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Left to right: Weatherhead Center Directors Robert D. Putnam, Michèle Lamont, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Beth A. Simmons, and Jorge I. Domínguez at the Warren and Anita Manshel Lecture in American Foreign Policy held on December 12 in honor of Professor Nye. Photo credit: Martha Stewart
I am wrapping up my second year as director of the Weatherhead Center, which has been an intense period: this fall was consumed by the external review, and this spring by the implementation of many recommendations from the review committee. The staff and I look forward to a more leisurely pace next year. I particularly relish future opportunities to discuss research with colleagues when the Center’s infrastructural reform is behind us.

The external review recommendations encouraged us to make two major changes. The first is the creation of Weatherhead Research Clusters, which take the place of the Weatherhead Initiatives for the next three years (as a new pilot program). Each cluster will focus on challenging and original questions in international, transnational, global, and comparative social science. These integrative projects will foster intellectual energy in the Center by actively conducting multidisciplinary research within our walls. We also hope to boost connectivity by linking faculty with graduate students, undergraduates, postdoctoral fellows, and visitors associated with the Weatherhead Scholars Program.

Up to five clusters will be put in place, but we will start slowly with only three this fall. One cluster, led by Professors Dani Rodrik and Bart Bonikowski, will focus on the political economy of global populism and will assemble a group of political scientists, economists, and sociologists working on this theme. In my role as Center director, I will direct another, which will focus on comparative inequality and social inclusion. A third cluster, led by Professors Sven Beckert, Charles S. Maier, Sugata Bose, and Jean Comaroff will focus on historical forces that have produced global transformation. Benefitting from a lower level of funding, these scholars will work closely with other faculty to address specific research questions related to this broader historical process. We will happily share further research details this fall. And stay tuned for another cluster competition in AY2017–2018.

The second major change involves folding in our former Fellows Program into our new Weatherhead Scholars Program, set to launch in the fall of 2017. We selected twenty-one individuals who will constitute the first cohort of the new program. This program will integrate a balanced mix of postdoctoral fellows, visiting faculty, and highly selected practitioners, and will be closely tied to the research activities conducted by our faculty and our new research clusters, as well as current Weatherhead Initiatives. New scholars will include practitioner Adrian Abbecassis, a close advisor to François Hollande; Nicole Elizabeth del Rosario CuUnjieng from the University of the Philippines, who will study pan-Asianism and the Filipino nation; and Matthias Koenig from the University of Gottingen, who will research the incorporation of minorities in modern nation states and the governance of religious diversity. We will share the full list of Scholars in the fall. I am delighted that Kathleen Molony will serve as the director of the Weatherhead Scholars Program.

Still more changes are underway. The Director’s Lunch Seminar will be recast into the Weatherhead Forum and will meet every second Wednesday at noon in the Bowie-Vernon Room (K262). WCFIA affiliates from programs, initiatives, and clusters will introduce their work by leading Weatherhead Forum sessions. We have every expectation that this new Weatherhead Forum will become a vibrant and engaging seminar for our community. If we support your research, you should plan to be there and be part of the conversation!

In addition, the Canada Program will undergo a leadership change as the program celebrates its fiftieth year. I am pleased that Timothy J. Colton, Morris and Anna Feldberg Professor of Government and Russian Studies, and former chair of the Department of Government, has agreed to serve as chair of the steering committee for this program.

Canadian author and activist Naomi Klein kicked off the fiftieth-anniversary celebrations of the Canada Program with a public lecture on April 19. Festivities will continue with a series of talks organized by Harvard Graduate School of Design’s Pierre Bélanger, associate professor of landscape architecture, that will bring to Harvard issues concerning settler colonialism—which deserve to be highlighted as we celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Canadian constitution.

I want to thank the dedicated members of the staff, the executive committee, and the steering committee for their deep involvement in the external review of the Center. I am satisfied with the process and hope that many will feel similarly. I wish you all a restful and productive summer, with the hope that we will have a bit more time to catch up next year.

Michèle Lamont, Weatherhead Center Director
Three Faculty Associates Elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Congratulations to three WCFIA Faculty Associates on their election to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Torben Iversen, Marc Melitz, and Jonathan Zittrain are part of the 237th class of members. Academy members include some of the world’s most accomplished scholars, scientists, writers, artists, as well as civic, business, and philanthropic leaders.

Byron J. Good Wins Lifetime Achievement Award

Faculty Associate Byron J. Good, professor of anthropology at Harvard University and professor of medical anthropology at Harvard Medical School, won the 2017 Society for Psychological Anthropology Lifetime Achievement Award. The award is given by the American Anthropological Association every year. The award “honors career-long contributions to psychological anthropology that have substantially influenced the field and its development.”

Michèle Lamont Awarded 2017 Erasmus Prize

Weatherhead Center Director Michèle Lamont, Robert I. Goldman Professor of European Studies and professor of sociology and of African and African American studies, was awarded the 2017 Erasmus Prize. One of Europe’s most illustrious recognitions, the prize honors individual or group contributions to European culture, society, or social science. The Erasmus Foundation recognizes Lamont’s “devoted contribution to social science research into the relationship between knowledge, power and diversity.”

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Wins Global Policy Book Award

Faculty Associate Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard Kennedy School, was awarded the Global Policy Book Award recently for his 2015 book, Is the American Century Over? The award, given by the Institute for Leadership Studies at Loyola Marymount University, recognizes books that make a profound impact on the discussion of global politics.

Frank Dobbin Wins HBR McKinsey Award

Faculty Associate Frank Dobbin, professor of sociology, won the HBR McKinsey Award for best Harvard Business Review article of the year along with coauthor Alexandra Kalev. Their article, “Why Diversity Programs Fail,” reveals that decades of workplace programs intended to foster diversity haven’t been successful.

Maya Jasanoff Wins Windham-Campbell Prize

Faculty Associate Maya Jasanoff, Coolidge Professor of History at Harvard University, won the 2017 Windham-Campbell Prize. The prize, given by Yale University, was awarded to eight recipients honored for their literary achievement or promise. Jasanoff is the author of two award-winning works of nonfiction, and has a forthcoming book called The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World, to be published in November 2017.

Theodore C. Bestor Appointed to Global Board of Directors

Faculty Associate Theodore C. Bestor, Reischauer Institute Professor of Social Anthropology, was appointed to the Board of Delegates of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), as the representative for the Association of Asian Studies. He will also serve on the Executive Committee of the Board of Delegates. The ACLS is the preeminent representative of American scholarship in the humanities and related social sciences.

Margot Moinester Receives Doctoral Fellowship

Graduate Student Associate Margot Moinester, PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology, has received a two-year American Bar Foundation Doctoral Fellowship. The American Bar Foundation (ABF) is committed to developing the next generation of scholars in the field of law and social science. The purpose of the fellowship is to encourage original and significant empirical and interdisciplinary research on the study of law and inequality.

Herbert C. Kelman Awarded National Order of Merit

Faculty Associate Emeritus Herbert C. Kelman, Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, was recently presented with the Grand Decoration of Honor for Services to the Republic of Austria. According to the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation, the prize “recognizes Kelman’s pioneering role in contemporary peace research and his extraordinary intellectual achievements.”

The Nature Conservancy Appoints Calestous Juma to Global Board of Directors

Faculty Associate Calestous Juma, Professor of the Practice of International Development at Harvard Kennedy School, was appointed as a member of the global board of directors at The Nature Conservancy. Guided by science, The Nature Conservancy is a global conservation organization dedicated to conserving land and water.
New Books

Presenting recent publications by Weatherhead Center Affiliates

Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy
By Daniel Ziblatt
(Cambridge University Press, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Daniel Ziblatt is a professor of government, Harvard University.

The Chessboard and the Web
By Anne-Marie Slaughter
(Yale University Press, 2017)
Weatherhead Center alum Anne-Marie Slaughter is president and CEO of New America. She was the former director of policy planning at the US State Department.

Realizing Roma Rights
Edited by Jacqueline Bhabha, Andrzej Mirga, and Margareta Matache
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Jacqueline Bhabha is the Professor of the Practice of Health and Human Rights, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.

