



Tuned Out Voters?

Media Impact on Campaign Learning

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Synopsis: What are the *consequences* of the rise of mediated or indirect channels linking parties and the electorate in modern and post-modern campaigns? Critics commonly blame the mass media (and particularly the role of television) for many of the supposed ills of representative democracy, from public disenchantment with elected leaders to increasing detachment from party loyalties, lack of awareness of public affairs, and half-empty ballot boxes. The argument presented in this study has three core components. Firstly, long-term evidence of trends in American elections over the last fifty years demonstrates that reports of the ill health, or even death, of traditional partisan channels of campaign communication are grossly exaggerated. Secondly evidence from the 2000 Bush-Gore US presidential elections confirms that far from ‘blaming the messenger’, the role of exposure to campaign information from parties, newspapers, television news, talk radio, and the Internet has been to strengthen civic engagement in America. Lastly, expanding upon previous work, the study considers the role of popular television entertainment in this process.

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There is widespread concern that the nature of mass politics changed during the late twentieth century, and indeed changed largely for the worse, in most post-industrial societies. The standard arguments are familiar and widely rehearsed. You can hear them echoed everyday, whether in simple or sophisticated versions, in the press, scattered in political speeches, and published in academe. Some arguments are cast in strictly empirical terms, but many popular accounts have strongly normative overtones. The intellectual roots lie in the classics of political sociology from the late 1950s and mid-1960s, captured perhaps just as the era of traditional party campaigns was passing, notably the work of Maurice Duverger on mass-branch political parties and Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset on social cleavages and electoral behavior¹. The standard view emphasizes the consequences of the significant shift from direct *party*-oriented linkages between citizens and the state towards indirect *media*-oriented linkages in representative democracies. In the traditional model of election campaigns that characterized the 'golden age' of West European party politics, running from the expansion of the mass franchise in the late nineteenth century until at least the mid-twentieth century, party loyalists characteristically selected parliamentary representatives based on long-standing social cleavages and stable ideological cues. The core cleavages of class, religion, region, and language gave a collective meaning to party support and united people with shared identities and social roots who strived for broadly similar political ideals. As illustrated in Figure 1, in traditional campaigns political leaders communicated with grass-roots party loyalists via elected representatives and core party activists, using direct face-to-face channels of persuasion, organization and mobilization, such as local meetings, party newsletters, candidate pamphlets, doorstep canvassing, and town-hall speeches, supplemented by partisan newspapers. Collective organizations and traditional interest groups such as unions and churches, local cooperatives, community groups, and workers' clubs, mobilized many citizens at the margins of political power and linked their interests to political parties. Support by party loyalists was regarded as a sign of trust in the ability of elected leaders to translate their programmatic principles into concrete policy actions.

[Figure 1 about here]

The standard view suggests that in Western democracies the 'golden age' of traditional party politics was eroded by the rise of the modern mediated campaign. Most observers view the critical turning point as the entrance of television onto the political scene during the 1950s to supplement or replace the role of the partisan press and direct face-to-face channels of communications. The common features of these developments have been identified and conceptualized in many ways, emphasizing different dimensions of this phenomena, from the growth of 'political marketing' to the 'modernization' or 'Americanization' of election campaigns². Observers such as Altheide and Mazzolini theorized that a 'party logic' in campaign communications had been replaced by a 'media logic'³. The most satisfactory way to understand these developments may be to see them as the shift from traditional to modern campaigns, and then during the late 1980s and early 1990s towards post-modern campaigns⁴. There are common elements that can be identified affecting the relationship between parties, the mass media, and the electorate in many Western democracies, although the pace and extent of change is contextual, path-dependent, and thus varies in important ways from one place to another. Many established democracies have seen accumulating indicators that the old loyalties binding citizens to political parties have deteriorated in recent decades, shown most conclusively by patterns of partisan dealignment in the electorate⁵, and by falling grassroots party membership⁶. Other related phenomena transforming modern campaigns include the rise of the cadre of professional political consultants, notably the breed of publicists, pollsters, and consultants within parties, using their glossy skills to sell politics in the market place, as they would hawk toothpaste, soap-powder, or lager⁷. In turn, West European parties are thought to have gradually lost their ideological roots, floating upon an opportunist 'catch-all' strategy to harvest whatever votes are available, irrespective of long-standing principles and identities⁸. Following these developments, it

is widely believed that in modern election campaigns popular personalities have replaced serious policy appeals, images have supplanted ideologies, and strategy has superseded substance⁹. Many have expressed concern that as a result of these developments, traditional direct channels of party-citizen contact and the role and influence of volunteer party members have become a thing of the past, as irrelevant to the modern age as the soapbox speech, candidate hustings, and town hall rally¹⁰.

