This paper discusses recent theoretcial and empirical work on the interactions between growth and business cycles. One may distinguish two very differenct types of approaches to the problem of the influence of macroeconomic fluctuations on long–run growth.
Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall it became common in Washington and Miami to bet on the date that Fidel Castro would fall. Those bets were based on the premise that the Cuban regime could not survive without Soviet support. Gone was the Soviet economic subsidy worth no less than one–sixth of the island's total gross product; gone were the weapons transfers free of charge. From 1989 to 1992 the Cuban economy contracted sharply, with imports shrinking from $8.1 billion to $2.2 billion. Yet the Cuban regime remains with Fidel Castro firmly at its helm. How has Cuban communism managed to survive?
The essential phenomenon of torture, however is that it is not an ordinary crime, but a crime of obedience: a crime that takes place, not in opposition to the authorities, but under explicit instructions from the authorities to engage in acts of torture, or in an environment in which such acts are implicitly sponsored, expected, or at least tolerated by the authorities. Lee Hamilton and I have defined a crime of obedience as "an act performed in response to orders from authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community." Torture is clearly considered illegal and immoral by the international community; it is prohibited by international declarations and conventions that have been unanimously adopted by member states of the United Nations. Yet it is the authorities of these very states that order, encourage, or tolerated systematic policies or sporadic acts of torture.
Theories of the development, maintenance, and adaptation of international institutions have been at the center of scholarship in international political economy in the past decade. Functionalist logic, often based on game–theoretic representations of strategic state behavior, has been especially influential in explaining the demand for international institutions. These theories point to the role of international institutions in infusing international relations with a greater degree of certainty, to the general longer–term benefit of cooperating nations. This article draws on a distinct but parallel development in the economic literature on international finance: dynamic contracting and rational expectations approaches to capital market suboptimality. Like functional theories of international cooperation, this approach focuses on the dynamics that lead to inefficient outcomes and provides a theoretical rationale for the development of international institutions to overcome these inefficiencies. When applied in the context of the policy preferences of the key actors (the governments of the major powers, their central bankers, and the dominant international bankers of the day), this approach makes it possible to explain not only the impetus for international financial cooperation, but also why this effort converged on an international financial institution such as the Bank for International Settlements.
Allison, Graham T., and Grigory Yavlinsky. Window of Opportunity: Joint Program for Western Cooperation in the Soviet Transformation to Democracy and the Market Economy. SDI Project, 1991. (Final draft report of the Joint Working Group on Western Cooperation in the Soviet Transformation to Democracy and the Market Economy.) (ordering information)
For some years now, my colleagues and I have been evolving an unofficial third–party approach to the resolution of intense, protracted conflicts between identity groups at the international and intercommunal levels. Within that category, I have worked extensively on the Arab-Israeli conflict, with primary emphasis on the Israeli–Palestinian component of that conflict. I have also done work over the years on the conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus and have followed other protracted identity conflicts around the world.
This occasional paper is an edited version of a briefing book that was designed by members of Harvard University's Avoiding Nuclear War Project and distributed among newly appointed officials in the Bush administration. Originally designed to help combat the lack of institutional memory on nuclear issues in the American government, these fourteen chapters also provide an interesting overview of these issues for a broader audience. ""A Primer for the Nuclear Age"" addresses the danger, effects, development, strategy, and force structure of nuclear weapons as well as assessing the influence of domestic and international politics on nuclear weapons policy. Co–published with the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.
Since the early years in their histories as independent nations, the United States and its southern near–neighbors have been linked through their foreign policies and the movements of their peoples. In the nineteenth century, the acquisition of the Floridas and the conquest of northern Mexico by the United States led to substantial movements of people. Later in the same century, the U.S. conquest of the remnants of Spain's American empire contributed to the hispanization of the population of the United States.
In the twentieth century, U.S. immigration policy turned generally restrictionist. Foreign policy concerns, however, led the government to permit and even, for a time, to stimulate Mexican immigration to the United States. Consistent with its policies toward the Soviet bloc, the U.S. government also stimulated migration from Cuba for a certain period. These U.S. policies have been supplemented by those determined and ingenious people who, drawn by the promise of the words inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, have entered the United States illegally. As a result, the United States is already the fifth largest Spanish–speaking country in the world.