The Law of Nations in Global History
By C. H. Alexandrowicz; Edited by David Armitage and Jennifer Pitts
(Oxford University Press, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate David Armitage is the Lloyd C. Blankfein Professor of History, Harvard University.

Paradoxes of Green: Landscapes of a City-State
By Gareth Doherty
(University of California Press, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Gareth Doherty is an assistant professor of landscape architecture, Harvard Graduate School of Design. Go to epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu for our blog post on this book.

Social Policy Expansion in Latin America
By Candelaria Garay
(Cambridge University Press, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Candelaria Garay is an assistant professor of public policy, Harvard Kennedy School.

Herbert C. Kelman: A Pioneer in the Social Psychology of Conflict Analysis and Resolution
Edited by Herbert C. Kelman and Ronald J. Fisher
(Springer, 2016)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate (emeritus) Herbert C. Kelman is the Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, Harvard University.

The Truth about Crime: Sovereignty, Knowledge, Social Order
By Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff
(University of Chicago Press, 2016)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Jean Comaroff is the Alfred North Whitehead Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Harvard University. Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate John L. Comaroff is the Hugh K. Foster Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Harvard University.

Synthetic: How Life Got Made
By Sophia Roosth
(University of Chicago Press, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Sophia Roosth is an associate professor of the history of science, Harvard University.

Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know
By Timothy J. Colton
(Oxford University Press, 2016)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate and Harvard Academy Senior Scholar Timothy J. Colton is the Morris and Anna Feldberg Professor of Government and Russian Studies, Harvard University.
Civil Wars: A History in Ideas
By David Armitage
(Penguin Random House, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate David Armitage is the Lloyd C. Blankfein Professor of History, Harvard University. Go to epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu for our blog post on this book.

Demanding Justice in the Global South: Claiming Rights
Edited by Jean Grugel, Jewellord Nem Singh, Lorenza Fontana, and Anders Uhlin
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow Lorenza Fontana is a research associate, Open University.

Insider Threats
Edited by Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan
(Cornell University Press, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Matthew Bunn is a professor of practice, Harvard Kennedy School.

On the Move: Changing Mechanisms of Mexico-U.S. Migration
By Filiz Garip
(Princeton University Press, 2016)
Weatherhead Center alum Filiz Garip is a professor of anthropology, Cornell University.

The Man with the Poison Gun
By Serhii Plokhy
(One World Publications, 2016)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Serhii Plokhy is the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History, Harvard University.

El caso de Sacco y Vanzetti. Los Estados Unidos a juicio (The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: The United States on Trial)
By Moshik Temkin
(Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2016)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Moshik Temkin is an associate professor of public policy, Harvard Kennedy School.

Inheritance of Loss: China, Japan, and the Political Economy of Redemption After Empire
By Yukiko Koga
(University of Chicago Press, 2016)
Former Weatherhead Center Academy Scholar Yukiko Koga is an assistant professor of anthropology, City University of New York’s Hunter College.

Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists, and the Making of Global China
By Julian Gewirtz
(Harvard University Press, 2017)
Former Weatherhead Center Undergraduate Associate Julian Gewirtz is a Rhodes Scholar and doctoral candidate, Oxford University.

Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in Europe’s Scramble for Africa
By Steven Press
(Harvard University Press, 2017)
Former Weatherhead Center Graduate Student Associate Steven Press is an assistant professor of history, Stanford University.

Empowering All Students At Scale
Edited by Fernando M. Reimers
(Amazon, 2017)
Weatherhead Center Faculty Associated Fernando M. Reimers is the Ford Foundation Professor of International Education, Harvard Graduate School of Education.

Read the latest research by faculty and other affiliates of the Center by visiting: wcfia.harvard.edu/publications
NEW UNDERGRADUATE ASSOCIATES

The following students have been appointed Undergraduate Student Associates for the 2017–2018 academic year and have received grants to support travel in connection with their senior thesis research on international affairs.


Cengiz Cemaloglu (Social Anthropology), Williams/Lodge International Government and Public Affairs Fellow. Islamic finance and communal debt and risk in Malaysia.

Maria Amanda Flores (Social Anthropology and Ethnicity, Migration, Rights), Williams/Lodge International Government and Public Affairs Fellow. The human right to adequate housing in urban indigenous communities in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

Benjamin Grimm (Comparative Study of Religion and German & Scandinavian Studies), Williams/Lodge International Government and Public Affairs Fellow. Integration issues and religious identity among Muslim immigrants in Sweden.

Kamran Jamil (Social Studies and Global Health & Health Policy), Williams/Lodge International Government and Public Affairs Fellow. The impact of Pakistan’s 2011 Ministry of Health devolution on two provinces.

Angela Leocata (Social Anthropology), Frank M. Boas Undergraduate Fellow. The lay-counselor experience through a framework of caregiving in Goa, India.

Margot Mai (Joint in Anthropology, Romance Languages & Literatures, and Global Health & Health Policy), Williams/Lodge International Government and Public Affairs Fellow. Political tension between French feminism and Muslim immigrant communities.

Daniel Martinez (Social Studies), Williams/Lodge International Government and Public Affairs Fellow. The relationship between revolutionary movements and race in Colombia, specifically focusing on the Benkos Biohó guerilla group.

Iman Masmoudi (Social Studies), Rogers Family Research Fellow. Islamic education in Tunisia with implications for the broader Muslim world.

Daniel Ott (Government), Williams/Lodge International Government and Public Affairs Fellow. Electoral College reform from a British perspective.

Theo Serlin (History), Frank M. Boas Undergraduate Fellow. Anglo-Indian MPs, nationalism, and competing internationalisms.


Junius Williams (African and African American Studies), Rogers Family Research Fellow. Contemporary Omani investment and economic development in East Africa.

Sohyun (Kate) Yoon (Social Studies), Undergraduate Canada Program Fellow. Multiculturalism and national identity in Canada.

2017 THOMAS TEMPLE HOOPES PRIZE WINNERS

The Weatherhead Center congratulates the following Undergraduate Associates and Juster Fellows who were awarded 2017 Thomas Temple Hoopes Prizes on the basis of their outstanding scholarly work.

Hana S. Connelly, “Kidnap in the Caucasus: Rethinking Russian Imperialism in the 19th Century.”

Samantha Deborah Luce, “Death and Taxis: Violence, Sovereignty, and the Politics of Mobility in Postapartheid South Africa.”

Sarah Nyangweso Michieka, “The 48th County: Kenyan State Diaspora Relations from 1990 and the Establishment of the Kenyan Diaspora Vote.”

Tessa Mattea Mrkusic, “Collapse the Distance: Climate Change Migration and Frontline Storytelling in the Republic of Kiribati.”
In 2017, the Canada Program is commemorating fifty years of Canadian Studies at Harvard, thanks to the William Lyon Mackenzie King Endowment. Since 1967, the program has hosted visiting Canadianist scholars in the social sciences and humanities, presented a distinguished speaker series on Canadian topics, and supported Harvard student dissertation and thesis research.

In the spring, the program held a number of events: a public lecture titled “This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate,” with Canadian journalist and author Naomi Klein; a workshop called “Critical Indigenous STS: Technoscience & Transition in Native North America,” organized by the 2016–2017 William Lyon Mackenzie King Postdoctoral Fellow Tom Özden-Schilling; and a faculty research conference called “Economic Issues Facing Indigenous People in Canada and the United States,” organized by the 2016–2017 WLMK Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies Krishna Pendakur. And in November, the program—along with the Mahindra Center for the Humanities—will co-host an event presenting Canadian author Michael Ondaatje, writer of the award-winning book The English Patient.

Eight Harvard students—representing the Law School, the T. H. Chan School of Public Health, the Graduate School of Design, and the College—are named Canada Research Fellows for the 2017–2018 academic year. The Canada Program will be awarding over $60,000 in support to the students with research interests ranging from national identity in Canada to the socioecological impact of Canadian-owned mineral extraction sites located in indigenous territories around the world.

In the fall, the program will welcome the 2017–2018 William Lyon Mackenzie King Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies, Charmaine Nelson, an art historian from McGill University. Nelson will be appointed through the Committee on Degrees in Studies of Women, Gender, and Sexuality.

