

Tracking the Restructuring of American Religion: Religious Affiliation and Patterns of Religious Mobility, 1973-1998*

DARREN E. SHERKAT, *Southern Illinois University*

Abstract

Trends and patterns of religious mobility have played a central role in theoretical controversies in the sociology of religion. Early examinations focused on how social status might motivate religious switching, and recently scholars have claimed that diminishing status differences between denominations have opened denominational boundaries and led to higher rates of religious mobility. Scholars working from rational actor perspectives have generated several hypotheses. First, human capital and adaptive preference theories suggest that switching will remain infrequent, and will tend to occur between similar denominations. Second, "strict church" perspectives argue that demanding sectarian denominations will have higher retention, and be more attractive destinations. Third, market niche perspectives argue that niche overlap will foster high rates of religious mobility. Finally, theories emphasizing normative constraints on religious choices suggest that quasi-ethnic religious groups will have a greater hold on members. This article examines trends and patterns of religious mobility in the U.S. between 1973 and 1998 using data from the General Social Surveys. Retention rates, distributions of original and destination affiliations, and mobility tables are compared across three periods, and four broad cohorts using log-multiplicative association models. I find some support for hypotheses generated by status theories, and for several propositions from rational actor theories, however the decline of denominationalism perspective is unsupported.

In the U.S., individuals are relatively free to choose religious affiliations, and consequently religious mobility is not uncommon. The fluidity of attachments to religious institutions in the U.S. has been noted by a number of social

** Data from the General Social Surveys were made available through the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. I thank Patty Chang, Chris Ellison, Roger Finke, Bernie Lazerwitz, Armand Mauss, John H. Simpson, Jesper Sorensen, Rodney Stark, and the anonymous Social Forces reviewers for comments on earlier versions. Discussions with Victor Anderson, Stephen Hart, and Eugene Sutton were also beneficial. Direct correspondence to Darren E. Sherkat, Department of Sociology, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901.*

commentators from Alexis de Tocqueville to Robert Wuthnow. Analyzing patterns of religious mobility furthers our understanding of the relative effectiveness and attractiveness of religious organizations operating in the free market environment of American religion. By examining mobility patterns over time and across cohorts, we can begin to discover how the American religious economy is restructuring. However, analyses of the dynamics of religious affiliation have been complicated by data constraints, and by debates over theoretical interpretations and methodological techniques (Breen & Hayes 1996; Kluegel 1980; MacDonald 1994; McKinney & Roof 1994; Sherkat 1990, 1993; Sullins 1993; Whitt & Babchuk 1992; Whitt, Crockett & Babchuk 1988).

Trends and patterns of religious mobility have played a central role in theoretical controversies in the sociology of religion. Early examinations of religious mobility focused primarily on how social status might motivate religious switching (Stark & Glock 1968; Wilson 1966). Recently, some scholars have claimed that a breakdown in status differences between denominations has led to the diminution of denominational boundaries — and consequently higher rates of religious mobility (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988, 1993). Theorists working from a rational actor perspective have generated a number of propositions relevant to religious mobility. Specifically, human capital (Iannaccone 1990) and adaptive preference (Sherkat 1997, 1998; Sherkat & Wilson 1995) theories suggest that if individuals shift their religious affiliation, they will choose denominations similar to their original group. “Strict church” theories argue that more demanding sectarian denominations will have higher rates of retention, and be more attractive to new members compared to liberal bodies (Finke & Stark 1992; Iannaccone 1992, 1994; Kelley 1977). Ecological niche perspectives maintain that organizations with little distinctiveness from other traditions or from secular society will have high membership turnover (Stark & Bainbridge 1985, 1987). Finally, theories emphasizing normative constraints on religious choices suggest that religious groups with ethnic or quasi-ethnic ties will have a greater hold on members (Sandomirsky & Wilson 1990; Sherkat & Wilson 1995; Sherkat 1997).

In this article, I adjudicate between theoretical expectations of status theories, the decline of denominationalism thesis, and rational choice perspectives. Each of these vistas generate unique expectations about: (1) levels of and trends in retention across denominations, periods, and cohorts; (2) the relative gains and losses from switching experienced by different religious groups across periods and cohorts; and, (3) patterns of switching across religious bodies over time and across generations. My study has a number of advantages over previous examinations of religious mobility (e.g., Babchuk & Whitt 1990; Hadaway & Marler 1993; Sullins 1993). First, I analyze data on religious mobility from the 1973-98 General Social Surveys (GSS) — providing both more cases and more recent data.¹ The longer time line and increased number of cases enables a methodical comparison of religious mobility over three periods, and across four cohorts. Second, I exclude African

Americans — who choose denominational affiliations in what is essentially a separate religious market — and I pay close attention to differences among liberal and conservative Protestant bodies by analyzing Episcopalians, Baptists, and Mormons separate from other liberal and conservative groups.² Finally, I examine a range of log-linear and log-multiplicative association models (Goodman & Clogg 1992; Goodman & Hout 1998; Powers & Xie 2000; Wong 1995; Xie 1992), to systematically compare the structure of religious mobility over time and across cohorts.

Status Theories and Religious Mobility

In the 1960s and 1970s research on religious mobility was dominated by status theories which posited that individuals would seek religious affiliations granting them high status in society. Following Stark & Glock's (1965) theoretical and empirical work, researchers expected that high-status liberal denominations, such as the Presbyterians and Episcopalians, would have strong membership retention and would gain members from less prestigious groups. In contrast, low-status conservative sects, such as the Baptists, Church of Christ, and various Pentecostal groups, were expected to lose members and decline (Alston 1971; Lauer 1975; Newport 1979). Status theories are driven by the assumption that individuals make religious choices with an eye towards social benefits that are unrelated to religious desires. This is common to demand-side rational choice theories applied to religious behavior (Sherkat 1997, 1998; Sherkat & Ellison 1999; Sherkat & Wilson 1995), as well as to economic theories of conformity and conspicuous consumption (eg., Bernheim 1994; Bagwell & Bernheim 1996). Consumption choices for members of high status groups are made to bolster "invidious comparisons" vis-à-vis lower status groups, while people of lower status engage in "pecuniary emulation" by mirroring the consumption patterns of higher status groups (Bagwell & Bernheim 1996; Bernheim 1994; Veblen [1899] 1994). Importantly, social connections and social contexts that vary over time and space drive status effects and other social influences of this type. Hence, status influences on religious choices may vary across periods and cohorts, just as fashion and other articles of conspicuous consumption go in and out of vogue, or become salient status markers only for particular generations. This is especially likely across cohorts, since voluntary organizations tend to attract and repel members based on age and status characteristic (McPherson & Rotolo 1996; Popielarz & McPherson 1995). Indeed, Roof and McKinney (1987) argue that status seeking was a common impetus for religious mobility in the conformist cohorts that reached adulthood in the World War II period and formed families in the post-war era. For these cohorts, affiliation with mainline liberal Protestant denominations conveyed a particular status.

Empirical examinations of religious switching have generated mixed findings regarding denominational status and religious mobility patterns (Greeley & Hout 1988; Kluegel 1980; Newport 1979), yet there is some evidence that status-based switching may have been cohort specific and limited to the pre-World War II generations (Roof & McKinney 1987). The Stark & Glock (1965) theory also predicts that having moved “up” the status ladder, individuals would opt “out” of religion altogether. Researchers have noted a trend in nonreligion among American respondents (Glenn 1987a; Greeley 1989), though this may be a function of age distributions in the population (Greeley & Hout 1988). Status theories of religious switching imply that: (1) *liberal denominations will win out in exchanges with other denominations; and, (2) nonreligion will become an increasingly attractive option, especially for individuals who originate in high status denominations.*

The Decline of Denominationalism Perspective

Some religious commentators have contended that denominational identities are no longer as salient as they once were, and that boundaries between religious groups have diminished to the point that denominations are less relevant units of analysis. These analysts point out that the status ordering of religious groups has become far less clear since the 1960s, and that denominational differences in status, regional distribution, and ethnic identity have decreased (Hunter 1990; Wuthnow 1988, 1993). The attenuation of demographic differences is also presumed to influence the belief systems of denominations — and scholars have asserted that religious beliefs now vary more within denominations than between denominations (Hunter 1990; Wuthnow 1988, 1993). The convergence of religious beliefs across denominations is perhaps most apparent in the ecumenical impulses of “mainline” liberal religious bodies. Wuthnow (1993:156) argues that “over the past half-century, denominationalism has declined seriously as the primary mode of identification in American religion. Indications of this decline include increased interfaith and interdenominational switching, heightened tolerance across faiths and denominational boundaries, ecumenical cooperation, and a deemphasis in many denominations on distinctive teachings and specific membership requirements.” The declining significance of denominational identities should influence trends and cohort shifts in religious affiliation. *First, denominational boundaries should be more permeable, and religious loyalty should be on the decline — particularly in younger cohorts. Second, there should be no clear winners or losers in switching exchanges, since people could presumably find what they are looking for in any denomination. Third, religious mobility will increasingly take place between disparate denominations, especially in later cohorts.*

Rational Choice Theory and Religious Mobility

Rational choice theory seems naturally suited for elucidating the dynamics of religion in the free market of the U.S. Theorists employing a rational actor framework have explained religious loyalty, patterns of exchange, and denominational differences in mobility outcomes by appealing to both supply- and demand-side features of the religious economy (Sherkat & Ellison 1999). Supply-side theories focus on religious regulation and competition (Finke & Stark 1988, 1992; Iannaccone 1991), as well as variations in the productive capacity of individuals and congregations (Iannaccone 1990, 1992, 1994). Demand-side rational actor theories concentrate on the importance of preference dynamics and configurations, and individual-level constraints on choices generated by social pressures (Sherkat 1997, 1998; Sherkat & Wilson 1995).

