On August 28, 2003, the Commissioners of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(PTRC) submitted their Final Report to President Alejandro Toledo and the
nation, thus joining the growing list of countries that have implemented truth commissions
as a means of transitioning from a period of armed conflict and authoritarian rule
towards the founding of a procedural democracy. The PTRC shared several features
with the Guatemalan and South African commissions that preceded it. All three commissions
were considered "gender sensitive" because they actively sought out women’s
experiences of violence. This focus reflected the desire to write more "inclusive truths,"
as well as changes in international jurisprudence. In this paper, the author draws upon
research she has conducted since 1995 in Peru to explore the commissioning of truth
and some implications in terms of women and war. She examines what constitutes "gender
sensitive" research strategies, as well as the ways in which truth commissions have
incorporated these strategies into their work. Truth and memory are indeed gendered,
but not in any common-sensical way. Thus the author hopes to offer a more nuanced
understanding of the gendered dimensions of war.
Este artículo explora algunos testimonios surgidos en las comisiones de verdad en el Perú y sus implicaciones
en relación con las mujeres y la guerra. Examina lo que constituye las estrategias de investigación "sensibles al género", como también los modos en los cuales las comisiones de verdad han incorporado estas estrategias dentro de su trabajo. Verdad y memoria son categorías que, de hecho, están atravesadas por el género, pero no necesariamente en los modos en los que plantea el sentido común. Por lo tanto, el texto espera ofrecer una comprensión más sutil de las dimensiones asociadas al género presentes en la guerra.
Truth commissions have become key mechanisms in transitional justice
schemes in post conflict societies in order to assure transitions to peace,
the rule of law, and respect for human rights. However, few studies examine
what must happen to ensure that the transition process initiated by a
truth commission successfully continues after the commission concludes
its truth-gathering work and submits its final report. This article argues that while attention often focuses on prosecutions and institutional reforms,
reparations also play a critical role. The authors share their observations
of how government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
civil society sectors and victim-survivor’s associations struggle over reparations
in post truth commission Peru, offering a preliminary analysis of key
theoretical suppositions about transitional justice: they explore whether
the act of telling the truth to an official body is something that helps or
hinders a victim-survivor in his or her own recovery process, and whether
in giving testimonies victim-survivors place particular demands upon the
state. The authors conclude that while testimony giving may possibly have
temporary cathartic effects, it must be followed by concrete actions. Truth
tellers make an implicit contract with their interlocutors to respond through
acknowledgment and redress.
A key component of peace processes and postconflict reconstruction is the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. DDR programs imply multiple
transitions: from the combatants who lay down their weapons, to the governments that
seek an end to armed conflict, to the communities that receive – or reject – these demobilized
fighters. At each level, these transitions imply a complex and dynamic equation
between the demands of peace and the clamor for justice. And yet, traditional approaches
to DDR have focused almost exclusively on military and security objectives, which in
turn has resulted in these programs being developed in relative isolation from the growing field of transitional justice and its concerns with historical clarification, justice, reparations and reconciliation. The author draws upon research in Colombia, a case of great
interest because the government is attempting to implement mechanisms of reparations
and reconciliation in a "pre-postconflict" context, and to implement DDR on the terrain of
The historiographies of Mexico and Brazil have implicitly stated
that business networks were crucial for the initial industrialization of
these two countries. Recently, differing visions on the importance of
business networks have arisen. In the case of Mexico, the literature
argues that entrepreneurs relied heavily on an informal institutional
structure to obtain necessary resources and information. In contrast,
the recent historiography of Brazil suggests that after 1890
the network of corporate relations became less important for
entrepreneurs trying to obtain capital and concessions, once the
institutions promoted financial markets and easy entry for new
businesses. Did entrepreneurs in Brazil and Mexico organize their networks differently to deal with the different institutional settings?
We examine whether in Mexico businessmen relied more on
networks of interlocking boards of directors and other informal
arrangements to do business than in Brazil. Our hypothesis
is confirmed by three related results: (1) the total number of
connections (i.e., the density of the network) was higher in Mexico
than Brazil; (2) in Mexico, there was one dense core network,
while in Brazil we find fairly dispersed clusters of corporate board
interlocks; and most importantly, (3) politicians played a more
important role in the Mexican network of corporate directors
than their counterparts in Brazil. Interestingly, even though Brazil
and Mexico relied on very different institutional structures, both
countries had similar rates of growth between 1890 and 1913.
