Phenomenology, Psychoanalysis, and Subjectivity in Java

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Abstract
This essay outlines the evolution of my personal thinking about phenomenology and subjectivity. In previous work, I drew heavily on cultural phenomenology for studying illness, subjective experience, and medical knowledge across cultures. Here I describe why I have become increasingly dissatisfied with this framework for understanding subjectivity and the subject and suggest alternatives I consider important for psychological anthropology. I focus in particular on questions of how to investigate that which is largely unspeakable and unspoken in everyday speech but at times erupts into awareness as complex specters haunting the present. I provide a case from my ongoing research in Java of a young man who suffered an acute psychosis, drawing implications for a theory of subjectivity and methods for psychological anthropology. I point briefly to the relation of madness and memories of political violence as sites for investigating subjectivity, suggesting the importance of a “hauntology” for psychological anthropology. Finally, I address questions about whether a method that addresses hidden aspects of psychological experience requires a stance in which ethnographers “know better than” those with whom they are interacting.

In this essay, based on brief, rather personal comments prepared for the 2007 AAA panel assessing the place of phenomenology in psychological and cultural anthropology, I provide preliminary critical reflections on phenomenology as a theory of subjectivity, contrasting cultural phenomenology with current forms of theorizing subjectivity that draw heavily on contemporary psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and postcolonialism as the basis for ethnographic investigation of experience. I begin with a brief review of my past uses of phenomenology and indicate why I find this perspective less satisfying as a theory of subjectivity today, less compelling as a means of provoking ethnographic analysis, than I did at that time. I explore the argument that studies of subjectivity need to attend to that which is not said overtly, to that which is unspeakable and unspoken, to “the Impossible and the Forbidden” in Sudhir Kakar’s words, that which appears at the margins of formal speech and everyday presentations of self, manifest in the Imaginary, in dissociated spaces and the apparitional, in individual dream time and partially revealed affect, coded in esoteric symbolic productions aimed at hiding as well as revealing (Kakar 1989:41; cf. Good et al. 2008a). I briefly introduce the issues raised for a theory of subjectivity by attention to such phenomena. I provide a case study of a young man in Java who suffered a dramatic psychosis, drawing parallels with efforts to understand the apparitional in relation to political violence. And I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and ethical complications of theories that purport to investigate that which is unspoken and even unspeakable.
Phenomenology has a long and distinguished trajectory within American anthropology. Boas and his students were distinctly phenomenological in their orientation, grounded as they were in German Romantic and neo-Kantian theories of *Kultur*, although they incorporated psychology and psychoanalysis in diverse ways into their theories of personality.\(^1\) It was Irving Hallowell, however, who elaborated the most explicit theorization of cultural phenomenology—and its place in a theory of subjectivity—in his explorations of the “behavioral environment of the self” among the Ojibwa peoples. Hallowell made clear the advantages of a phenomenological perspective—in particular, in contrast with rationalist positions prevailing among British anthropologists of his generation—for ethnographic understanding of a people who continued to speak with their ancestors, engage spirit beings as a category of “persons,” and go on vision quests to seek personal empowerment from powerful animal spirits who would finally come to bless them. These were all objects or forces or persons—“realities”—within the Ojibwa world, and classic phenomenology, linked to symbolic studies of culture, provided Hallowell a framework for ethnographic investigation and description.\(^2\)

Clifford Geertz, my teacher in graduate school at Chicago, was, I would argue, the greatest advocate among his generation for this phenomenological tradition. Placing Kenneth Burke’s symbolics and Hallowell’s cultural phenomenology in direct conversation with the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer, on the one hand, and the German phenomenologist–sociologist Alfred Schutz, on the other, Geertz undertook a series of explorations of religion, aesthetics, and common sense each as “cultural systems,” linking Cassirer’s notion of symbolic forms to Schutz’s phenomenological “perspectives” to elaborate a theory of the symbolic worlds within which all human groups live and through which they constitute their experiential worlds. Although well versed in psychoanalytic theory and deeply aware of the place of historical violence in a society’s consciousness, Geertz remained steadfast in his commitment to phenomenology and interpretive studies as a basis for exploring Javanese, then Balinese and Moroccan subjectivity.\(^3\)

