The Economics of International Refugee Law

Citation:

Kremer, Michael, Ryan Bubb, and David Levine. 2007. “The Economics of International Refugee Law”. Copy at http://www.tinyurl.com/y4h97lkr

Date Published:

Jan 1, 2007

Abstract:

We model the current system of refugee protection based on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as a Pareto improving contract that bound states to provide a more efficient level of the global public good of refugee protection. Our analysis suggests that the increase in economic migration since the 1951 Convention was adopted has made it more difficult for host states to distinguish between refugees and those who migrate in search of economic opportunities. The response of states to this screening problem has been to shade on performance of their obligations under the 1951 Convention by, inter alia, increasing the standards of proof of their refugee status determination procedures, resulting in more false negatives and refoulement of refugees. We show that the choice of standard of proof can exhibit strategic complementarity; as more states use a high standard of proof, the best response of other states may be to increase their standard of proof. We also model potential reform schemes in which wealthy states pay poorer states to host refugees that initially travel to the wealthy states, and argue that such transfer systems could ameliorate the screening problem by inducing self-selection among those who migrate and result in increased protection of refugees. However, such reforms could also make some developing countries worse-off by increasing their burden of hosting refugees without fully compensating them for their increased costs.

Notes:

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