Sociologists and economists have theorized about two distinct but complementary processes that should promote continuity of religious affiliation, and structure patterns of mobility — human capital and adaptive preference theories. Human capital theory implies that experience with rituals, liturgy, doctrines, hymns, and the like, makes individuals more capable of generating religious value — just as an experienced cook is better able to construct a valuable meal from familiar foods than from foreign larders (Iannaccone 1990). According to human capital theory, preferences for religious benefits remain constant, while the capacity to produce value changes. In contrast, the theory of adaptive preferences suggests that prior religious involvement conditions individuals' desires for well-known religious offerings (Elster 1983; Sherkat 1997, 1998; Sherkat & Wilson 1995). Through repeated consumption of specific religious products, individuals come to prefer them to alternatives. Indeed, while much has been made of the tendency of Americans to switch religious affiliation, studies have found that most stay in their original denomination, and that if people do switch, they choose a denomination similar to the one from which they came (Bibby 1999; Hadaway & Marler 1993; Sullins 1993). Human capital and adaptive preference theories of religious behavior generate two common expectations for aggregate switching behavior: (1) *religious continuity should remain more prevalent than religious switching; and, (2) individuals who switch will tend to choose denominations similar to those from which they originated.*

Theories in the rational choice tradition have also posited why particular denominations are more successful at gaining and retaining members. Several researchers and theorists have argued that more restrictive organizations are better able to generate benefits for members (Finke & Stark 1992; Iannaccone 1992, 1994; Kelley 1977). Formal expositions of this "strict church" thesis demonstrate how gratuitous costs imposed by sectarian religious groups prevent freeriding that would otherwise hamstring collective production efforts (Iannaccone 1992, 1994). According to this perspective, highly committed members in conservative groups are able to collectively produce religious benefits that more than offset the costs of

strictures. Costs of sacrifice and stigma ensure that less committed individuals are dissuaded from joining, and cannot freeride on the positive benefits generated by more committed members. Because of their high levels of collective production, strict conservative groups are better able to retain current members and attract new ones. Given this, I expect that *conservative denominations will: (1) be more retentive of their members; and, (2) win affiliates from liberal groups through religious switching.*

The ecumenical enterprise, which seeks to eliminate differences in creed and practice, has been quite popular in liberal and moderate denominations. One characteristic common to these denominations is that they embrace more secular orientations, and this also forces them to compete with secular commitments for members' loyalties (Finke & Stark 1992; Stark & Bainbridge 1987). Using the conceptual framework developed in the voluntary organizations literature, ecumenical denominations have a high degree of niche overlap, with both religious and secular organizations. Theory and research on voluntary organizations bears out the negative effect of niche overlap on the duration of membership (Popielarz & McPherson 1995). Further, competition has been shown to significantly decrease the duration of organizational memberships even when members participate frequently (Cress, McPherson & Rotolo 1997). Niche overlap is also high among groups of conservative denominations, namely between Baptists and other sectarian groups, and this also should lead to a circulation of members among these groups (Bibby 1999; Bibby & Brinkerhoff 1983, 1994). Generally, I expect that: *(1) religious groups with distinctive theologies, liturgies, or rituals will have higher rates of retention; (2) denominations with little distance from secular society will have lower rates of retention and will lose members through switching; and (3) denominations that are similar to a high number of other religious organizations will have lower rates of retention.*

Finally, recent applications of the rational actor model to religion have demonstrated that nonreligious benefits and costs influence religious decisions (Ellison & Sherkat 1995; Phillips 1998; Sherkat 1997, 1998; Sherkat & Wilson 1995). Religious groups provide members with social support, tangible benefits, assistance with childrearing, opportunities for status and leadership, and access to other scarce collective resources (Sherkat & Ellison 1999). Members of religious organizations are sanctioned for defection and rewarded for participation. Harrison and Lazerwitz (1982) contend that in religious groups with ethnic or quasi-ethnic characteristics, ties to the community through language, folklore, custom, intermarriage, and solidary groups make disaffiliation difficult. Consolidation of associations intensifies group pressures by linking a variety of social rewards to religious participation (Ellison & Sherkat 1995; Sherkat & Cunningham 1998). Cross-cutting ties have the opposite effect, putting "individuals at the intersection of a web of group affiliations that exert diverse and often counteracting pressures, weakening the hold of any one group on its members" (Blau & Schwartz 1984).

Consolidated ties will impede members from joining other denominations, since changing affiliations generates strain between other social ties. This tension would require switchers from these groups to sever their quasi-ethnic identities in order to become a member of another denomination, hence, it may be easier for them to leave religion altogether rather than take on another affiliation (Sandomirsky & Wilson 1990; Sherkat & Wilson 1995). The consolidation of social relations is most evident among Catholics, Jews, Lutherans, and Mormons (Greeley 1977; Iannaccone 1992; Lazerwitz 1995a 1995b; Pescosolido & Georgianna 1988; Roof & McKinney 1987; Johnson 1980; McCutcheon 1988). The influence of social sanctions on religious choices leads us to the following: (1) *ethnic and quasi-ethnic religious groups will have the highest rates of retention*; (2) *disaffiliates from quasi-ethnic groups will be attracted to nonreligion*.

Data and Classification

The 1973-98 General Social Surveys (GSS) asked respondents for both their current religious affiliation as well as affiliation at age 16. The GSS also provides a comprehensive breakdown of religious groups, which allows for relatively fine-grained classification. I separate religious groups into 12 categories: (1) Liberal Protestant (Presbyterians, United Church of Christ [Congregationalist], Unitarian); (2) Episcopalian; (3) moderate Protestant (Methodist, Disciples of Christ, Brethren, Reformed); (4) Lutheran; (5) Baptist;³ (6) conservative Protestant (Assembly of God, Nazarene, Church of Christ, Pentecostal Holiness, etc.); (7) Mormon; (8) other Protestant; (9) Catholic; (10) Jewish; (11) other religion; and, (12) None. The GSS was not conducted in 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, and 1999. Since 1994, the GSS began taking larger samples, and has proceeded with a biennial data collection. Hence, despite the missing years, there are as many cases available in the 1990s as in other periods.

I examine retention, marginal distributions, and models explaining patterns of mobility across the 12 affiliation categories for three periods (1973-82, 1983-90, and 1991-98), and four cohort groupings (pre-1925, 1925-43, 1944-55, and 1956-80). These periods and cohorts yield relatively equal sized groups, which facilitates comparisons, and provide enough cases to estimate a range of log multiplicative association models across periods and cohorts (cf. Goodman & Clogg 1992; Powers & Xie 2000). The periods are fairly evenly spaced over the 26 years of the GSS. The first period is slightly longer, because the GSS was not conducted in 1979 or in 1981. Cohorts were defined largely by historical breakpoints. The pre-1925 cohorts experienced the Great Depression, and were adults during World War II. The 1925-43 cohort had some experience in the Depression and/or World War II period, but entered adulthood before the tumultuous latter half of the 1960s. The 1944-55 cohort is comprised of baby boomers — the oldest could have been

at Berkeley during the heyday of the Free Speech movement, and the youngest might have been in college at the close of the Vietnam War. The eldest respondents from the 1956-80 cohort would have been too young to participate in the antiwar and countercultural movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many in the youngest cohort came to maturity during the 1980s, when conservative movements tended to hold sway and evangelical religion was prominent on the public scene.⁴

Membership Retention by Denomination, Period, and Cohort

Table 1 presents the retention percentages for the 12 categories of origin, and by period and cohort. Overall, it is clear that the vast majority of respondents retain their original affiliation. Further, there are no trends in rates of religious retention or switching. Nearly 69% claim their original affiliation in the 1991-98 period, while the corresponding figure was just over 70% in the 1973-82 period. Looking across cohorts, there is more stability in the pre-1925 cohort, with 71% of the oldest cohort remaining faithful to their origin denomination, whereas 68.6% of the 1925-43 cohort and 67.4% of the 1944-55 cohort report stable affiliations. The youngest cohort has even lower rates of religious switching — with 73.1% remaining in the denomination of origin. However, this cohort has had less opportunity to switch religious affiliations when compared to the older cohorts and their actual rates of mobility may well be higher (Sherkat 1991).

Loyalty rates are somewhat lower in liberal and moderate Protestant groups when compared with conservative sects — particularly with Baptists. One exception is that Episcopalians post somewhat higher retention rates than conservative Protestants — at least overall. Across the three periods there is substantial trendless variation in loyalty rates for both liberal and conservative groups. Most notable are peaks in retention in the middle period for both Conservative Protestants and Episcopalians. Liberal Protestant and Baptist retention dipped by one to two percent, while Conservative Protestants increased retention by 2.6% over the course of the cumulative GSS. In the 1990s, sectarian groups have higher rates of retention than any of the liberal mainline groups. And, among the nonethnic Protestant denominations, Baptists are least likely to switch in all three periods.

The cohort findings in Table 1 are enlightening for identifying explanations for denominations' varying fortunes. Because the youngest cohort has not completed their religious trajectories, comparing across the three oldest cohorts tells a story of differential fortunes in retention. Liberal Protestant loyalty declined by more than a 10% between the pre-1925 cohort and the large, baby boom, 1944-55 cohort. Episcopalians also follow this pattern of declining loyalty across cohorts. Moderate Protestant groups had lower rates of retention in the 1925-43 cohort, however they managed to rebound in the baby boom cohort — though Moderates are the least loyal among Protestants in every cohort. In contrast, Baptist retention declined by only 3%, to 67%, in the 1944-55 cohort. In the pivotal 1944-1955 cohort, Baptists

TABLE 1: Percentage Retained by Religion of Origin by Period and Cohort — White Americans in the General Social Survey

	Total	Period			Cohort			
	1973-98	1973-82	1983-90	1991-98	Pre-1925	1925-43	1944-55	1956-80
Liberal groups								
Liberal Protestant	58.4	60.1	56.9	58.1	64.9	56.3	54.1	58.8
Episcopalian	63.6	62.4	70.8	58.2	66.7	61.4	60.3	66.7
Mod. Protestant	59.3	60.2	58.4	59.1	59.9	55.8	59.5	63.0
Conservative sects								
Baptist	70.1	70.5	71.0	68.8	70.0	68.8	67.0	75.2
Cons. Protestant	62.4	59.0	66.5	61.6	60.0	59.0	62.1	69.1
Other Protestant	55.0	52.8	53.9	58.5	49.7	47.5	60.2	61.2
Quasi-ethnic								
Mormons	89.7	96.7	91.5	81.4	88.5	87.0	93.0	89.3
Lutheran	72.1	72.6	72.7	71.1	75.3	71.5	67.9	74.1
Catholic	81.1	83.4	82.5	77.3	88.1	84.9	75.7	79.1
Jewish	85.8	85.8	86.6	85.1	93.2	83.9	82.4	82.2
Other religion	66.5	65.2	68.0	65.9	53.9	65.3	72.4	69.7
None	45.8	35.8	43.8	54.5	29.3	25.1	43.4	64.0
Total	70.1	70.4	71.1	68.6	71.4	68.6	67.4	73.1

are nearly 7% more loyal than Episcopalians, and 13% more stable than liberal Protestants. Conservative Protestant groups increased their loyalty rates somewhat across cohorts, keeping 62% of 1944-55 baby boomers — and this made them more retentive of members of this critical cohort than any of the Liberal groups.