Mireille Paquet, an assistant professor of political science at Concordia University, will join us as a 2017–2018 William Lyon Mackenzie King Postdoctoral Fellow. Paquet studies public policies for immigrant integration in Canada.


The following Harvard faculty accepted invitations to be WCFIA Faculty Associates during the 2016–2017 academic year:

**Pierre Bélanger**, Associate Professor of Landscape Architecture, Harvard Graduate School of Design. The intersection of territory, infrastructure, media, mapping, history, conflict, and power.

**Eve Blau**, Adjunct Professor of the History of Urban Form, Department of Urban Planning and Design, Harvard Graduate School of Design. Modern architecture and urbanism; postindustrial and postsocialist urban transitions; Central and Eastern Europe; and urban design and planning.

**Emmerich Davies**, Assistant Professor of Education, Harvard Graduate School of Education. Political economy of development and education, particularly in South Asia.

**Benjamin Enke**, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Harvard University. Behavioral, cultural, and experimental economics.

**Frances Hagopian**, Jorge Paulo Lemann Senior Lecturer on Government, Department of Government, Harvard University. Comparative politics, with a specialization in comparative Latin American and Brazilian politics; democratization and democratic governance; political representation; political institutions; religion in politics; and political economy.

**Ieva Jusioniute**, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and of Social Studies, Department of Anthropology, Harvard University. Political and legal anthropology; public anthropology; security; crime and violence; urban infrastructures; emergency management and response systems; statecraft, governance, and borders; news media and journalism; Argentina; Mexico; and US–Mexico border.

**Ya-Wen Lei**, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Harvard University. Political sociology; law and society; economic sociology; cultural sociology; Chinese studies; political communication; and urbanization.

**Scott Mainwaring**, Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor for Brazil Studies, Harvard Kennedy School. Democracy, authoritarianism, and party systems, primarily in Latin America.

**Gautam Rao**, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Harvard University. Applying insights from psychology to topics in economics, particularly in developing countries.

**Sophia Roosth**, Associate Professor, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University. History of biology; science and technology studies; and women and gender studies.


**S.V. Subramanian**, Professor of Population Health and Geography, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Harvard Chan School of Public Health. Social and contextual determinants of health; health inequalities in India; and understanding the causes and consequences of undernutrition among children in disadvantaged settings.

**Yuhua Wang**, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University. Corruption and the rule of law; authoritarian politics; state building and state capacity; and Chinese politics.

**Xiang Zhou**, Associate Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University. The causes and consequences of economic inequality; political culture and public opinion; and quantitative methods.
A LIFETIME IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE

Although we now think of it as a failed effort, the 1993 Oslo Accord forever changed the nature of the Middle East conflict. It marked the first time Israelis and Palestinians recognized each other’s national identity and legitimacy; it created the Palestinian National Authority and the promise of a two-state solution.

Many give credit to longtime Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Herbert C. Kelman, Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, for helping plant the seeds for Oslo more than two decades ago—when he began his efforts to bring together politically influential Israelis and Palestinians in confidential meetings, designed to explore the two sides’ needs and fears and engage in a process of joint thinking about possible solutions responsive to their concerns.

To Resolve Conflict, Listen First

Herb Kelman—a social and political psychologist, peace researcher, and educator—has conducted problem-solving workshops and related activities, with a primary focus on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, for more than four decades. In 1971, he and Stephen P. Cohen, with whom he co-taught a graduate seminar on Social-Psychological Approaches to International Relations, conducted a pilot workshop in the context of the class, in which the students participated as apprentice member of the third party. Such workshops became a standard feature of this course throughout the 1980s and 1990s and a model for Kelman’s work over the decades.

In 1976, Kelman joined the Center for International Affairs (to be renamed the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs in 1998) as a Faculty Associate and executive committee member and soon after began to chair its Middle East Seminar. The seminar series, which brings in scholars, political figures, and other Middle East specialists to address political, economic, and social issues in the region, is held at the Weatherhead Center every other week during the academic year. Since 1997, Lenore G. Martin and Sara Roy have joined Kelman as co-chairs of the seminar.

At the initiative of Kelman’s growing number of graduate students and associates working on various aspects of international and intercommunal conflict, Kelman applied for and received a grant from the Hewlett Foundation in 1993, to establish the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at the Center for International Affairs. PICAR was run by its members, all of whom had their own projects—in many cases dissertation research. Most of the members of PICAR had at least some experience with Israeli–Palestinian workshops and a number of the student members wrote their dissertations on various aspects of the workshop process, based on systematic observations of workshops and analysis of workshop notes.

A major area of practice and research for many PICAR members was the Middle East. However, several other initiatives were developed by PICAR members, including projects focusing on Sri Lanka, the Balkans, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Colombia, and US-Cuban relations. PICAR also ran a Seminar on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Center for International Affairs. Although PICAR ended in 2003, the seminar has continued to this day at the Weatherhead Center. It has been renamed the Herbert C. Kelman Seminar on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution. It is chaired by Donna Hicks and, since 2003, it has been co-sponsored (in addition to the Weatherhead Center) by the Program on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School, the Shorenstein Center at the Kennedy School of Government, and the Nieman Foundation of Journalism.

Kelman’s latest Israeli–Palestinian working group ran from 2004 to 2013. In these confidential workshops and working-group sessions—and there were more than seventy of them over the years—Kelman brought together political influencers face-to-face in a private setting, not to hash out terms of a political agreement, but to talk about the needs, fears, and concerns on both sides of the conflict that would have to be addressed in order to pro-
duce a mutually acceptable agreement. Kelman believed that to make progress in achieving a political agreement, the parties had to understand each other’s experiences and acknowledge each other’s identity and legitimacy. He believed in this process so strongly, he would dedicate his career to it.

As Kelman writes in the journal *Peace and Conflict*, the purpose of the Israeli-Palestinian workshops, and of the model in general, was twofold: “…to produce change—in the form of new insights into the conflict and new ideas for resolving it—in the particular individuals who are sitting around the workshop table, and to transfer these changes to the political debate and decision-making process in their respective societies.”

“We preferred to work with people who were politically influential but not bound by an official position—such as community leaders, parliamentarians, party activists, former officials, journalists, and politically engaged academics,” explains Kelman, who retired from teaching in 1999 and lives with his wife and lifelong collaborator, Rose, in Cambridge. “Someone in the official hierarchy, like the foreign ministry, would be too constrained. You can’t have somebody of that level in a group with people from the other side and say something without having to worry that it might be construed as policy. It’s very hard to get out of those official roles and think and speak freely,” says Kelman.

Steve Bloomfield, who joined the Center in 1993, and served as executive director from 2006–2015, remembers Kelman’s Israeli-Palestinian workshops as being rather daring in their construction. “People he recruited would come at some risk to be identified as being in the same room with the other party.”

Kelman’s objective was to promote a process that would gradually change the political culture in the region. His work helped to create the conditions that made the Oslo agreement possible and contributed to the hopeful shift in the Middle East in the 1990s.

“He has dedicated his life toward the promotion of peace with an optimism that is now not at all evident in the macro-politics of the region,” says Bloomfield.

When Kelman’s workshops began, it was a time when realist thinking held sway. Political realism said that a nation’s chief motivation was to accumulate power, and all conflicts arose from this dynamic. A new group of scholars would later challenge this view by emphasizing cooperation and interdependence between nations, instead of a zero-sum, win-lose power scenario.

Weatherhead Center Associate Donna Hicks teamed up with Kelman for many years and served as deputy director of PICAR from 1994 to 2003. She says they approached the Middle East conflict from a group dynamics perspective, not entirely through the lens of economics, policy, or game theory.

“As a social psychologist, Herb recognized that there was another dimension of conflict that wasn’t being addressed, and it was what he called the social-psychological dimension: looking at the inner worlds of people and asking what it was psychologically that drove them into these complex situations. A few others worked in this field, but Herb was really the pioneer,” Hicks says.