The key issue addressed by this study is less the multiple causes than the *consequences* of these developments, particularly the impact of the rise of mediated or indirect channels linking parties and the electorate in modern and post-modern campaigns. The common fear is that today the public in Western democracies has tuned out from public affairs, preferring the entertaining dramatic spectacle of *The West Wing* to the dull but worthy day-to-day reality of political sausage-making with parliamentary debates, EU Commission proposals, and U.N. resolutions¹¹. Critics commonly blame the mass media (and particularly the role of television) for many of the supposed ills of representative democracy, from public disenchantment with elected leaders to increasing detachment from party loyalties, lack of awareness of public affairs, and half-empty empty ballot boxes, as well as diverse social ills from childhood violence and the breakdown of community to the erosion of social capital. Here we focus upon the impact of campaign information upon '*civic engagement*', broadly conceptualised in this study as a multidimensional phenomena which includes what people know about politics, their bonds of social capital (measured by social trust and organizational membership), their support for the political system (including attitudes such as political efficacy and trust in government), and the most common types of political activism (including political discussion, voting turnout, and campaign activism). Elsewhere I have drawn cross-national comparisons but this study focuses upon evidence derived from American presidential election campaigns because the rise of post-modern campaigns is assumed to have gone furthest in this country. American parties have always been relatively weak 'caucus-cadre' organizations rather than the 'mass-branch' structure typical of West European parties of the left¹². Since the early 1970s, the growth of entrepreneurial candidates for local, state and national elected office and the availability of the cadre of professional hired advisors is also thought to have weakened the role of traditional party organizations and grassroots volunteers¹³. The impact of money-intensive and advertising-saturated campaigns has gone further in American presidential elections than in most other Western democracies, and the United States has a media system that is particularly television-predominant rather than newspaper-predominant¹⁴. The United States also provides some of the best evidence because of the availability of the longest continuous series of national election surveys, dating from 1952, prior to the rise of TV in everyone's home. Accordingly if television has displaced other channels of direct communication in modern and post-modern campaigns, there are many reasons to believe that this process should be most advanced within the American political system.

Within the limitations of a brief presentation I cannot hope to dissuade you of all the claims advanced by media jeremiahs. Multiple phenomena are commonly mixed up together into a melange of 'crisis', 'discontent' and 'disaffection' where the mass media are regarded as the chief scapegoat. But what I do hope to do today is to raise some questions in your minds and develop an argument with three core components. Firstly, to demonstrate that reports of the ill health, or even death, of traditional partisan channels of campaign communication are grossly exaggerated. Secondly to present evidence from the 2000 Bush-Gore US presidential elections which confirms that far from 'blaming the messenger', the role of exposure to campaign information from parties, newspapers, television news, talk radio, and the Internet has strengthened civic engagement in America. Lastly, expanding upon previous work, I will consider the role of popular television entertainment in this process. All the evidence does not fall into a simple and consistent pattern, instead there are many untidy strands. Any media effects we

detect are often modest, at best. We need to call upon alternative sources of data and different methods to pull the pieces of the puzzle together. It remains tricky to establish the direction of causality when any apparent 'media effects' can be easily confounded with 'selection effects'. In other studies, I have drawn far broader comparisons in terms of patterns of media use, Internet diffusion, and political activism, in Western Europe and worldwide¹⁵. In this presentation I will focus the data analysis upon the United States, since this is the system where post-modern campaign has advanced furthest, as well as the nation where perhaps the strongest concerns have been expressed about the role of television in vitiating our sense of community and public life. But the core argument can be understood to be broadly applicable across many political systems, including European parliamentary democracies like Belgium, with a different media and political system.

The conclusion of this study is that both partisan and mediated sources of campaign information function to boost civic engagement. Moreover experimental studies demonstrate that this phenomena is not purely a 'selection effect', because the public has been found to learn about political issues after exposure to all types of mass media, with television news proving as beneficial in this respect as newspapers and the Internet. Now I recognize that represents a strong argument, which will doubtless make many regard me as a naïve Panglossian optimist, at best, or a blind defender of the media industry, at worst, but let me try to walk you through some of the evidence supporting this case with an open mind to contradictory tendencies and alternative interpretations of the data.

I: The Decline of Direct Communications?

The first assumption that I want to challenge is the common idea that television has taken over and subsumed older direct forms of party-voter linkage, so that people are getting their only messages during modern election campaigns when sitting in isolation through the flickering blue light of the TV tube rather than being contacted personally by local activists and party members, or discussing politics face-to-face with family, friends, or with colleagues over the office water cooler.

Trends in Party Contacting

The best evidence to examine this proposition comes from the series of National Election Studies conducted from 1948-2000 in America. We will focus on Presidential elections both to compare like with like, and to focus on the races where money and the media are believed to exert the strongest influence. In these surveys, the public has regularly been asked about their experience of the election campaign, including how far they have been contacted by one or other of the major parties (typically either by calling around in person or more recently by telephone canvassing). Figure 2 shows the trends in presidential elections since 1956: the proportion contacted by the major parties rose slightly from 1956 to a peak in 1972, then fell back steadily to earlier levels from 1972 to 1992. If this trend had continued it would indeed provide convincing evidence of party decline, but in fact after 1992 the proportion of Americans contacted by one of the major parties experienced a sharp and consistent rise in successive contests during the last decade. In the Bush v. Gore 2000 race overall more than one third of the American electorate (37%) reported being contacted by one of the major parties during the campaign: the highest proportion since records began almost fifty years earlier, and more than double the proportion contacted in the Eisenhower v. Stevenson race during the height of machine party politics in 1956. The linear trend line shows almost a 10-point rise in party contact activity over the last fifty years. It is true that the form of contact today is more likely to be from phone banks than from doorstep visitors, and perhaps also from paid workers rather more than from campaign volunteers, but nevertheless this still means greater personal discussion between party workers and individual voters, not less.

[Figure 2 about here]

Trends in Political Discussion

But party canvassing is essentially a ‘top down’ form of activity that could reflect the closeness of the race, the role of professional phone banks, and the financial resources of the presidential candidates. What of levels of personal persuasion about the pros and cons of political issues and candidates, and informal discussions about the campaign among friends, colleagues, and neighbours? Has this seen a steady fall if American politics becomes a ‘privatized’ and solitary spectator sport, and if the bored and cynical public increasingly turns off from the drama of the race for the White House? Discussion represents one of the most common forms of voluntary activism, depending upon motivational attitudes such as political interest and personal confidence rather than financial or even time resources, so it represents a good indicator of levels of civic engagement. The NES regularly monitors how far people tried to persuade others how to vote for one of the parties or for the candidates during each presidential campaign. Figure 3 shows a pattern of trendless fluctuation around the mean, with political persuasion peaking during the 1976 Carter v. Ford race, and again during the 1992 Bush v. Clinton contest. The best fitting linear trend line shows an almost flat profile, or even a very modest rise, with no evidence of a slow and steady erosion of political discussion over successive contests. During the mid-1950s and early 1960s about one third of Americans engaged in political persuasion during Presidential elections, and the same pattern holds true today¹⁶.

