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The 'new cleavage' thesis and the social basis of radical right support.

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Synopsis: The rise of the radical right is open to multiple interpretations. The question addressed in this paper is whether many of these parties have fostered an enduring social base among core voters and, if so, which social sectors are most likely to support them. *Part I* discusses the alternative theoretical frameworks provided by the classic accounts of the 1950s and 1960s, the 'new social cleavage' thesis common during the last decade, and the theory of partisan dealignment. The chapter then compares evidence to analyze rival hypotheses about the social basis of the radical right vote across fifteen nations, using data drawn from the European Social Survey, 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2001. *Part II* focuses upon the role of socioeconomic indicators, while *Part III* considers the enduring gender gap and patterns of generational support. The conclusion considers the implications of these results for understanding the basis of radical right popularity, and for the stability and longevity of these parties.

This paper is drawn from Chapter 6 of *Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition*, a new book by the author forthcoming with Cambridge University Press (2005).

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The core puzzle that this study seeks to explain is why radical right parties have established a clear presence in national parliaments in recent years in a diverse array of democracies – such as in Canada, Norway, France, Israel, Russia, Romania and Chile - and entered coalition governments in Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Italy, while failing to make comparable advances elsewhere in similar societies such as Britain, Sweden, and Portugal. Figure 1 summarizes the growing popularity of some of the most successful radical right parties in Western Europe. Their rise has occurred in both predominately Catholic and Protestant societies, in Nordic and Mediterranean regions, in liberal Norway and conservative Switzerland, as well as in the European Union and in Anglo-American democracies. The puzzle is deepened by the fact that they have arisen in established democracies, affluent post-industrial 'knowledge' societies, and cradle-to-grave welfare states with some of the best-educated and most secure populations in the world, all characteristics which should generate social tolerance and liberal attitudes antithetical to xenophobic appeals¹. Moreover radical right parties are not confined to these countries; they have also won support within certain post-Communist nations, as well as in some Latin American democracies.

The popularity of figures such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Jörg Haider, and Pim Fortuyn has aroused widespread popular concern and a burgeoning scholarly literature.² Despite this interest, little consensus has emerged about the reasons for this phenomenon. This paper reexamines one of the classic questions about the underlying social conditions facilitating the rise of the radical right, providing insights into the nature of electoral change and the drivers behind patterns of party competition.

Part I discusses the alternative theoretical frameworks and considers the rival hypotheses about the social basis of radical right support in more detail. The study then compares evidence to analyze the social basis of the radical right vote across fifteen nations, using data from the European Social Survey, 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2001. Previous case-studies analyzing voting support for specific parties, such as *Vlaams Blok* or *Lega Nord*, have often reported inconsistent results. These variations may be attributed to genuine contrasts found in the national electorates, or they may be due to the use of inconsistent classifications of social stratification and occupational class employed in alternative studies, as well as the common problems of limited sample size and measurement error³. The number of respondents included in the pooled cross-national samples in the surveys used in this study, combined with the consistency of the measures and the range of indicators they tap across different countries, allows us to surmount some of these problems. *Part II* focuses upon the role of social stratification while *Part III* considers the enduring gender gap and patterns of generational support. The conclusion considers the implications of these results for understanding the basis of radical right popularity, and for the stability and longevity of these parties.

I: Structural theories for the rise of the radical right

Out of the multiple explanations offered for the rise of the radical right in the extensive literature, *structural* theories, widely common in sociology, social psychology and political economy, emphasize long-term 'bottom up' generic conditions -- notably the growth of a marginalized underclass in post-industrial economies, patterns of migration flows, or the expansion of long-term unemployment -- which are thought to have facilitated the rise of radical right parties as an outlet for political frustrations among the losers in affluent societies⁴. Social conditions are regarded as 'structural' in the sense that they are understood as persistent and enduring factors which constrain the behavior of all actors in the political system. This relationship involved some endogeneity; in the long-term, public policies can gradually transform society, for example through cuts in the welfare state expanding the number of households living in poverty, or through legal restriction on the influx of immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees.

Nevertheless structural theories treat society as the 'given' context within which political parties fight any particular election.

Fringe and minor electoral parties often remain fragile and unstable organizations, vulnerable to unexpected shocks caused by internal organizational splits, difficult leadership transitions, factional rivalries, or sudden scandals. The history of the radical right is littered with short-lived 'flash' parties, exemplified by the Poujadist movement in France, the Reform Party in the United States, and *Lijst Pym Fortuyn* in the Netherlands. Such parties can surge into the headlines on a tidal wave of public protest, to the consternation of many commentators, gaining seats in 'deviating' elections, but they can equally suddenly fall back into obscurity when circumstances change. Without ballast, they bob in the wake of government and opposition popularity. By contrast, minor parties which have forged more enduring roots in the mass electorate, by consolidating support among their heartland social base and among core party loyalists, can be expected to prove more resilient to sudden fluctuations of electoral fortunes. They often experience a breakthrough into minor party status in a 'critical' election, and then manage to consolidate and build upon this success in subsequent contests. In these circumstances, certain radical right parties have proved more durable. The *Alleanza Nazionale*, for example, repackaged in 1994 as the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), was first founded in 1946. Le Pen's *Front National* has survived turbulent electoral peaks and troughs in a long series of elections since it was founded in 1972, with a decisive breakthrough experienced in 1984. The *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) was first founded as a more moderate organization in 1956, before moving sharply rightwards after 1986 under Jörg Haider's leadership. The question is whether many of radical right parties have fostered an enduring social base and attracted core party loyalists and, if so, which social sectors are most likely to support them.

Ever since early work on the origins of fascism and authoritarianism, a series of studies in political sociology have explored these issues. Three distinct strands emerged in the literature.⁵ Classic accounts published during the 1950s and 1960s sought to explain the phenomenon of the rise of fascism in Weimar Germany, as well as Poujadism in France, and McCarthyism in the United States, as a '*revolt against modernity*' led primarily by the petit bourgeoisie - small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, merchants, self-employed artisans, and independent farmers - squeezed between the growing power of big business and the collective clout of organized labor⁶. Echoing and updating these concerns, contemporary theorists argue that a '*new social cleavage*' has emerged in affluent societies. In this view, some residual elements of the appeal of the radical right among the petit bourgeoisie can still be detected, but during the last decade their populist rhetoric has fallen upon its most fertile ground among a low-skilled blue collar underclass, with minimal job security, and among those populations most vulnerable to new social risks who have tumbled through the cracks within affluent societies.⁷ Alternatively, theories of *partisan dealignment* suggest that today the appeal of the radical right is not based upon a single identifiable social cleavage common in all countries, whether the unskilled working class or the petit bourgeoisie. Rather, the theory predicts significant variations in the social basis of support for parties within the radical right family, and an erosion in how far social structure and partisan loyalties are related to voting behavior.

