@newspaperarticle {67671,
	title = {An Exit Plan for Mubarak},
	year = {2011},
	month = {Feb 3, 2011},
	publisher = {New York Times},
	abstract = {
Hosni Mubarak{\textquoteright}s promise this week to initiate constitutional reform in 
Egypt and then step down at the end of his presidential term in 
September did little to mollify the anger of the demonstrators 
protesting his rule. Many protesters seemed to agree with the assessment of the opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei that it was {\textquotedblleft}a trick{\textquotedblright} intended to buy time. With the regime-sponsored ugliness
 now engulfing Tahrir Square, demands for Mr. Mubarak{\textquoteright}s immediate 
resignation have grown only more urgent, and the risk of a violent 
conclusion appears to have grown.        
But there may still be a chance to effect the {\textquotedblleft}orderly transition{\textquotedblright} that 
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has called for. Paradoxically,
 it requires that Mr. Mubarak stay on, but only for a short time, to 
initiate the election of an entirely new Parliament that could then 
amend all the power out of the presidency or even abolish it.        
This would no doubt disappoint those who want to put Mr. Mubarak on the 
next plane to Saudi Arabia, but there are two risks associated with his 
leaving so abruptly. The first is that the demonstrations might diminish
 or dissipate, leaving Mr. ElBaradei and his coalition trying to 
negotiate with the military or Vice President Omar Suleiman  without the
 force of the crowds behind them.        
The second risk stems from the Egyptian Constitution, which gives the 
power to dissolve Parliament and call new elections only to an elected 
president. Mr. Mubarak{\textquoteright}s successor, as an acting president, would be 
specifically prohibited from getting the parliamentary elections under 
way. A new Parliament is crucial to democratic reform, because only 
Parliament has the power to defang the Egyptian presidency, stripping it
 of its dictatorial powers through constitutional amendment. The current
 Parliament {\textemdash} bought and paid for by Mr. Mubarak{\textquoteright}s National Democratic 
Party {\textemdash} is not fit for that task.        
Egypt{\textquoteright}s next scheduled presidential election is only months away. If the
 Constitution isn{\textquoteright}t amended before it is held, the notorious Article 76,
 which makes it difficult for independents like Mr. ElBaradei to get on 
the ballot, will still be in place. More important, the new president 
would have the same imperial powers Mr. Mubarak has had {\textemdash} the very 
powers that the Egyptian public wants taken away.        
The constitutionally sanctioned timeline would be this: Mr. Mubarak 
dissolves Parliament, forcing a new election within 60 days 
(international observers would be required to make sure the election is 
fair). Once the new Parliament is seated, Mr. Mubarak resigns, and an 
acting president, probably the new Parliament{\textquoteright}s speaker, takes charge 
until a new president is elected. The new Parliament would work around 
the clock to amend the Constitution in ways that would put Mr. Suleiman 
or any would-be strongman out of a job. The final step is a national 
referendum on the amendments.        
For American policymakers, the most frightening possibility is that the 
Muslim Brotherhood would sweep the parliamentary elections and institute
 a constitution based on Islamic holy law. This is unlikely. The 
political momentum in Egypt is not with the Islamists. Moreover, the 
Brotherhood{\textquoteright}s members have never sought to compete for a majority of 
seats in Parliament, and during the current protests have impressed 
people across the Egyptian political spectrum with their 
self-effacement. Brotherhood adherents know that a victory for them 
could be used by the military as an excuse to short-circuit the birth of
 democracy in Egypt.        
A likelier outcome is that the Islamists would join a coalition slate of
 candidates, becoming part of an ideologically diverse Parliament. The 
greater danger now is that Mr. Mubarak would corrupt the electoral 
process by unleashing the same thugs who are now attacking the peaceful 
protesters of Tahrir Square.        
One might wonder why, at this moment of change and tumult, anyone would 
talk about amending a constitution that everyone recognizes as a 
deformed confection of a corrupt regime. But by working with even a 
flawed constitution, the opposition would be helping to entrench and 
deepen a constitutionalist principle that has been steadily eroded. And 
with its built-in deadlines, the constitutional route also makes it 
harder for the military to draw out the transition and consolidate its 
hold.        
For any of this to happen, Mr. Mubarak must remain briefly in office, 
and he must agree to the changes as an answer to his people{\textquoteright}s legitimate
 cry for democracy. The demand that can make him comply must come from 
President Obama.        
It has often been said in recent days that the United States can do 
nothing to affect the progress of democracy in Egypt, but the military{\textquoteright}s
 dependence on American money and mat{\'e}riel suggests that this is untrue.
 The more the United States can make clear that continued military 
support depends on how the Egyptian Army conducts itself during this 
transition, the more likely the military is to play midwife to 
democracy.        
Much could go wrong, but finding an orderly way to get not just Mr. 
Mubarak but also the armed forces out of political life should be a more
 important priority than ensuring that Islamists don{\textquoteright}t hijack the 
revolution. All that is required of us is to remind ourselves that 
democracy in Egypt, or any other part of the world, is not something we 
should fear.        },
	url = {http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/opinion/04masoud.html?_r=1\&scp=1\&sq=masoud\&st=cse},
	author = {Masoud, Tarek}
}