Many others have taken up the phenomenological tradition—Michael Jackson (1996, 1998) and Tom Csordas (1994a, 1994b) may serve as icons for this work—demonstrating the power of this rich, largely philosophical body of writing to frame ethnographic explorations of the lived, local worlds, cultivated perspectives, and modes of embodiment that form the basis for knowing and acting in distinctive cultural settings.\(^4\) My own *Medicine, Rationality and Experience* (Good 1994) was written explicitly within this tradition. It drew on phenomenology in two primary ways. First, it had as its core questions those of epistemology and rationality, asking how we make sense of what people in other societies tell ethnographers concerning what they claim to know about the world, in particular when those claims seem unbelievable to Western scholars. This is no small matter when discussing medicine, where what is true—and efficacious—matters a great deal. Some readers will know how the argument of that book went—that “knowledge” is grounded within local worlds of experience and human action, that there are diverse phenomenological “perspectives” that shape interpretive practices (a la Geertz and Schutz), that different knowledge claims may be made from within distinctive cultural worlds, and that the senses are cultivated in a manner that allows
access to particular dimensions of reality, about which knowledge claims are made. I linked this argument to Hillary Putnam’s theoretical writings on “realism,” which he developed in relation to his colleague, the phenomenologist Nelson Goodman. Recognizing how fundamentally symbolic these worlds or reality forms are requires an approach different from the common rationalist division between “belief” and “knowledge” in order to translate across worlds and make sense of knowledge claims of others. In larger measure, I still hold to this position.

Second, I used phenomenology in that book to develop a method for describing how the lived world changes for those with severe illnesses. Rather than describing conditions such as depression or chronic pain primarily in internal, subjective terms, focused on cognition and affect (or neurobiology), as is usual in psychology and psychiatry, the phenomenological approach developed there asks questions about how the world changes for someone who is depressed, how the very structures of time, space, and the taken-for-granted shift and break down. For this, phenomenological methods—along with methods and theories drawn from narrative studies—provide extremely interesting categories and frames for investigating the profound shifts in ordinary reality associated with serious illness. I continue to find that this methodological perspective has the potential for important, sometimes startling insights.

Despite these strengths of the phenomenological tradition, I have increasingly come to feel that cultural phenomenology provides a profoundly inadequate basis for a theory of subjectivity. “Experience,” in that tradition, begins as a neo-Kantian structuring of the sensorium and moves outward, in its anthropological reading, to cultural interpretations of sense experience and intersubjective worlds. But to my current thinking, cultural phenomenology fails to theorize and bring analytic attention to two strands of experience which are at the heart of recent work on subjectivity—complex psychological experiences most often associated with diverse forms of psychoanalysis, and political subjectivity, those aspects of subjectivity shaped by repressive and hegemonic political and administrative structures, gender ideologies, and histories of violence that constitute the “natural gaze” of the political order and political realities. It is difficult to find serious phenomenological accounts of psychologically oriented life histories, of how primary, developmental attachments and relationships structure an individual’s inner life over time, of how these—often unbeknownst to each individual—shape what is experienced as real. In essence, this tradition leaves ethnographers without a fully articulated psychology, and increasingly I find understandings of subjectivity absent a complex psychology inadequate and of limited value.

But it is not only the absence of what I am gesturing toward as a fully articulated psychology that limits phenomenology as a theory of subjectivity—there is obviously a long tradition of linking phenomenology with psychoanalysis to provide such a psychology, with Edward Sapir, culture and personality theorists, and Hallowell himself serving as exemplars. It is also the absence of an explicit theorization of the political and limited theoretical grounds for linking individual psychology to social, historical, and political processes that serves to divide most cultural phenomenologies of the self from a wide range of current theorizations of subjectivity.
How have I Come to this and Where Does this Critique Take Me?