[Figure 3 about here]

Trends in Traditional Campaign Activism

Yet political talk is ubiquitous but also cheap and relatively costless: what of more demanding forms of political activism? Theories of media malaise claim that tidal waves of apathy have swept the American electorate, with the spectacle of politics encouraging civic couch potatoes who watch events from their living rooms but rarely participate in the public sphere. The NES has monitored traditional forms of campaign activism during the last fifty years using four indicators including whether people had attended a political meeting, worked for a party or candidate, displayed a candidate button or sticker, or donated money to a party or candidate. These dimensions can make different demands on electors, with the resources of time required to attend a local rally or town hall debate, but financial resources needed for campaign contributions. Figure 4 shows the trends in campaign activism since 1952, when traditional machine caucus-cadre parties were supposedly at the peak of their powers during the golden age when only one in ten American households had a television set, just before the tube swept into every living room¹⁷.

[Figure 4 about here]

The pattern shows that campaign activism has always been a minority activity in America: in 1952 and again in 1956 only 3.2% of the American electorate worked for a party or candidate. The figure fluctuates slightly over time but in the 2000 election the equivalent figure was 2.8%, a remarkably similar level. In America, in 1952 grassroots party volunteers and local party bosses may have been vital in get-out-the-vote drives for Eisenhower’s victory, along with the support of the partisan press and radio addresses, but only a small proportion of grassroots voters were engaged in such activities, and the size of this hard-core group of activists barely seems to have altered despite the massive transformation during recent decades in the nature of presidential election campaigns. The figures estimating the proportion of Americans who attended a political meeting or rally shows a similar flat line. The proportion that donated money during the campaign is also largely flat, with the exception of the mini-blip following the reform of campaign funding laws in the early 1970s. The single indicator that has declined consistently, and indeed

fallen fairly sharply, has been the proportion of Americans displaying a campaign button or bumper sticker. It seems unlikely that more should be drawn from this than the changing fashions of political activists, where buttons have become one more iconic 'collectable', like old biscuit tins and movie posters, to be traded on the Internet rather than worn on one's lapel (indeed whatever happened to lapels?).

So, in short, despite our best efforts to find evidence of long-term erosion in traditional forms of direct political communications and types of campaign activism during American elections, the evidence suggests that, to the contrary, most of these indicators have been stable over fifty years, and that the amount of party canvassing even increased during the 1990s. None of this is to deny that other major changes have altered, indeed transformed, the familiar campaign landscape during the last fifty years, from the long-term erosion of partisan alignments in the electorate to the use of new communication and information technologies for linking candidates and voters, exemplified by party websites. But the evidence suggests that, like layers of sediment in the Mississippi, new forms of mediated campaign communications and information have supplemented, but not replaced, older direct forms. Just because Al Gore and George Bush blanketed the airwaves with campaign ads in key states, and mounted relatively sophisticated websites and email campaigns, does not mean that they neglected old formats as well. Similar pattern are evident in many other Western countries, exemplified by the British Labour party's campaign in June 2001 making greater use of more sophisticated centralized telephone banks to canvass wavering voters, as well as targeting marginal seats more intensively for personal doorstep contact by party volunteers and parliamentary candidates¹⁸.

II. The Impact of Campaign Information

Yet even if traditional forms of campaigning continue, none of this disproves the central claim of the many popular jeremiads who believe that exposure to political news has a corrosive effect upon what the public learns about the campaign, their trust in politicians, and their levels of activism. Even if traditional channels of communication remain, many suggest that typical patterns of campaign journalism have the effect of fostering passivity and apathy, focusing on personalities, horse-race polls and scandal, not serious policy debates about the major issues of the day. The simple idea that television news contributes towards civic disengagement and public cynicism -- and thus the intellectual origins of video malaise theories in political science and communication studies -- can be traced back to early work by Kurt and Gladys Lang¹⁹. Michael Robinson first popularized the term 'video malaise' to describe the link between reliance upon television journalism and feelings of political cynicism, social mistrust, and lack of political efficacy²⁰. Greater exposure to network TV news, he argued, with its high 'negativism', conflictual frames, and anti-institutional themes, generated political disaffection, frustration, cynicism, self-doubt and malaise in American politics. The idea gained currency and rapidly became adopted as the mainstream perspective during the 1990s²¹. Hence for Cappella and Jamieson, strategic campaign coverage in American elections has become the dominant mode of political news and this has generated a 'spiral of cynicism' among citizens²². Along similar lines, Patterson argues that a journalistic emphasis on the 'game' of politics rather than the substance of the policymaking process has crowded out discussions more relevant to issues of governance, activating public cynicism about parties and candidates²³. As an intermediary, the press, Patterson concludes, has become dysfunctional for civic engagement, or 'out of order', by widening the gap between parties and the public.