Classic sociological accounts: a crisis of modernity?

The classic account of voting behavior by Lipset and Rokken emphasized that social cleavages shaped patterns of party competition in Western Europe⁸. They argued that the enduring foundations for political parties were formed from historical divisions in the electorate, existing at the time of the expansion of the mass franchise, between Catholics and Protestants, core and peripheral regions, and owners and workers. Parties were thought to reflect and channel these interests into the public sphere. These structural theories in political sociology are rooted in broader processes of societal modernization, identifying multiple long-term secular trends associated with the rise of industrial and postindustrial societies⁹. The most fundamental

economic developments shaping European societies during the early twentieth century include the consolidation of large-scale manufacturing industry through the economies of scale generated by assembly-line production, the unionization of the labor force, and the growth of professional and managerial white-collar employees in the service sector. These developments were closely associated with the expansion of secondary and higher education, rising middle-class affluence, and growing standards of living.

The early seminal accounts in political sociology linked these economic and social developments to the roots of support for fascism in Italy and Germany, and for McCarthyism in America. These ideas were contained in a series of essays in *The New American Right*, edited by Daniel Bell, first published in 1955, and in *Political Man*, published by Seymour Martin Lipset in 1959. Fearing downward mobility and loss of social status, Lipset and Bell argued, radical rightwing movements tapped fears and insecurities among those who lost out to industrialization: "Extremist movements have much in common. They appeal to the disgruntled and psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and the authoritarian persons."¹⁰

In particular, Lipset argued, it was the small individual entrepreneurs, especially those lacking education and those socially-isolated in rural areas and small towns, who formed the traditional bedrock support for fascism, trapped between the threat of big business and manufacturing industry, on the one hand, and the collective strength of organized labor, on the other. The petit bourgeoisie consisted of small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, urban merchants, self-employed craftsmen, and independent family farmers. These groups differ in many regards. What they share in common is that they risk their own modest reserves of capital, and they lack the security that comes from managerial and professional careers employed in large organizations or from the collective bonds of trade union membership. The self-employed, working in family businesses, are exposed to market forces and they remain vulnerable to sudden economic down-turns, hyper-inflation, or rising interest rates. Bell and Lipset emphasized, however, that it was the threat of loss of *status* by the petit bourgeoisie in industrial societies, more than purely economic threats, which triggered their resentment against big business and organized labor, boosting the appeal of American movements offering simple populist solutions, exemplified by Coughlinism in the 1930s, McCarthyism in the 1950s, and the John Birch Society in the 1960s, as well as mass support for fascist movements in Germany and Italy. Subsequent historical research on the origins of European fascist movements during the interwar period lends further support to these conclusions¹¹. If there is some historical continuity in the social basis of contemporary politics, then the theory predicts that electoral support for radical right parties will be concentrated most strongly among the petit bourgeoisie.

Modern sociological accounts: a 'new social cleavage'?

Modern sociological explanations echo, but also update, some of these concerns. The core ideas and ideological appeals that characterized populism and fascism in earlier decades differ sharply from modern rightwing movements today, and these shifts may attract a different social base. Traditional platform of interwar fascism advocated corporatist and state-controlled economies, with strong government authority built around a hierarchical political leadership, in sharp contrast to the free-market, small government, and anti-state appeal of the contemporary right¹². The signature issues mobilizing support for the radical right today, however, is not primarily fear of big business and organized labor per se, but rather the threat of 'the other': driven by patterns of immigration, asylum seekers, and multiculturalism. The radical right has responded to the way that modern postindustrial societies have been transformed during the late twentieth century by multiple social developments which have transformed living conditions, life-chances, and patterns of socio-economic inequality in advanced industrial societies. These include processes of globalization, reducing national barriers for labor, trade, and capital mobility; the liberal restructuring of economic markets and the shrinkage of the welfare state reducing

social protection; and the decline of local communities and traditional working class formal organizations, exemplified by trade unions and labor cooperatives. Contemporary sociological accounts emphasize that these processes have largely benefited those social groups with the educational and cognitive skills, geographic mobility, and professional career flexibility to take advantage of the new economic and social opportunities in affluent societies¹³.

At the same time, commentators argue that these developments have left behind a residual 'underclass' of low-skill workers, facing shrinking life chances, poorer opportunities for fulltime employment and well-paid secure careers in the job market, reduced state benefits, and growing conditions of social inequality¹⁴. The less-educated poor face being stuck in low-skill, low-wage casual work, usually with minimal job security. It might be thought that these groups would naturally gravitate towards mainstream socialist, social democratic, labor, and communist parties of the centre-left and extreme left, the traditional advocates for the socially disadvantaged; or mainstream conservative parties that stand for security, law and order, and national identity. But instead, theorists argue, mainstream parties have been unable or unwilling to respond to a 'displaced constituency' generated by increased economic inequality and social insecurity among the losers of modernity, combined with growing multiculturalism. These conditions have encouraged the politics of resentment against immigrants, kindling the conflagration sparked by populist rhetoric and fanned by extremist party leaders.

The old left may have proved unresponsive to these concerns, social inequality may have worsened, where these parties have become increasingly 'catch-all' in pursuit of support among the rapidly expanding middle classes, and where the forces of globalization and international market pressures have constrained the autonomy of center-left governments to pass protectionist measures¹⁵. Traditionally the left has been concerned with protection against the type of social disadvantage that seriously limits the capacity of wage-earners to extract an income from the labor market, such as industrial accidents, unemployment, disease, invalidity, or old age. Protection against these social risks became the key objective of the welfare states throughout post-war Western Europe and elsewhere, with social policies developed primarily by social democratic parties in alliance with the labor movement, as well as by Christian Democratic parties. Where mainstream center-left parties have failed to recognize or respond to the emergence of populations experiencing new social risks, and where patterns of economic retrenchment mean that spending on the welfare state has been sharply reduced, this may create new social cleavages in the electorate which can be exploited by entrepreneurial new parties. At the same time, Betz suggests that social individualization and fragmentation have eroded the mass membership of traditional collective organizations, social networks, and mass movements that used to mobilize working class communities, exemplified by workers' cooperatives and the trade union movement. Socialist and social democratic parties, functioned in the past as a channel for the collective organization and expression of working class grievances.