Six political–psychological assumptions are presented as the basis for this paper's argument that direct Israeli–Palestinian negotiations are necessary and possible and for its delineation of the requirements of such negotiations. The last of these assumptions – that neither party will enter negotiations that leave its right to national existence in doubt – is linked to the psychological core of the conflict: its perception by the parties as a zero–sum conflict around national identity and existence. This view has led to a mutual denial of each other's identity and right to exist and systematic efforts to delegitimize the other. Such efforts have undermined the steps toward negotiation that leaders on both sides have in fact taken because each defines the negotiating framework in ways that are profoundly threatening to the other. Negotiations are possible only in a framework of mutual recognition, which makes it clear that recognition of the other's rights represents assertion, rather than abandonment, of one's own rights. Such negotiations can be facilitated through a prenegotiation process conducive to differentiation of the enemy image, including a breakdown of the monolithic view of the enemy camp, a distinction between the enemy's ideological dreams and operational programs, and a differentiation between negative and positive components of the other's ideology and symbols of legitimacy.
Over the last ten years, international regimes emerged as a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations. The interest in regimes sprang from a dissatisfaction with dominant conceptions of international order, authority, and organization. The sharp contrast between the competitive, zero–sum "anarch" of interstate relations and the "authority" of domestic politics seemed overdrawn in explaining cooperative behavior among the advanced industrial states. The policy dilemmas created by the growth of interdependence since World War II generated new forms of coordination and organization that fit uneasily in a realist framework... We begin by briefly surveying the contending definitions of international regimes, which range from patterned behavior, to convergent norms and expectations, to explicit injunctions. We then suggest a number of dimensions along which regimes vary over time or across cases; these dimensions have been or might be used to operationalize "regime change." They include strength, organizational form, scope, and allocational mode. The third section examines four theoretical approaches to regimes – structural, game–theoretic, functional, and cognitive – and attempts to clarify what each theory can and cannot tell us about regimes. In the conclusion, we ask how and whether regimes "matter..."
While the debates over U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf rage inconclusively, Lenore Martin addresses the fundamental questions. How unstable is the Gulf? What are the long-term challenges to the protection of U.S. interests in the area? What are the strategic choices the United States must make? Drawing together topics usually dealt with separately, The Unstable Gulf analyzes territorial conflicts, sociopolitical cleavages, superpower competition, U.S. energy policy, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) strategy in this vital region.
Dr. Martin discusses the basic contradictions of a U.S. policy that relies on stable relations with the Gulf states, whose international relations are themselves unstable. She explores the dynamism of the international politics of the regions as fueled by territorial disputes, religious differences, ethnic dissensions, and ideological contests among these states.
The Chinese have a long–standing tradition of using history to comment upon contemporary events. This article attempts to advance our understanding of the formal criminal justice process in late imperial China by reconstructing from archival materials and analyzing one of the most celebrated criminal cases in Chinese history — that of Yang Nai–wu and Hsiao–pai–ts'ai. It is a sign of the state of our explorations of the Chinese legal tradition that no Western scholar has ever written about the case, that no Chinese scholar has produced a definitive account of it and its overall significance, and that no scholar, Chinese or foreign, has yet charted in meaningful and explicated detail the full course of any imperial Chinese case that traversed the entire formal criminal justice system from the level of the district magistrate to the highest reaches of the imperial government...In addition, fluid had started to seep into the corpse's eyes and ears, further complicating the autopsy laid out in Hsi-yuan lu, the classic Chinese coroner's manual... In his memorial, Pien Pao-ch'uan did not restrict his criticism to Yang Ch'ang-chun and Hu Jui-Ian...
Genuine peace between Israelis and Palestinians requires mutual acknowledgment of each people’s right to political expression of its national identity within the land they both claim. Negotiations must focus, therefore, on developing a formula for sharing the land. Furthermore, since most Palestinians perceive the PLO as their legitimate representative, only it – or some agency directly deriving legitimacy from it – has the capacity to negotiate an agreement that will elicit widespread acceptance and commitment among Palestinians.
In light of these two assumptions, the PLO leadership’s potential readiness for peace becomes critical to the success of negotiations. This article argues that the PLO under Arafat’s leadership has signaled such readiness, and it discusses political and psychological reasons for the continuing ambiguity and inconsistency of these signals. Analysis of Arafat’s cognitive style and image of the enemy, as revealed in two lengthy conversations with the author, reinforces the hypothesis that he has the capacity and will negotiate an agreement with Israel, based on mutual recognition and peaceful coexistence, if offered necessary incentives and reassurances. This article discusses methodological questions raised by the analysis and concludes with recommendations for testing the hypothesis derived from the analysis through the policy process.
