@newspaperarticle {67811,
	title = {The Right Way to Trim},
	year = {2011},
	month = {Aug 4, 2011},
	publisher = {New York Times},
	abstract = {
The recent debt deal will slash the defense budget over the next decade.
 And if Congress can{\textquoteright}t agree on an additional $1.5 trillion in cuts, the
 law{\textquoteright}s {\textquotedblleft}trigger mechanism{\textquotedblright} will lead to deeper reductions in military 
spending. The initial cuts will not imperil America{\textquoteright}s national security,
 but the deeper cuts could.        
The administration of George W. Bush nearly doubled the defense budget 
following 9/11. With the winding down of Mr. Bush{\textquoteright}s two wars, we could 
cut our ground forces to 1990s levels, reduce the planned purchases of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters,
 make greater use of cheaper drones and other technologies, and deal 
with the escalating costs of the defense health care system {\textemdash} without 
serious damage to national security. Indeed, President Obama{\textquoteright}s budget 
had already planned for $400 billion in defense savings by 2023.        
But it is not enough to tinker with the defense budget. We also need to 
rethink how we use our military power. Unlike the state of affairs 
during the cold war, the United States and its allies today account for 
over 70 percent of world military expenditure. The No. 1 power no longer
 has to patrol every boundary and seek to police every country. 
Opponents of defense cuts are raising the specter of isolationism and 
the weakening of American power. But there is a middle way.        
At the height of the cold war, President Dwight D. Eisenhower decided 
against direct military intervention on the side of the French in 
Vietnam in 1954 because he was convinced that it was more important to 
preserve the strength of the American economy. Today, such a strategy 
would avoid involvement of ground forces in major wars in Asia or in 
other poor countries. While it will take time to extricate ourselves 
from Mr. Bush{\textquoteright}s post-9/11 strategy, we must start, as the National Security Strategy of 2010
 states, {\textquotedblleft}by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins 
with the steps we take at home.{\textquotedblright} Eisenhower could have said that {\textemdash} and 
no one could accuse Ike of being an isolationist.        
Counterinsurgency is attractive as a military tactic but it should not 
lead us into a strategy of nation-building in places where we do not 
have the capacity to engineer change. The maxim of avoiding major land 
wars in poor countries does not mean withdrawing our military presence 
from places like Japan and South Korea, or ending military assistance to
 countries like Pakistan and Egypt. Some analysts call this {\textquotedblleft}off-shore 
balancing,{\textquotedblright} but that term must mean more than just naval and air force 
activity. For example, in Japan and South Korea, our allies pay a 
significant portion of the cost for basing American troops there because
 they want an insurance policy in a region faced with a rising China and
 a volatile North Korea.        
Over the course of this century, Asia will return to its historic 
status, with more than half of the world{\textquoteright}s population and half of the 
world{\textquoteright}s economic output. America must be present there. Markets and 
economic power rest on political frameworks, and American military power
 provides that framework. Military security is to order as oxygen is to 
breathing: underappreciated until it becomes scarce. That is why the new
 bipartisan Congressional commission must provide the revenues that 
allow America to continue to play this vital role while avoiding the 
trap of overly ambitious nation-building.        
Such a strategy is also sustainable at home. The British historian Niall
 Ferguson, an enthusiast for empire, lamented at the time of the Iraq 
war that the United States lacked the capacity for empire because of 
three domestic deficits: personnel (not enough boots on the ground); 
attention (not enough public support for long-term occupation); and 
financial (not enough savings and not enough taxation relative to public
 expenditure). He was correct.        
Lacking a stomach for empire or colonial occupation is one of the 
important ways in which American political culture differs from that of 
imperial Britain. Americans like to promote universal values. But rather
 than succumbing to the temptation to intervene on the side of {\textquotedblleft}the 
good,{\textquotedblright} we can do it best by being what Ronald Reagan called {\textquotedblleft}a shining 
city on a hill.{\textquotedblright}        
The alternatives we face today are not an untouchable defense budget or 
isolationism. A smart strategy for preserving America{\textquoteright}s power and global
 role will depend on wisely tailoring our foreign policy to fit the 
cloth we have. Eisenhower knew this well.        },
	url = {http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/opinion/the-right-way-to-trim-military-spending.html?_r=2\&ref=opinion},
	author = {Nye, Joseph S., Jr.}
}