It is these new socially-disadvantaged groups, Betz suggests, who are most prone to blame ethnic minorities for deteriorating conditions, to support cultural protectionism, and to criticize government for failing to provide the growing prosperity and social security that was characteristic of postwar Europe. The failure of center-left political elites to restore a sense of security and prosperity to the unemployed and under-privileged in Western Europe, this account argues, fuels support for populist leaders who do make such promises¹⁶. In short, the politics of resentment is believed to generate conditions favorable to populist leaders offering simplistic solutions. Some empirical evidence sustains for this argument; for example, Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers report that in Western Europe radical right support at individual-level is significantly stronger among the unemployed, blue-collar workers, the retired, and less educated sectors, as well as among younger voters, the non-religious, and men¹⁷. Yet these were specific not diffuse effects: they did not find stronger rightwing voting in nations with higher levels of unemployment¹⁸. The gender gap in support for extreme right parties has been a well-established and persistent pattern, although the reasons for this are not clearly understood¹⁹. In a five-nation

comparison, Niedermayer also found that white collar employees and professionals are consistently under-represented in the electorates of radical right parties, although he also demonstrated that the proportion of blue-collar workers and those with low educational achievement varied substantially among different parties such as the Austrian FPÖ, the German Republicans, and the Danish Progress party²⁰.

Aggregate-level analysis has also found a relationship between national unemployment rates and the share of the vote for far right parties in each country, for example work by Jackman and Volpert. The authors emphasized that the effect of macro-economic conditions were expected to operate at socio-tropic level, affecting all groups within a society, but not necessarily at ego-tropic level, so that support for the radical right was not expected to be stronger among those with direct experience of long-term unemployment, unskilled workers, or poorer social sectors. A similar link has been found between unemployment and radical right voting patterns by analyzing regional variations in France and Austria²¹. Golder, however, argues that there is an interaction effect, reporting that unemployment only matters where immigration is high²². The new cleavage thesis therefore emphasizes that 'bottom up' secular trends common in affluent postindustrial societies, particularly the growth of disadvantaged populations subject to contemporary social risks, have created a disgruntled pool of citizens open to the appeals of the radical right. If this account is supported by the survey evidence, then we would expect to find that today voting support for the parties under comparison should be disproportionately drawn from the unskilled manual workers, the less educated, and those with direct experience of unemployment or job insecurity.

Partisan dealignment and weakening social cues

Yet not all the evidence is consistent with this thesis, for instance van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie examined support for seven radical right parties and the study reported that they attracted support equally across all social strata. After controlling for ideological proximity and political attitudes, they found that the indicators of social stratification were rarely significant associated with party support, (including the role of social class, income, religion, and education), and there were no significant patterns found consistently across all parties²³. Studies of French voting behavior also suggest that the class and the religious profile of electors fail to prove a particularly powerful predictor when explaining support for the Front National²⁴. General processes of social and partisan dealignment may have eroded any distinctive social profile of the radical right voter, along with the role of class and religious cleavages in predicting support for many mainstream parties on the center-left and center-right. A large body of research suggests that the class cleavage in party politics has gradually faded over the last three decades in many postindustrial societies, with more cross-cutting cleavages arising in multicultural societies, and growing partisan dealignment weakening traditional voter-party loyalties²⁵. The most recent review of the evidence by Dalton and Wattenberg compared indicators of party attachments across a wide variety of advanced industrialized democracies, based on time-series survey analysis of Eurobarometer and national election studies. They concluded that over time the total number of the electorate expressing a party identification had eroded significantly (at the .10 level) in thirteen out of nineteen nations under comparison, and non-partisanship had spread most widely among more politically-sophisticated and better educated citizens, as well as among the younger generation²⁶.

If the rock-like ballast of class and partisan identities no longer anchor voters to mainstream parties over successive elections, this may have significant consequences for patterns of growing volatility in electoral behavior and in party competition, opening the door for more split-ticket voting across different levels, the occasional sudden surge of support for the parties based on protest politics, as well as more vote-switching within and across the left-right blocks of party families²⁷. The dealignment thesis suggests that the radical right may be able to capitalize on protest politics, particularly benefiting from any temporary widespread disaffection

with governing parties, in second-order elections held during periods of 'mid-term blues', or from sudden events (exemplified by the wave of support for *Lijst Pym Fortuyn* following the assassination of their leader), to pick up votes generally across the board, rather than presenting a distinctive social profile. At the same time, this thesis also suggests that any short-term gains for the radical right may be dissipated in subsequent elections, as it will not be based on stable social and partisan cleavages which make supporters stick with parties through good times and bad.

II: Evidence comparing the socioeconomic basis of support

To recap the core alternative hypotheses, the roots of the contemporary radical right will continue to reflect patterns of electoral support for interwar fascism in the 'crisis of modernity' thesis if the evidence demonstrates that their vote is disproportionately concentrated among the petit bourgeoisie, whether in self-employed professional and managerial workers, such as family farmers, freelance architects, and restaurant proprietors, or in own-account manual occupations, such as self-employed builders, taxi drivers, and casual plumbers. On the other hand, modern sociological accounts of the emergence of a 'new social cleavage' will be confirmed if radical right support in many countries draws disproportionately upon the most socially disadvantaged and poorer sectors of the electorate. And the partisan dealignment thesis will be demonstrated if social cleavages are only weakly related to voting behavior today.

What evidence could be used to test these propositions? Previous survey analysis of the social basis of the radical right vote have often been hampered by poor measurement of vulnerability to new social risks, experience of job insecurity, and socioeconomic inequality (including fairly crude measures of social class categories). This problem is compounded by the limited sample size of most standard social surveys, restricting analysis of the small number of radical right voters contained within each sector. Moreover, due to the limitations of survey data and the available measures, previous analysis has often failed to distinguish in sufficient detail among distinct segments of the 'new' working class, such as examining any similarities in voting behavior among self-employed professionals and own-account skilled manual workers, as well as party support among those with direct experience of job and financial insecurity.

To examine the systematic cross-national evidence, this study draws upon the European Social Survey, 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2001. These surveys facilitate consistent comparisons across fifteen industrial and postindustrial nations containing relevant right parties, including diverse Anglo-American, West European and post-Communist states, to see whether there are similarities in the electorate across and within societies. These sources also allow analysis of more finely-grained measures of the social and attitudinal structure of support for radical right parties at individual, party, and country-levels. Given limitation of space, full details about these surveys, the comparative framework, and the concept and definition of radical right parties, is presented elsewhere²⁸.