However, the dense and exclusive Mexican network might have
ended up increasing the social and political tensions that led to the
Mexican Revolution (1910–1920).
This paper focuses on the dilemma that humanitarian non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) face in their efforts to gain access to populations
caught up in current wars. Narrow and broad concepts of humanitarian protection
are discussed and it is argued that despite high levels of professionalism,
the space for humanitarian action has constricted sharply since the events
surrounding the attacks of 11 September 2001. Increasingly, aid workers are
now being viewed with suspicion as agents of the great powers and assertions
of humanitarian neutrality are not heeded or rejected. Non-governmental
organizations have evolved a range of options to address this problem, but there is an urgent need to work collectively to find more durable and coherent solutions.
This essay explores the impact of the end of the Cold War on the counter-refugee-crisis
policies of the United Nations and its strongest member states. I argue that during the ColdWar, state interests were subordinated to the refugee interests for two reasons. First, refugees were fewin number and tended to be educated, skilled, and informed (valuable). Second, the WWII experience of the Holocaust in Europe led to the institutionalization
of concern for the fate of persecuted groups at the expense of state interests. After the
end of the Cold War, however, a number of the Soviet Union’s allies and successor
states began to fail, and these state failures, combined with unprecedented access to
information about living conditions abroad, led to refugee flows that impacted powerful
states. Whereas the preferred counter-refugee crisis policy during the Cold War was
resettlement, after the Cold War it shifted to repatriation: voluntary repatriation in
the best cases, and forced repatriation in the worst. The essay’s primary focus is an
assessment of the consequences of this policy shift from resettlement to repatriation
of refugees. After introducing a number of important empirical findings regarding the
frequency and scale of contemporary refugee crises, I conclude that although in some
cases the policy of supporting voluntary repatriation is a good thing, it may have the
unintended consequence of involuntary or forced repatriations as receiving states feel
little compulsion to resettle these refugees within their borders.
Do shifts in the distribution of ethnic group populations within a multinational state make civil war more likely? This article tests the proposition that they do using the competing logic of two core theories of interstate politics: power transition (PTT) and balance of power theory (BPT). The universe of potential population transition types are reduced to nine, and the logic of each of the competing explanations of war likelihood are reduced to four testable hypotheses. Overall, PTT fares better than BPT; although the article concludes that, as is the case at the interstate level, the key determinate of war likelihood rests more with how power is perceived than with raw changes in its distribution across the spectrum of meaningful political actors. Finally, the article offers a useful framework for further specifying the conditions under which population shifts alter the likelihood of an escalation to civil war.
When future economic historians write their textbooks, they will no
doubt marvel at the miraculous turn the world economy took after 1950.
Over the long stretch of history, neither the Industrial Revolution nor the
subsequent economic catch-up of the United States and other “western
offshoots” looks as impressive (Figure 1). The period since 1950 has
witnessed more rapid economic growth than any other period before,
with only the classical gold standard era between 1870 and 1913 coming
close. Even more striking, there has been a quantum jump in the growth
rate of the most rapidly growing countries since 1950. Prior to 1950,
growth superstars experienced growth rates that barely surpassed 2
percent per annum (in per capita terms) over long stretches. Compare
this with the post-1950 growth champions: Japan, South Korea, and
China; each grew at 6-8 percent per annum during 1950-73, 1973-90,
and 1990-2005, respectively. Even allowing for the shorter time slices,
this indicates that the world economy became a much more enabling
environment for economic growth after 1950. Clearly, the architects of
this new world economic system got something right.
When local cost discovery generates knowledge spillovers, specialization
patterns become partly indeterminate and the mix of goods that a country produces
may have important implications for economic growth. We demonstrate this proposition
formally and adduce some empirical support for it. We construct an index of
the "income level of a country’s exports," document its properties, and show that it
predicts subsequent economic growth.
The vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since 1967 are analyzed using attitudes and related concepts
where relevant. The 1967 war returned the two peoples' zero-sum conflict around national identity to its origin as a conflict within the land both peoples claim. Gradually, new attitudes evolved regarding the necessity and possibility of negotiations toward a two-state solution based on mutual recognition, which became the building stones of the 1993 Oslo agreement. Lacking a commitment to a final outcome, the Oslo-based peace process was hampered by reserve options, which increased avoidance at the expense of approach tendencies as the parties moved toward a final agreement. The resulting breakdown of the process in 2000 produced clashing narratives, reflecting different anchors for judgment and classical mirror images. Public support for violence increased, even as public opinion continued to favor a negotiated two-state solution. Reviving the peace process requires mutual reassurance about the availability of a partner for negotiating a principled peace based on a historic compromise that meets the basic needs and validates the identities of both peoples.