First, anyone who has engaged in relatively long-term psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy develops respect for just how difficult it is to understand that which is hidden—or that which one hides—from one’s conscious self, aspects of one’s self that seem “natural” but are motivated in complex ways, understandings and intuitions concerning the world and other people that seem mysteriously powerful. I increasingly find that phenomenology as a method is not helpful for understanding these matters, although it does provide a way of attending with detail to phenomena as they are experienced. Writings broadly in the domain of psychoanalysis or psychodynamic theories of the self now seem to me far richer sources for reflection on that which is hidden—that which one does not have access to without concentrated reflection, or many times even with such reflection—some of which is hidden consciously and purposely for political purposes, but much of which is rooted in fears and desires, far beyond any rational control. All of this has given me great respect for the difficulties of truly understanding the subjectivity of others. It has also left me dissatisfied with cultural phenomenology, narrative studies, and other forms of cultural analysis as sole or even primary methods for understanding such phenomena.

Second, this conviction has taken me in the direction of reading very different works and authors than I read for *Medicine, Rationality and Experience*, and makes very different questions important. Questions of power and power relations were present in that book in various ways, including an argument for a “critical phenomenology,” and I attempted to link my epistemological arguments to forms of critical theory. However, a genuine attention to psychological experiences of authority and authority relations, both individual and collective; to the dynamics of “subjection” and anxiety; to the real force of loss as it reverberates through one’s being; to the power of desire and the chaos it may lose; to the sources of ambivalence and self deception, and how these play out in social life; these were not made central in my earlier work. Critical questions about the flows between individual and collective experience, about the genuinely irrational dynamics of social or collective life, including the repressive or paranoid as well as the humane and joyous, and about what is said and not said in public life—all of these remain largely outside of theorizing in much of phenomenological anthropology, including my own earlier work. Over the past decade my interests have increasingly turned to theoretical traditions that may contribute to ethnographic exploration of just such issues. And I have become particularly interested in the uncanny, in the appearance of the spectral, in the eruption of the mysterious in individual lives as well as in political life, particularly in Indonesia.

There is now, I suggest, a broad range of writings—by philosophers, literary critics, psychoanalysts, gender theorists, postcolonial scholars, as well as anthropologists—focused on subjectivity and the subject, for which such issues are central, a body of work only beginning to be absorbed within psychological anthropology. Many of these are influenced by the Lacanian tradition (more than by Freud, though Freud is ever present). It is not that these works provide a “theory” in any straightforward way, but rather a vocabulary or language for linking aspects of consciousness and psychological experience with the linguistic and
institutional, reflecting a long-standing pattern in French social and psychological theories for conscience to provide a natural bridge mediating individual and collective aspects of experience or consciousness. Reflections on colonialism are important in much of this work, either directly or indirectly, as a mode of exploring historical experience, collective traumas, and the complex suppressions and reworkings of memory—again, something largely absent in phenomenological writing. Postcolonial Disorders was assembled as a means of giving form to “a project to develop new strategies for investigating and theorizing subjects in postcolonial societies and situations,” broadly defined (Good et al. 2008b:11). The collection juxtaposes the categories subjectivity, postcolonialism, and disorders, as a means of developing approaches to subjectivity that I think of as expressly alternative to cultural phenomenology. Over these past 15 years, much of my thinking on these issues has been stimulated by the field studies my colleagues and I have been conducting in Indonesia since 1996, focused broadly on serious mental illness, political violence, and subjectivity.

In what follows, I can give only a small hint of that work. My wife Mary-Jo and I began carrying out field research in Yogyakarta, in central Java, in 1996, during the late years of Suharto’s New Order, when increasing political repression was being met with growing student demonstrations and outbursts of popular violence. We watched the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, followed by a period of reformasi exuberance, not fully matched by changes among the political elite in Jakarta. We witnessed the frightening rise of ethnic violence and popular fears that Indonesia might fall into widespread disorder and even dissolution. More recently, we have watched the emergence of a revived economy and an increasingly mature democracy, evident in the 2009 national elections. Finally, since 2005, we have been deeply involved in post-tsunami, postconflict Aceh, working in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration to assess mental health needs associated with the years of violence enacted against civilian communities by the Indonesian military as part of the conflict with the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM), and to develop mental health responses to the “remainders of violence” suffered by members of highly traumatized village communities.

In Yogyakarta throughout much of this time, my own work has focused on intensive, longitudinal studies of persons with first episode psychotic illness. To illustrate the arguments I have been making about the limitations of phenomenology as a source for anthropological theories of subjectivity, I begin with brief reflections on a single case of a young man my research team in Yogyakarta has followed since 2001. This case is important here not because of its relevance to the issues of political subjectivity and violence to which I have been referring, but because in a rather mundane way it brought home to me the importance—and challenge—of thinking psychologically when conducting such work. I will then suggest parallels in research related to political violence.