The ESS-2002 survey includes several indicators of social deprivation and experience of long-term unemployment. Ratio measures are used to present the results, as the clearest and most straightforward way to compare how far support within each group is greater or less than the average party vote among all the electorate in each country. Ratios are measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country. A ratio of 1.0 suggests that the proportion of a group voting for the radical right reflects the share of the vote that the party received from across the whole electorate (e.g. if the Lega Nord received 10% of the national vote and the support of 10% of the unskilled working class). A ratio less than 1.0 indicates that, compared with the national average, the group is underrepresented in voting for the radical right. And a ratio greater than 1.0 (flagged in Tables in **bold**) suggests that, compared with the national average, the group is over-represented in voting for these parties.

To test the impact of social stratification with systematic evidence, we follow the five-fold Goldthorpe-Heath classification of occupational class, used by Heath, Jowell and Curtice for understanding the British electorate, on the basis of a schema originally developed by the sociologist, John Goldthorpe²⁹. This distinguishes among five groups: (i) the *salariat* (employees who are managers and administrators, supervisors and professionals, with relatively high career security, salaries and status); (ii) *routine non-manuals* (employees such as accounts clerks, sales workers, and personal assistants, with lower work security, income, and prestige); (iii) the *petit bourgeoisie* (self-employed farmers, small proprietors, and own-account manual workers, exposed to market risks through reliance upon their own capital); (iv) the skilled working class (manual employees including electricians, machinists and crafts-persons); and (v) unskilled working class (more casual employees, such as plant operatives, laborers, and domestic helpers, with the lowest job security, pay, and status). Respondents were classified by their own work, based on the ISCO88 occupational code, if employed in the paid work force, rather than by head of household. We focus in this study upon simple descriptive models measuring the direct effects of social cleavages upon voting support, leaving aside for the moment any indirect effect that may run from social cleavages through political attitudes to party support.

[Table 1 about here]

The first model in Table 1 presents the results of a binary logistic (logit) regression model, including the unstandardized beta coefficients (B), the standard errors, and their significance, in the pooled 8-nation European sample. Countries were selected from all those in the ESS-2002 based on whether they contained a relevant radical right electoral party, defined as those with over 3% of the vote, including Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted for a radical right party. The results of the pooled model confirm that nearly all the basic social indicators were significant at the conventional .95 probability level and coefficients pointed in the predicted direction; the one exception was education which was negatively related to support for the radical right, as predicted, but which was only significant at the .90 probability level. The results confirm what many others have found in previous studies, namely in these nations, support for the radical right was significantly stronger among the older generation and men, and ethnic minority voters were under-represented. The analysis by social class indicate that support for the radical right was under-represented among the salariat, and over-represented among the petit bourgeoisie, as well as skilled manual and unskilled manual workers. Moreover support for these parties was greater among those who had experienced unemployment, as well as among the less religious. This social profile of radical right voters broadly reflects that found earlier by Lubbers et al. based on analysis of other cross-national surveys conducted in Western Europe in the mid-1990s, strengthening confidence in the stability of these findings³⁰.

Overall these patterns suggest that structural characteristics continue to differentiate radical right voters; lacking consistent time-series data, we cannot establish whether the impact of these variables has weakened over the years, as theories of partisan dealignment suggest. What we can conclude with more confidence, however, is that radical right parties are not simply appealing across all social sectors equally, for example based on temporary protest politics and a period of widespread public disenchantment with mainstream politics, as some previous studies suggest³¹. The continued attraction of the contemporary radical right to the petit bourgeoisie, for example, indicates that there are deeper roots which also characterized interwar fascism. To go further, the pooled results need to be broken down by nation and by type of social cleavage, as well as being compared with the social profile of the radical right electorate in other Anglo-American and post-Communist countries, to see whether there are consistent patterns across postindustrial societies.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 summarizes the ratio measures of class voting for the radical right in thirteen countries containing relevant radical right parties, without any prior controls. The evidence confirms that support for these parties remains disproportionately over-represented among the petit bourgeoisie, as well as the skilled manual and the unskilled manual working class, in most of the countries under comparison. In particular, compared with the general electorate, support for the radical right is at least twice as strong among the petit bourgeoisie in Hungary, Italy, and Romania, showing the greatest resemblance to the classic roots of European fascism. By contrast, the salariat are under-represented within the radical right electorate in every country except for Hungary, Italy, and Israel. This remains the radical right's greatest area of electoral weakness, given the substantial expansion in professional and managerial employees in service sector economies, and the limited size of the petit bourgeoisie. Some important cross-national differences are also apparent, exemplified by the more blue-collar base of the Austrian FPÖ (confirming the substantial growth of their support among the working class in elections during the 1990s, documented elsewhere)³², in contrast to the greater attraction of the Romanian PRM and PUNR among lower middle class voters and the Lega Nord's strongest base among the petit bourgeoisie. Elsewhere we examine whether these social differences relate to systematic patterns of ideological support, as case study comparisons suggest that the different class base found in the FPÖ and the Lega Nord can be explained by their divergent programmatic appeals, with Lega Nord maintaining its advocacy of radical free-market neo-liberal policies while the FPÖ altered its platform under Haider to favor more protectionist measures³³.

[Table 3 about here]

The educational profile of voters is broken down in more detail in Table 3, showing a not dissimilar pattern across nations, which is not surprising given the close link between prior educational achievement and subsequent social status. Again the radical right in Hungary (MIEP), Israel (Mafdal and IL), and Italy (AN, LN and MsFt) draws disproportionately upon those with better education, just as they had a stronger imprint among the salariat. In nearly all other countries, support for the radical right tends to be stronger among those with low or moderate education. Nevertheless there are variations in these patterns, and it would be an exaggeration to claim that party support was confined to early school-leavers with the lowest level of educational attainment and cognitive sophistication.