**Early Days as an Activist**

As a student at Brooklyn College in 1943–47, Kelman became active in the civil rights and peace movements. In the summer of 1944, he attended a conference of politically engaged conscientious objectors in Chicago that would put him on the path of his life’s work. On his way home on the train after the conference, Kelman sat next to one of the conference speakers—a man who had spent time in prison as a draft resister and whose presentation had been particularly eloquent. In their conversation he said that—if he were at Kelman’s stage in life—he would study psychology and sociology, because these were the disciplines most relevant to Kelman’s concerns with issues of peace, justice, and social change. On returning to Brooklyn College, Kelman chose to major in psychology and very clearly recognized his special interest in social psychology.

One of his earliest public actions was a demonstration in 1946 at the swimming pool in Palisades Park, New Jersey, which discriminated against blacks. Following Gandhian methods of nonviolent direct action, he and his peers kept standing in the ticket line at the pool behind a black member of the group who had been denied admission. The police were called and ordered the protesters to move. Several members of the group, including Kelman, who disobeyed the order, were arrested. A year later he was arrested again, following a demonstration at the Pentagon against nuclear weapons testing. On their way back from the Pentagon to the DC railroad station, he and other members of the group continued to carry their picket signs and were arrested for “parading without a permit.”

In 1947, Kelman began graduate work in the Psychology Department at Yale. His doctoral research focused on social influence and attitude change and he firmly established himself as an experimental social psychologist. However, he never forgot his reasons for going into the field. While still in graduate school, he and Arthur Gladstone—a colleague at Yale—were instrumental in starting the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War, the first peace research organization in North America.

After earning his PhD in 1951, he moved to Baltimore for a postdoc at Johns Hopkins, and during this time met his future wife and longtime collaborator, Rose. Both became active in the nascent civil rights movement in that city.

“Baltimore was my first direct experience of racial segregation in the United States on a daily basis. In 1951, the city was completely segregated. There was no place other than the airport where blacks and whites could sit down together to have a meal or a cup of coffee. I could not live there without doing something about this,” Kelman remembers.
The following year, he co-founded the Baltimore chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), whose efforts led to the desegregation of lunch counters in the five-and-ten cent stores in downtown Baltimore, a key experience in his life as an activist.

“Even though the founders of the CORE chapter were a group of white men with a pacifist background, we were successful in reaching into the black community, largely through three avenues: people—mostly women—affiliated with the black churches; upwardly mobile black women belonging to the ILGWU; and faculty members at Morgan State College, an all-black school at the time,” says Kelman.

Via picket lines, sit-ins, negotiations with store owners, and presentations at stockholder meetings of the parent companies, the group prevailed, and barriers at lunch counters came down across the city. The experience was proof that change could indeed happen, but you had to work hard for it, “one discussion, one lunch counter at a time,” as Kelman puts it.

“It was the most exciting experience. Baltimore was ready for change. The Supreme Court had just ruled on desegregating schools. But it needed people to work on it,” Kelman recalls.

A Career as an Interdisciplinary Scholar-Practitioner

In 1954, after three years in Baltimore, Kelman was invited as one of the first group of fellows at the newly established Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Science at Stanford. There he convened a group of the fellows—many of whom were senior scholars in various disciplines—to tell them about the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War and solicit their advice on how to advance its agenda. These discussions led to the decision to launch the first journal in the interdisciplinary field of peace research, called the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and to publish that journal out of the University of Michigan. The editorial work on the journal at the University of Michigan soon led to the decision to form an interdisciplinary Center for Research on Conflict Resolution.

In the meantime, Kelman finished his year at the Stanford Center fully committed to his role as an interdisciplinary social scientist. From 1995 to 1957, he was a research psychologist at the National Institute for Mental Health, where he completed a manuscript reporting his theoretical and experimental work on processes of social influence, which earned him the Socio-Psychological Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1956. In 1957, he joined Harvard's then Department of Social Relations as a Lecturer on Social Psychology. In 1962, he moved to the University of Michigan as a professor of social psychology and research psychologist at the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. During the seven years he spent at Michigan, he completed work and published an interdisciplinary volume entitled *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (1965). The book was more widely read by IR scholars and students than by social psychologists and no doubt helped to give him the credentials that led to his appointment to the Center for International Affairs in 1976 and his election as President of the International Studies Association in 1977.

In 1966, while still at the University of Michigan, Kelman met John Burton, a former Australian diplomat who had established a Center for the Analysis of Conflict at the University of London—a meeting that marked a major turning point in his career. When Burton told him about his experiments in unofficial diplomacy, which brought together influential members of conflicting societies in an academic setting, to explore each other’s perspective under the guidance of a third party of social scientists, Kelman immediately saw it as a way of putting into practice the social-psychological approach to international conflict that he had been thinking and writing about. Burton invited Kelman to London to join the third party in an exercise on the Cyprus conflict. Soon thereafter, Kelman began thinking about building on Burton’s model and applying it to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the meantime, Kelman returned to Harvard for good in 1969, as the Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics. His first experiment in building on Burton’s model was the pilot workshop in 1971. At the time of the Middle East war in 1973, he decided to put this work at the top of his agenda. Initially, with a “balanced” team that included two Jewish-American and three Arab-American social scientists—as well as Rose—he traveled throughout the Middle East and organized a variety of workshops and related events. With different partners and different formats, he continued these activities until 2013. Kelman tells a story that encapsulates the process of change his program was designed to evoke:

We were in a workshop and things weren’t getting anywhere. The Israelis were, in a sense, asking the Palestinians for help for something and Palestinians were just not giving. And then at one point an Israeli participant, who happened to be a woman—probably not a coincidence—acknowledged some of the wrongdoings of Israelis toward Palestinians. She showed some understanding, you might say sympathy, for the Palestinian situation with

Continued on page 20 >
The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs solemnly acknowledges the loss of one of its founders, Thomas C. Schelling. A Nobel Prize-winning economist and arms control theorist during the Cold War, Schelling passed away on December 13, at the age of 95.

"Tom was not only a brilliant economist, he was a delightful colleague who was a crucial part of the founding faculty of the Center," remembers Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Faculty Associate, who joined the CFIA in 1961 as a research assistant.

In 1958, Schelling, along with Robert R. Bowie, Henry A. Kissinger and Edward S. Mason, cofounded the Center for International Affairs at Harvard as a home for basic research in international relations, at a time when academia did not recognize the legitimacy of this discipline. Schelling and his colleagues at the Center were committed to nurturing a generation of leaders who would be knowledgeable about other nations and their policies. When he arrived at Harvard, international relations was represented by its Russian Research Center. Indeed, the times had called for the need to study the country’s main adversary, but Schelling and his colleagues understood that broadening scholarship in international relations would be a strategic advantage beyond any outcomes with the Soviet Union.

While at the Center, Schelling expanded his scholarship of political-military issues, and with support from the National Science Foundation began his decades-long fascination with the application of game theory to military interactions. With the advent of nuclear arms, the rules of traditional engagement had been rendered obsolete. Schelling made his thinking transparent and accessible to everyone. He was known for creating models and games that simulated the different sides of a conflict.

Schelling's theories on the behavioral strategies in nuclear war shaped the course of events in the Kennedy administration during the height of the Cold War. His work in game theory is credited for calming tensions during this period by providing a plausible explanation for a continued mutual stand-off. Most notably, he showed how tacit cooperation can emerge between two conflicting parties.

"Tom Schelling, one of the great minds at Harvard, was a wonderful human being, always helpful to his younger colleagues. The rigor with which he applied rationality to the analysis of international politics is unforgotten and in fact changed strategic thinking on nuclear strategy for the benefit of world peace," says Karl Kaiser, Senior Associate, Program on Transatlantic Relations.

Schelling began his academic career as a professor of economics at Yale in 1953. Before coming to Harvard, he helped administer the Marshall Plan in Paris and Copenhagen and helped negotiate foreign aid programs in Washington, DC. At RAND, he studied nuclear weapons strategy and made important contacts, many of whom he would invite to become colleagues at the Center. By joining the Center in 1958, he expected to establish an academic career then go back to government, which he never did. He became a faculty member of the John F. Kennedy School of Government in 1969 and left in 1990 to join the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. In 2005 he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, along with Robert Aumann, for his pioneering work in game theory, a key subject of his 1960 book The Strategy of Conflict. Schelling worked on this book at the Center, which published it formally under its auspices.

