The limits of reputation on compliance

Citation:

Brewster, Rachel. 2009. “The limits of reputation on compliance.” International Law Reporter. International Law Reporter. Copy at http://www.tinyurl.com/yydnuf9e
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Date Published:

Jul 1, 2009

Abstract:

This short paper is a response to Andrew Guzman's book, How International Law Works. Guzman presents a novel synthesis of the IR approaches to IL by arguing that a state's concern with its reputation is one most important source of compliance with international law. But the book's approach to reputation is not up to the task of explaining compliance. In discussion the book's shortcomings, I ask to whom the relevant reputation belongs. Guzman relies on notions of the state's reputation, but this assignment is a problem for a causation analysis because governments (who make the compliance decisions) will not fully internalize the state's reputation. In addition, I discuss the methodological problems in Guzman's approach. The book provides for only a very loose means of assessing reputational costs, even as a conceptual matter. Without such means of assessment, any claim about the power of reputation remains non-falsifiable and therefore has less theoretical force.

Notes:

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Last updated on 07/26/2016