The standard critique of the mass media has been modified most recently by accounts stressing the differential effects of television *entertainment* and television *news* on social capital and civic engagement²⁴. Putnam argues that watching TV soaps, sit-coms and movies steals time from social life, encouraging community lethargy and civic passivity in America, but at the same time he confirms that watching TV news and current affairs programs is consistently associated

with higher levels of political trust and activism. As Putnam summarizes the American evidence: “*The more time spent watching news, the more active one is in the community, whereas the more time spent watching soap operas, game shows and talk shows, the less active one is in the community.*”²⁵ Survey evidence drawn from many postindustrial societies consistently replicates these conclusions. In Britain, reading a broadsheet newspaper, and watching a lot of television news, is related to greater political knowledge, interest, and trust of politics²⁶. Similar patterns have been demonstrated in Germany and Belgium, as well as in a five-nation study²⁷. Recent examination of evidence from the American National Election Study confirms that trust in politics and trust in the news media go hand-in-hand, with no indication that use of the news media is systematically related to political cynicism²⁸. These studies suggest that rather than a blanket critique of the impact of the ‘mass media’, we need to distinguish carefully between different types including the role of newspapers, radio, TV, and the Internet. Within television we need to further distinguish at a minimum by the type of program, in particular the contrasts between TV news and entertainment²⁹.

To examine the American evidence, we can draw upon the latest National Election Study during the 2000 Bush-Gore presidential election, where the survey monitored patterns of media use. This included the frequency of watching popular game shows like *Jeopardy* and *Wheel of Fortune*, and talk shows like *Oprah Winfrey*, *Rosie O'Donnell*, or *Jerry Springer*. The characteristics contents of these programs means that there would be no reason to expect that watching them would induce any sort of ‘mean-world effect’ by reinforcing images of crime, violence or personal insecurity, unlike, for example, popular dramas such as *NYPD*, *The Practice*, or *Law and Order*. The survey also monitored the frequency of watching television news, including national network TV early evening news, and local news (early and late evening), as well as the frequency of use of newspapers and the use of the Internet for election information. Of course the NES indicator of TV news exposure remains incomplete, since today many Americans get their news from cable channels like Fox and CNN, as well as from sources such as National Public Radio’s *All Things Considered*, ABC’s *Nightline* and PBS’s *News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, none of which are monitored by the NES survey. Nevertheless the evening network news represents the largest combined nation-wide news audience that easily outdoes the audience for cable channels. We focus the analysis upon the behavioural measure of the frequency of simple exposure (use), rather than the attitudinal measure of the attention to political news in these media, since the latter can be confounded with other political attitudes such as interest.

Factor analysis (with details not given here) revealed that use of the television programs for either news or entertainment fell into two distinct dimensions. Accordingly scales were constructed for each of these dimensions and these scales were then dichotomised into four roughly equal categories: as shown schematically in Figure 5, including those who watch much TV of any type, the news-oriented viewers with high exposure to local and network TV news but not entertainment, the entertainment-oriented viewers with high exposure to TV entertainment but not local and network TV news, and the last group with little exposure to any TV. Details about the operationalization of all these measures, and the dependent variables, are given in Appendix A. If theories of media malaise are correct, then it follows that there should be systematic and predictable differences in civic engagement among these groups, after controlling for the usual social characteristics of age, gender, race, education, and income that also commonly affect both TV-watching habits and political attitudes. In particular, if media malaise theories are correct, we would expect to find that, all other things being equal, the *anti-TV* group who watched minimal television would display the greatest civic engagement.

[Figure 5 about here]

Table 1 presents the mean results on the scales of civic engagement by type of television viewer, without introducing any prior social controls. The results show a remarkably consistent

pattern: across all the indicators except political trust, the news-oriented group proved the *most* civically engaged: the most knowledgeable, socially trusting, organizationally-networked, with the strongest sense of internal and external efficacy, the greatest campaign activism, the highest propensity to cast a ballot, and the most willing to discuss politics. In contrast, the entertainment-oriented group who watched programs like *Jeopardy* and *Oprah* but not network or local news, proved the *least* engaged across all these indicators, again with the single exception of trust in government. The simple idea that it matters *what we watch*, as opposed to *whether we watch*, seems to receive substantial support from this initial comparison. Yet the pattern is not quite so simple when we turn to the other groups in the study. It turns out that those who watch much TV, including a mix of both entertainment and news, are also relatively high in civic engagement. Like a moderate amount of sugar and salt, it appears that a mixed diet of television does no harm, and may even prove beneficial, to political activism and electoral involvement. This group remains slightly less engaged than the pure news-seekers, but also far more engaged than the purely entertainment-oriented. Yet if we look at the typical profile of the people who watch little television of any kind, whether news or entertainment, the results show that this group falls slightly above the entertainment oriented in levels of civic engagement but below the groups who watch much news and entertainment television. Little or no television, it appears, like no salt or sugar in the diet, may be as bad for civic health as a diet of pure *Wheels of Fortune* saccharine.

[Table 1 about here]

But so far we have not considered the distinctive social profile of the audiences who fall into these categories of TV-watching. It is well established that the audience for different programs on American television as well as for other media is differentiated by patterns of age, gender and race, as well as by education, income and work status³⁰. So all these factors need to be included in any multivariate analysis before we can have any confidence that the relationships observed so far are the product of media effects rather than the type of people most drawn to these programs. In particular, as in many European countries, the retired population in America is both more sedentary and yet has more leisure time, so older viewers often watch more TV, including news and popular entertainment. In addition, we also need to compare the effects of exposure to TV news and entertainment with the effects of exposure to the other most common sources of campaign information, including TV campaign ads, newspapers, talk radio, and the Internet. For comparison between direct and mediated channels, we can also compare the effects of party campaigns. The latter is measured by whether a party contacted people during the campaign, or whether they had received any campaign information from one of the parties by mail. The underlying analytical model is presented schematically in Figure 6.