A young Javanese man I call Mas Anto lives in a village not far outside of Yogyakarta, with his stepfather—a construction worker—and his mother and sister. His father left his mother when he was four years old. He completed only eight years of school, even though he was near the top of his class. He worked for one year as a servant in the house of a rich Yogya
merchant, returned home complaining of how he was treated, and began working at a small satay restaurant. He was 19 years old, and had only been working in the restaurant for two weeks, when he fell sick. One night, in February 2001, he failed to return home from work. When he did come home, he was obviously troubled. When asked what was wrong, he became angry and would only say that when he rode his bicycle past a graveyard, the spirits came after him and tried to woo him to go with them.

Anto went to work the next day but did not come home that night. When he did return after two days, his condition had deteriorated severely. He would weep, laugh, and shout without reason, mumbling while counting on his fingers. He had difficulties sleeping because, he said, ghosts were bothering him, and he refused to eat. He became silent, walked around stiffly—like a “zombie”—with a blank look in his eyes, acting frightened. He said that a black pig entered his body, making him root about on the ground. He had the powerful sensation of centipedes crawling on his body and a large number of red ants attacking him. He was upset by anything with the colors red and black and tried to burn or bury items with these colors. He dreamed of Yogyakarta’s South Sea and reported being visited by Nyi Loro Kidul, the great Queen of the South Sea, who hypnotized him. He was visited by Hamengku Bowono, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, and treated with great respect. He also began feeling that people wanted to poison him. He heard voices, thought a character on the television was mocking him, and felt that someone was trying to control him. He became angry with his mother, claiming she had made a deal with a spirit (a *Thuyul*) to take his soul in exchange for her achieving wealth. Overall, his family—and our research team—reported that he acted very strangely.

After one week, Mas Anto was taken to the private clinic of a psychiatrist, who started him on antipsychotic medications. He insisted that Anto be brought to the clinic weekly to pick up the drugs. After three weeks Anto’s family simply stopped purchasing the medication for him, feeling that they were not effective and too costly. He was taken to several healers to be given special water, blessed by the healers, to drink. A few weeks later, during one of the early visits by members of our team with him and his family, the psychiatrist on our team offered standard antipsychotic medications to the family, which they gave him until approximately the fourth month of his illness. While his illness was quite dramatic, it gradually declined, and by April he was able to begin working again. When we visited him in May, he appeared almost totally recovered, to the amazement of the psychiatrist on our team who had seen him initially. Anto told us he could not remember what happened during the illness.

We have followed Anto since his initial psychosis. His illness is completely gone. He has taken no medication since his acute episode and shows no residual impairment. I sometimes have gone along with our research team, usually a psychiatrist and psychologist, both women, for our annual follow-up visits. Anto always seems happy to see us and talk with us. He is not, however, interested in remembering or talking about his illness. He is only modestly embarrassed about what happened in what is now the distant past, and has largely “sealed over” his memories of the psychosis. He is primarily concerned with finding work in the construction business and moving on with his life.
A psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrist friend from Jakarta joined our team visiting Mas Anto in 2007. The visit went as usual, with Anto talking about his current life difficulties, uninterested in talking about the psychotic episode, now six years in his past. As Anto sat in the small, poor bamboo house, chatting with us, he held his guitar and talked about how he still occasionally sings and plays guitar with his friends, with whom he used to make up a small rock group. My psychiatrist friend encouraged him to play for us; he expressed embarrassment, asking what he would sing. His older sister, passing through, said, “Sing the Ayah song,” the song about the father. With encouragement, he began singing, with increasing emotion, a song by a popular Indonesian group, Koes Plus. The song includes highly intimate and idealized lyrics of someone who is missing a father. In Anto’s adaptation of the lyrics, he sang “too sad to remember, having to go on without, . . . how sad my heart is to remember your love and affection,” and the refrain, datang kembali, “come back again.” “What answer will you give me,” the song went on, “is there a path you will follow for us to come back together again (kita kembali lagi). . . .” Our group sang along with the popular refrain, and applauded his singing. As we left, my psychiatrist friend held Anto’s hand quietly and said, “I know what you are feeling, that you miss your father and no one understands you . . .”

