@unpublished {62121,
	title = {Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Typology and Hypotheses},
	year = {1999},
	note = {Martin, Lisa L. \&quot;Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Typology and Hypotheses.\&quot; Working Paper 99{\textendash}05, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1999.},
	month = {Jan 1, 1999},
	abstract = {We develop a new typology for examination of the effects of international institutions on member states{\textquoteright} behavior. Some institutions lead to convergence of members{\textquoteright} practices, while others result, often for unintended reasons, in divergence. We hypothesize that the observed effect of institutions depends on the level of externalities to state behavior; the design of the institution; and variation in the organization and access of private interests that share the goals of the institution. We illustrate these propositions with examples drawn from international institutions for development assistance; protection of the ozone layer; and completion of the European Union{\textquoteright}s internal market. We find that significant externalities and appropriately{\textendash}designed institutions lead to convergence of state behavior, while divergence can result from the absence of these conditions and the presence of heterogeneity in domestic politics.},
	author = {Lisa L. Martin}
}
