@newspaperarticle {67911,
	title = {Zakaria{\textquoteright}s World},
	year = {2011},
	month = {Mar 9, 2011},
	publisher = {Foreign Policy},
	abstract = {
Fareed Zakaria is one of our most perceptive analysts of
America{\textquoteright}s role in the world, and I generally agree with him. But in the case of
his new special essay for Time, \&quot;Are
America{\textquoteright}s Best Days Behind Us?,\&quot; I think he paints too gloomy a picture of
American decline. Americans are prone to cycles of belief in decline, and the
term itself confuses various dimensions of changing power relations. 
Some see
the American problem as imperial overstretch (though as a percentage of 
GDP, the United States spends half as much on defense as it did during 
the Cold War); some see the
problem as relative decline caused by the rise of others (though that 
process
could still leave the United States more powerful than any other 
country); and still
others see it as a process of absolute decline or decay such as occurred
 in the
fall of ancient Rome (though Rome was an agrarian society with stagnant
economic growth and internecine strife).
Such projections are not new. As Zakaria notes, America{\textquoteright}s Founding 
Fathers worried about comparisons to the decline of the Roman Republic.
A strand of cultural pessimism is simply very American, extending back 
to
the country{\textquoteright}s Puritan roots. English novelist Charles Dickens observed a century and a half
ago: \&quot;[I]f its individual citizens, to a man, are to be believed, [America]
always is depressed, and always is stagnated, and always is at an alarming
crisis, and never was otherwise.\&quot;
In the last half-century, polls showed
Americans believed in their decline after the Soviet Union launched 
Sputnik in
1957, after Richard Nixon{\textquoteright}s devaluation of the dollar and the oil shocks
 in the 1970s,
and after the closing of Rust Belt industries and the budget deficits of
 Ronald
Reagan{\textquoteright}s administration in the 1980s. At the end of that decade, a 
majority of Americans believed their country was in decline; yet within 
the next 10
years they believed that America was the sole superpower. And now, after
the 2008 financial crisis and recession, polls show a majority believes 
in
decline again. These
cycles of declinism tell us more about Americans{\textquoteright}
collective psychology than underlying shifts in power resources, but as 
British
journalist Gideon Rachman argued
in these pages recently, maybe this time decline is real. After all, as the
Congressional Budget Office warns, on current trends the U.S. national debt
will be equal to its GDP in a decade, and that will undermine confidence in the
dollar.
Zakaria lists other worrying
indicators related to education and infrastructure. According to the OECD,
American 15-year-olds rank 17th in the world in science and 25th in math. The
United States is 12th in college graduation rates, 23rd in infrastructure, and
27th in life expectancy. On the other side of the ledger, America ranks first among
rich countries in guns, crime, and debt.
All these are very real problems,
but one could also note that the United States is still first in total R\&amp;D
expenditures, first in university rankings, first in Nobel prizes, first on
indices of entrepreneurship, and according to the World Economic Forum, the
fourth-most competitive economy in the world (behind the small states of
Switzerland, Sweden, and Singapore).The
United States remains at the forefront of technologies of the future like biotechnology
and nanotechnology. This is hardly a picture of absolute economic decay, ancient
Rome style. The truth is that one can draw a picture of the United States today
that emphasizes either dark or bright colors without being wrong. No one can be
sure which shade better portrays the future because the number of potential
futures is vast, and which one comes to pass will depend in part on decisions
not yet made.
Drawing on the thinking of Mancur
Olson, the late great political economist, Zakaria believes that America{\textquoteright}s very
success has made its decision processes sclerotic, like that of industrial Britain. But
American culture is far more entrepreneurial and decentralized than that of Britain,
where the sons of industrial entrepreneurs sought aristocratic titles and
honors in London. If Olson is right, Zakaria says, the solution is to \&quot;stay
flexible.\&quot; And despite recurrent historical bouts of concern about it,
immigration helps keep America flexible. In 2005, according to Forbes, foreign-born immigrants had
participated in one of every four technology start-ups in the previous decade.
