@book {65331,
	title = {Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy},
	year = {2005},
	note = {Winner, John Bates Clark Medal, American Economic Association, 2005Winner, Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, 2007Winner, William H. Riker Award, Political Economy Section, 2007},
	month = {Jan 1, 2005},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	abstract = {This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and
consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different
political institutions because of the way they allocate political power
and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens,
but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when
citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when
the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of
concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy.
By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the
citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites
do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend
on the strength of civil society, the structure of political
institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of
economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and
extent of globalization.},
	url = {http://www.cambridge.org},
	author = {Robinson, James A. and Acemoglu, Daron}
}