[Table 4 about here]

We can go beyond these basic indicators to also see whether those with experience of being unemployed and the poorest groups living in low income household are more prone to support the radical right, as many suggest. This is important given that many aggregate-level studies in political economy argue that rising levels of unemployment, coupled with the perceived threat of migrant foreign workers to job security, plays a major role in explaining the rise of the radical right in the European Union³⁴. We can also examine the location of respondents, to see whether votes for these parties are concentrated either within poorer inner-city urban neighborhoods, or else, as classic accounts of fascism suggested, within rural areas and small villages. Table 4 demonstrates that those with experience of unemployment were over-represented among supporters of the radical right in about half the nations under comparison, with particularly strong effects in the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation. Yet the results can hardly be seen as providing strong confirmation for claims that individual experience of job insecurity and unemployment is a major factor behind the success of these parties. The comparisons among low-income households were even more equivocal: support for the radical right was only over-represented in this group among one third of the nations under comparison. The analysis by area also demonstrates that there were mixed patterns, with six countries where the radical right was stronger in rural areas and only three cases where they gained more votes among urban residents. On balance, the interpretation of the contemporary right as simply being the product of disaffection among the poorest and least-educated social sectors appears to be an

exaggerated stereotype; while it is true that radical right parties in Austria, Denmark, and the Czech Republic do derive considerable reservoirs of support from these social sectors, at the same time these parties attract considerable votes across the spectrum in Hungary and the Netherlands, and they gain slightly greater than average support among the petit bourgeoisie and the highly-educated in Italy and Israel.

III: Demographic factors: Gender and Generation

Research on gender differences in the electorate has been a recurrent theme in political science ever since the earliest systematic surveys of voting behavior³⁵. Many hoped, and others feared, that once women were enfranchised there would be a distinctive “women’s vote.” Gender was not regarded as a primary electoral cleavage, equivalent to class, region, and religion, because women and men experienced many crosscutting forces, but the seminal account of European voting behavior by Lipset and Rokkan viewed gender as one of the secondary cleavages shaping the electoral base of party politics.³⁶ The early classics in the 1950s and 1960s established the orthodoxy in political science: gender differences in voting were generally fairly modest, but women were likelier than men to support center-right parties in Western Europe and in the United States, a pattern that has been termed the “traditional gender gap”³⁷. Most explanations of this phenomenon emphasized structural differences between men and women in religiosity, longevity, and labor force participation; for example, women in Italy and France were more likely to attend churches associated with Christian Democratic parties³⁸. During this era, women were also commonly assumed to be more conservative in their political attitudes and values, producing an ideological gap underpinning their party preferences³⁹. Yet at the same time many studies suggested that men were far more likely to belong to extreme right parties, such as the fascist movement⁴⁰. The traditional gender gap on the center-right gradually faded and the literature suggested that the old thesis of female conservatism was apparently no longer evident; instead, the situation in the 1980s seemed contingent upon political circumstances: in some established democracies women seemed to lean towards the right, in others to the left, and in still others no significant differences could be detected⁴¹. By the end of the 1990s, however, women had shifted towards the center-left of men in many established democracies⁴². What is the pattern on the extreme-right, and have there been parallel shifts?

[Table 5 and 6 about here]

The results of the comparison by gender in Table 5 confirm a consistent pattern; men continue to be over-represented among the radical right electorate in a dozen of the countries under comparison, and in the remainder there was no gender difference. The gender gap in support is greatest in support for the Liberal Democrats in Russia, the RSC in the Czech Republic and in Italy. Although some parties such as Le Pen’s Front National have made a particular effort to change their traditional male-dominated image, by picking more women candidates for elected office, nevertheless the leadership and the grassroots base of these parties remains predominately male. Elsewhere I examine whether this pattern is due to the issues and policies advocated by the radical right, such as their xenophobic and anti-state appeals, or whether it can be attributed more generally to long-standing gender differences towards the use of violence, and the association of extreme right movements with acts of aggression and direct-action radical tactics⁴³.

The generational profile is important as this can tell us much about the future of these parties. If their support is over-represented among the older generation, reflecting a nostalgic appeal to the past, then in the long-term these parties may gradually fade in popularity through the usual process of population replacement and the shrinkage of their mass base. If, however, they manage to attract and retain a younger generation, for example appealing strongly to unemployed male youth, then this could contribute towards their future expansion. Table 6.6 demonstrates the age profile of radical right voters; the results show that there is little consistency

across countries; in some (notably post-Communist Russia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic) the younger generation is disproportionately attracted to these parties, but in others (New Zealand, Switzerland and Austria, in particular) their appeal is stronger among the older generation. This suggests that the specific age-related profile of these parties varies cross-nationally, which may be due to their historical roots in each society and their leadership images, campaign strategies, and ideological appeals among different groups of voters.

Conclusions:

One of the classic ways of explaining patterns of party support relates to the distribution of social cleavages in the electorate. Where parties are based upon distinct social sectors, then they can forge enduring ties with these groups, representing their interests and concerns in the political system. Where such ties have weakened, though social and partisan dealignment, then we would expect greater electoral volatility and more potential for protest voting. What do the results suggest about enduring patterns of support for the radical right?

The comparison of the social class profile of the radical right electorate, including indicators of social inequality, suggests that they are disproportionately over-represented among both the *petit bourgeoisie* – self-employed professionals, own-account technicians and small merchants – *as well as* among the skilled and unskilled working class. In many countries patterns of individual-level voting support among the unemployed and among low-income households is not as strong as suggested by many aggregate-level accounts in political economy. This cross-class coalition means that we should look skeptically upon the idea that the radical right is purely a phenomenon of the politics of resentment among the 'new social cleavage' of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in inner-city areas, or that their rise can be attributed in any mechanical fashion to growing levels of unemployment and job insecurity in Europe. The social profile is more complex than popular stereotypes suggest. It remains to be seen in subsequent chapters whether, as some claim, it is the particular combination of experience of unemployment and anti-immigrant attitudes which matters, rather than job insecurity alone⁴⁴. At the same time the traditional gender gap persisted, with men fuelling support for these parties. Moreover although the pooled analysis suggests that there are some common factors, the results disaggregated by nation show considerable variations in who voted for the radical right. Elsewhere I consider in more detail the systemic impact of 'dealignment elections' and the consequences of weakening voter-party loyalties for patterns of party competition and the opportunities facing new radical right challengers. In some countries, I demonstrate that dealignment has facilitated the rise of these parties, with either 'deviating' or 'critical' elections, whereas in others cases such as Britain and the United States, despite widespread evidence of a long-term erosion of partisan identities, radical right parties have failed to surmount the electoral barriers to make a sustained series of gains.

Therefore based on this evidence we can conclude that classic sociological theories of a 'crisis of modernity', or modern accounts emphasizing the emergence of a 'new social cleavage', only take us so far in explaining variations in the success and failure of radical right parties. What we need to understand is not just how social conditions might facilitate their rise, but, even more importantly, how parties respond to these factors in crafting their strategic and programmatic appeals, in building their organization, and in consolidating their support.