Stability in the youngest cohort is high, as expected, since they had less opportunity to switch religious affiliations prior to being interviewed. Yet, differences across the denominations seem to mirror the findings for the 1925-43 and 1944-55 cohorts, and may even point to a widening of the loyalty gulf between liberal and conservative groups. For example, between the 1944-55 cohort and the 1956-80 cohort, the retention gap between Baptists and conservative Protestants and liberal Protestants increases by 3.5% and 2.4%, respectively. Similar findings hold for both Episcopalians and moderates when compared to Baptists or Conservative Protestants.

As expected, Table 1 shows that “quasi-ethnic” religious groups have remarkably high loyalty — only the Lutherans retain less than 80% of affiliates, and overall retention for Mormons pushes 90%. Across the three periods, there are notable declines in stability for Catholics and especially Mormons. In the case of Mormons, small origin marginals and shifting GSS sampling frames are probably the

explanation — particularly since there are no intercohort declines in stability for Mormons. Catholic loyalty declines, however, seem more explicable by appealing to generational differences and cohort replacement. Indeed, the cohort results show that Lutheran, Catholic, and Jewish retention rates decline substantially across the first three cohorts. Still, rates of stability in all of the quasi-ethnic groups remain extraordinarily high even in the least stable cohort (1944-55).

In Table 1, the nondenominational "other Protestant" category posts the lowest overall retention rate among religious affiliations, while the diverse "other religions" category charts a relatively high loyalty percentage. Loyalty is increasing for other Protestants and for nonreligion across the three periods. The cohort results provide insight into this trend. In the post-1944 cohorts, nondenominational Protestant groups retain over 60% of their members — more than 10% higher than their retention percentages among the two pre-1944 cohorts. This may reflect increasing affiliation with "nondenominational" religious organizations in the younger cohorts, whereas in prior cohorts this response more often indicated a lack of affiliation with organized religion. Other religions also increase their hold on members across cohorts. Indeed, rates of retention for other religions in the two post 1944 cohorts are comparable to those found in quasi-ethnic denominations. This is not surprising since the majority of respondents in the other religion category are Orthodox Christians or members of major ethnic religious traditions, primarily Islam, Buddhism, and Hindu (Sherkat 1999). Irreligion is becoming a more stable option for members of younger cohorts. In the pre-1944 cohorts, less than 30% of those who grew up with no religion lacked an affiliation at the time of their interview, yet among 1944-55 baby boomers 43% remained without an affiliation. The stability of nonaffiliation seems even stronger in the 1956-80 cohort, however younger respondents have had less opportunity to pick up a religious affiliation.

Religious Switching and Market Share: Trends over Time

The structure of religious affiliation is only partly a function of rates of retention. The circulation of members among similar religious groups could yield no change in the relative distribution of members claimed by denominations, despite high rates of switching. Religious switching patterns, differential fertility, variations in childrearing outcomes, and immigration factors also play a strong role in determining the changes in the structure of religious ties. Tables 2 and 3 present the distributions of origin and destination religious identifications, along with the proportion of the original total lost through switching. These findings are important because they reveal directly the market share of denominational groupings, how much market share changed because of religious switching, and trends and cohort shifts in denominational market shares.

The period results in Table 2 uncover several trends in the distributions of origin and destination percentages. First, liberal Protestant denominations lose substantially higher percentages of their original affiliates in the later survey years, and Episcopalian gains from switching in the 1970s and 1980s turn into deficits in the 1991-98 period. Losses due to switching reduce liberal mainline groups' market share by 2.7% in the periods 1973-82 and 1984-90, and declines from switching increase to 3% of market share in 1991-98. Baptist switching deficits are roughly stable across the three periods.⁵ Conservative Protestant gains from switching decline from 20% in the 1973-82 period to 10% in the 1990s. Switching losses have less of an impact on sectarian market share, causing reductions of less than 1% in the first two periods, and just over 1% in the 1991-98 period — all of this attributable to Baptist losses.

Table 2 shows that 25% of Americans were raised in one of the three groups that comprise the liberal mainline, but this figure sinks to less than 22% in the 1991-98 period. In contrast, the market totals of Baptists and conservative sects remain remarkably stable across all three periods for both original and destination affiliates. Comparing origin marginals in the first period with destination marginals in the last period captures an apt summary of trends in Protestant market share. While 25.4% of nonblack Americans reported being raised with liberal mainline affiliations in 1973-82, only 18.9% claimed affiliation with these groups in 1991-1998. In contrast, 24.9% of respondents in 1973-82 grew up in conservative sects, and 24.1% claimed sectarian affiliations in 1991-98. Liberal market share shrank, while conservative market share remained relatively stable.

In the first period, one-third of all Mormons were converts. In the 1983-90 period the GSS included sampling units in the Mormon strongholds of the intermountain West, and growth from switching appears to subside. Lutheran and Jewish switching losses are highest in the first period, perhaps because of temporary disaffiliation by baby boomers. Switching losses have little effect on Jewish or Lutheran market share. In contrast, Catholic losses from switching increase across each period — the 15% decline resulting from switching in the 1991-98 period is twice as high as it was in 1973-82 — reducing Catholic market share by almost 5% when compared to the origin distribution.

Origin and destination marginals from Table 2 evidence the stability of the quasi-ethnic groups. After slight declines in market share in the first period, both Lutherans and Jews report no loss in their proportions of original affiliates in the subsequent periods. Indeed, despite higher losses due to switching among Catholics, the proportion of Americans who report growing up Catholic actually increases slightly, to 31.9%. Indeed, Catholic market share in the 1991-98 is less than 1% lower than in the 1973-82 period. Clearly, some combination of fertility, strong childrearing, and gains through immigration are allowing Catholics to maintain their large share of affiliates despite sizeable losses due to switching.

Gains from switching are remarkably high for other Protestants, other religions, and nones. Increases in market share taper off somewhat in the middle period for both the Protestants and no religion, while a linear increase in gains from switching is evident for other religions. The proportion of respondents who grew up "other Protestant" or "other religion" increases steadily over the periods examined, and the proportion raised with no religion increases more markedly — from 3.2% to 5%. It is safe to say that in the last decade of the twentieth century more Americans reported growing up with no religious affiliation than were raised in Judaism, or as Episcopalians. Combining this baseline increase with switching gains yields a marked increase in market share (or religious market exit) for religious Nones. In the 1991-98 period 11% claim no religious affiliation at the time of the study, up almost 4% from the first period. This gives "no religion" a larger share of the market than the once powerful moderate Protestant groups, ranking market exit third behind Catholics and Baptists in terms of overall share.

Religious Switching and Market Share: Variation Across Cohorts

Table 3 breaks down affiliation origins and destinations by cohort. In the two oldest cohorts liberal denominations were an attractive destination — both liberal groups and Episcopalians experience growth from switching in the pre-1944 cohorts. Indeed, growth for the Episcopalians in these two cohorts is substantial, creating a 28% increase in the pre-1925 cohort and a 16% increase in the 1925-43 cohort. Liberal Protestants also benefited from switching exchanges in the pre-1925 cohort, but they only break even in the 1925-43 cohort. In stark contrast, liberal Protestants and Episcopalians incur substantial losses from switching exchanges in the two younger cohorts. For the liberal Protestants these losses are remarkable — almost 19% in the critical 1944-55 cohort, and over 23% in the 1956-80 cohort. Interestingly, the heavy moderate Protestant losses from switching do not vary much across cohorts. Baptist losses are lowest in the two oldest cohorts and highest in the 1944-55 baby boom cohort. Interestingly, while Baptist losses are high in the 1944-55 cohort, conservative Protestants gain a larger percentage in this same cohort — suggesting circulation mobility among sectarian groups. Conservative Protestants also gained 20% from switching in the oldest cohort — the same cohort that found the liberal Protestants and Episcopalians attractive.

Cohort variations in the marginal distributions of religious origins and destinations help explain the period results. Over 30% of nonblack Americans in the pre-1925 cohort reported growing up in liberal mainline denominations, and more than 28% still claimed those ties at the time of the interview. Yet, the origin percentage for the three mainline groups drops precipitously across the four cohorts, to just 17% in the youngest cohort. Further, heavy switching losses in the post-1944 cohorts lead to a serious hemorrhage in liberal denominations' market share.

TABLE 3: Distributions of Religious Identifiers by Origin and Destination for Cohorts, and Percent of Origin Total Gained or Lost Through Switching

	Liberal	Episc.	Moderate	Baptist	Con. Prot.	Mormon	Lutheran	Catholic	Jewish	Oth. Prot.	Oth. Rel.	None	Total
Pre-1925													
Origin	553	192	1,333	1,222	440	61	730	1760	222	157	65	167	6,902
Percent	8.0	2.8	19.3	17.7	6.4	.9	10.6	25.5	3.2	2.3	.9	2.4	100.00
Destination	628	246	1,079	1,127	528	70	724	1745	217	235	57	246	6,902
Percent	9.1	3.6	15.6	16.3	7.7	1.0	10.5	25.2	3.1	3.4	.8	3.6	100.00
Pct. gain/loss	13.6	28.2	-19.1	-7.8	20.0	14.8	-8	-9	-2.3	49.7	-12.3	47.3	
1925-1943													
Origin	551	189	977	1,319	490	77	629	2001	199	160	75	239	6096
Percent	8.0	2.7	14.5	19.1	7.1	1.1	9.1	29.0	2.9	2.3	1.1	3.5	100.00
Destination	552	219	814	1237	536	96	605	1925	180	276	98	368	6096
Percent	8.0	3.2	11.8	7.9	7.8	1.4	8.8	27.9	2.6	4.0	1.4	5.3	100.00
Pct. gain/loss	.2	15.9	-16.7	-6.2	9.4	24.7	-3.8	-3.8	-9.5	72.5	30.7	54.0	
1944-1955													
Origin	604	204	963	1,453	530	100	704	2,732	210	176	87	295	8,058
Percent	7.5	2.5	12.0	18.0	6.6	1.2	8.7	33.9	2.6	2.2	1.1	3.7	100.00
Destination	490	194	772	1,228	630	130	648	2,293	203	382	191	897	8058
Percent	6.8	2.4	9.6	15.2	7.8	1.6	8.0	28.5	2.5	4.7	2.4	11.1	100.00
Pct. gain/loss	-18.8	-4.9	-19.8	-15.5	18.9	30.0	-8.0	-16.1	-3.3	117.0	119.5	204.1	
1956-1980													
Origin	386	165	652	1,305	434	131	536	2,549	146	183	122	461	7,070
Percent	5.5	2.3	9.2	18.5	6.1	1.9	7.6	36.1	2.1	2.6	1.7	6.5	100.00
Destination	297	154	532	1,169	488	146	498	2,151	138	322	197	978	7,070
Percent	4.2	2.2	7.5	16.5	6.9	2.1	7.0	30.4	2.0	4.6	2.8	13.8	100.00
Pct. gain/loss	-23.1	-6.7	-18.4	-10.4	12.4	11.5	-7.1	-15.6	-5.5	76.0	61.5	112.1	

Fewer than 19% of 1944-55 baby boomers claimed affiliation with mainline groups, and this percentage declines to under 14% in the youngest cohort.