[Figure 6 and Table 2 about here]

Table 2 presents the results of a series of OLS regression models when exposure to the news media is regressed on all the indicator scales of civic engagement, including age, gender, race, education, household income, and employment status as prior controls. The same results are presented schematically in Table 3. The results demonstrate that there are only two cases where the effects of exposure to information sources prove negative: namely the association between television entertainment and feelings of external efficacy (government responsiveness), and the link between exposure to TV campaign ads and political trust. The reasons for these associations remain somewhat puzzling; it could be that repeatedly watching highly negative ads eroded confidence in government but we would need more information about the contents of the ads (which is unavailable) to support this claim in any convincing fashion. But these findings are outweighed by the number of cases where exposure to campaign information from different sources is positively related to indicators of civic engagement. Of the different sources, party contact proves the most consistent, proving significant across all nine separate indicators. The use of the Internet and of newspapers for campaign information also each prove positive across 7

out of the 9 indicators. Talk radio is consistently related to indicators of political activism, as well as to knowledge and internal efficacy. Lastly use of television news proves to be positively related to political knowledge, internal efficacy, and discussion of politics. Use of TV entertainment is positively related to political trust, electoral turnout and political discussion. Contrary to Putnam, neither exposure to TV news nor entertainment were significantly related to social trust and organizational activism. Overall the strength of the media effects should not be exaggerated; as many other studies have reported, general social factors such as education and age proved by far the most important predictors of civic engagement. Many factors such as measurement error and the limited size of some groups of users could generate the non-significant effects. The results are not always consistent across all indicators. Nevertheless the consistently *positive* direction of nearly all the coefficients provides no support for the more sweeping generalizations about the harmful effects of exposure to the news coverage of election campaigns, as claimed in popular theories of media malaise, and indeed the positive results strongly suggest that campaign information from the news media functions in a similar way to information from parties.

III: Conclusions and Discussion

The evidence presented in this study suggests three major findings:

First, modern and post-modern campaigns add new channels of information and campaign communication, but this process essentially *supplements rather than replacing* older party-voter linkages. Evidence from the series of national election surveys in the United States shows that many traditional forms of campaign communication have remained popular during the last fifty years, while U.S. parties have actually become *more* active in directly contacting individual voters during the last decade, not less.

Secondly, the evidence shows that *campaign information provided by parties and by the news media strengthens civic engagement*, using multiple indicators ranging from knowledge of the candidates to levels of social capital, political efficacy and trust, and campaign activism. People contacted by parties are indeed mobilized. These findings are reassuring but hardly surprising, this is, after all, the chief function of the efforts that politicians make during campaigns to get out their vote. But, it is also true that campaign information provided by the news media serves a similarly positive function for citizens. Survey evidence from the Bush-Gore 2000 American presidential election demonstrates that, after introducing standard social controls for the characteristics of the audience, exposure to campaign information from newspapers, talk radio, television news, and the Internet, had no significant *negative* effect on citizen involvement. Instead, in contrast, where significant effects were detected, exposure to campaign information from the news media was found to strengthen multiple indicators of civic engagement. By reducing the ‘blooming, buzzing’ confusion of politics, where there are effects, campaign information from the news media improves political knowledge, reinforces social capital, heightens feelings of political efficacy and trust, and boosts campaign activism.

Lastly, *what of the impact of television entertainment?* Previous research suggests that an important distinction needs to be made about the effects of watching different types of TV programs³¹. This study confirms that, as others have found, in analysis without any prior social controls, Americans who watched much television entertainment like *Oprah*, *Wheel of Fortune*, and *Jeopardy* apparently proved least politically engaged during the last campaign, across a wide battery of indicators, including social trust and organizational membership, as Putnam argues. But this pattern becomes insignificant in multivariate models (with the single exception of feelings of external efficacy) once controls are introduced for the social characteristics of viewers who typically depend most upon popular TV entertainment. This suggests that it is the particular profile of the audience for game and talk shows that generates lower levels of civic engagement

including social capital, not the effects of entertainment TV per se. Moreover Americans who watched a blend of news and entertainment proved more engaged than those who regularly watched little television of any kind. American television entertainment is often suspected of having a pernicious effect upon the body politic, as well as upon social capital and community life. Yet it appears that, taken in moderation, some balanced television, like some moderate sugar and salt in a balanced diet, not only adds to life's pleasures, but also proves healthy.

The analysis of the 2000 presidential election in the United States therefore serves to provide additional confirmation of the pattern found in previous work, where successive tests in a series of models established that, contrary to theories of media malaise, those most exposed to the news media consistently proved more knowledgeable, not less, more trusting towards government and the political system, not less, and more likely to participate in election campaigns, not less. This pattern was found across different data sets, different years, and different countries, including in the United States as well as in Western Europe³². The role of information provided by the news media therefore functioned in a similar way to the role of information provided by party campaigns, serving to educate, mobilize and activate the electorate.

Nevertheless the association between patterns of media exposure and civic engagement remains open to three alternative interpretations, which are tricky to disentangle from cross-sectional surveys even with the best available evidence. One explanation could be a '*selection effect*', with the direction of causality flowing from prior political attitudes towards media use. After all, everyday we commonly click on the remote to select programs for many different long-established preferences, because we enjoy crime drama, because we're interested in natural history programs, because we love the soaps, just as we turn to the horoscopes, weather or sports section in newspapers. In the same way, people may also switch to politics and current affairs programs, or turn to the political headlines in newspapers, if they enjoy the cut and thrust of political debate, if they want to catch up with the news headlines, or if they simply want to know which side is most likely to win an election. Yet if we assume that the direct of causality is strictly one-way (from motivational interest to patterns of media exposure) this makes certain heroic assumptions that, irrespective of what we watch or read or surf, we remain unaffected by this process, learning nothing, changing nothing.

