@unpublished {65966,
	title = {The Legislative Dynamic: Evidence from the Deregulation of Financial Services in Japan},
	year = {2002},
	note = {Also John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Working Paper no. 373.Download PDF},
	month = {Jul 1, 2002},
	abstract = {In many ways, the current financial distress in Japan traces itself
to the limited range of non-bank financial intermediaries available. That limited
availability is itself a creature of regulation. By examining the recent deregulation
of commercial paper issues by financial intermediaries, we explore the dynamics of
the regulatory process that originally contributed to{\textemdash}if not caused{\textemdash}the current
distress.
We also use this case study to explore the dynamics of the Japanese
legislative and regulatory process more generally. We characterize deregulation as a
bargain between banks and the newer non-bank intermediaries: the banks
acquiesced to commercial paper issues by non-banks, while the non-banks agreed to
the regulatory jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. The non-banks obtained a
cost-effective way to raise additional funds; the banks brought their new competitors
within their regulatorily enforced cartel. At a specific level, the dynamics illustrate
the classic Stiglerian theory of regulation; at a more general level, they illustrate the
trans-national economic logic to the Japanese legislative and regulatory process.},
	author = {Ramseyer, J. Mark and Miwa, Yoshiro}
}