As we sat and discussed the case afterward, I realized with a kind of shock, akin to those remarkable moments in psychotherapy when one has a moment of embarrassed insight, that although I knew that Anto had lost his father as a small child, I had largely forgotten this and we had never discussed it in any depth with him. I returned to visit Anto with my psychiatrist friend from Jakarta two months later, this time without other members of the research team, to take up the issues the song had raised. Anto talked with us for over an hour about his lack of self-confidence, his feelings of indecisiveness. He talked explicitly about how he thinks often about his father, though he cannot really remember him. His mother refuses to talk about him or the divorce, and he is not close to his stepfather. He thus has no one with whom he shares his feelings. He sang again a portion of the song, Kita Kembali, then went on to talk even more explicitly about how difficult it is to feel that his father may live in Yogyakarta but has never contacted him. He cannot really be angry at his father, he said, because he does not know what happened. But he thinks why, why do I have such bad fate (nasib), why does no one love me like my father loved me? What would you tell your father if you could meet him, we asked. I would tell him to love me, to come back and take care of me, he told us movingly. He concluded by singing another song, Tiga Puluh Menit, Thirty Minutes, about a person sitting for thirty minutes with a lover, too shy to speak, unable to say what he felt, until one day he could force himself to say, aku sayang padamu, “I love you . . .”

In retrospect, it is obvious that the real heart of this case is not the cultural phenomenology, the fascinating array of ghosts and mighty spirits that visited Anto when he became sick, or even simply the clinical course of the illness, the rapid onset, acute symptoms, and complete resolution and recovery. The rage at his mother during the psychosis suddenly seems motivated; his story that his mother was selling his soul to a spirit, and her counter claim that it was the Chinese businessman for whom he had worked who was the one selling
his soul, become meaningful. For all of my fascination with this world of spirits and magical forces and hauntings made visible through his psychosis, this young man was haunted by something far less exotic but more primal, the loss of his father. And it took an Indonesian psychiatrist, a man, psychologically attuned, to really hear and acknowledge this haunting.

The case also raised for the research team the question of why we had not attended to this sense of loss. Was it because our team was made up of women, who were drawn into collusion in some fashion with the mother who would not speak about his father with him? In my case, how much had to do with the simple fact that much of the conversation with Anto goes on in Javanese, and is only translated back to me in Indonesian, filtering my relationship with him? But the question remains: what was the source of this “not knowing” about something that at another level we knew, in my case the source of my forgetting about the loss of his father? Understanding the phenomenology of Javanese culture was essential as we worked with Mas Anto. It was not, however, enough. Understanding required another kind of listening, a different sort of intuition, and then an exploration with this young man of what he could only tell us initially in the coded language of Indonesian popular songs.

I am arguing for a view of subjectivity that goes beyond cultural phenomenology or cultural interpretation. I have given a short illustration of what turns out to be, in retrospect, a rather obvious—and personally embarrassing—interpretation of a clinical case and my own failure to understand. But the implications are much broader. I could equally illustrate with a political case, asking for example why my Javanese friends, and I myself, chose to know so little about the violence in Aceh during the first decade of my work in Indonesia. I am suggesting in general that in anthropological research we need constantly to listen to what is unspoken, unsaid, repressed, unspeakable—in politics and in everyday life, as well as in psychopathology—and to attend to our own resistances to knowing as much as to the complex forms of resistance to knowing of those with whom we work.

Indonesia is filled with hauntings and the largely unspeakable—from the killings of 1965, still unacknowledged and dangerous even after the fall of Suharto, to the years of violence in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua, to the unsolved cases of political violence against activists, to ongoing corruption. At times, speaking openly about these events is politically repressed. This was particularly true during the years of Suharto’s rule. But complex forms of censorship and self-censoring continue, linked to “moral policing” by groups of Islamic conservatives, to nationalist ideologies and sentiments, to ongoing concerns about surveillance by the intelligence apparatus, and to unresolved social divides that threaten to reemerge when any efforts are begun to reflect openly on the events of 1965. Although social and psychologically repressed, traces of these events at times erupt into public consciousness as ghostly hauntings—as the “ninjas” and sorcerers, dukun santet, that appeared in 1998 and led to witch hunts and ninja killings (Siegel 2006), as the “dark forces” often referred to by former President Abdurrahman Wahid, as ghosts of past violence that speak to individuals in dreams and nightmares, as the mysterious spirits, ghosts and forces present in popular film, and as political figures charged with corruption who threaten to reveal what is hidden from ordinary view, taking on mythic qualities elaborated as much in social media forms as in
public media. These all erupt into popular imagination, uncannily suggesting the presence of the repressed and apparently forgotten, forces that have social and political effects and that require new forms of anthropological listening and writing.\textsuperscript{13}