An alternative explanation could be a '*media effect*', with the direction of causality flowing from exposure to the news media and party to subsequent political attitudes. In this account, habitual patterns of media use, for whatever reasons, could lead towards people learning more about public affairs, developing greater trust in the political system and thereby becoming more participatory. For example, if people watch or listen to the news because it comes on the schedules at a particular time of the day when convenient, or if they catch the news headlines when buying a paper primarily for sports or entertainment, then they could plausibly acquire greater political information and stronger civic attitudes. This account, if interpreted strictly as a one-way direction of causality, also requires certain strong assumptions about how far our patterns of media use are purely habitual, determined by the program schedules and editorial headlines rather than by viewers' prior choices. The influence of media habits was probably fairly strong in earlier decades, when home delivery of newspapers was common and there were only two or three main network channels available, but it seems increasingly unlikely for most TV viewers with remote in hand, given the expansion in the multi-channel cable and satellite TV environment, not to speak of the multitude of other sources of campaign information available at the click of the mouse in the digital world.

The last and most convincing alternative is that there is an interactive reciprocal effect at work, or the theory of a '*virtuous circle*', where we assume that prior interests and motivation lead towards patterns of media exposure and, in turn, use of these information sources strengthens

and reinforces existing opinions and attitudes (illustrated schematically in Figure 5). Hence people most interested and informed about politics and public affairs will be most motivated to seek campaign information by reading newspapers, watching TV news, and surfing the Internet, thereby becoming more aware of the electoral choices, reducing the information costs of voting participation. Following Hardin, we assume that trust is a cognitive process, in which information functions as a necessary but not sufficient condition for enabling trust³³. The reason is that rational actors with sufficient information can predict whether people and institutions will act for or against their interests. Hence it is rational to trust friends whom we know well more than strangers, just as we often trust familiar communities more than the unfamiliar locations. It follows that greater information about elections and government allows voters to make more reliable predictions about whether supporting one of the presidential candidates will or will not serve their interests. Without sufficient knowledge, in an uncertain and risky world, it is safer to be skeptical about electoral choices. Based on these assumptions, typical information provided by the news media and parties during election campaigns can be expected to generate feelings of greater familiarity with the electoral process that, in turn, enables and facilitates greater political trust and civic engagement.

Without panel evidence, or experimental research, it remains difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the causality underlying the relationship between use of the media and civic engagement from the American evidence. Cross-sectional surveys can only provide circumstantial grounds rather than conclusive proof. But here we can briefly mention the results of quasi-natural experiments, conducted during the course of the June 2001 British general election, which examined what the public learnt about the government's record and party policies after exposure to equivalent information in tabloid and broadsheet newspapers, television news, and party websites³⁴. People were asked to complete a brief questionnaire, they were then assigned at random to one of the exposure groups, or to the control that was shown no political TV news, and they were subsequently asked to complete a second short survey. Media effects were assessed by the mean change in the pre-post test levels of knowledge for the groups who were exposed to different media when compared with pre-post change in the control. The full results, published elsewhere, give complete details of the research design, methodology and analysis. But the essential findings were that the British public learnt about equally from all the media sources, including television news, and the amount of campaign learning was significant compared with the control group. By controlling the conditions, these experiments demonstrated that the causal direction ran from campaign media exposure to the acquisition of political knowledge, even if we assume that in the real world there are probably reciprocal effects at work in this relationship.

Therefore the broader conclusions of the paper are that the modernization process in Western democracies has indeed transformed elections, with the evolution from traditional to modern and then post-modern campaigns. This development has altered the channels and techniques of electioneering, but the rise of television and then the Internet has supplemented, not displaced, direct channels of party campaigning. Moreover popular claims that the rise of television (or TV entertainment) has generated any so-called 'crisis' of civic engagement receives no support from the evidence here, and indeed even the claims of a crisis of civic engagement need to be seriously questioned. Evidence presented in other work strongly suggests that there has been a shift from the politics of loyalties towards the politics of choice, including a wider range of repertoires and targets of political activism in democratic societies, but this does not mean that citizens in Brussels, Berlin, and Amsterdam have become passive and apathetic; rather many are actively expressing their political preferences, but through different channels to their parents and grandparents³⁵. But that, as we say, is another story for another day.

Table 1: Mean indicators of civic engagement by type of television viewer, without any controls

Type of TV Viewer	Knowledge	Social Capital		Political Attitudes			Political Activism		
	Political Knowledge	Social Trust	Org. member	Internal Efficacy	External Efficacy	Political trust	Campaign activism	Voted in election	Discuss politics
News-oriented TV	2.44	1.99	.92	10.22	13.49	6.85	.71	.82	4.85
Watch much TV (news and entertainment)	2.14	1.96	.88	9.44	12.59	7.18	.69	.80	4.28
Watch little TV (news or entertainment)	1.99	1.86	.88	8.97	12.89	6.87	.60	.73	3.99
Entertainment-oriented	1.70	1.71	.63	8.17	12.18	7.13	.48	.68	3.40
<i>All</i>	<i>2.07</i>	<i>1.89</i>	<i>.84</i>	<i>9.21</i>	<i>12.78</i>	<i>7.01</i>	<i>.63</i>	<i>.76</i>	<i>4.14</i>
Sig.	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
Eta	.22	.09	.09	.16	.11	.10	.09	.12	.17
Scale range	0-4	0-3	0-5	0-22	0-21	4-12	0-6	0-1	0-7
N. Of cases	1807	1544	1807	1554	1554	1453	1807	1807	1807

Note: For details of the construction of all the scales see Appendix A. The significance of the mean difference between groups is measured by ANOVA. P. sig.001=***.