Later in his career Schelling applied behavioral analysis to problems such as racial segregation, addiction, and climate change. Some of his research concepts have become part of common parlance. He is credited for using the term “tip point” to describe the dynamic of whites moving out of racially mixed neighborhood to avoid minority status. The familiar phrase “collateral damage” became widely used after it first appeared in Schelling’s 1961 paper titled "Dispersal, Deterrence, and Damage." Schelling entered the realm of popular culture when he consulted with director Stanley Kubrick to conceptualize the "doomsday machine" for the 1964 movie Dr. Strangelove.

Kennedy School colleague Dani Rodrik remembers Schelling as one of the giants in his field. "He was one of the most original, brilliant minds I have ever encountered. Once you grasped the deep insights in his work, they changed the way you think forever. There are few scholars about whom you can say: if he had not been around, our understanding of the world would have been far more incomplete."
GLOBAL FOOD+ 2017

Global Food+ 2017 was a public event held on February 24, 2017 that featured an afternoon of “speed talk” presentations by two dozen top scholars in the Boston area. This event highlighted current research findings at the important nexus between food, agriculture, health, society, and the environment.

The twenty-four presenters included scholars from a wide range of disciplines, including anthropology, economics, political science, history, sociology, engineering, biology, and environmental sciences. Each delivered a seven-minute summary of his or her most recent research findings.

Following these presentations, Dr. Shenggen Fan, director general of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), gave the keynote address. Fan offered his views on what scholars from our Boston-area research institutions can provide in the larger global effort to understand and improve outcomes in food and farming.

Photos: Spring 2017 Events

2017 UNDERGRADUATE THESIS CONFERENCE

The Weatherhead Center Undergraduate Thesis Conference was held on February 2–3, 2017 and featured a series of panels chaired by Faculty Associates and Graduate Student Associates. Clustered by regional or disciplinary themes, each student’s presentation was followed by questions, commentary, and feedback for the enhancement of their thesis work in its final stages. Photo credit: Kristin Caulfield

Top (left to right): Melda Ayse Gurakar (Social Studies) presented “Ottoman Law in Practice versus Theory: Women and Judges Coming Together to Devise Unique Solutions”; Jessica Margaret Dorfmann (Social Studies) presented “Decolonizing Multiculturalism: Teaching Maori History in a ‘Nation of Immigrants’”; and Hana S. Connelly (History & Literature) presented “Nineteenth-Century Literary Representations of Georgia versus the North Caucasus, Specifically Focusing on the Kidnapping of Two Georgian Princesses by North Caucasian Tribal Leader, Imam Shamil, in 1854” during a session entitled “Identity and Representation” chaired by Erez Manela, professor of history.

Bottom: Samantha Deborah Luce (Social Studies) presented “Taxi Violence and the Politics of Mobility in Post-Apartheid South Africa” on a panel entitled “Urban Inequality in the Global South.” Also on the panel were (left to right): Bharath Venkatesh (South Asian Studies), who presented “The Economic History of Transportation and Coffee Shops in South Asia” and Henry Sewall Udayan Shah (History & Literature), who presented “The Construction of Urban Citizenship through Beggary and Vagrancy in Bombay, 1898–1959.” The session was chaired by Sunil Amrith, Mehra Family Professor of South Asian Studies and professor of history.

Global Food+ 2017

Top: Shenggen Fan, director general of the International Food Policy Research Institute.

Bottom: Tsai Auditorium was packed for the four-hour Global Food+ 2017. Photo credit: Marena Lin
SCANCOR CONFERENCE

The SCANCOR–Weatherhead Partnership, directed by Frank Dobbin, held its first conference, “Organizations, Institutions, and Nation-States,” on May 11–12, 2017. SCANCOR explores the role of corporations—and other formal organizations—in the creation of international, social, environmental, economic, and political conventions and norms.

WEATHERHEAD INITIATIVE ON GLOBAL HISTORY FINAL SEMINAR

The Weatherhead Initiative on Global History (WIGH) held its final seminar of the year on April 3, 2017 with a talk by Timothy Mitchell, professor, Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies, Columbia University, entitled “Durability: A History of the Future, 1869–1912.”

THE HARVARD ACADEMY CELEBRATION

On April 26, 2017 The Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies held its 2016–2017 farewell reception at Loeb House and gave certificates to its departing second-year Scholars.

FINAL FELLOWS PROGRAM DINNER

Family and friends of the Fellows Program celebrated the 2016–2017 academic year on April 25, 2017 with a dinner at the Faculty Club. In 2017–2018 the Fellows Program will become the new Weatherhead Scholars Program.

CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT

SCANCOR: (Top) The 2016–2017 class of SCANCOR-Weatherhead Partnership scholars. (Bottom) SCANCOR scholars gather for their first conference at William James Hall. Photo credit: Lauren McLaughlin

WIGH: (Left to right) Graduate Student Commentator Aden Knaap, PhD Candidate, History Department, Harvard University; WIGH Chair Charles S. Maier, Leverett Saltonstall Professor of History, Harvard University; Sugata Bose, Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs, Harvard University; Speaker Timothy Mitchell, professor, Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies, Columbia University; and Commentator E. Roger Owen, A. J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History, Emeritus, Harvard University. Photo credit: Kristin Caulfield

Fellows Program: (Top, left to right) Karl Kaiser, Senior Associate, Program on Transatlantic Relations and adjunct professor of public policy, Emeritus, Harvard Kennedy School; Valentina Martinez, Fellow and political advisor, Vice President’s Office, Spain; and Rich Hollingsworth. (Bottom) The 2016–2017 Fellows. Photo credit: Bruce Jackan

The Harvard Academy: (Top) The 2016–2017 Harvard Academy Scholars along with several Senior Scholars, Weatherhead Center Director Michèle Lamont, and Harvard Academy Staff. (Bottom) Chair of The Harvard Academy, Jorge I. Domínguez presents second-year Academy Scholar Casey M. Lurtz, PhD, Department of History, University of Chicago, with her certificate. Photo credit: Michelle Nicholasen
It is an honor to give this Manshel Lecture this evening in honor of Joseph S. Nye, whom I have known for almost half a century. I will begin with a few remarks about Joe, before focusing on my major theme: whether, in light of the populist turn in American politics, the “American Century” that he has both explained and celebrated, will continue.

Joe is a master of globalization. It seems to me that whenever we have an e-mail exchange, he is somewhere in Asia—Tokyo, Beijing, or Delhi. His wisdom is sought everywhere. No wonder that he is iconic at the Kennedy School—a great thinker who has access to the highest levels of government around the world. Long ago I joked that Joe Nye only gets jet lag when he stays in Cambridge. But jetting around the world is not central to Joe’s identity. In some respects he is a peasant at heart—gradually expanding his eighteenth- and nineteenth-century farm—now forest—in Sandwich, New Hampshire. In others he is a woodsman. Let him take you on a hike on his property after the snow has just fallen. He will show you evidence of “nature red in tooth and claw” that you would probably not have noticed, and could not have interpreted, on your own.

I am not celebrating Joe’s peasant instincts or woodsman-ship tonight. Instead, I am celebrating him as an analyst of world politics and offering him a challenge, to which he will have an opportunity to respond.

Joe’s global status is not based on political maneuvering or trendy yet superficial discussions of world affairs, but on solid intellectual accomplishments. He was an early pioneer in pointing out the changes that were taking place in state-centered IR. Throughout his career he has emphasized both the relevance of power to state and nonstate behavior in an era of globalization, and the varied, nuanced aspects of what we call power.

In his most sustained discussion of power, The Future of Power, published in 2011, Joe defines “relational power” as the ability to affect others, in a particular domain, and therefore to achieve one’s preferred outcomes through: 1) the ability to affect others’ preferences; 2) the ability to frame issues and shape agendas; and 3) the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise do. The word, “ability,” implies the other principle conceptualization of power—as resources rather than relationally. Joe uses this resource conception in analyzing American power and I will also do so today, since resources can be observed directly, whereas inferring a power relationship in any given situation requires a causal inference. If a set of resources has been shown in a variety of situations to be linked to the ability to affect outcomes, we can regard them, in general, as power resources. We have to be aware that converting such resources into actual relational power is always contextual; but as an approximation, viewing power in terms of resources makes identifying changes in power more feasible. When I discuss changes in United States power in this talk, therefore, I will be referring to power resources.