Depending on our tastes and definitions, we can take quite divergent views on what constitutes the beginnings of peace research. The range of possible dates becomes narrower when we think of the beginnings of peace research movement. I refer here to deliberate, organized efforts to mobilize the resources of different disciplines – especially, but not exclusively, the mathematical models and quantitative methods developed in the social sciences – for studying the conditions of peace and war. Even the beginnings of the peace research movement, however, cannot be dated precisely, since it is in the very nature of a movement that similar ideas and activities spring up almost simultaneously in different places and under different guises.
The relationship of action to attitude change has been a central and recurrent theme in my work ever since my doctoral dissertation (Kelman, 1953). I have written several theoretical papers on this issue over the years (Kelman, 1962a, 1974a, 1974b, 1978), and during the 1960s several colleagues and I were engaged in an experimental program on the relationship of discrepant action and attitude change. Some of the results of this program are described in Kelman and Baron (1974), but most of the experiments are still unpublished. The relationship between action and attitude change has also entered importantly into my work in various applied contexts, including psychotherapy (Kelman, 1963), international exchange (Kelman, 1962b, 1975), and conflict resolution (Kelman, 1972; Kelman & Cohen, 1979). I therefore welcome the opportunity, provided by the Nebraska Symposium, to draw together some of my ideas in this area and to distill some of the generalizations that have emerged from my work. I am particularly intrigued with noting some of the continuities and changes in my thinking over the years, as I have moved back and forth between experimental and applied work. It is exciting to observe the way these two lines of activity inform and stimulate each other and thus contribute to theoretical refinement.
Many observers of the Middle East conflict now regard the establishment of an independent Palestinian problem. Such a state would live side by side with an independent Israel, based more or less within its pre–1967 boundaries. This solution envisages a Palestinian state that would be free to decide for itself what kinds of links, if any, it wants to establish with Jordan or with any other country. It further assumes that the state would offer opportunities for citizenship and leadership to Palestinians in the diaspora, including elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), provided they accept the principle of peaceful coexistence with Israel.
Human dignity refers to the status of individuals as ends in themselves rather than means to extraneous ends. To be consistent with dignity, institutions must provide for their constituencies’ identity and community – the two components of dignity. These correspond roughly to individual freedom and social justice, which are seen as interdependent conditions of dignity. Achievement, extension, and preservation of human dignity are to a large extent a transnational enterprise.
The paper addresses three issues in the realization of dignity in which the transnational dimension plays a significant role. It proposes (1) that the conditions for realizing human dignity (which include international peace in addition to social justice and individual freedom) must be created through worldwide efforts, given our increasing global interdependence; (2) that the criteria for assessing whether policies and institutional arrangements are consistent with human dignity must be universalistic, while remaining respectful of cultural and political difference; and (3) that the social processes whereby human dignity is extended and protected are inherently dialectical, since they require both the fulfillment and the inhibition of nationalistic demands.
In my own view of social behavior, attitude is a central concept, and I regard the study of attitudes as a legitimate pursuit in its own right and as useful component of a multimethod research strategy. For example, studies of the structure and distribution of public attitudes on various social issues or of the determinants of attitude change can greatly contribute to our understanding of societal processes. In particular, attitude assessment combined with other research procedures – such as structural indexes in studies of organizational functioning or behavioral observations in studies of child–rearing practices – can add depth and perspective to the analysis of social phenomena. Too often, however, research has focused on attitudes, not so much because of primary interest in attitudes per se or in their contribution to complex social processes, but because the assessment of attitudes was the easiest and most convenient way of obtaining data. It is obviously more convenient to distribute questionnaires in our classes, asking students how they would be likely to react in a variety of situations, than to observe their behavior in such situations, or to ask a sample of some population about the functioning of their organization, community, or society, than to make the detailed observations and develop the elaborate indexes needed to study a social system more directly. In many of our laboratory experiments too, after investing a great deal of energy and ingenuity in manipulation the independent variables, we have used attitudes as the cheapest and most painless dependent variable for assessing the effects of our manipulations.