Source: 2000 American National Election Study (N.1489)

Table 2: Regression models of civic engagement by type of information exposure, with prior social controls

Type of campaign information exposure	Knowledge		Social Capital		Political Attitudes			Political Activism										
	Political Knowledge		Social Trust	Org. member	Internal Efficacy	External Efficacy	Political trust	Campaign activism	Voted in election	Discuss politics								
	B.	SE.	B.	SE.	B.	SE.	B.	SE.	B.	SE.								
TV News	.01	.004***	-.01	.005	.01	.005	.09	.018***	.03	.02	-.01	.008	.01	.004	.01	.002	.04	.011***
TV Entertainment	.01	.008	-.01	.009	-.01	.009	.01	.032	-.06	.03*	.03	.014*	.01	.007	.01	.003***	.04	.021*
TV Campaign Ads	-.06	.062	.23	.072***	-.06	.070	-.41	.254	.55	.25*	-.07	.108***	.06	.051	.03	.024	.04	.156
Newspaper	.03	.010***	.03	.011***	.04	.011***	.16	.039***	.03	.04	.06	.017***	.02	.008*	.01	.004	.09	.024***
Talk Radio	.15	.023***	-.02	.025	.01	.026	.46	.090***	.14	.09	-.04	.038	.10	.020***	.05	.009***	.49	.059***
Internet	.45	.064***	.04	.070	.26	.071***	.72	.248***	.67	.24**	.03	.106	.26	.052***	.20	.024***	1.56	.159***
Party contact	.43	.036***	.21	.041***	.33	.040***	.31	.145*	.59	.14***	.17	.062**	.31	.029***	.23	.014***	.92	.089***
Adjusted R ²	.35		.17		.16		.18		.16		.03		.18		.34		.29	
Constant	-.46		.016		-.657		-4.66		7.42		6.70		-.31		-.04		.531	
N. Of cases	1564		1329		1564		1355		1355		1279		1564		1564		1564	

Note: For details of the construction of all the scales see Appendix A. All models control for age (years), gender (male), race (white), education, household income, and work status (currently working). The coefficients show unstandardized beta (B), Standard Error (SE), and significance. P. sig.001=***, sig.01=**, sig.05=.01.

Source: 2000 American National Election Study

Table 3: Summary of Regression Models, with social controls

Type of information exposure	Knowledge	Social Capital		Political Attitudes			Activism		
		Political Knowledge	Social Trust Org. member	Internal Efficacy	External Efficacy	Political trust	Campaign activism	Voted in election	Discuss politics
TV News	+			+					+
TV Entertainment					-	+		+	+
TV Campaign Ads		+			+	-			
Newspaper	+	+	+	+		+	+		+
Talk Radio	+			+			+	+	+
Internet	+		+	+	+		+	+	+
Party contact	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Note: For full details see Table 2. A significant positive coefficient =+. A significant negative coefficient =-.

Source: 2000 American National Election Study

Figure 1: Typology of the Evolution of Campaign Communications

	<i>Premodern</i>	<i>Modern</i>	<i>Post-Modern</i>
Predominant era	<i>Mid-19thC to 1950s</i>	<i>Early 1960s-late 1980s</i>	<i>1990s+</i>
Campaign Organization	Local and decentralized party volunteers	Nationally coordinated with greater professionalization	Nationally coordinated but decentralized operations
Preparations	Short-term, ad hoc	Long campaign	Permanent campaign
Central coordination	Party leaders	Central party headquarters, more specialist advisors	Special party campaign units and more professional consultants
Feedback	Local canvassing and party meetings	Occasional opinion polls	Regular opinion polls plus focus groups and interactive web sites
Media	Partisan press, local posters and pamphlets, radio broadcasts	Television broadcasts through main evening news, targeted direct mail	TV narrowcasting, direct and mediated websites, email, online discussion groups, Intranets
Campaign events	Local public meetings, whistle-stop leadership tours	News management, daily press conferences, controlled photo-ops	Extension of news management to routine politics and government
Costs	Low budget	Moderate	Higher costs for professional consultants
Electorate	Stable social and partisan alignments	Social and partisan dealignment	Social and partisan dealignment

Source: Pippa Norris. 2002. 'Campaign Communication.' In *Comparing Democracies 2*. Ed. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris. London: Sage.

Figure 2




Figure 3





Figure 4

Campaign Activism, US 1952-2000




Q: Did you attend a political meeting, work for a party or candidate, display a candidate button/sticker, or donate money to a party or candidate?

Source: NES 1952-2000.