In this talk, I will revisit a question that Joe has asked in his work over the last twenty-five years: “Is the American century over?” Joe has given this question a consistently negative answer, and has recently, in a book with this title, extended his expected time frame for the American century to 2041. Before reaching this conclusion, Joe directly addressed the question that seems central to me: Will its internal cultural and political divisions decisively weaken the United States in world politics? He pointed out that “culture wars could adversely affect American power if citizens become so distracted or divided by
domestic battles over social and cultural issues that the United States loses the capacity to act collectively in foreign policy” (ACO: 73). But in his answer he claimed that “past culture battles over slavery, prohibition, McCarthyism, and civil rights were more serious than any of today’s issues” (ibid). He did not expect disruption of American power as a result of internal social divisions.

Joe’s answer seemed more plausible in 2015 than it does today, in light of the recent election in the United States. Perhaps he now agrees—we will soon see. At any rate, my rather gloomy thesis this afternoon is that we are moving toward a world in which American power will decline, in a process accelerated by the election of Donald Trump. The American century will soon be over. With this prospect in mind, I will conclude by asking about the role of multilateral institutions in world that lacks powerful American leadership.

Since I am as stunned as anyone about the events of recent months, I do not claim to provide definitive answers. I hope, however, to stimulate our conversation about the dramatic and disturbing political changes taking place in the world. I will first briefly discuss populism, since populism seems to me to be shifting the contours of contemporary world politics. I will then assess likely shifts in American power as a result of the election of President Trump, arguing that for the first time we can glimpse the end, ahead of us, of American hegemony. At the end I will briefly reflect on the role of multilateral institutions after the American century is over.

I. Populism, Globalization, and Interdependence

What do I mean by “populism”? The crucial identifying mark of populism, as I define it, following my colleague Jan-Werner Mueller, is the belief of people comprising the populist movement that there is an authentic “people” whose ability to shape their own destiny politically is obstructed by self-serving elites manipulating complex political institutions. Such a belief makes these people receptive to emerging political leaders who claim, whether on the Left or the Right, to represent the authentic voice of the people. These leaders claim either that they listen to the people or intuit their views—and then they serve as an amplifier, sharing these views with others. In Huey Long’s day the medium was radio; for Donald Trump it is Twitter. Social media are wonderful tools for populists since they bypass elite gatekeepers and enable populist leaders to speak directly to their followers.

The populist leader is in direct contact with “the people,” and is therefore authentic, whatever his or her other characteristics. Attacks on Donald Trump or Marine Le Pen only make such leaders seem more authentic to their followers, proving that malign elites oppose them. Indeed, there is a danger that populism will become antipluralistic, turning against institutions that seem to thwart the popular will. Democracy to populists means following the will of the people, even if that will challenges long-maintained practices and even rights. When Erdogan in Turkey imprisons hundreds of journalists merely for criticizing his regime, he claims to do so in the interests of the real people of Turkey, his followers—not in the interests of an abstract ideology such as socialism or communism or simply to ensure continuation of his authoritarian rule.

Populism is opposed to cosmopolitanism and globalization. The prime minister of the United Kingdom was appealing to populists in her country when she declared this year that anyone who claims to be a citizen of the world is a citizen of nowhere. Populism is generally opposed to immigration, since it views “the people” as people with a common language who have long inhabited a particular territory and have therefore traditionally constituted the nation. It is clear that in contemporary Europe and the United States, populism is fueled by fear of immigration. Strikingly, Japan, which experiences little immigration, does not have a populist movement.

Unlike Nazism and fascism, populism is not necessarily militarily aggressive. Mueller points to Venezuela under Chavez as a populist regime that was not aggressive. In the recent US campaign for president, it was Donald Trump who accused his opponent of being too aggressive militarily—supporting the 2003 attack on Iraq, advocating a no-fly zone in Syria, and refusing to work more effectively with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Populism is a contested concept and I do not claim to be providing an authoritative definition. But now you know what I mean when I claim that populism is a threat to global interdependence and to multilateral institutions—that is, to globalization.

One of the ironies of populism’s challenge to globalization is that on a worldwide basis, globalization has been an equalizing force. People in formerly poor countries that opened themselves to the outside world—most notably, China and India—have been its biggest beneficiaries. Global inequality has fallen dramatically. If there were a world polity with elections, and people voted according to their economic interests, the global governors would have good odds of being re-elected. But inequality has increased in the West. Working-class people engaged in manufacturing industries in the developed countries of the OECD have seen their incomes stagnate and their future prospects dim. How much of this effect is due to technological change as opposed to globalization is not entirely clear, but from a political standpoint this is not important. The stagnation or even retrogression of income and status are.

One way to view our current situation is to view it through Karl Marx’s insights about modes of production. Marx thought that all modes of production eventually generate contradictions that destroy the superstructures that rest on them. He expected that capitalism would be destroyed by a revolutionary working class that it brought into being. This expectation was wrong. But we can interpret current
populist opposition to globalization as suggesting that another contradiction has appeared. This is the contradiction between the enormous forces of productivity unleashed by global capitalism, on the one hand, and the losses suffered by masses of people in democracies, on the other. This contradiction would not pose such a systemic problem except for the fact that the losers have the capacity to vote against the operation of the system, which they see as having been manipulated by elites at their expense.

Those of us who have celebrated as well as analyzed globalization share some responsibility for the rise of populism. We demonstrated that an institutional infrastructure was needed to facilitate globalization, but this infrastructure was constructed by and for economic elites. They pursued a path of action favored by academics such as Joe and myself, building multilateral institutions to promote cooperation, but they built these institutions in a biased way. Global finance and global business had a privileged status, and there was little regard for the interests of ordinary workers. World Trade Organization rules emphasized openness and discouraged measures to create what John Ruggie has called “embedded” liberalism, which would cushion the effects of globalization on those disadvantaged by it. The multilateral and bilateral investment treaties of the 1990s incorporated provisions that could be exploited by corporate lawyers to oppose health and safety regulation by developing countries that paralleled long-standing measures by OECD countries. Most outrageous was the campaign by Philip Morris to use the provisions of bilateral investment treaties to sue against health warnings on cigarette packages—suits that this tobacco company has fortunately lost.

We did not pay enough attention as global capitalism hijacked complex interdependence. There were multiple actors and multiple channels of contact, but overwhelmingly these were business actors and their connections ran both to each other and with governments. Ordinary people were left out.

It will be evident to this audience that my analysis of populism is quite superficial. I only discuss it since in my interpretation, the rise of populism is likely to have profound effects on American power. We need a more sustained and research-based analysis of populism in political science, since we do not fully understand how the combination of social media, large-scale immigration, and economic imbalances and inequality produced by globalization have come together in this witches’ brew.

Let us hope that the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs will be a leader in generating such research.

Now I turn to the principal question of this talk: In the light of American populism, is the American century over?

II. Is the American Century Over?

Joseph S. Nye made his first striking entry into the debate on American power in 1990 in response to Paul Kennedy’s book on *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.

In *Bound to Lead*, Joe argued that “American leadership is likely to continue well into the next century.”[1] Kennedy’s forecast of American decline may have sold more books at the end of the 1980s; however, Joe was the clear winner of this debate. But as I said at the outset of this talk, it seems to me that the likely answer to this question has changed. None of us anticipated Donald Trump and the rise of populism in America, and we now have to revise our forecasts.

Joe focused in *The Future of Power* on three forms of power: military power, economic power, and soft power. I agree that military power, economic power, and soft power are all important. As I noted earlier, I will focus here on the resources on which attempts to exercise power rely and I will add two categories: *internal coherence and sense of social purpose*, and *network centrality*.

Military power and economic power depend on material and organizational advantages, which confer on their possessors the ability to affect outcomes. They depend on “what one has.” Joe defines the sources of soft power as the attractiveness of one’s own society and values to others, which can contribute to persuasiveness and to the ability to elicit “positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.” That is, soft power is conferred by “what one is.”

