autonomy grievances and the religious grievances variable in a formula that slightly emphasizes the influence of autonomy grievances by assuring that

**Table 2 The Influence of Religious Issues on Ethnic Militancy Among Religiously Differentiated Groups**

Independent Variables	Regression for		
	Number of Militant Organizations 1990–1995	Scope of Support for Militant Organizations 1990–1995	Rebellion in 1995
Religious grievances 1990–1995	(–.092)	(–.135)	(.005)
Minority Islamic	(.092)	(–.015)	(.062)
Minority Christian	(–.045)	(.099)	(–.023)
Cultural differences	(–.034)	(–.075)	(.041)
Autonomy grievances 1990–1995			
Religious * autonomy grievances	.308***	(.067)	(.027)
Cultural grievances 1990–1995			
Economic grievances 1990–1995	(–.046)	.227*	.164*
Political grievances 1990–1995			
Democracy 1994	–.207*	(–.133)	(.049)
Repression 1996			
International military support 1990–1995	(.054)	(–.029)	(.052)
Contagion of rebellion 1980s	(.047)	(.053)	(.049)
Contagion of rebellion 1990–1995	(.047)	(–.093)	(.098)
Diffusion of rebellion 1980s	(.126)	.259*	.181*
Diffusion of rebellion 1990–1995			
Number of militant orgs. 1990–1995	.357***	.208*	.428***
Scope of support for militant orgs. 1990–1995	(.099)	(.073)	(–.026)
	.312***	.167	(.031)
	(.051)	(.006)	(–.036)
	(.051)	(.107)	(–.025)
	—	—	(.088)
	—	—	.351***
df adjusted-r-squared	89.365	89.292	89.66

*Notes:* All values in the table are beta values. Values in parentheses indicate that the variable was not included in the regression and are the beta value had the variable been included in the regression (obtained in SPSS from the list of excluded variables).

\* = Significance (p-value) <= .05

\*\* = Significance (p-value) <= .01

\*\*\* = Significance (p-value) <= .001

if religious grievances is equal to 0, the product of the two is not necessarily 0. This is done because, as described above, a previous analysis of the MAR data found that rebellion was rare among ethnoreligious minorities who expressed no autonomy grievances

but the combination of religious and autonomy grievances increased the level of rebellion.<sup>57</sup> Thus, it is fair to conclude that if there is an interaction between religious and autonomy grievances, it occurs only when autonomy grievances are expressed. That is, religious grievances can exacerbate the influence of autonomy grievances on militancy, but religious grievances alone do not cause militancy. That the interaction variable proves to be significant confirms this.

Furthermore, when the interaction variable is removed from the regressions (in regressions not presented here) autonomy grievances are significant only in the regression for the number of militant organizations (this is significant in the regressions presented here, also) and religious grievances are not significant in any of the regressions. This shows that it is the interaction between autonomy and religious issues that most strongly contributes to ethnic militancy. Thus, while religious issues alone are not enough to impact ethnic militancy, they do have a significant influence when they occur in combination with autonomy issues.

Be that as it may, the most significant variables in both sets of regressions are nonreligious variables. The variables that are most significant in both sets of regressions are cultural grievances, repression, international military support, the various variables that measure the spread of conflict across borders, and, in the regressions for rebellion, the mobilization variables. This shows that while religious issues may influence a conflict, they are by no means the strongest direct influence.

However, it is arguable that religious differences and grievances may influence the extent of these other causes of ethnic militancy. That is, those factors that are shown in the regressions to be most strongly correlated with militancy, may themselves be correlated with religious factors. This proposition is tested in Table 3. The results show that all four factors that most contribute to ethnic militancy are significantly correlated with at least one of the religion variables. This means that both religious differences and religious issues have an indirect impact on ethnic militancy through these mediating variables. This also confirms previous findings that religion influences the dynamics of ethnic conflict at many levels.<sup>58</sup>

Another important finding is that whenever cultural grievances is associated with militancy, it is a negative association. In other words, the more upset a minority is over cultural issues, the less militant it is likely to be. This runs directly counter to what we would expect. One potential explanation for this is that the variable for cultural grievances mostly measures language issues, including the promotion of the group's language and the use of its

**Table 3 Correlations Between Religion Variables and Variables that Impact Ethnic Militancy**

	N	Autonomy Grievances 1994–1995	Repression in 1996	Intl. Military Support 1994–1995	Contagion of Rebellion 1990–1995
Religious differences					
Religious grievances	275	.246***	.171**	-.004	.139*
Religious grievances*/ autonomy grievances	101	-.132	.151	.030	.276**
	101	—	.338***	.296**	.077*

Notes: = significance (p-value)  $\leq .05$

\*\* = significance (p-value)  $\leq .01$

\*\*\* = significance (p-value)  $\leq .001$

language in educational and official settings. These types of demands are not made by the sort of group that wants so secede from a state—because getting one's own state would settle this issue. These demands are, rather, the type of demand made by a group that is expecting to remain within a state and desires to create a more favorable environment within that state. Such a group would be expected to engage in protest, rather than rebellion. This is confirmed by the fact that the cultural grievances variable and protest in 1995 are significantly correlated (correlation = .200,  $p = .001$ ).<sup>59</sup> Another potential explanation is the argument made by Donald Horowitz that ethnic conflict is more likely between groups that are culturally similar.<sup>60</sup>

\* \* \*

The basic questions asked here are whether conflicts involving groups with different religions, minorities of specific religions, or differences over religious issues contribute to ethnic militancy. The simple answers to these questions are (1) whether the groups involved are of different religions has no impact on religious militancy; (2) similarly, the specific religion of the minority has no impact on religious militancy; but (3) the presence of religious issues does contribute to militancy. The more accurate answers are more complicated, however.

While the presence of religious issues in a conflict contributes to ethnic militancy, it does so only in combination with autonomy issues. That is, unless a minority expresses a desire for autonomy, grievances over religious issues have no significant direct impact on the extent of ethnic militancy. Thus, religious issues can exacerbate



a conflict that involves autonomy issues, but they are unlikely to be a cause of that conflict. This means that while conflicts such as those in Israel, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir are often represented as religious conflicts, the results of this study show that it is the national aspects of these conflicts that are the basic cause: The religious aspects are exacerbating factors.

Several other factors are consistently more important than religion in determining the extent of ethnic militancy. These include repression, international military support for the minority group, and the spread of conflict across borders. However, these factors themselves are shown by this study to be influenced by religion. Thus, religious factors indirectly contribute to ethnic militancy through these mediating variables. For example, in the case of Kashmir, all of these factors are present. The Islamic population of Kashmir suffers from repression by the Indian government, has international support from Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, from other Islamic states, and the issue is clearly a cross-border one. Yet all of these factors cannot be wholly separated from the religious overtones of the conflict.

Given all of this, we can construct a more exact description of whether and how religion contributes to ethnic militancy. The presence of religious issues in a conflict, while not a basic cause of ethnic militancy can, under the appropriate circumstances, exacerbate ethnic militancy. Also, both the presence of religious issues and whether the minority is of a different religion than the majority group influences the dynamics of ethnic conflict. However, the specific religion of the minority group and whether the minority is of a different religion than the majority group do not directly increase religious militancy.

These results are important for two reasons. First, they show that simply being of different religions is not enough to contribute to ethnic militancy directly. This runs directly counter to those, including Huntington, who predict that religious differences increase the extent of ethnic conflict. It is important to note that the tests performed here are not a direct test of Huntington's "clash of civilizations" argument in that they look at religious differences and not civilizational differences, but the results presented here are clearly inconsistent with what one would expect to find based on his argument that "clashes" will be more likely between his religiously based "civilizations."

Second, they run counter to the assumption that religion is a basic cause of ethnic conflict. These results clearly show that religion is not a direct cause, but they also show that religion has an influence on the dynamics of ethnic conflicts. That religious factors

influence the dynamics of ethnic conflicts is confirmed by other studies. Religious institutions influence the extent of peaceful and militant ethnic mobilization.<sup>61</sup> Religious legitimacy influences the formation of ethnic grievances.<sup>62</sup> Also, religious factors influence the extent of discrimination against ethnic minorities.<sup>63</sup> Thus, while religion may not be the direct cause of ethnic militancy, it does contribute to ethnic militancy and influences the ethnic conflict process in many ways.

All of this has an interesting policy implication: solving the religious aspects of ethnoreligious conflicts may reduce the level of violence, but it will not solve the basic problem. This study, and others, show that ethnoreligious conflicts rarely involve violence unless autonomy issues are an aspect of the conflict.<sup>64</sup> Thus, religious issues alone are not sufficient to cause violence, but autonomy issues are. This implies that if the religious aspects of such conflicts are dealt with, the basic cause of violence remains, but dealing with only the autonomy aspects of an ethnoreligious conflict should eliminate most of the violence.

However, since religious issues do contribute to the level of violence, addressing them has value in that this tactic will, if successful, likely reduce the level of violence. Similarly addressing the other factors that contribute to ethnoreligious violence, such as repression, international military support, and the spread of conflict across borders, can also reduce the level of violence. But in the end, like religion, these are exacerbating factors, and, at least for ethnoreligious conflicts, in order to be sure of eliminating violence, autonomy issues must be addressed.

Thus, predictions like those of Huntington that religion is the defining trait of conflict are mistaken. Religion is certainly an important intervening factor, and a full understanding of ethnic militancy is impossible without taking religion into account. However, it remains an intervening variable, not the root cause of ethnic militancy. Furthermore, religion's influence on ethnic conflict is not primarily through differences in religious identity; rather, it is through differences over religious issues.

This means that policymakers who focus on the civilizational aspects of ethnic conflicts are more likely causing increased levels of conflict, rather than solving the situation—for two reasons. First, the basic causes of ethnic conflict are not civilizational. Second, focusing on civilizational differences can turn Huntington's theory into a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby people expect conflict between groups of different religions, prepare for it, and thereby provoke it. For this reason, among others, a better understanding of how religion contributes to all types of conflict is necessary, and, accordingly, this should be the topic of further research.

## Notes

I would like to thank Ted R. Gurr and the staff of the Minorities at Risk project; without them, this study would not have been possible. All errors of fact or interpretation that remain are mine alone. All statistics were performed using SPSS 9.0.

1. For a full model of religion and ethnic conflict, see Jonathan Fox (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002).
2. For more details, see the section "Research Design," below.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49; idem, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); idem, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (1996): 28–46.
4. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, note 3, pp. 45–48.
5. Those who, similarly, argue that Huntington's definition of civilizations is mostly based on religion include Benjamin R. Barber, "Fantasy of Fear," *Harvard International Review* 20, no. 1 (1997/98): 66–71; S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities,'" *Millennium* 29, no. 3 (2000): 591–611; Carsten B. Laustsen and Ole Wæver, "In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization," *Millennium* 29, no. 3 (2000): 705–739; Anthony D. Smith, "The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism," *ibid.*: 791–814; and Bassam Tibi, "Post-Bipolar Disorder in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicized Islam," *Millennium* 29, no. 4 (2000): 843–859. For a more complete discussion of the overlap between religion and Huntington's concept of civilizations, see Jonathan Fox, "Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Religions, Which Is a More Important Determinant of Ethnic Conflict?" *Ethnicities* 1, no. 3 (2001): 295–320; and idem, "Civilizational, Religious, and National Explanations for Ethnic Rebellion in the Post-Cold War Middle East," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 13, nos. 1–2 (2001): 177–204.
6. Fred Halliday, "A New World Myth," *New Statesman* 10, no. 447 (1997): 42–43; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick et al., "The Modernizing Imperative," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (1993): 22–26; Richard Rosecrance, "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (1998): 978–980; and Stephen N. Walt, "Building Up New Bogeymen," *Foreign Policy* 106 (1997): 177–189.
7. M. E. Ahari, "The Clash of Civilizations: An Old Story or New Truth," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1997): 56–61; Said Tariq Anwar, "Civilizations versus Civilizations in a New Multipolar World," *Journal of Marketing* 62, no. 2 (1998): 125–128; John G. Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (1997): 162–163; and Frederick S. Tipson, "Culture Clash-ification: A Verse to Huntington's Curse," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (1997): 166–169.
8. Robert L. Bartley, "The Case for Optimism," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (1993): 15–18.
9. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago UP, 1991); Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago

UP, 1993); and Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago UP, 1994).

10. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995); and Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

11. Esposito, note 10.

12. Shirleen T. Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998); Zerougui A. Kader, "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1998): 89-92; and Mahmood Monshipouri, "The West's Modern Encounter with Islam: From Discourse to Reality," *Journal of Church and State* 40, no. 1 (1998): 25-56.

13. See, for example, Wang Gungwu, "A Machiavelli for Our Times," *The National Interest* 46 (1997): 69-73; Dwight C. Murphey, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 23, no. 2 (1998): 215-216; and William E. Naft, "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 556 (1998): 198-199. For a more complete discussion of Huntington and his critics, see Fox, "Civilizational, Religious, and National Explanations," note 5.

14. Karl W. Deutsch, "The Limits of Common Sense," in Nelson Polsby, ed., *Politics and Social Life* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 51-57.

15. Jonathan Fox, "Islam and the West: The Influence of Two Civilizations on Ethnic Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 4 (2001): 459-472; idem, "Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis," *British Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 3 (2002): 415-434; idem, "Civilizational, Religious, and National Explanations," note 5; and Ted R. Gurr, "Peoples Against the State: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (1994): 347-377.

16. Fox, "Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Religions?" note 5.

17. Ellingsen Tanja, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 2 (2000): 228-249.

18. Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, "Civil War in the Post-colonial World, 1946-92," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (2000): 275-299.

19. Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and Michalene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Deja Vu? Some Evidence," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 5 (2000): 583-608.

20. Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 2 (2001): 317-338.

21. Several studies also indirectly test Huntington's thesis. Errol A. Henderson finds that while religious differences increase international

conflict, culture has no consistent impact; see his "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity States, and the Onset of War, 1820–1989," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 5 (1997): 649–668; and idem, "The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820–1989," *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (1998): 461–484. Others find that the presence of cross-border ethnic linkages alone is not enough to influence international conflict and foreign-policy behavior, but they can be of influence when combined with other factors; see David R. Davis and Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (1997): 171–184; and David R. Davis, Keith Jagers, and Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity, Minorities, and International Conflict," in David Carment and Patrick James, eds., *Wars in the Midst of Peace* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh UP, 1997), pp. 148–163.

22. Liliane Voyer, "Secularization in a Context of Advanced Modernity," *Sociology of Religion* 60, no. 3 (1999): 280–284; and Jefferey R. Seul, "'Ours Is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 3 (1999): 558.

23. David Carment and Patrick James, "Escalation of Ethnic Conflict," *International Politics* 35 (1998): 68; David Little, *Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1991), p. xx; and Gurr, note 15.

24. Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic Election and National Destiny: Some Religious Origins of Nationalist Ideals," *Nations and Nationalism* 5, no. 3 (1999): 331–355; and idem, note 6.

25. Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict," *Millennium* 29, no. 3 (2000): 641–674. For a further discussion of the primordial, instrumental, and constructivist perspectives, see John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern, eds., *Perspectives on Nationalism and War* (Luxembourg: Gordon & Breach, 1995); Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying?" *World Politics* 26 (1972) 319–355; and Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 145–167.

26. Richard Wentz, *Why People Do Bad Things in the Name of Religion* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer, 1987). For more examples of this type of argument, see Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Andrew M. Greeley, *Religion: A Secular Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1982); Vendulka Kabalkova, "Towards and International Political Theology," *Millennium* 29, no. 3 (2000): 675–704; and Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge, "Of Churches, Sect, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 18 (1979): 117–133.

27. Rhys H. Williams, "Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 35, no. 4 (1996): 369.

28. Laustesen and Waever note 5, p. 719.

29. Bernadette C. Hayes, "The Impact of Religious identification on Political Attitudes: An International Comparison," *Sociology of Religion* 56, no. 2 (1995): 177–194.

30. Alan S. Miller, "The Influence of Religious Affiliation on the Clustering of Social Attitudes," *Review of Religious Research* 37, no. 3 (1996): 123-136.

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32. C. J. M. Drake, "The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, no. 2 (1998): 53-85; Bruce Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18 (1995): 271-284; David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984): 658-677; idem, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 2 (1988): 195-213; and idem, "Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), pp. 103-130.

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34. David Little, "Religious Militancy," in Chester A. Crocker and Fen O. Hampson, eds., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 79-91; David Little, "Studying 'Religious Human Rights': Methodological Foundations," in John D. van der Vyver and John Witte Jr., *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), pp. 45-77; and Little, note 23.

35. Helen Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," *Current Sociology* 38, no. 1 (1990): 49; and Andreas Osiander, "Religion and Politics in Western Civilization: The Ancient World as Matrix and Mirror of the Modern," *Millennium* 29, no. 3 (2000): 785.

36. Gunther Lewy, *Religion and Revolution* (New York: Oxford, 1974); David Rapoport, "Some General Observations on Religion and Violence," *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 3 (1991): 131; Rapoport, "Sacred Terror," note 32, p. 120; Maxwell Taylor, *The Fanatics* (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 121-155; and Steve Zitrin, "Millenarianism and Violence," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 12, no. 2 (1998): 110-115.

37. Mark Juergensmeyer, "Sacrifice and Cosmic War," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 3 (1991): 101-117; Rapoport, "Some General Observations," note 36; Zitrin, "Millenarianism," note 36; and Rene Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins UP, 1977).

38. Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Third World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?* (Berkeley: California UP, 1993); Mark Juergensmeyer, "The New Religious State," *Comparative Politics* 27, no. 4 (1995): 379-391; Vali Nasr, "Religion and Global Affairs: Secular States and Religious Oppositions," *SAIS Review* (summer-fall

1998): 32–37; and Emile Sahliyah, ed., *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World* (New York: SUNY Press, 1990).

39. Marty and Appleby, *Fundamentalisms and the State*, note 9; idem, *Fundamentalisms and Society*, note 9; and idem, *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, note 9. For a more thorough theoretical discussion of religious causes of conflict, see Jonathan Fox, "The Effects of Religion on Domestic Conflict," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10, no. 4 (1998): 43–63; idem, "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethnoreligious Conflict," *Nations and Nationalism* 5, no. 4 (1999): 431–463; and idem, "The Ethnic-Religious Nexus: The Impact of Religion on Ethnic Conflict," *Civil Wars* 3, no. 3 (2000): 1–22.

40. Rudolph J. Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?" *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 2 (1997): 163–175.

41. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity," note 21.

42. Jonathan Fox, "The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3, no. 3 (1997): 1–19; idem, "Do Religious Institutions Support Violence or the Status Quo?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22, no. 2 (1999): 119–139; idem, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnoreligious Minorities," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 3 (1999): 289–307; idem, "Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6, no. 2 (2000): 1–23; and idem, "Religious Causes of Ethnic Discrimination," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 3 (2000): 423–450. While these studies use some of the MAR and supplemental religion data used here, none of them address the specific questions asked here.

43. David Latin, "Language Conflict and Violence: The Straw That Strengthens the Camel's Back," *Archives Europennes De Sociologie* 41, no. 1 (2000): 97–137.

44. While the MAR dataset does not overtly code the majority group, the majority group for each state is implicitly coded in the dataset in variables that measure ethnic, religious, and cultural differences between the majority and minority groups. In general, the majority group is the group that is in control of the state and/or is the majority ethnic group in the state.

45. Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (US Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 5–7.

46. James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, "A Cross-Sectional Study of Large-Scale Ethnic Violence in the Postwar Period," unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, September 30, 1997. This does not, however, deter Latin from using the MAR dataset in his own research: see Latin, note 43.

47. Ted R. Gurr, *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2000), pp. 10–13.

48. The MAR and the religion variables are available at the MAR website: [www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar)

49. This variable is taken from Jonathan Fox, "Civilizations Data for Use with the Minorities at Risk Dataset," available at [www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/links](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/links)

50. This variable is part of Jonathan Fox, "Ethnoreligious Conflict Dataset for Use with the Minorities at Risk Dataset," available at [www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/links](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/links). The dataset codes the variable separately for 1990–1992, 1992–1993, and 1994–1995 periods. The variable used here takes the highest of these three codings.

51. This variable is part of Fox, note 50.

52. Ted R. Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel," *International Political Science Review* 14, no. 2 (1993b): 161–201; Ted R. Gurr and Will H. Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 4 (1997): 1079–1103; Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, note 45; and Gurr, *Peoples versus States*, note 47.

53. The manual is available at the MAR website: [www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar)

54. Jonathan Fox and Josephine Squires, "Threats to Primal Identities: A Comparison of Nationalism and Religion as It Impacts on Protest and Rebellion," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 1 (2001): 88–102.

55. This variable is described more fully by Keith Jagers and Ted R. Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 4 (1995): 469–482. It is important to note that there is also a variable measuring autocracy from the POLITY dataset available in the MAR dataset. It is constructed from the same components as the democracy variable with the addition of a measure for regulation of political participation and also ranges from 0 to 10, but with 10 being the most autocratic. The democracy variable was chosen for this study because the variables are very similar (the correlation between the two variables in 1994 is  $-.868$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Other studies have used combinations of the autocracy and democracy variables by subtracting the two variables. This creates a variable that ranges from  $-10$  to  $10$  but is statistically nearly identical to the democracy variable (the correlation between the autocracy minus democracy and the democracy variable is  $-.974$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

56. Repression in 1996 and 1997, for instance, has a correlation of  $.897$  ( $p\text{-value} < .001$ ).

57. Fox and Squires, note 54.

58. See the five Fox articles cited in note 42: "Salience"; "Do Religious Institutions . . . ?"; "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy"; "Is Islam?" and "Religious Causes."

59. On the cultural grievances variable and protest in 1995, see Gurr, note 47.

60. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: California UP, 1985).

61. Fox, "Do Religious Institutions . . . ?" note 42.

62. Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy," note 42.

63. Fox, "Religious Causes," note 42.

64. Fox and Squires, "Threats to Primal Identities," note 54.