Figure 5: Typology based on exposure to television entertainment and news

	Low TV News	High TV News
Low TV Entertainment	Watch little TV	News-oriented
High TV Entertainment	Entertainment-oriented	Watch much TV

Figure 6: Schematic Model of the Virtuous Circle

Appendix A: Technical Details of Variables and Coding, NES 2000

Variable	Question	Coding	Mean
EXPOSURE TO TV ENTERTAINMENT			
001424	How many times in the last week have you watched "Jeopardy"?	0-7	0.64
001425	How many times in the last week have you watched "Wheel of Fortune"?	0-7	0.76
001427	How many times in the last week have you watched daytime television talk shows such as "Oprah Winfrey," "Rosie O'Donnell," or "Jerry Springer"?	0-7	0.67
EXPOSURE TO TV NEWS			
000329	How many days in the past week did you watch the national network news on TV?	0-7	3.3
000331	How many days in the past week did you watch the local TV news shows such as "Eyewitness News" or "Action News" in the late afternoon or early evening?	0-7	3.3
000332	How many days in the past week did you watch the local TV news shows in the late evening?	0-7	2.6
EXPOSURE TO OTHER MEDIA			
000338	TVADS: Do you recall seeing any ads for political candidates on television this fall?	0/1	0.7
000335	PAPER: How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper?	0-7	3.4
001434	INTERNET: Do you have access to the Internet or the World Wide Web? (If yes), Have you seen any information about this election campaign on the (Internet/Web)?	Yes 1 No 0	0.3
001431	TALK RADIO: There are a number of programs on radio in which people call in to voice their opinions about politics. Do you ever listen to political talk radio programs of this type? (If yes). How often do you listen to those programs -- every day, most days, once or twice a week, or only occasionally?	1-4	0.6
PARTY CONTACT			
v001219	Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign this year?	0/1	
v001222	Did anyone from one of the political parties send you mail about the campaign this year?	0/1	
SOCIAL CAPITAL			
v001475	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	0-3	1.8
v001477	Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are just looking out for themselves?		
v001476	Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?		
001495	JOINORG: Here is a list of some organizations people can belong to. There are labor unions, associations of people who do the same kinds of work, fraternal groups such as Lions or Kinterviewanis, hobby clubs or sports teams, groups working on political issues, community groups, and school groups. Of course, there are lots of other types of organizations, too. Not counting membership in a local church or synagogue, are you a member of any of these kinds of organizations? (If yes). How many organizations are you currently a member of?	0-5	0.7
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE			
v001458 v001462 v001466 v001470	Scale based on the correct identification of the home states of the presidential and vice presidential candidates (George Bush, Al Gore, Dick Cheney and Joe Lieberman)	0-4	1.8
POLITICAL TRUST			
001534	How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time? (Or never)	1-4	
001535	Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?	1-3	
001537	Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?	1-3	
001536	Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?	1-2	
INTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY			
001516	I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. Agree/disagree	1-5	
001517	I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics. Agree/disagree	1-5	
001518	I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people. Agree/disagree	1-5	
001519	I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people. Agree/disagree	1-5	
001529	Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	1-5	
EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY			
001528	People like me don't have any say about what the government does. Agree/disagree	1-5	
001538	How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think -- good deal, some, or not much?	1-3	
001527	Public officials don't care much what people like me think. Agree/disagree	1-5	

001520	So many other people vote in the national election that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not. Agree/disagree	1-5	
001539	Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what people think when it decides what to do -- a good deal, some, or not much?	1-3	
	CAMPAIGN ACTIVISM	0-6	0.5
001225	We would like to find out about some of the things people do to help a party or a candidate win an election. During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?	0/1	
001226	Did you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?	0/1	
001227	Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like that in support of a particular candidate?	0/1	
001228	Did you do any (other) work for one of the parties or candidates?	0/1	
001229	During an election year people are often asked to make a contribution to support campaigns. Did you give money to an individual candidate running for public office?	0/1	
001230	Did you give money to a political party during this election year?	0/1	
	POLITICAL DISCUSSION		
V001205	Do you ever discuss politics with your family or friends? (If yes) How many days in the past week did you talk about politics with family or friends?	0-7	3.5
	VOTE TURNOUT		
001248	How about the election for President? Did you vote for a candidate for President?	0/1	0.6
	DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CONTROLS		
000908	Age (in years)	18-95	
000913	Educational qualifications, summary	0-7	
001029	Gender	0/1	
000066	Race (White/Non-white)	0/1	
000994	Household income	1-10	
000920	Work status (dummies for in paid employment, retired, or homeworker).	0/1	

Source: 2000 American National Election Study

¹ Maurice Duverger. 1954. *Political Parties*. New York: Wiley; Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Eds. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press.

² For the debate about 'modernization' or 'Americanization' see Dennis Kavanagh. 1995. *Electioneering*. Oxford: Blackwell; Ralph Negrine and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos. 1996. 'The "Americanisation" of Political Communications: A Critique'. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 1(2): 45-62; David Swanson and Paolo Mancini. (Eds). 1996. *Politics, Media and Modern Democracy*. New York: Praeger. For the debate about political marketization see Fritz Plassner, Christian Scheucher and Christian Senft. 1999. 'Is there a European Style of Political Marketing?' In *The Handbook of Political Marketing* edited by Bruce I. Newman. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Philip J. Maarek. *Political Marketing and Communication*. London: John Libbey. See also Margaret Scammell. 1995. *Designer Politics: How Elections are Won*. London: Macmillan; Dennis Kavanagh. 1995. *Election Campaigning: The New Marketing of Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell; Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy. 1990. *The Phenomenon of Political Marketing*. New York: St Martin's Press; Nicholas Jones. 1995. *Soundbites and Spindocrats*. London: Cassell; Scammell, Margaret. 1999. 'The Wisdom of the War Room: US Campaigning and Americanization.' *Media, Culture and Society*. 20; Margaret Scammell. 2000. 'Political Marketing: Lessons for Political Science.' *Political Studies*.

³ See, for example, David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow. 1979. *Media Logic*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; Gianpietro Mazzoleni. 1987. 'Media Logic and Party Logic in Campaign Coverage: The Italian General Election of 1983.' *European Journal of Communication*. 2(1): 81-103.

⁴ For a fuller discussion of these concepts see Pippa Norris. 2002. 'Campaign Communications.' In *Comparing Democracies 2*. Ed. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris. London: Sage.

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⁷ Bruce I. Newman. