@article {65071,
	title = {Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?},
	year = {2006},
	note = {WCFIA Working Paper No. 07-15, February 2006},
	month = {Feb 1, 2006},
	abstract = {Fiscal policy is procyclical in many countries, and especially in developing ones. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to "starve the Leviathan" to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or fewer taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies.},
	author = {Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini}
}