Table 1: The social structure of radical rightwing votes, ESS-2002

	<i>Predictors of voting for the radical right, pooled 8-nation European sample</i>		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)	-3.08		
DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND			
Age (In years)	.005	.002	**
Sex (Male=1, Female=0)	.307	.074	***
Ethnic minority (Ethnic minority=1, else=0)	-1.04	.249	***
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS			
Education (Highest level attained on a 6-point scale from low to high)	-.051	.030	N/s
Salariat (professional and managerial employees)	-.267	.120	*
Petit bourgeoisie (self-employed)	.297	.105	**
Skilled manual working class	.372	.119	**
Unskilled manual working class	.390	.102	***
Ever been unemployed (for more than 3 months)	.198	.085	**
Religiosity (Self-identified as religious on a 7-pt scale)	-.033	.012	**
Nagelkerke R ²	.025		
Percentage correctly predicted	93.1		

Notes: The model presents the results of a binary logistic (logit) regression model including the unstandardized beta coefficients (B), the standard errors, and their significance, in the pooled 8-nation European sample weighted by design and population size. The nations were selected from all those in the ESS-2002 based on whether they contained a relevant party on the radical right (including Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway). France was excluded from the pooled sample because the standard occupational classification was not measured in the survey. The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted for a radical right party. All coefficients were confirmed to be free of multicollinearity errors. The pooled sample contained 13,768 respondents in total, including 932 voters for the radical right (6.8%). The routine non-manual category of social class was dropped as the default (comparison) case in this model. Sig.001=***; Sig .01=**; Sig .05 =*.

Source: Pooled sample 8-nations, European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-2002)

Table 2: The class basis of radical right voters

Nation	Party(s)	% Who voted for the radical right, all voters	The ratio of voting support for the radical right in each class compared with the national average share of the vote				
			Salariat	Routine non-manual	Petit bourgeoisie	Skilled manual	Unskilled manual
Austria	FPÖ	3.2	1.0	0.8	0.8	1.9	1.8
Belgium	VB, FN	4.4	0.5	0.9	1.3	2.3	1.4
Czech Rep.	RSC	5.6	0.9	0.7	0.7	2.0	1.5
Denmark	DF, FP	6.8	0.3	0.9	0.9	1.4	1.6
France	FN	3.2			0.8		
Hungary	MIEP	2.2	1.4	0.5	2.0	0.7	1.0
Israel	Mafdal, IL	4.6	1.7	0.9	1.1	1.3	0.5
Italy	AN, LN, MsFt	6.1	1.2	0.7	2.0	0.3	0.7
Netherlands	PF, CD	11.5	0.6	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
New Zealand	NZFP	10.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.1
Norway	FrP, FLP	11.9	0.5	0.8	1.1	1.3	2.0
Romania	PRM, PUNR	3.2	0.3	1.3	2.4	1.3	0.9
Switzerland	SVP, EDU, SD, LdT, FPS	8.8	0.9	0.9	1.7	0.8	1.0
MEAN		6.2	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.2

Notes: The figures represent the ratio of each group's support for the radical right compared with the national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A coefficient of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that group was under-represented among radical right voters. A coefficient greater than 1.0 (**in bold**) suggests that the group was over-represented among radical right voters. For the list of parties included, see Table 3.1.

Sources: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway analyzed from data in the ESS-2002. The Czech Republic, New Zealand, Romania and Hungary analyzed from data in the CSES 1996-2001. Note that 'self-employment' was not classified in Canada, Russia and Slovenia, necessitating dropping these nations from the comparison in this table, while standard occupational category was not classified in France.

Table 3: The educational background of radical right voters

Nation	Party(s)	% Who voted for the radical right, all voters	The ratio of voting support for the radical right in each group compared with the national average share of the vote		
			Low education	Moderate education	High education
Austria	FPÖ	3.2	1.1	1.0	0.8
Belgium	VB,FN	4.4	1.3	1.0	0.3
Canada	RP	18.9	0.9	1.1	0.9
Czech Rep.	RSC	5.6	1.4	1.1	0.6
Denmark	DF,FP	6.8	1.4	1.1	0.1
France	FN	3.2	1.5	0.5	0.5
Hungary	MIEP	2.2	0.8	1.0	1.7
Israel	Mafdal, IL	4.6	0.2	0.8	1.8
Italy	AN, LN, MsFt	6.1	0.7	1.3	1.4
Netherlands	PF,CD	11.5	1.1	1.0	0.7
New Zealand	NZFP	10.9	1.5	1.1	0.8
Norway	FrP, FLP	11.9	1.3	1.2	0.4
Romania	PRM,PUNR	3.2	0.6	1.2	1.3
Russia	LDPR	1.5	1.3	1.5	0.7
Slovenia	SNS	2.2	0.5	1.3	1.1
Switzerland	SVP,EDU,SD,LdT,FPS	8.8	0.7	1.2	0.5
MEAN		6.2	1.0	1.1	0.9

Notes: The figures represent the ratio of each group's support for the radical right compared with the national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A coefficient of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that group was under-represented among radical right voters. A coefficient greater than 1.0 (**in bold**) suggests that the group was over-represented among radical right voters. For the list of parties included, see Table 3.1.

Sources: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway analyzed from data in the ESS-2002. Canada, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Hungary analyzed from data in the CSES 1996-2001.

Table 4: Social indicators, type of area, and radical right voters

Nation	Party(s)	% Who voted for the radical right, all voters	The ratio of voting support for the radical right in each group compared with the national average share of the vote			
			Unemployed during the last 5 years	Low HH income	Live in rural area or village	Live in a large city
Austria	FPÖ	3.2	0.8	0.8	1.2	0.6
Belgium	VB,FN	4.4	1.6	1.1	1.2	0.9
Canada	RP	18.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0
Czech Rep.	RSC	5.6	2.3	1.1	1.2	0.1
Denmark	DF,FP	6.8	1.1	1.2	0.9	0.8
France	FN	3.2	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.6
Hungary	MIEP	2.2	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.2
Israel	Mafdal, IL	4.6	0.8	0.6	1.6	0.9
Italy	AN, LN, MsFt	6.1	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.7
Netherlands	PF,CD	11.5	1.4	0.9	1.0	0.9
New Zealand	NZFP	10.9	1.1	1.5	1.3	0.9
Norway	FrP, FLP	11.9	1.1	0.7	1.0	0.9
Romania	PRM,PUNR	3.2	0.3	0.8	1.0	1.0
Russia	LDPR	1.5	2.0	1.5	0.8	1.1
Slovenia	SNS	2.2	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.0
Switzerland	SVP,EDU,SD,LdT,FPS	8.8	0.6	0.9	1.1	0.2
MEAN		6.2	1.1	0.9	1.1	0.9

Notes: The figures represent the ratio of each group's support for the radical right compared with the national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A coefficient of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that group was under-represented among radical right voters. A coefficient greater than 1.0 (**in bold**) suggests that the group was over-represented among radical right voters. For the list of parties included, see Table 3.1.

Sources: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway analyzed from data in the ESS-2002. Canada, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Hungary analyzed from data in the CSES 1996-2001.

Table 5: The gender gap among radical right voters

Nation	Party(s)	% Who voted for the radical right, all voters	The ratio of voting support for the radical right in each group compared with the national average share of the vote	
			Men	Women
Austria	FPÖ	3.2	1.3	0.7
Belgium	VB,FN	4.4	1.2	0.8
Canada	RP	18.9	1.2	0.8
Czech Republic	RSC	5.6	1.4	0.6
Denmark	DF,FP	6.8	1.3	0.7
France	FN	3.2	1.3	0.8
Hungary	MIEP	2.2	1.2	0.9
Israel	Mafdal, IL	4.6	1.0	1.0
Italy	AN, LN, MsFt	6.1	1.4	0.7
Netherlands	PF,CD	11.5	1.0	1.0
New Zealand	NZFP	10.9	1.0	1.0
Norway	FrP, FLP	11.9	1.2	0.7
Romania	PRM,PUNR	3.2	1.2	0.8
Russia	LDPR	1.5	1.6	0.7
Slovenia	SNS	2.2	1.0	1.0
Switzerland	SVP,EDU,SD,LdT,FPS	8.8	1.2	0.9
MEAN		6.2	1.2	0.8

Notes: The figures represent the ratio of each group's support for the radical right compared with the national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A coefficient of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that group was under-represented among radical right voters. A coefficient greater than 1.0 (**in bold**) suggests that the group was over-represented among radical right voters

Sources: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway analyzed from data in the ESS-2002. Canada, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Hungary analyzed from data in the CSES 1996-2001.


Table 6: The age profile of radical right voters

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Party(s)</i>	<i>% Who voted for the radical right, all voters</i>	<i>The ratio of voting support for the radical right in each group compared with the national average share of the vote</i>		
			Younger	Middle	Older
Austria	FPÖ	3.2	0.9	0.8	1.8
Belgium	VB,FN	4.4	1.0	1.2	0.8
Canada	RP	18.9	0.8	1.1	1.1
Czech Rep.	RSC	5.6	1.3	1.2	0.2
Denmark	DF,FP	6.8	1.2	0.8	1.4
France	FN	3.2	0.3	1.4	1.3
Hungary	MIEP	2.2	0.7	1.1	1.1
Israel	Mafdal, IL	4.6	0.9	1.2	0.9
Italy	AN, LN, MsFt	6.1	0.7	1.1	1.0
Netherlands	PF,CD	11.5	0.7	1.1	0.9
New Zealand	NZFP	10.9	0.7	1.0	1.6
Norway	FrP, FLP	11.9	0.9	1.0	1.1
Romania	PRM,PUNR	3.2	1.0	1.1	0.9
Russia	LDPR	1.5	1.2	1.1	0.7
Slovenia	SNS	2.2	1.7	0.6	0.3
Switzerland	SVP,EDU,SD,LdT,FPS	8.8	0.7	1.2	1.3
MEAN		6.2	1.0	1.0	1.0

Notes: The figures represent the ratio of each group's support for the radical right compared with the national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A coefficient of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that group was under-represented among radical right voters. A coefficient greater than 1.0 (**in bold**) suggests that the group was over-represented among radical right voters. For the list of parties included, see Table 3.1.

Sources: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway analyzed from data in the ESS-2002. Canada, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Hungary analyzed from data in the CSES 1996-2001.

Figure 1: Mean share of the vote for seven radical right parties in Western Europe, 1980-2004



Note: This summarizes the average share of the vote in the lower house from 1980-2004 for the following parties in Western Europe, all of which have contested a continuous series of national parliamentary elections since 1980: Italian MSI/AN, Austrian FPÖ, Swiss SVP, Danish FP/PP, Norwegian FrP, Belgian VIB, French FN. All these parties can be defined as ‘relevant’ i.e. they have achieved over 3% of the vote in one or more national parliamentary elections during this period. In the Italian and Danish cases, splits occurred within parties but there are still recognizable continuities in renamed successor parties.

Source: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. London: Macmillan; Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. *A decade of election results: Updating the International Almanac*. Studies in Public Policy 295. Strathclyde: CSPP; recent elections from *Elections around the World*. www.electionsworld.org.

¹ For the expectation that a worldwide 'liberal revolution' would supersede the attractions of authoritarianism, see, for example, the argument presented by Francis Fukuyama. 1992. *The End of History and the Last man*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

² For comparative overviews see, for example, Paul Hainsworth. Editor. 1992. *The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA*. New York: St Martin's Press; Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg. Eds. 1993. *Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right*. Boulder: Westview; Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press; Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan; Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan. Eds. 1995. *The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe*. New York: Longman; Peter H. Merkl and L. Weinberg, Editors. 1997. *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*. London: Frank Cass; Hans-Georg Betz and S. Immerfall. Editors. 1998. *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*, St Martin's Press, New York; Paul Hainsworth. Editor. 2000. *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*. London: Pinter; Rachel Gibson. 2002. *The Growth of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press; Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay. Editors. 2002. *Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe*. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan; Piero Ignazi. 2003. *Extreme right parties in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.

³ For example, Betz collects together many separate studies from the literature, but each uses slightly different measures and definitions of occupational class and education. See Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press. Chapter 5

⁴ This perspective is exemplified by Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press.

⁵ Note that performance-based theories of political economy are discussed in detail in later chapters. These are distinct from the sociological accounts focusing upon secular trends, as political economists emphasize the impact of more specific developments in government policy performance on radical right support, notably surges in immigration, refugees and asylum seekers, combined with rates of unemployment and job insecurity among poorer sectors. See chapter 8 for details and also Terri E. Givens. 2002. 'The role of socioeconomic variables in the success of radical right parties.' In *Shadows over Europe*. Ed. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay. New York: Palgrave; Matt Golder. 2003. 'Explaining variations in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe.' *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4): 432-466.

⁶ Exemplified by Seymour Martin Lipset. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. New York: Doubleday; Daniel Bell. Ed. *The Radical Right*. 3rd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publisher (first published in 1955 as *The New America Right*, subsequently expanded in the 2nd edition in 1963).

⁷ Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press. Chapters 1 and 5; Piero Ignazi. 2003. *Extreme right parties in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press. See also Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Table 2.11; J.G. Anderson and T. Bjorkland. 1990. 'Structural changes and new cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway.' *Acta Sociologica*. 33(3): 195-217.

⁸ Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press.

⁹ For some of the key classics in this literature, see Daniel Lerner. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: Free Press; Walt W. Rostow. 1952. *The Process of Economic Growth*. New York: Norton; Walt W. Rostow. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Daniel Bell. 1999. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.

¹⁰ Seymour Martin Lipset. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. New York: Doubleday Chapters 4 and 5. p.175. See also Daniel Bell. Ed. *The Radical Right*. 3rd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publisher (first published in 1955 as *The New America Right*, subsequently expanded in the 2nd edition in 1963); W. Sauer. 1967. 'National Socialism: Totalitarianism or fascism?' *American Historical Review* 73(4): 404-424.

¹¹ Juan Linz. 1976. 'Some notes toward a comparative study of fascism in sociological historical perspective.' In *Fascism: A Reader's Guide*. Ed. Walter Laquer. Berkeley: University of California Press; Detlef Mühlberger. 1987. *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements*. London: Croom Helm.

¹² Cas Muddle. 2000. *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

¹³ Piero Ignazi. 2003. *Extreme right parties in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press. P.218.

¹⁴ See, for example, G. Esping-Anderson. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Paul Pierson. 1998. 'Irresistible forces, immovable objects: post-industrial welfare states confront permanent austerity' *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 5, pp 539-60; G. Esping-Andersen. 1999. *The Social Foundations of Post-industrial Economies*, Oxford University Press.

¹⁵ Indeed the relative lack of class dealignment in Swedish party politics has been suggested as one reason why the radical right has failed to make much headway in this nation. See Jens Rydgren. 2002. 'Radical right populism in Sweden: Still a failure, but for how long?' *Scandinavian Political Studies*. 25(1): 27-56; Jens Rydgren. 2003. 'Meso-level reasons for racism and xenophobia: some converging and diverging effects of radical right populism in France and Sweden.' *European Journal of Social Theory* 6 (1): 45-68.

¹⁶ Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press.

¹⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. New York: Doubleday; Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press; Marcel Lubbers, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers, 2002. 'Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe.' *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (3): 345-378. Table 4.

¹⁸ Marcel Lubbers, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers, 2002. 'Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe.' *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (3): 345-378. See also Marcel Lubbers and Peers Scheepers. 2001. 'Explaining the trend in extreme right-wing voting: Germany 1989-1998.' *European Sociological Review* 17 (4): 431-449. Knigge also reported a negative relationship between national-levels of unemployment and voting support for extreme right parties. Pia Knigge. 1998. 'The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe.' *European Journal of Political Research* 34:249-79.

¹⁹ Terri E. Givens. 2004. 'The radical right gender gap.' *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (1): 30-54.

²⁰ Oskar Niedermayer. 1990. 'Sozialstruktur, politische Orientierungen und die Unterstützung extrem rechter Parteien in Westeuropa.' *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 21(4): 564-82; Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Table 2.11.

²¹ Terri E. Givens. 2002. 'The role of socioeconomic variables in the success of radical right parties.' In *Shadows over Europe*. Ed. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay. New York: Palgrave

²² Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert. 1996. 'Conditions favouring Parties of the extreme right in Western Europe.' *British Journal of Political Science* 264:501-22; Matt Golder. 2003. 'Explaining variations in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe.' *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4): 432-466.

²³ Wouter Van der Brug, Meidert Fennema and Jean Tillie. 2000. 'Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?' *European Journal of Political Research*. 37(1): 77-102; Wouter Van der Brug and Meidert Fennema. 2003. 'Protest or mainstream? How the European anti-immigrant parties developed into two separate groups by 1999.' *European Journal of Political Research*.42: 55-76.

²⁴ Michael Lewis-Beck and G. E. Mitchell. 1993. 'French electoral theory: The National Front test.' *Electoral Studies* 12(2): 112-127; John W. P. Veugelers. 1997. 'Social cleavage and the revival of far right parties: The case of France's National Front.' *Acta Sociologica* 40 (1): 31-49; Subrata Mitra. 1988. 'The National Front in France: A Single-Issue Movement?' *West European Politics* 11(2): 47-64.

²⁵ Ivor Crewe, Jim Alt and Bo Sarlvik. 1977. 'Partisan dealignment in Britain 1964-1974.' *British Journal of Political Science* 7: 129-90; Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and John Petrocik. 1976. *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Ivor Crewe and David Denver. Eds. 1985. *Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility*. New York: St. Martin's Press; Mark Franklin, Tom Mackie, Henry Valen, et al. 1992. *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russell J. Dalton, Scott Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, Eds. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mark Franklin 1985. *The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 1964-1983*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks. 1999. *Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions*. New York: Oxford University Press; Terry Nichols Clark and Seymour Martin Lipset. Eds. 2001. *The Breakdown of Class Politics*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press.

²⁶ Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Ed. 2001. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press. For a discussion of the trends, see Chapter 2.

²⁷ Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Ed. 2001. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press. For a discussion of the consequences, see Chapter 3.

²⁸ Pippa Norris. 2005. *Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition* New York: Cambridge University Press.

²⁹ Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice. 1985. *How Britain Votes*. Oxford: Pergamon; John H. Goldthorpe. 1980. *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

³⁰ The Lubbers et al. study used data derived from the 1994 Eurobarometer European Election Study and the 1998 International Social Survey Program. See Marcel Lubbers, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers, 2002. 'Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe.' *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (3): 345-378.

³¹ Wouter Van der Brug, Meidert Fennema and Jean Tillie. 2000. 'Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?' *European Journal of Political Research*. 37(1): 77-102.

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- ³² Piero Ignazi. 2003. *Extreme right parties in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press. See Table 6.2. See also Max Riedisperger. 1992. 'Heil Haider! The revitalization of the Austrian Freedom Party since 1986.' *Politics and Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland*. 4(3): 18-47.
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