In contrast, origin and destination market share is relatively stable for Baptists and conservative Protestants. 24% of pre-1925 cohort respondents claimed affiliation with these groups with no substantial losses from switching (Baptist losses were offset by conservative Protestant gains). In the youngest cohort 24.6% grew up in conservative groups and 23.4% still claimed those at the time of the interview. Across these generations the old liberal mainline has seen a 4% market share advantage vis-à-vis conservative sects turn into a nearly 10% deficit. Importantly, conservative groups did not experience growth — they simply increased their share of the market relative to other Protestant competitors.

Table 3 shows that Mormon gains seem strongest in the 1925-43 and 1944-55 cohorts where growth from switching is 24.7% and 30%, respectively. Notably, the cohort results also smooth out the problems with Mormon sampling and give us a better picture of their relative growth. Jewish declines from switching are highest in the 1925-43 cohort, almost reaching 10%, however losses in later cohorts are less substantial. Lutherans and Catholics lose very few members in the pre-1925 cohort. Switching losses increase to just under 4% for both groups in the 1925-43 cohort. But, in the 1944-55 cohort Lutheran losses double to 8% while Catholic deficits balloon to over 16%.

Table 3 provides some remarkable findings regarding origin and destination marginals for quasi-ethnic denominations. First, while Mormons accounted for only 1% of affiliates among the pre-1925 cohort, they more than double their market share in the 1956-80 cohort. Fertility and childrearing factors clearly play a role in Mormon growth, since their origin percentages increase steadily. Indeed, Mormon market share in the youngest cohort is roughly the same as Jewish market share (2.1% vs. 2.0%). Lutherans experience declining percentages of origin and destination affiliates across each cohort. While 10.5% of the pre-1925 cohort claimed Lutheran heritage, only 7.6% of the youngest cohort grew up Lutheran. Catholics increase their origin and destination market share across each cohort, despite the heavy losses from switching in the later cohorts. This attests to Catholicism's strong family focus, which admonishes high fertility, provides support for childrearing within the faith tradition, discourages intermarriage, and encourages Catholic childrearing in the event that intermarriage occurs. Immigration probably also plays a role in Catholic growth among the younger cohorts.⁶ In contrast, Jewish market share declines steadily across the cohorts, dwindling from 3.2% among the pre-1925 cohort to 2.1% in the 1955-66 cohort. Of course, Jewish fortunes vary across denominational categories within Judaism, and the GSS is ill suited for identifying these patterns (cf. Lazerwitz et al. 1998).

Cohort variations in the propensity to switch to other Protestant groups are apparent. While origin market share does not vary substantially across the cohorts, the two post-1944 cohorts are much more likely to join the nondenominational

grouping. In the first three cohorts, origin distributions for the other religions are fairly stable, accounting for about 1% of the religious market. However, the three earliest cohorts demonstrate remarkably different penchants for joining or leaving these other religions. Among the pre-1925 cohort, other religions see a net decrease in market share because of religious mobility. In the 1925-43 cohort, other religions gain a substantial share of adherents through switching exchanges. In the 1944-55 baby boom cohort growth from switching increases markedly — allowing these groups to more than double their market share in this pivotal generation. In the youngest cohort, gains from switching remain high, and the other religions are also showing growth in their origin distribution — suggesting that either fertility is substantial, or that immigration is fueling other religions in younger cohorts. Finally, nonreligion experiences substantial gains from switching exchanges in every cohort, and the 47% gain among the pre-1925 cohort increases to 204% in the large 1944-55 cohort. The rate of increase remains quite high in the youngest cohort — at 112%. Indeed, nonaffiliation is an increasingly prevalent starting point for Americans — while only 2.4% of the pre-1925 cohort claimed to grow up with no religious affiliation this increased to 6.5% in the youngest cohort. Further, nonaffiliation holds the third highest market share of any religious choice in the two youngest cohorts, behind only the Baptists and Catholics. In contrast, nonaffiliation only ranks seventh in market share in the pre-1925 and 1925-43 cohorts.

Modeling Religious Mobility

The analyses presented above provide an important overview of period and cohort shifts in religious markets as a function of retention, switching, and other factors. However, they cannot discern the patterns of exchange across religious groupings that drive many of the interesting shifts in the American religious marketplace. Only the model of quasi-independence (QI) holds any hope for the expectations of the decline of denominationalism thesis. In the QI model, exchanges between groups are expected to be a function only of the marginal distribution of switchers, once patterns of retention are held constant. Hence, cell proportions are a function of the marginal proportions of switchers: $p_{ij} = p_{i+} p_{+j}$ when $i = j$. Even under QI, however, switching differentials which I pointed out in Table 3 will lead to asymmetries in exchanges among denominations. For example, in the overall sample QI predicts that 201 moderates will switch to conservative sects (roughly 12.5% of moderate switchers). In the other direction, 88 members of sectarian groups are expected to move to moderate groups under the QI model (which is about 12.5% of conservative switchers). Since there are fewer conservative out-switchers and more that switch into conservative groups, the model still evidences the asymmetry. This is most apparent by comparing the proportion of moderate in-switchers who are expected to come from sectarian groups — 10.1%, to the

TABLE 4: Model Fit for Log-Linear and Log-Multiplicative Models across Periods and Cohorts

Model	DF	L ²	BIC
Full sample			
Quasi-independence	109	1486	366
Uniform association	108	1055	-54
Row effects	98	832	-175
Column effects	98	927	-80
Row-column effects	88	474	-431
Homogeneous RC effects	98	572	-435
Period models			
Quasi-independence	327	1733	-1627
Uniform association	326	1318	-2032
Heterogeneous uniform assoc.	324	1311	-2017
Homogeneous row effects	316	1100	-2146
Homogeneous column effects	316	1191	-2055
Heterogeneous row effects	314	1093	-2146
Heterogeneous column effects	314	1183	-2043
Heterogeneous RC effects	264	658	-2053
RC effects period restricted	284	736	-2181
RC effects period res. vary ϕ	282	716	-2181
Homogeneous RC effects	294	789	-2231
Homogeneous RC period restricted	316	834	-2412
Homog. RC period res. vary ϕ	314	819	-2407
Cohort models			
Quasi-independence	436	1643	-2836
Uniform association	435	1371	-3098
Heterogeneous uniform assoc.	432	1364	-3074
Homogeneous row effects	425	1201	-3165
Homogeneous column effects	425	1254	-3112
Heterogeneous row effects	422	1192	-3144
Heterogeneous column effects	422	1241	-3094
Heterogeneous RC effects	352	661	-2956
RC effects cohort restricted	385	795	-3160
RC effects cohort res. vary ϕ	382	760	-3164
Homogeneous RC effects	392	813	-3214
Homogeneous RC cohort restricted	425	876	-3490
Homog. RC cohort res. vary ϕ	422	858	-3477

proportion of conservative converts who are expected to come from moderate groups 20.1%. Departures from quasi-independence can be quite informative for assessing higher or lower than normal exchange ratios between denominations above and beyond their marginal gains and losses from switching (cf. Ellison & Sherkat 1990; Newport 1979; Kluegel 1980; Sherkat 1990). However, this technique

is not very parsimonious. New models for categorical data analysis allow for comparisons of exchanges across several groups, and facilitate a parsimonious explanation for patterns of exchanges and tests of hypotheses about exchanges within and across groups (cf. Powers & Xie 2000). Further, these models enable a scaling of denominations that allows a more precise estimation of asymmetries in exchanges of members, and better estimates of exchanges among similar and dissimilar denominations — which is important given that denominationalism structures these exchanges quite considerably. For example, the row-column (RC) effect model (described below) for the full sample predicts that 23.6% of converts to conservative sects come from moderate groups, and that 13.9% of switchers into moderate groups come from conservative sects. The “closeness” of moderate Protestant groups to conservative Protestant groups means that the density of exchange is higher, and the association parameters from the row-column model can be used to order denominations in terms of similarity or closeness — a desired end of research investigating the Rokeach ordering of religious groups (e.g., Babchuk & Whitt 1990).