As Singapore{\textquoteright}s Lee Kuan Yew once put it, China can draw on a talent pool of 1.3
billion people, but the United States not only draws on a talent pool of 7
billion, but can recombine them in a diverse culture that enhances creativity
in a way that ethnic Han nationalism cannot.
Zakaria also worries about the
inefficient American political system. But the Founding Fathers created a
 system
of checks and balances precisely to preserve liberties at the price of
efficiency. Moreover, just because we are now going through a period of 
excessively
partisan politics and mistrust of government doesn{\textquoteright}t mean the American
political system is in decline. Some aspects of the
current mood are probably cyclical and related to unemployment, while 
others
represent discontent with the bickering and deadlock in today{\textquoteright}s 
political
process. Compared with the recent past, party politics has indeed become
 more
polarized, but nasty politics is nothing new and goes all the way back 
to the Founding Fathers. Supporters of John Adams reputedly once called 
Thomas
Jefferson \&quot;a mean-spirited, low-lived fellow, the son of a
half-breed Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto father.\&quot;
Part of
the problem of accurate assessment is that faith in government became
abnormally high among the generation that survived the Great Depression and won World
War II. Over the long view of American history, it was overconfidence in
government in the 1950s and early 1960s, not low levels thereafter, that was
the anomaly. American government and politics have always had problems,
sometimes worse than today{\textquoteright}s. In assessing political decline, one must beware of
the golden glow of the past. It is easy to show decline if one compares the
good in the past with the bad in the present. 
In
addition, we sometimes mistakenly idealize the efficiency of the 
political
process in authoritarian countries like China. When it comes to 
infrastructure,
for example, it is far easier to build high-speed rail lines where there
 are
weak property rights and few lawyers. But if one looks at the important
question of how Chinese leaders are struggling to implement their 12th 
five-year plan -- reducing dependence on exports, shifting to internal 
demand, and
reducing regional inequality by moving industry to the west -- China is 
far from
efficient. Although central bankers and economic planners know that 
revaluing the
yuan would promote these goals and help head off inflation, a strong 
coalition
of coastal export industries and associated local party bosses seeks to
preserve the status quo.
Zakaria
notes that one Asian country after another is learning the secrets of Western
success, and he is right. In The Future
of Power, I argue that one of the two great power shifts of this century is
the recovery of Asia to what it represented before the Industrial Revolution
led to the ascendance of the West: more than half the world{\textquoteright}s population and its
economic production. We should herald Asia{\textquoteright}s recovery -- it has brought
millions out of dire poverty-- but
those with excessive fear of China should remember that Asia is not one entity.
In his important book Rivals, Bill
Emmott reminds us that Japan, India, and others that are concerned about the
rise of China welcome an American presence. Can anyone similarly imagine Canada
and Mexico seeking a Chinese alliance to balance American power in their
neighborhood?
Nor is China likely to surpass
America anytime soon. Yes, barring political uncertainties, China{\textquoteright}s size
 and
high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its strength
 relative
to that of the United States. Still, China won{\textquoteright}t necessarily become the 
world{\textquoteright}s most
powerful country as a result. Even if China suffers no major domestic 
political
setback, many of the current projections based on GDP growth alone are 
too one-dimensional. They ignore what are likely to be enduring U.S. 
military and soft-power advantages, as well as China{\textquoteright}s geopolitical 
disadvantages in the internal
Asian balance of power.
Zakaria
is correct that the United States faces serious problems. But issues that
preoccupy us today, such as long-term debt, are not insoluble; see for example,
the recommendations
of the Simpson-Bowles commission, and remember that only a decade ago some
people worried about the government surplus.
Of course, such solutions may forever remain out of reach. But it is worth
distinguishing situations for which there are no solutions from those that could,
in principle, be solved.
The greatest
danger to America is not debt, political paralysis, or China; it is parochialism,
turning away from the openness that is the source of its strength and resting
on its laurels. As Zakaria says, in the past, worrying about decline has helped
avert it. Let us hope that his intelligent though darkly drawn picture will yet
again start that healthy process.\&nbsp;},
	url = {http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/08/zakaria_s_world},
	author = {Nye, Joseph S., Jr.}
}