The heated debate about the Palestinian issue and Israeli actions in the occupied territories often confronts me with a dilemma. To begin with, I have trouble with any attempt to structure the issue as one between supporters of Israel versus supporters of the Palestinian cause. I consider myself to be both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian. Moreover, I consider many of the protagonists in these debates—whichever side they claim to support—to be working against the interests of both sides in this tragic conflict. In particular, I am profoundly alienated by the rhetoric of some elements on both sides of the debate: both by those who use their totally legitimate criticism on Israeli policies and practices as a warrant for anti-Semitic pronouncements and by those who use the totally appropriate rejection of anti-Semitism an other forms of racism in any decent society as a weapon to delegitimize all criticism of Israeli policies and practices.
In this article I argue that overlapping historical, geographical, and, in particular, structural factors account for Islam’s higher representation in religious civil wars. Together, the historical absence of an internecine religious war similar to the Thirty Years’ War in Europe (1618–48), the geographic proximity of Islam’s holiest sites to Israel and large petroleum reserves, and jihad—a structural feature of Islam—explain why so many civil wars include Islamic participants.
Individually or in combination, two federal policies have the potential to transform the American racial and ethnic hierarchy more than any other policy changes since the civil rights movement. They are the Immigration Act of 1965 and the introduction of the "mark one or more" instruction in the race question on the 2000 census. Unlike the civil rights activities of the 1940s through 1960s, the first change was not intended to overturn the racial order and the second was a response to a process of transformation already underway. Both were, and remain, highly dependent on the isolated choices of many people around the world, as well as strategies of political and business leaders and economic or other forces outside anyone's control. Because the long-term effects of these policies have not played out fully, their ultimate outcomes will remain unclear for a long time—but they could be substantial.
It is tempting, but wrong, to infer from the failures of the EU draft constitution that all reforms based on increasing citizen participation in the European Union are doomed to fail. Andrew Moravcsik’s trenchant dismissal of the constitutional project commits this error. Moravcsik’s sweeping claims, based on what he calls empirical social science, speak well beyond the evidence on democratic institutional innovations. Participatory measures such as consultative Citizens’ Assemblies may articulate a citizens’ perspective that can help to anchor the democratic legitimacy of the EU. We do not know if such innovations can resolve the problems of the democratic deficit, but we do know that empirical social science has not spoken decisively on the issue. It is worth examining their democratic potential rather than dismissing them outright.
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR—minimum winning coalitions versus consensus—we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.
Prevailing theories in political economy hold that a coalition or political party, acting through parliament, can break down institutions of stable shareholding. In spite of extremely favourable conditions in the late 1990s—the election and durable rule of a leftist government supported by a transparency coalition, a bureaucratic elite that favoured institutional change, and substantial state shareholdings which the government could privatize in pursuit of its objectives—these reforms failed to affect the concentration of shareholdings among the largest private companies in Italy. This disjuncture between legal change and actual practice in Italian corporate governance suggests that current theories of institutional change in corporate governance systems are incomplete. The focus of inquiry needs to turn to the political resources of those who support the existing system: managers and large shareholders.
Once upon a time, not very long ago, economic globalization— the free worldwide flow of capital, goods, and labor—looked both inevitable and inexorable. Most governments seemed to embrace the very real benefits being offered by rapid technological change and international markets and sought to liberalize their economies in order to maximize these gains. Policymakers worked to prepare their societies for a world of ever-increasing interconnectedness and relentless competition, and the debate—at least within the United States—started to revolve around how to cope with the effects of this new "flat" earth.
Then came the financial crises of the 1990s and the early years of this century in Asia, Russia, and Latin America. The U.S. current account deficit—the difference, broadly speaking, between what U.S. residents spend abroad and what they sell abroad—shot upward. The U.S. dollar fell in value and seemed headed for an even more precipitous drop. As outsourcing accelerated, the American middle class came to feel increasingly insecure. Historians such as Niall Ferguson and Harold James pointed out that the previous era of globalization (which ran from about 1870 to 1914) had once seemed as unstoppable as the current one but had ended disastrously; so, too, they warned, could today’s.
We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both "building bloc" and "stumbling bloc" effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.