I consider a variety of models that generalize the row-column (RC) association model or log-multiplicative model to multiple groups (Becker & Clogg 1989; Goodman & Clogg 1992; Goodman & Hout 1998; Powers & Xie 2000; Wong 1995; Xie 1992). The row-column model has the advantage of handling row and column associations in a way that does not assume an order among rows or columns. The basic model takes the form:

$$F_{ij} = \tau \tau_i^R \tau_j^C \exp(\phi \mu_i \nu_j) \quad (1)$$

Here, ϕ is the intrinsic association between rows and columns, μ_i are the scaling or score parameters for the row associations, and ν_j are the column association parameters. The row and column parameters from the row-column model and its generalizations indicate the ordering of destination distributions corresponding to particular row origins (and vice versa). This gives an indication of the distance of a switch across disparate denominations — expressed in terms of the local odds ratios, which are a function of the row and column scores and the intrinsic association:

$$\log \Omega_{ij} = \Phi(\mu_i - \mu_{i+1})(\nu_j - \nu_{j+1}) \quad (2)$$

Notice here that as the intrinsic association increases, the distance of switches across a scale increases multiplicatively as a function of row and column parameters. Hence, the larger the value of the intrinsic association parameter f , the less likely it is that disparate denominations exchange with one another, while the more likely it is that similar denominations exchange members. Adjusting the row and column score parameters by square root of f provides an assessment of the distance between origin and destination categories:

$$\Phi^{.5} \mu_i - \Phi^{.5} \nu_j \quad (3)$$

A more general variant of the RC model allows the integration of multiple groups or layers, by doing so, parameters for row, column or intrinsic associations may vary across layers, or may be constrained to be equal across layers:

$$F_{ijk} = \tau \tau_i^R \tau_j^C \tau_k^L \tau_{ik}^{RL} \tau_{jk}^{CL} \exp(\phi_k \mu_{ik} \nu_{jk}) \quad (4)$$

where k indicates layer specific intrinsic association parameters (ϕ), row score parameters (μ), and column score parameters (ν) that may or may not vary across layers depending on the model specified. In this study, I will consider cohorts and periods as layers, and will test whether or not the intrinsic association and/or the row and column parameters vary across cohorts or periods.

Table 4 displays the model fit statistics for the model of quasi-independence and the blocked diagonal association models for the total sample, with period as the specified layer, and with cohort specified as the layer.⁷ In the full sample, QI provides a very poor fit to the data, while the homogeneous row-column (RCH) model provides the best fit to the data according to the BIC criteria (Raftery 1986), this model specifies that $\mu_i = \nu_j$, implying that exchanges among denominations for origins and destinations are equivalent once the distance between the denominations and their marginal distributions of switchers are taken into account. Hence, there is a single ordering of distances between religious groups, rather than separate orders for origins and destinations. The row-column model with separate origin and destination scores (μ_i and ν_j) has a better fit according to the likelihood ratio statistic, and the BIC score is close to that of the RCH model.

In the period models, several interesting findings are evident. First, according to the BIC criteria, models specifying period-specific parameters, $\phi_k \mu_{ik} \nu_{jk}$ (model 2, and model 5 where $\mu_{ik} = \nu_{jk}$), do not provide a very good fit to the data compared to the more parsimonious models which constrain row and column score parameters to be equal across periods. Comparisons of models 3 and 4, and models 6 and 7 show that varying ϕ across groups does little to improve the model fit. This specification costs two degrees of freedom in the period layer effect models, and only improves the L^2 by 20 in the row-column model and by 15 in the RCH model — negligible improvements given the size of the sample, as indicated by their inferior BIC statistics. This finding demonstrates that there were no substantial shifts in the fluidity of attachments to denominational groupings across the three periods — in contrast to the expectations of the decline of denominationalism thesis. According to BIC, the best fitting model is the most parsimonious — specifying a single intrinsic association parameter for the three periods, and equal row and column scores. This best-fitting model implies that the distance across denominations has not changed substantially across the three periods studied, and that exchanges between origins and destinations are relatively equal once the initial distance and differences in blocked diagonal origin and destination marginal distributions are taken into account. The RC model specifying different distances for origins and destinations (thus parameterizing unequal

exchanges beyond blocked diagonal origin and destination distributions) comes close to the RCH model in terms of BIC.

As was the case in the period results, the RCH model with a nonvarying intrinsic association parameter provides the best fit to the data in the cohort models. This suggests that there are not sizeable shifts in the distance between denominations or in the fluidity of attachments across these four cohorts — again this finding conflicts with the expectations of the decline of denominationalism thesis. The row-column model with invariant ϕ across cohorts also has a fairly good fit to the data, suggesting that there are nontrivial unequal exchanges between denominations beyond what can be predicted given a single set of distance parameters and marginal distributions of origins and destinations. In Table 6, I investigate departures from the RCH model to uncover sources of lack of fit in the cohort models.

Table 5 presents the $\mu_i = \nu_j$ score parameters from the best fitting model, the RCH model homogeneous across periods and cohorts for all $\phi_k, \mu_{ik}, \nu_{jk}$. Also presented are ϕ , and the $\mu_i = \nu_j$ parameters adjusted by the square root of the intrinsic association — to given an indication of the distance of a denominational exchange (as in equation 3). The parameter estimates from both the period and cohort models are remarkably close — there are no changes of order, and only small differences in coefficient values (including the intrinsic association parameters). In the discussion that follows, I will focus exclusively on parameters from the cohort models, and will use the 1944-55 cohort in discussions of estimated switching frequencies. Other cohorts will be examined in the discussion of departures from this best-fitting model.

At the extremes of the origin-destination scales are Jews and Baptists, evidencing wide gulf that must be bridged to move from either Jewish to Baptist or Baptist to Jewish under this model — few exchanges are expected (or observed) between the two groups. Switching between denominations on the “Protestant” end of the scale is expected to be fairly common, particularly between other Protestants, moderate Protestants, conservative sects, and Baptists. Liberal Protestants and Episcopalians are more separated from the other nonethnic Protestant groups. An indication of this is that in the 1944-55 cohort exchanges between moderates and conservative sects are estimated to be more prevalent given their distributions among switchers than are exchanges between moderates and Episcopalians or moderates and liberals.

The estimates from these models are particularly important because they indicate where switchers tend to go while taking into account gains and losses from switching. Since we know that moderates and Baptists are big losers in the switching game, these parameters are implying that proportionately more switchers from these groups join conservative sects or the “other Protestant” designation than affiliate with liberal Protestants or Episcopalians. Indeed, the cohort model predicts that among the 1944-55 cohort, 58 moderates will join the conservative Protestants, and 69 will join the Baptists (actual cell frequencies are 46 and 69), whereas 26.5

TABLE 5: Parameter Estimates ($\mu_i = \nu_j$) from the Row-Column Homogeneous Model with Intrinsic Association (ϕ) Restricted Across Periods or Cohorts: Ordered by Row-Column Parameters

	Periods		Cohorts	
	$\mu_i = \nu_j$	$\phi^5 \mu_i$	$\mu_i = \nu_j$	$\phi^5 \mu_i$
Jewish	.608	1.352	.617	1.350
Catholic	.241	.535	.224	.491
Other religion	.225	.501	.205	.450
None	.206	.457	.167	.366
Mormons	.124	.276	.089	.196
Episcopalian	.017	.037	.072	.157
Lutheran	.004	.009	.038	.082
Liberal Protestant	-.120	-.267	-.075	-.164
Other Protestant	-.229	-.509	-.246	-.539
Moderate Protestant	-.295	-.656	-.262	-.574
Conservative Protestant	-.342	-.760	-.362	-.792
Baptist	-.438	-.974	-.468	-1.023
ϕ		4.937		4.790

moderates are predicted to join the liberal Protestants and 9 are expected to switch to the Episcopalians (the observed frequencies are 31 and 9). For comparison, in the 1944-55 cohort, 63 Baptists and 23 members of conservative Protestant groups are expected to join moderate groups (observed frequencies are 70 and 23), while 23 liberals and 5.5 Episcopalians were predicted to jump to moderate groups (observed frequencies are 33 and 3). Hence, the model predicts the switching asymmetries that lead to the collapse of the moderate middle, and help bolster conservative sects' market share.

Liberals, Episcopalians, and the quasi-ethnic groups are scaled relatively close to nonaffiliation. These results fit both the "up and out" hypothesis from status theories, and the social constraint theories regarding quasi-ethnic denominations. While about one-third of liberal Protestant, Lutheran, and Episcopalian baby boomers are expected under this model to relinquish religious affiliation, only 21% of Baptists and 23% of conservative sectarians are expected to apostatize. Expected apostasy among Catholics and Jews is 43% and 44%, respectively, and observed frequencies are substantially higher than predicted by the model (Table 6 explores departures from the model).

Episcopalians and Catholics are also rather closely linked. Ritual and polity similarities between Catholicism and the Episcopalians, make exchanges between the two groups easier than other moves across the Protestant-Catholic divide. For example in the 1944-55 cohort, 14% of Episcopalian switchers are expected to join the Catholics (the observed mobility rate is 16%), while 3.3% of Catholic switchers are expected to go Episcopalian — and this inflow constitutes 30.6% of the expected

switchers into the Episcopalians (25.4% of observed mobility into the Episcopalians came from the Catholics). Further, Episcopalians make up only 2.7% of switchers in the 1944-55 cohort, yet comprise nearly 5% of the expected switchers into the Catholics (and almost 6% of observed switchers in this cohort).

Mormon exchange densities are highest with nonaffiliation, other religions, Catholics, and the liberal religious groups. As predicted, all of the quasi-ethnic groups have nonaffiliation as a relatively close switch — indicating the propensity of members of quasi-ethnic groups to leave religion if they make a switch. Catholics also exchange members frequently with other religions, and given the closeness of this move it is likely that much of the growth of these other religions comes from unequal exchanges with Catholicism. For example, the model predicted that other religions would pick up 44.7 switchers from Catholicism among the 1944-55 cohort (the observed frequency was 44), and this constitutes roughly 43% of all switchers into the other religions.

Table 6 presents the standardized residuals from the best fitting cohort model. Only standardized residuals greater than 1.65 are reported, and I focus the discussion on residuals greater than 2 — indicating significant departures from the model. First, the residuals show that switching densities between liberal Protestants and Episcopalians are higher than the model predicts. And, there are some additional asymmetries — liberal Protestant moves to Episcopalian are somewhat stronger than Episcopal switching to liberal Protestant denominations. Further, Episcopal switching to the Liberal Protestants in the 1944-55 cohort is not significantly higher than the model predicts. The model underpredicts liberal Protestant defection to the moderates for the 1944-55 cohort. Significantly more liberal Protestants joined the Lutherans than was expected in the youngest cohort.

In concert with status theories, moderate Protestants in the two oldest cohorts were found to be even more likely than the model predicts to move to the liberal Protestants and Episcopalians (in the 1925-43 cohort). But, pre-1925 liberal Protestants, and pre-1944 Moderate Protestants were significantly less prone than predicted leave religion. Upward status switching seems most evident in the oldest cohorts, while switching “out” is more prevalent among younger cohorts of liberal and moderate Protestants. Moderates from the 1956-80 cohort are also more attracted to the Lutherans than was predicted, and in the 1944-55 cohort the moderate denominations sent more members to the Catholics and to Judaism than was expected under the model.

