@article {67241, title = {The limits of reputation on compliance}, journal = {International Law Reporter}, year = {2009}, note = {}, month = {Jul 1, 2009}, publisher = {International Law Reporter}, abstract = {This short paper is a response to Andrew Guzman{\textquoteright}s book, How International Law Works. Guzman presents a novel synthesis of the IR approaches to IL by arguing that a state{\textquoteright}s concern with its reputation is one most important source of compliance with international law. But the book{\textquoteright}s approach to reputation is not up to the task of explaining compliance. In discussion the book{\textquoteright}s shortcomings, I ask to whom the relevant reputation belongs. Guzman relies on notions of the state{\textquoteright}s reputation, but this assignment is a problem for a causation analysis because governments (who make the compliance decisions) will not fully internalize the state{\textquoteright}s reputation. In addition, I discuss the methodological problems in Guzman{\textquoteright}s approach. The book provides for only a very loose means of assessing reputational costs, even as a conceptual matter. Without such means of assessment, any claim about the power of reputation remains non-falsifiable and therefore has less theoretical force.}, url = {http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2009/02/brewster-limits-of-reputation-on.html}, author = {Brewster, Rachel} }