@booklet {62531,
	title = {Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries},
	year = {2001},
	month = {Oct 1, 2001},
	abstract = {A straightforward extension of the standard Stigler{\textendash}Peltzman model of regulation, coupled with the Taagepera{\textendash}Shugart analysis of electoral{\textendash}system effects, suggests: (a) that the greater the seat{\textendash}vote elasticities of majoritarian electoral systems will tilt policy in favor of consumers, while proportional systems should strengthen producers; and (b)that the pro{\textendash}consumer bias of majoritarian systems should be manifested in systematically lower prices. Empirical tests, controlling for structural determinants of national price levels established in the earlier "law of one price" literature, establish majoritarian electoral systems as a significant and robust predictor, lowering national price levels in the mean OECD country by between ten and seventeen percent.},
	author = {Ronald Rogowski and Mark Andreas Kayser}
}