Interestingly, Baptists from the 1925-43 cohort were more likely to join “other Religions” than was predicted — this may (or may not) be a function of the misclassification of many nondenominationals into the “other religions” (Sherkat 1999). Members of conservative Protestant groups in the pre-1925 cohort were significantly less likely than predicted to join the liberal Protestants (and sizeable negative residuals are apparent for two other cohorts). Baptists received more members than expected from the conservative Protestants in the pre-1925 cohort,

further bolstering the expectations of human capital and adaptive preference theories. Conservative Protestants from the 1925-43 cohort were even less likely than expected to become Catholic. Yet, conservatives Protestants from the 1925-43, and 1944-55 cohorts were more likely than predicted to join the other Protestant category.

The pre-1925 Mormons and Lutherans were significantly more likely to join the liberal Protestants than was estimated — again in line with cohort specific status theories. Mormons in the 1925-43 cohort were more likely than predicted to join the conservative Protestants, while the 1944-55 Mormon cohort had a greater penchant than expected for joining the Baptists. Lutheran movement into the moderates was higher than estimated in the pre-1925 and 1944-55 cohorts, but their switching into the Baptists was less than predicted in the pre-1944 cohorts. In the 1923-44 cohort, more Lutherans than expected joined the Catholics. In the oldest cohort, significantly fewer Lutherans left religion than was predicted by the model, while significantly more Catholics (in both pre-1944 cohorts) and Jews (in all but the youngest cohort) left religion than expected. The Catholic and Jewish findings further support the expectations for quasi-ethnic switching patterns. Catholics in the earliest cohort are significantly more likely than expected to become Jewish, while Jews from this cohort move more frequently than expected to other religions. Importantly, in the youngest cohort (following a pattern of sizeable positive residuals in the two prior cohorts) more Catholics than expected switch to conservative Protestant denominations. Indeed, in the pre-1925 cohort more Jews than predicted become Baptists, and more than expected switch to Conservative Protestant groups in the 1925-43 cohort.

Table 6 also shows that other Protestants in the 1925-43 cohort were more likely than the model predicts to join the Mormons. Members of other religions from the pre-1925 cohort switched to Catholicism significantly more often than the model predicted. Yet, significantly fewer members of other religions switched to Catholicism in the youngest cohort. In the two oldest cohorts, the model overestimates the number of religious nones who joined the liberal Protestants or Episcopalians — evidencing a substantial asymmetry in exchanges between these groups. In contrast, in all but the youngest cohort, people who grew up without a religious affiliation are significantly more likely than the model predicts to join the Baptists or conservative Protestants. Among the youngest cohort, mobility from the nones to the Mormons is significantly higher than expected. Hence, conservative sects tend to pick up members from this relatively unstable, but growing nonreligious category.

TABLE 6: Significant Standardized Residuals from RCH Restricted Across Cohorts: Origin in Rows, Destination in Columns

	Liberal	Episcopalian	Moderate	Baptist	Cons. Protestant	Mormon	Lutheran	Catholic	Jewish	Other Prot.	Oth. Religion	No
Liberal												
Pre-1925		3.65		-1.85								-2.29
1925-43		2.86		-1.89		1.80						
1944-55		3.56	2.10	-1.66	-1.93							
1956-80		5.18		-1.72		2.34						
Episcopalian												
Pre-1925	1.84			-1.75			1.71					
1925-43	2.18		-1.81									
1944-55												
1956-80	2.24											
Moderate												
Pre-1925	2.34								-1.77		-2.05	
1925-43	2.05	2.86									-2.12	
1944-55						1.70	3.00	2.36				
1956-80						2.62						
Lutheran												
Pre-1925	4.16		2.04	-2.81								-2.39
1925-43				-2.32			2.94					
1944-55			2.06					-1.65				
1956-80												
Baptist												
Pre-1925	-1.93											
1925-43									2.11			
1944-55					2.03		1.82					
1956-80		-1.74										
Cons. Protestant												
Pre-1925	-2.59		2.12		-1.93							
1925-43	-1.66						-2.36		4.39			
1944-55									2.06			
1956-80	-1.91		-1.88								1.66	

Discussion

In my investigation, I have found some substantial changes in the distribution of religious affiliations in the U.S. in the late twentieth century, and described how these changes are a product of denominational retention, patterns of religious mobility, and other factors that impact the relative distribution of religious affiliations. I have examined shifting affiliations both over time and across cohorts,

TABLE 6: Significant Standardized Residuals from RCH Restricted Across Cohorts: Origin in Rows, Destination in Columns (Continued)

	Liberal	Episcopalian	Moderate	Baptist	Cons. Protestant	Mormon	Lutheran	Catholic	Jewish	Other Prot.	Oth. Religion	No
Mormon												
Pre-1925	2.07											
1925-43					2.45							
1944-55				2.23								
1956-80												
Nondenom.												
Pre-1925		-1.88										
1925-43					2.15							
1944-55												
1956-80												
Catholic												
pre-1925	-2.08							2.87			2.19	
1925-43				-1.67	1.69					-1.79	2.95	
1944-55			-1.86		1.85							
1956-80					2.19							
Jewish												
Pre-1925				2.17						2.76	2.88	
1925-43					1.97			-1.91			3.20	
1944-55											2.84	
1956-80												
Other												
pre-1925								2.56				
1925-43												
1944-55						2.72						
1956-80					1.89	5.76		-2.19				
None												
pre-1925	-2.23	-2.42		2.63	3.23							
1925-43	-1.72	-1.65		2.76	2.62							
1944-55				3.08	4.28			-3.40				
1956-80					2.73							

providing a picture of the changing religious marketplace over the 26-year time span for which we have data, and lending insight into the future restructuring of American religion. While both status theories and rational choice perspectives find mixed support in the patterns and trends revealed by my analyses, the expectations of the decline of denominationalism thesis are not upheld. Perhaps most importantly, this study provides a launching pad for systematic research into the dynamics of religious affiliation, and its causes. From this starting point, more

elaborate examinations might be possible that could take into account important family, educational, ethnic, and regional processes that influence the choice of affiliation.

First, my analyses provide some support for status theories of religious mobility — so long as the scope is restricted to pre-1944 cohorts — as Roof & McKinney (1987) suggest. In these cohorts, Liberal Mainline denominations enjoyed relatively high retention rates, saw growth from switching exchanges with other denominations, and held more than a quarter of the religious market. Even Catholics and Lutherans from these early cohorts were more likely than expected to join liberal mainline groups. This demonstrates support for both an “invidious comparison” motivation — since members of these high status groups continued their affiliation—as well as “pecuniary emulation” because members of lower status groups sought to gain status by joining these elite denominations (Bagwell & Bernheim 1996; Veblen [1899] 1994). The Stark & Glock (1965) theory also expects high-status liberals to be more likely to leave religion, and this is consistent with my findings. Liberal Protestants and Episcopalians are much more likely to disaffiliate than are members of “low status” conservative sects, and this propensity is more apparent in the younger cohorts. On the basis of my analyses, status theories cannot be disconfirmed, however the same findings are consistent with variants of rational actor theories — including the status striving motivation itself.

Proponents of the decline of denominationalism thesis have argued for more than a decade that rates of religious mobility are high and growing, that religious mobility is increasingly patternless, and that exchanges across disparate denominations are becoming more frequent (Hunter 1990; Wuthnow 1988, 1993). These expectations are off the mark. First, denominational loyalty is only declining among Liberal Protestants, Episcopalians, and in Catholicism. Even Moderate Protestant loyalty is relatively trendless and invariant across cohorts. For Catholics, increasing mobility does not indicate a greater propensity to join Protestant denominations, but instead results in higher rates of apostasy — much of which will likely be temporary as the large younger cohorts return to their former faith (Greeley & Hout 1988; Wilson & Sherkat 1994). Patterns of mobility are clearly evident in the models, as indicated by the extreme lack of fit of the model of quasi-independence relative to log-multiplicative models that scale religious groups according to systematic patterns of exchange. The best fitting model of religious mobility patterns suggests that distances between denominational origins and destinations remain constant across both periods and cohorts. Further, even departures from this model fail to support the contention that mobility is opening up in later periods or cohorts — significant residuals from the model are relatively rare, not systematically associated with earlier or later cohorts, and largely consistent with other theories. Movement between denominations is structured by denominational similarities and characterized by distinct asymmetries that are not predicted by the decline of denominationalism thesis.

In contrast, high rates of religious loyalty and the continuity of exchange distances across origin and destination denominations are in keeping with the expectations of adaptive preference and human capital theories of religious behavior (Iannaccone 1990; Sherkat 1997, 1998; Sherkat & Wilson 1995; Sherkat & Ellison 1999). Several previous studies have found that if individuals switch religious affiliations, they are much more likely to choose one similar to their original faith (e.g., Babchuk & Whitt 1990; Hadaway & Marler 1993; Sullins 1993). What I have shown is that this continues to be true over time and across cohorts. This relative continuity in distances of exchange across religious affiliations means that shifts in the structure of religious affiliation are driven primarily by variations in loyalty across denominations — which help produce asymmetries in exchanges between groups — and by variations in fertility, childrearing success, and growth from immigration across religious groups.

Growth from switching among conservative Protestants and Mormons, extraordinarily high loyalty among Baptists and Mormons, and increasing retention rates for Conservative Protestant denominations all support the expectations of strict church theories (Finke & Stark 1992; Iannaccone 1992, 1994; Kelley 1977). Further, model estimates and observed switching patterns demonstrate that conservative sects — including the Baptists — tend to be more attractive destinations for liberals and moderates than the liberal and moderate groups are for conservative switchers. Conservative Protestants, Baptists, and Mormons all receive substantial, largely unreciprocated inflows from nonaffiliation. And, Mormons make inroads into other untapped segments of the religious marketplace, acquiring members from non-Judeo-Christian groups. While, Baptists are among the big losers in the switching game, their retention rates are high and roughly half of their switchers circulate to equally conservative denominations — providing much of the explanation for growth in these denominations. Sects are not so much attractive for switchers as they are retentive of members — both over the life course and across cohorts. Replacement level fertility combined with strong childrearing orientations helps maintain sectarian market share. Since liberal Protestant groups are shrinking and market exit seems to be growing (more people are shunning religious affiliation), this means that conservative sects have a greater share of the religious market even though their marginal percentages are the same as they were in prior decades and cohorts. While differences in collective production may play a role, other processes may also be responsible for the reproduction of sectarian Christianity. Formal expositions of strict church theories do not take into account the radical shift in the religious products offered by liberal and moderate Protestant groups. Rather than failing to make demands on members, these organizations may be failing to meet demand for basic supernatural compensators — and this requires little in the way of earthly sacrifice or stigma for members. The heyday of the liberal Protestant mainline in the post-World War II period was arrived at not by forcing members to make substantial sacrifice for the faith, but instead by selling

a faith compatible with white, middle class, lifestyles of the period. By the 1960s, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, and increasingly Methodist theologians openly doubted the existence of God, the divinity of Jesus, and the ethics of conversion and Christian missions. It is hard to imagine that this type of leadership could generate a faithful following in the younger generations that came of age after the 1960s, and, indeed, it did not.