My suggestion is thus that psychological anthropology needs a more robust “hauntology,” to use Derrida’s term (Derrida 1994:10), to address issues as diverse—and similar—as desertion by a father and the remainders of political violence in subjective experience of individuals, families, communities, and national polities. I am not advocating that psychological anthropologists should abandon more classic studies of cultural and psychological lifeworlds or embodiment. But I am suggesting that for addressing many forms of subjectivity common in settings in which psychological anthropologists work today, for attempting to understand that which appears in spectral form or is only partially articulated, diverse psychoanalytically influenced theories of subjectivity serve far better than classic forms of cultural phenomenology as a basis for ethnographic research and writing.

This then raises a final problematic. I have always been uncomfortable with a theorized position that places the observer–analyst in a relationship of “knowing better” than members of another society whose experience we seek to analyze. These issues arise in classic rationalist anthropology—my “knowledge,” your “belief” (Good 1994); in writings on power that invoke the “romance with resistance”; and with older psychoanalytic interpretations of culture that confidently suggested motives denied by members of a society; and even by efforts to find hidden traces of traumatic violence in individual lives or social memory. So for those of us interested in the hidden, the unspoken, even the unspeakable, or in the mysterious specters that haunt individuals and polities, how do we avoid reproducing a colonial anthropology of “knowing better” than those with whom we work?

My initial answer to this is that I am advocating not only a different form of theorizing, but a different form of listening and engagement that involves a mode of mutual discovery. The old view of the psychoanalyst who reads your mind, who knows what you do not know about yourself, is of course not an accurate description of clinical psychoanalysis. It is rather an expression of a popular anxiety. The critical issue for psychoanalysis in its clinical mode, rather than in its positivist mode, is the process of discovery, the cultivation of a way of remembering and reflecting on the significance attached to memories, of resistances and repressions, in less romantic ways than the “romance of resistance.” And this form of discovery is essentially mutual and collaborative. The real point is that the analyst cannot know ahead of time what will emerge in the analytic process. Anthropologists do not and cannot “know better than” the members of societies with which they work. We can only discover what everybody else already knows, or discover in collaboration with members of a society what is not easily knowable, what is bound up in the complicities and the “after the facts,” what lies at the complex intersection of the psychological and the political. And our interpretations of these matters always remain provisional, open to revision.

It is clear to me that a phenomenology of everyday politics—or of psychopathology, or other forms of experience—and a narratology, aimed at listening for stories and identifying
plausible motives, are utterly essential to understand subjects and subjective experience. What is equally clear to me from my current vantage in the field in Indonesia is that these are not enough, that additional and often competing theories of subjectivity and forms of ethnographic practice, nearly all in conversation with contemporary forms of psychoanalysis, need to be joined with the phenomenological to address the issues discussed in this essay.

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Notes

2. Hallowell’s writings on the “self,” “object orientation,” perception of time, space, and persons, were explicitly phenomenological, and referred directly both to the neo-Kantian Cassirer and to phenomenological psychology (e.g., Hallowell 1955:chs. 4,8,10, 11).

3. Although he read and drew upon psychoanalysis—most notably in his use of Kohut’s distinction “experience-near” versus “experience-distant” (Kohut 1971)—Geertz refused to make explicit a psychology, even as he refused to reflect explicitly on the ghosts of 1965 Indonesia (see essays by Robert LeVine and by Byron and Mary-Jo Good, as well as Geertz’s response, in Shweder and Good 2003).