*Internal coherence and sense of social purpose* also concerns “what one is,” but our focus in deploying these concepts is on a country’s internal situation rather than how it projects itself onto the world. Internal coherence and sense of social purpose profoundly condition the willingness and ability of countries to act coherently in foreign policy. Think, for example, of the defeat of France in 1940, which was less a result of inferior material resources than of a collapse in internal coherence.

Finally, *network centrality* means being at the center of the international regimes that govern globalization, and therefore being a “rule-maker” rather than a “rule-taker.” This form of power is conferred by “where one is.”

I will ask: What are the implications for each of these sources of American power of populism, not only in the United States but elsewhere? In making this assessment, I will begin with some contentions about power shifts that appear to be occurring independent of populism, then move to a preliminary assessment of the impact of populism and the prospective effects of a Trump presidency.

If one only looked at the material positions of the United States and its principal rivals for power in world politics—China and Russia—power shifts would seem to be relatively modest. China is growing more rapidly than the United States but elsewhere? In making this assessment, I will begin with some contentions about power shifts that appear to be occurring independent of populism, then move to a preliminary assessment of the impact of populism and the prospective effects of a Trump presidency.

If one only looked at the material positions of the United States and its principal rivals for power in world politics—China and Russia—power shifts would seem to be relatively modest. China is growing more rapidly than the United States, making it less asymmetrically dependent on the United States than it was one or two decades ago, but Russia is facing economic stagnation if not decline. America’s European and Japanese allies are doing less well than the United States, which would marginally weaken the US position.

Recently, and especially during the last year, we observe more striking changes in internal coherence and
sense of social purpose. During the 1990s Russia lost both coherence and sense of social purpose; in that same decade, China’s Communist Party was seeking to regain both coherence and social purpose in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacres of 1989. It appears that under Putin, Russia now has regained internal coherence around President Putin’s nationalist and authoritarian vision. China’s economic success, bringing hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, has helped the Communist Party both to regain legitimacy and to support a more ambitious foreign policy. China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative and its efforts to secure dominance of the South China Sea are the foreign policy expressions for our time of China’s vision of itself as at the center of greater Asian politics.

Until very recently, Europe had a clear sense of coherence and social purpose: “toward a more perfect Union.” Immigration and the populist reaction to it have fundamentally changed this situation. Brexit is accompanied by the rapid rise of anti-EU populism not only in eastern Europe but in France and Italy—formerly stalwarts of European integration, of which Joe has long been a student. These populists are much more willing than proponents of a strong EU to make accommodations with Russia that eschew attempts to foster liberal democracy in Ukraine and other countries that were historically part of Russia.

These changes are the result of widespread populism—and, it appears, of similar forces to those that have propelled Donald Trump to the American presidency. They are not the results of Trump’s election. Adverse shifts away from the American century were already underway before November 8.

Now I turn to the “Trump effect.” My core argument is that on balance, far from “making America great again,” Trump’s proposals will damage some key sources of American power—and in particular, the sources of power that Joe’s work has helped us understand. This analysis may therefore lead us—and perhaps Joe—to reassess his forecast about the durability of the American century.

Let us begin with military power. Trump has promised to expand funding for the American military, but the American military is already the strongest in the world. We know that force does not necessarily generate power. The shadow of force can generate power, if its wielder pursues a sustainable policy in a credible and consistent way, as the United States did in Europe throughout the Cold War. That is, credible and consistent policy is a power resource, essential for directing force. Credibility and consistency, however, are not hallmarks of Donald Trump’s approach to policy. Instead, he seems to thrive on unpredictability, enjoying generating uncertainty. A President Trump would almost certainly speak loudly, but how he will act is difficult to predict. However, he does not seem prepared to develop strategies that translate US command of military force into effective American power.

The effect of a Trump administration on American economic power is harder to evaluate. Trump’s proposed fiscal stimulus may generate faster economic growth and capital inflows. Trump’s America is likely to become even more central to financial networks as a result of Brexit, which may drive finance away from the City of London and reinforce the position of New York. If Donald Trump’s tough trade bargaining with China and Mexico enhances American bargaining power with other states, his administration could help on the margin to revive US industrial capacity as well, although these measures are unlikely to have strong systemic effects.

On the other hand, the termination of TPP will reduce US influence in East Asia. Trump’s tax and regulatory policies could generate capital inflows and a corresponding increase in the trade deficit. Or his huge projected deficits could generate inflation and a subsequent recession in response to anti-inflationary monetary tightening. As Joe has pointed out, immigration is a source of American economic strength, so constraining immigration will have negative effects. Macroeconomic forecasting is not reliable in a turbulent world so my net evaluation of the impact of Trump’s election for American economic power is ambiguous.

When we turn to soft power, the picture darkens. Populism at home will damage US soft power by reducing the attractiveness of American society and the ideals that it represents. A movement that came to power by bashing foreigners, criticizing American alliances, and opposing trade and immigration can hardly expect to appeal to people in the rest of the world. Trump’s opposition to the Paris Accord exemplifies his dismissive attitude, so far, toward the views of others—and he has already been warned by no less than China and Saudi Arabia not to renege on the agreement. Indeed, China is clearly positioning itself to be a “soft power” leader on climate change as well as the promotion of trade openness. They have learned from Joe’s trips to Beijing!

American ethnic diversity is also a soft power strength. We look more like many other countries than we would were we a country dominated by white people—which the US was before the Immigration Act of 1965 and the civil rights and black power movements. Donald Trump’s populism cannot reverse this diversity but it is setting itself...
up in opposition to it, and seeking to slow down America’s demographic shifts by restricting immigration. As I noted, restricting immigration will have economic costs and therefore implications for economic power; but I think that its major impact on US power will be on American soft power. Judging from Joe's discussion of this issue in The Future of Power, he agrees. An America that rejected diversity would be less appealing to the rest of the world and less persuasive to others.

My fourth dimension of power is network centrality. Joe has explicitly recognized the importance of network centrality: as he says in The Future of Power, "centrality in networks can be a source of power" (217). In my view, it is even more important than his analysis suggests. What Susan Strange called "structural power" is best exemplified by network centrality. I hope that in Joe's next brilliant work on power it is given a more prominent position.

In the short run, we may observe an increase in US financial centrality as a result of Trump's deregulatory policies and the impact of Brexit on the City of London. But on the whole, including network centrality as a major dimension of power reinforces the negative implications of populism for American power.

Throughout the last seventy years, the ability of the United States to achieve its purposes has been vastly enhanced by its leadership in multilateral organizations, including the United Nations, the World Bank and IMF, and the World Trade Organization. Our core values and interests are embedded in scores of international regimes. When United States priorities changed—at the beginning and end of the Cold War, and in the wake of 9/11—it could use and reorient these institutions because they played crucial roles in international cooperation and the United States was central to them. If a Trump presidency devalues American participation in multilateral institutions, American power will decline.

We can see evidence of the importance of network centrality from China's response to the prospect of a Trump presidency. During the last month China has moved swiftly to assert leadership on climate change policy, and on trade. Expectations that a Trump administration could oppose the Paris Agreement have led the Chinese to make explicit statements about its importance, implicitly asserting their willingness to take leadership if the United States pulls back. Even more clearly, the Chinese push for a broad free trade area in the Pacific—including the United States—has gained momentum with the prospective collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership after the election. Since economics and security are tightly linked, a further erosion of the US strategic position in the South China Sea—already weakening before the election—can be expected. It seems to me that China’s recent initiatives, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and “One Belt, One Road” indicate that it aspires not to world dominance but to network centrality. A world in which China was at the core of major world networks would be profoundly different from the world in which Joe’s generation and mine has worked.

My fifth and final dimension of power refers to a society’s coherence and sense of social purpose. I believe that most members of the American elite have taken coherence and sense of social purpose for granted since the Second World War. Internally, America was seen as becoming more coherent, as a result of the civil rights movement and its extension to other formerly disadvantaged groups, including women. Externally, the United States had a mission: to protect “the free world” during the Cold War, then to advance human rights and democracy worldwide. The contrast during the 1990s between American and European sense of mission and the lack of a lack of social purpose in Russia and China is, in retrospect, striking.

As Robert Putnam has shown, America’s social coherence has been in decline for forty years. In 2016, populism has shattered what remained of this social coherence by removing cosmopolitan elites from governmental power. It has therefore seriously jeopardized the American sense of mission in the world. No longer does the United States hold an advantage over its rivals on the basis of internal coherence and sense of social purpose. Chinese and Russian coherence have risen, while that of the United States and Europe has fallen.

If the policies that Donald J. Trump proclaimed during his campaign are indeed carried out, we can expect a decline in American power. Lack of a sophisticated strategy to convert force to power will nullify any gains from increased force-capacity as a result of increases in military spending. Any temporary gains in economic power are likely to be outweighed by rapid erosion of our soft power, a continued decline in our social coherence, and challenges to our network centrality.

If a negative power shift indeed takes place, we will understand better the intangible sources of power, which are crucially important but overlooked by people whose conceptualization of power is crude than Joe’s. American
network centrality, and therefore American power—soft and hard—has rested on a foundation of internal coherence and sense of purpose—intangible assets only maintained if we keep making investments in them. It is these intangible assets, as well as on more tangible economic and military assets, on which the American century has relied.

A less coherent and purposeful United States will have less soft power and network centrality, and will therefore relegate itself to a less powerful position in the world. We will be then be looking back not a full American century but at the American three-quarters century, coinciding with my life so far. As we look back, we will see that American power rests on what we are and where we are, not merely on what we have, yet it may be impossible to recapture what has been lost. Once again, the Owl of Minerva will fly at dusk.

III. The Role of Multilateral Institutions after the American Century

Joe and I have spent our careers studying multilateral institutions—formal international organizations, international regimes, and informal organizations. We have done so in the context of the American century, or partial-century. So a background condition for our analyses has been American hegemony. We have pointed out how international institutions help states to cooperate under conditions of complex interdependence, and how the United States presence at the center of these institutions has served America’s interests. United States leadership in multilateral institutions has shaped these institutions, and the institutions have facilitated the mutual adjustment of American and other countries’ policies.

In this lecture I have suggested that we are now moving into a very different world, one in which the United States will no longer be hegemonic in the sense that it has the capacity to make and enforce rules that are generally followed throughout most of the global political economy. Other powerful states may be the key rule-makers in certain geographical areas, or on particular issues. The exercise of US power through global institutions will be less important. I want to ask, in conclusion, what role multilateral institutions will have in such a world.

We would not expect such institutions to be as comprehensive or coherent as the major postwar economic institutions—the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. There will be more contestation within these organizations and greater inclinations toward exit—creating new development banks or regional trading arrangements. Global regimes will continue to fragment into what we now call “regime complexes,” with diverse and overlapping institutional arrangements setting rules in the same issue-area. Coherent rules will become even harder to make and to enforce. Political scientists will become less obsessed with compliance and noncompliance with international rules because there will be fewer rules to comply with and less prospect of compliance.

The unresolved question in my mind is whether the core functions of multilateral institutions—to promote cooperation through reducing uncertainty and transaction costs—will remain valid in a more fragmented world, lacking strong American leadership. In such a world, the United States will have to adjust more to others’ preferences unless it wants even further to lose influence and relevance. Multilateral institutions could retain their relevance more as locales for mutual adjustment—like the Concert of Europe—and less as sites of joint decision making. Westphalian sovereignty will be less challenged: there will be fewer external authority structures imposed by multilateralism on domestic societies. As a result, interdependence will become harder to manage—more conflicts will occur over it—and in some areas of human life, such as trade, it will probably decline.

In a world without the possibility of warfare, contagious disease, or the likelihood of highly damaging climate change, we could perhaps be sanguine about declines in our ability to regulate economic interdependence and therefore to sustain it. For rich societies in which technology is rapidly advancing, some efficiency losses could be quite bearable. Unfortunately, war remains possible, so the uncertainty-reducing tasks of multilateral institutions will, in a more fragmented world, become even more important than in the recent past. It will also be essential to maintain some capacity of these organizations for joint policy making in areas where the consequences of unregulated human action are especially malign, such as disease and climate change. So we cannot contemplate their decline with equanimity.

One of the many threats of contemporary populism is that it will not only constrain multilateral institutions—this seems inevitable—but undermine them. An urgent task for the next generation of scholars and practitioners of world politics is to figure out how, within the context of nationalism, populism, and increasing power fragmentation, multilateral institutions can reconfigure themselves to retain their relevance and their capacity for promoting human welfare. Here is another task for the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

As they undertake this difficult task, these scholars and practitioners will find valuable conceptual resources in the work of Joseph S. Nye. They can also find inspiration in his career. Joe has combined analytical originality and conceptual sophistication with a clear understanding of how to think and write about policy issues in accessible and politically relevant ways. The author of the concept of “soft power” is an exemplar for the next generation, as well as for those of us in his own.

Thank you for listening. Now it is Joe’s turn to respond.

Notes:
the implication of partial Israeli responsibility for it. And, all of a sudden, the atmosphere completely changed. In the next session there was a real give and take. This was a dramatic case; it wasn’t always dramatic. It’s usually more cumulative. But this was a dramatic case where you could feel a real shift from an unwillingness to cooperate to a readiness to cooperate, at least in this process of generating ideas.

A Pioneer in the Field

“He was brave,” Hicks says of Kelman. “It wasn’t fashion-able in those early days when power politics defined the rules of the game in international conflicts. Psychology was thought of as a soft subject, because back then we didn’t have the sophisticated data that we have today. But in those days, he just knew in his soul that this was something that had to be examined.”

“Having my program affiliated with the Center for International Affairs made a world of difference. It would be very hard for me to have done all the work that I’ve done coming out of a psychology department,” says Kelman. “It gave my program legitimacy and also, through the Center, I developed important international contacts.”

Hicks, who has worked in international conflict negotia- tion for more than twenty-five years, and is the author of the book *Dignity: The Essential Role It Plays in Resolving Conflict*, credits Kelman for the profound effect he had on her intellectual life. “I call him my moral giant,” she says. “He’s inspired so many young people and contemporaries, and he does it quietly. He’s not the kind of person to go and shout his wisdom.”

“He’s a person of immense goodwill and great warmth,” says Steve Bloomfield. “He brings people into his pres- ence, makes them feel comfortable and then shines his wisdom on them. I have always felt my relationship with him to be a very fortunate and blessed one.”

Kelman’s warmth belies living through a difficult time in history. “My interest in civil rights and the pursuit of peaceful resolution of conflicts is a direct result of my own experience as a Jewish boy in Austria,” Kelman explains. Thanks to the remarkable foresight of his parents, Kelman and his family were able to escape Vienna a year after the Anschluss—the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany—by using illegal Belgian visas. His parents had applied for US visas shortly after the Anschluss but, because of the quota system at the time, it took two years for the visas to arrive. In the meantime, Belgium offered them asylum. Kelman and his family left for the United States just a few weeks before the Nazis invaded Belgium.

Herb Kelman turned ninety this year. From an eleven- year old boy who witnessed the pogroms of Kristallnacht, to a dedicated peace activist, to a scholar who has seen more failures than successes in the Middle East, Kelman remains hopeful.

“I call myself a strategic optimist,” he clarifies. “A ‘strategic optimist’ will use optimism essentially as a strategy to look for all possible openings and pursue them vigorously. That doesn’t mean that you assume every-thing will turn out all right, but rather that you have to find those openings for peace and work hard to take advantage of them.”

Not only did Kelman work for it; he continues to live it. “Herb Kelman is one of our faculty members most committed to bringing practice to theory,” says Steve Bloomfield. “He’s still very much involved in these is- sues. There is no past tense with Herb.”

Now a professor emeritus, Kelman regularly partici-pates in events at the Center, including the Herbert C. Kelman Seminar on International Conflict and the Mid-dle East Seminar. It’s easy to find the likeness of Herb Kelman through the years in the group portraits lining the Center’s hallways, standing in the front row, arms crossed, as if ready for the next opening.

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