Religious groups that embrace the ecumenical enterprise are losing members and market share. This is most apparent for moderate Protestants, who in earlier periods and cohorts vied with the Baptists as the largest Protestant grouping. The lack of distinctiveness across liberal mainline groups has likely contributed to increasing levels of circulation mobility, as loyalty rates declined over time and across cohorts. In the latter half of the twentieth century, liberal and moderate denominations became increasingly secular and this lack of distinctiveness from secular society pushed out members who desired more otherworldly religious compensators (Finke & Stark 1992; Stark & Bainbridge 1985, 1987). Further, niche overlap with secular alternatives has meant that decreased loyalty also contributed to increasing rates of defection from organized religion — to both nonaffiliation and the nebulous “other Protestant” designation. While status theories argue that nonaffiliation has become a high status option, ecological theories suggest that a lack of differentiation from secular alternatives and their similar status characteristics makes it likely that people will relinquish religious ties and instead focus on secular attachments such as political groups, sporting organizations, country clubs, civic associations, and the like (Cress, McPherson & Rotolo 1997; Popielarz & McPherson 1995). Indeed, the problem of niche overlap for mainline denominations is likely exacerbated by their skewed age structure, which could push away younger affiliates who seek an organization populated by people more like themselves (McPherson & Rotolo 1996). Interestingly, distinctiveness is protective even among the more ecumenical groups — as evidenced by Episcopalian’s higher retention rates and smaller losses from switching. While the Episcopalians are liberal in terms of doctrine and moral positions, the institutionalization of liturgy and ritual in the Book of Common Prayer and the performance of the Eucharist allow it to retain particular and distinctively religious elements.

Quasi-ethnic religious denominations have high rates of loyalty, and members who switched tend to leave religion altogether. Since social ties in ethnic communities make religion one of many common traits and ties shared by members, social pressures to retain affiliation will be high — and becoming nonreligious will be a less stressful option than taking up an affiliation alien to the community (Harrison & Lazerwitz 1982; Sandomirsky & Wilson 1990; Sherkat & Wilson 1995). Importantly, other religions are increasingly following this quasi-ethnic pattern, as critical masses of Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists, and Orthodox Christians enable continuing affiliation with these religious groups. Three key

findings are also worthy of note. First, Mormons are becoming a major faith tradition in the U.S. (Stark 1984, 1996). Across the three periods and the four cohorts, the proportion of Americans who report affiliation with the Latter Day Saints increases steadily — equaling Jewish market share in the youngest cohort. Second, Catholic market share is constant despite increasing losses from switching. While a substantial and increasing minority of Catholics has left the church, Catholics continue to raise ever larger cohorts of original affiliates. The lingering influence of high Catholic fertility rates in the 1950s and 1960s almost certainly plays a role in bolstering Catholic affiliation across cohorts. While several studies have argued that Protestant-Catholic fertility rates have converged (cf. Mosher, Williams & Johnson 1992), this convergence did not occur until the mid-1970s or early 1980s, and it only applies to white, non-Hispanic Catholics. Further, relatively low rates of intermarriage (Johnson 1980) help to solidify Catholic ties and prevent childrearing in other religious traditions. Indeed, even when religious intermarriage occurs, children are most often raised Catholic (Nelsen 1990). Additionally, immigration has likely helped reinforce Catholic market share across periods and cohorts. Third, Jewish affiliation is stable across periods but declining substantially across cohorts. Jewish market share falls from 3.1% to 2% across the four cohorts examined. Increased switching is not the cause of the decline. Instead, some combination of low fertility (Mosher et al. 1992), increasing intermarriage (Lazerwitz 1995b), and less tenacity in childrearing must be to blame.

Three important trends are also in evidence across cohorts, the growth of “other Protestants,” “other religions” and nonaffiliation. The other Protestant option could indicate that a respondent is disavowing organized religion, or it might be that they affiliate with a nondenominational faith community. My analyses suggest that the former was most likely true for older cohorts, while the latter is increasingly the case among younger cohorts. Hence, this growing group is comprised of a mix of respondents who shun religious affiliation, along with people who affiliate with vibrant congregations that are, by and large, sect-like in theology and worship style. Other religions are benefiting from both switching as well as immigration and/or fertility and childrearing factors. While GSS estimates for other religions are problematic (cf. Sherkat 1999), even adjusted rates show that non-Christian groups are growing. Finally, nonaffiliation is an increasingly popular choice across periods and cohorts. Age/life course factors certainly play a role in the level of apostasy in the younger cohorts (Greeley & Hout 1988; Stolzenberg et al. 1995). However, it seems unlikely given the magnitude of my estimates that these later cohorts will match the affiliation rates of prior cohorts. Clearly, it is becoming more acceptable to jettison religious affiliation — to exit the market. Importantly, most of these respondents had already exited the market — many that once claimed affiliation, no doubt, did not attend church and were not members of church. Social desirability

biases are declining for religious affiliation, and affiliation rates may continue to more closely approximate membership rates.

This study provides an important starting point for future research on religious change in the U.S. Building on these models, it might be possible to further investigate the influence of denominational composition on membership change — identifying the possible effects of educational, age, and ethnic niches on membership dynamics (Cress, McPherson & Rotolo 1997; McPherson & Rotolo 1996; Popielarz & McPherson 1995). Ecological studies of religious markets have also suggested that religious competition spurs religious activity and perhaps religious mobility (cf. Finke & Stark 1992), and generalized log-multiplicative models could be developed which might integrate multilevel covariates into models of religious mobility. Gender differences in religious mobility are interesting in their own right (Hayes 1996) and important for driving future trends in affiliation, since religious inheritance tends to follow the faith of the mother (Nelsen 1990). Future studies can utilize the methods presented in this article to systematically analyze gender differences in religious mobility patterns and trends. Finally, religious intermarriage is pivotal for many decisions to switch religious affiliation (Lazerwitz 1995b; Musick & Wilson 1994; Sandomirsky & Wilson 1990; Sherkat 1991), and the models presented in this paper provide a starting point for analyzing both intermarriage and religious mobility as interconnected phenomena.

Notes

1. The two most recent studies, Hadaway and Marler (1993) and Sullins (1993), analyze 1973-90 GSS data.
2. See Ellison and Sherkat (1990), Sherkat and Ellison (1991), and Sherkat (1993) for discussions of trends and patterns in religious mobility among African Americans. Hadaway and Marler (1993) claim that theological similarity between the African American Methodists and Baptists and white conservative Protestant groups allow them to be conglomerated, this strategy: (1) ignores extreme theological differences; (2) raises conservative Protestant retention unjustifiably by including large numbers of less mobile African Americans (Ellison & Sherkat 1990); (3) ignores important switches between these African American mainline groups and the more conservative sectarian groups (e.g., the Church of God in Christ); (4) fails to consider that African American religious affiliation is blocked by ethnic barriers that segment the religious marketplace into black and white arenas. Sullins (1993) pursues a similar strategy, and this calls into question his claim of stable or increasing retention. By leaving African Americans in the sample, overall stability rates are artificially increased for the 1980s, because of African American oversamples in the 1982 and 1987 GSS.
3. Unfortunately, I cannot differentiate Southern Baptists from other Baptists before 1984. Hence, American, independent and Southern Baptists are in the Baptist category, though the majority are Southern Baptists or equally conservative independent Baptists. Since 1984, 55.2% of respondents who reported a Baptist affiliation claim to be Southern

Baptists, while only 8% claimed membership in the more liberal American Baptist bodies. 14.3% reported an affiliation with other Baptist conventions, and 21.7% did not specify a particular group.

4. One note of caution is necessary for interpreting cohort specific retention rates, and loyalty across periods insofar as it is a function of the relative distribution of cohorts. Religious mobility follows life course events, particularly marriage and childrearing. As a consequence, it tends to occur in the mid-20s, and is most often a one-time shift (Roof 1989; Sherkat 1991). The primary exception is that around 60% of those who relinquish religious affiliation early in life, later reclaim a religious identity (Wilson & Sherkat 1994). Because religious switching is age dependent, younger cohorts will have lower probabilities of mobility, since they have had less opportunity to switch. However, with the exception of the relationship between disaffiliation and age, there is no compelling reason to analyze patterns of mobility by age groups — nor is any bias in patterns of switching likely to result. Ancillary analyses (available on request) show that mobility patterns across age groups follow the period and cohort findings presented below.

5. Identifying Southern Baptists in the post 1982 data does not change Baptists' switching fortunes — conservative Baptist groups are losing as high a proportion of members from switching as the more liberal Baptists.

6. Ancillary analyses (available on request) show that the proportion of Catholics who list their race as "other" increases across cohorts and periods of the GSS, evidencing the probable influence of immigration on Catholic market share.

7. All models are estimated using LEM (Vermunt 1997). Downloads are currently available from Jeroen Vermunt at: http://cwis.kub.nl/~fsw_1/mto/mto_snw.htm#software. Full mobility tables and programs for the models estimated in this paper are available from the author on request.

References

- Alston, Jon P. 1971. "Religious Mobility and Socioeconomic Status." *Sociological Analysis* 32:140-48.
- Babchuk, Nicholas, and Hugh P. Whitt. 1990. "R-Order and Religious Switching." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 20:246-54.
- Bagwell, Laurie Simon, and B. Douglas Bernheim. 1996. "Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption." *American Economic Review* 86:349-73.
- Becker, Mark P. and Clifford C. Clogg. 1989. "Analysis of Sets of Two-Way Contingency Tables Using Association Models." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 84:142-51.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas. 1994. "A Theory of Conformity." *Journal of Political Economy* 102:841-77.
- Bibby, Reginald. 1999. "On Boundaries, Gates, and Circulating Saints: A Longitudinal Look at Loyalty and Loss." *Review of Religious Research* 41:149-64.
- Bibby, Reginald, and Merlin Brinkerhoff. 1983. "Circulation of the Saints Revisited: A Longitudinal Look at Conservative Church Growth." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 22:253-62.