4. It is hazardous to mention Jackson and Csordas, however important, as central to a theoretical tradition that has been so generative for so many. Jackson’s 1996 collection on “new directions in phenomenological anthropology,” which includes essays by Desjarlais and Arthur and Joan Kleinman, and Csordas’s 1994a collection on “embodiment and experience” demonstrate the reach of the phenomenological tradition in the mid-1990s. Writings by younger scholars, such as Sarah Willen (2007) and Jason Throop (2010) suggest the continuing potency of the phenomenological tradition within anthropology.

5. For studies of mental illness, this work is most closely linked to that of Ellen Corin (e.g., Corin 1990, 1998; Corin and Lauzon 1992; Corin et al. 2004) and Janis Jenkins (e.g., Jenkins 1991, 2004; Jenkins and Carpenter-Song 2008). See Desjarlais (1994) for an important critical perspective from within this tradition.

6. It is obvious that many leading phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, were deeply engaged politically. It is also true that there have been various attempts to develop a “critical phenomenology” aimed at rich descriptions of the embodied experiences of repressive political processes. My argument is rather that most forms of phenomenology provide limited conceptual frames for linking the political and the psychological in ways that have become increasingly common in much contemporary writing on subjectivity.

Some of Michael Jackson’s work, such as his writing about the lives of Australian aboriginal peoples in Minima Ethnographica (Jackson 1998), takes on colonial–postcolonial experience in a richly phenomenological voice. Such ethnographic writing is, unfortunately, rare.

7. See the Introduction to Postcolonial Disorders (Good et al. 2008a) for our fullest exposition of these ideas to date.

8. For example, see Good and Subandi 2003; Good and colleagues 2007, 2010a.

9. The team includes Carla Marchira, psychiatrist from the Department of Psychiatry, and M. A. Subandi, Nida Ul Hasanat, and Muhana Sofiati Utami, psychologists from the Faculty of Psychology, Gadjah Mada University. For analysis of the study from which this case is drawn, see Good and colleagues 2010a. All of our research is
subject to regular review by the human studies committees of Harvard Medical School and the Faculty of Medicine of Gadjah Mada University.

10. An analysis of this case also appears in Good in press a. Mas Anto was part of a small set of eight longitudinal case studies of persons we began interviewing, along with their family members, during a first episode of psychosis. In this study, after individuals and family care providers agreed to participate in our research, members of a small research team (see N. 9) would visit the individual and family members in their homes. Over the first six months, team members visited these individuals four to six times. We have continued to visit these families annually for nearly a decade. Interviews are tape-recorded and transcribed. When one individual became incompetent to provide continued consent to participate in the research, her participation was suspended. See Good and colleagues 2010 for a description of the study, to which the case of this individual belonged, and initial analyses drawn from that research. This is only one of a number of first episode psychosis studies we have conducted using similar approaches.

11. Although the visits associated with our research projects are not intended as interventions, team members often respond to questions and offer advice and access to medical clinics. In a very few cases, if an individual was acutely psychotic and not taking medication, the psychiatrist on the team would recommend the family seek treatment or even, in this case, provide basic antipsychotic medications.

12. For our initial formulations linking analyses of madness and violence in Indonesia, see Good and Good 2001, Good and colleagues 2007, and Good and Good 2010. For our work in Aceh, see Good and colleagues 2010a, Grayman et al. 2009, and Good and Good in press.

The analysis suggested in this paragraph is developed more fully in a recent paper “Haunted by Aceh: Specters of Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia” (Good in press b) and in my 2010 Marett Lecture, “Theorizing the ‘Subject’ of Medical and Psychiatric Anthropology” (Good in press a). It relies not only on field research and primary sources, but on such critical analyses of violence and its traces in Indonesia as James Siegel’s writing (e.g., 1998, 2001, 2006) and Robert Lemelson’s pioneering film 40 Years of Silence (2008).

13. In my recent essay addressing “hauntings” of this kind, I draw on elaborations of Freud’s theory of the uncanny (e.g., Royle 2003), Derrida’s writings on specters and haunting (Derrida 1994, 1998), Avery Gordon’s feminist sociology of “ghostly matters” (Gordon 1997), and anthropologists who have addressed these issues (e.g., Aretxaga 2008; Das 2000; Garcia 2010; Taussig 1992; and Weismantel 2001).

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