- . 1994. "Circulation of the Saints 1966-1990: New Data, New Reflections." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 33:273-80.
- Blau, Peter, and Joseph Schwartz. 1984. *Crosscutting Social Circles*. Academic Press.
- Breen, Richard, and Bernadette C. Hayes. 1996. "Religious Mobility in the UK." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 159:493-504.
- Cress, Daniel M, J. Miller McPherson, and Thomas Rotolo. 1997. "Competition and Commitment in Voluntary Memberships: The Paradox of Persistence and Participation." *Sociological Perspectives* 40:61-79.
- Ellison, Christopher G., and Darren E. Sherkat. 1990. "Patterns of Religious Mobility among Black Americans." *Sociological Quarterly* 4:551-68.
- . 1995. "The Semi-Involuntary Institution Revisited: Regional Variations in Church Participation among Black Americans." *Social Forces* 73:1415-37.
- Elster, Jon. 1983. *Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality*. Cambridge University Press.
- Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark. 1992. *The Churching of America, 1776-1990: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy*. Rutgers University Press.
- Glenn, Norval. 1987. "The Trend in "No Religion" Respondents to U.S. National Surveys, Late 1950s to Early 1980s." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51:293-314.
- . 1987. "Social Trends in the United States: Evidence from Sample Surveys." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51:s109-s126.
- Goodman, Leo A. 1991. "Measures, Models, and Graphical Displays in the Analysis of Cross-Classified Data" (with discussion). *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. 86:1085-1138.
- Goodman, Leo A. and Clifford C. Clogg. 1992. "New Methods for the Analysis of Occupational Mobility Tables and Other Kinds of Cross-Classifications." *Contemporary Sociology* 21: 609-22.
- Goodman, Leo A. and Michael Hout. 1998. "Statistical Methods and Graphical Displays for Analyzing How the Association Between Two Qualitative Variables Differs Among Countries, among Groups, or Over Time: A Modified Regression-Type Approach." *Sociological Methodology* 28:175-230.
- Greeley, Andrew. 1989. *Religious Change in America*. Harvard University Press.
- Greeley, Andrew M, and Michael Hout. 1988. "Musical Chairs: Patterns of Denominational Change." *Sociology and Social Research* 72:75-86.
- Hadaway, C. Kirk, and Penny Long Marler. 1993. "All in the Family: Religious Mobility in America." *Review of Religious Research* 35:97-116.
- Harrison, Michael and Bernard Lazerwitz. 1982. "Do Denominations Matter?" *American Journal of Sociology* 88:356-77.
- Hayes, Bernadette C. 1996. "Gender Differences in Religious Mobility in Great Britain." *British Journal of Sociology* 47:643-56.
- Hunter, James Davison. 1991. *Culture Wars*. Basic Books.
- Iannaccone, Laurence. 1990. "Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 29:3:297-314.

Tracking the Restructuring of American Religion / 1491

- . 1991. "The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of Religion." *Rationality and Society* 3:2:156-77.
- . 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Freeriding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectivities." *Journal of Political Economy* 100:2:271-91.
- . 1994. "Why Strict Churches are Strong." *American Journal of Sociology* 99:1180-1211.
- Johnson, Robert Allan. 1980. *Religious Assortative Marriage in the United States*. Academic Press.
- Kelley, Dean M. 1977. *Why Conservative Churches are Growing: New and Updated Edition*. Harper & Row.
- Kluegel, James R. 1980. "Denominational Mobility: Current Patterns and Recent Trends." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 19:26-39.
- Lauer, Robert H. 1975. "Occupational and Religious Mobility in a Small City." *Sociological Quarterly* 16:380-92.
- Lazerwitz, Bernard. 1995a. "Denominational Retention and Switching among American Jews." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34:499-506.
- . 1995b. "Jewish-Christian Marriages and Conversions 1971 and 1990." *Sociology of Religion*. 56:433-43.
- Lazerwitz, Bernard, J. Alan Winter, Arnold Dashefsky, and Ephraim Tabory. 1998. *Jewish Choices: American Jewish Denominationalism*. SUNY Press.
- MacDonald, K.I. 1994. "What the Data Can Say: The Case of Denominational Switching." *Social Science Research* 23:197-218.
- McCutcheon, Allan L. 1988. "Denominations and Religious Inter-marriage: Trends among White Americans in the Twentieth Century." *Review of Religious Research*. 29:213-227.
- McKinney, William and Wade Clark Roof. 1994. "The New Protestant Coherence? A response to Sullins." *Social Forces* 74:753-55.
- McPherson, J. Miller, and Thomas Rotolo. "Testing a Dynamic Model of Social Composition: Diversity and Change in Voluntary Groups." *American Sociological Review* 61:179-202.
- Musick, Marc, and John Wilson. 1995. "Religious Switching for Marriage Reasons." *Sociology of Religion* 56:257-70.
- Need, Ariana, and Nan-Dirk DeGraaf. 1996. " 'Losing My Religion': A Dynamic Analysis of Leaving the Church in the Netherlands." *European Sociological Review* 12:87-99.
- Nelsen, Hart M. 1990. "The Religious Identification of Children of Interfaith Marriages." *Review of Religious Research* 32:122-34.
- Newport, Frank. 1979. "The Religious Switcher in the United States." *American Sociological Review* 44:528-52.
- Phillips Rick. 1998. "Religious Market Share and Mormon Church Activity." *Sociology of Religion*. 59:117-130.
- Popielarz, Pamela A. and J. Miller McPherson. 1995. "On the Edge or in Between: Niche Position, Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association Memberships." *American Journal of Sociology* 101:698-720.
- Powers, Daniel, and Yu Xie. 2000. *Statistical Methods for Categorical Data Analysis*. Academic Press.

- Raftery, Adrian E. 1986. "Choosing Models for Cross-Classifications." *American Sociological Review* 51:145-46.
- Roof, Wade Clark. 1989. "Multiple Religious Switching: A Research Note." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 28:530-35.
- Roof, Wade Clark, and Christopher Hadaway. 1979. "Denominational Switching in the Seventies: Going Beyond Stark and Glock." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 18:363-79.
- Roof, Wade Clark, and William C. McKinney. 1987. *American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future*. Rutgers University Press.
- Sandomirsky, Sharon, and John Wilson. 1990. "Processes of Disaffiliation: Religious Mobility among Men and Women." *Social Forces* 68:1211-29.
- Sherkat, Darren E. 1990. "Some Theoretical and Methodological Objections to Stephan-Deming Adjustments to Religious Mobility Tables." *Social Science Research* 19:239-49.
- . 1991. "Leaving the Faith: Testing Theories of Religious Switching Using Survival Models." *Social Science Research* 20:171-87.
- . 1993. "Theory and Method in Religious Mobility Research." *Social Science Research* 22:208-27.
- . 1997. "Embedding Religious Choices: Integrating Preferences and Social Constraints into Rational Choice Theories of Religious Behavior." Pp. 65-86 in *Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Summary and Assessment*, edited by Lawrence A. Young. Routledge Press.
- . 1998. "Counterculture or Continuity? Examining Competing Influences on Baby Boomers' Religious Orientations and Participation." *Social Forces* 76:1087-1115.
- . 1999. "Tracking the Other: Dynamics and Composition of "Other" Religions in the General Social Survey, 1973-1996." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 38:551-60.
- Sherkat, Darren E., and Shannon A. Cunningham. 1998. "Extending the Semi-Involuntary Institution: Social Constraints and Regional Differences in Private Religious Consumption Among African Americans." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 37:383-96.
- Sherkat, Darren E., and Christopher G. Ellison. 1991. "The Politics of Black Religious Change: Disaffiliation from Black Mainline Denominations." *Social Forces* 70:2431-54.
- . 1999. "Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25:363-94.
- Sherkat, Darren E., and John Wilson. 1995. "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in Religious Markets: An Examination of Religious Switching and Apostasy." *Social Forces* 73:993-1026.
- Stark, Rodney. 1984. "The Rise of a New World Faith." *Review of Religious Research* 26:18-27.
- . 1996. "So Far, So Good: A Brief Assessment of Mormon Membership Projections." *Review of Religious Research* 38:18-27.
- Stark, Rodney, and William Sims Bainbridge. 1985. *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation*. Berkeley. University of California Press.
- . 1987. *A Theory of Religion*. Rutgers University Press.
- Stolzenberg, Ross M., Mary Blair-Loy, and Linda J. Waite. 1995. "Religious Participation Over the Early Life Course: Age and Family Life Cycle Effects on Church Membership." *American Sociological Review* 60:84-103.
- Sullins, D. Paul. 1993. "Switching Close to Home: Volatility or Coherence in Protestant Affiliation Patterns." *Social Forces* 72:399-419.

- Veblen, Thorstein. [1899] 1994. *The Theory of The Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions*. Dover.
- Vermunt, Jeroen K. 1997. *LEM: A General Program for the Analysis of Categorical Data*. Tilburg University. http://cwis.kub.nl/~fsw_1/mto/mto_snw.htm#software.
- Whitt, Hugh P., and Nicholas Babchuk. 1992. "Some Theoretical and Methodological Reasons for Using Stephen-Deming Adjustments in Religious Mobility Tables." *Social Science Research* 21:204-15.
- Whitt, Hugh P. Harry Crockett, and Nicholas Babchuk. 1988. "Religious Switching: An Alternative Model." *Social Science Research* 17:206-18.
- Wilson, John, and Darren E. Sherkat. 1994. "Returning to the Fold." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 33:148-61.
- Wong, Raymond Sin-Kwok. 1995. "Extensions in the Use of Log-Multiplicative Scaled Association Models in Multiway Contingency Tables." *Sociological Methods and Research* 23:507-38.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 1988. *The Restructuring of American Religion*. Princeton University Press.
1993. *The Future of Christianity*. Princeton University Press.
- Xie, Yu. 1992. "The Log-Multiplicative Layer Effect Model for Comparing Mobility Tables." *American Sociological Review* 57:380-95.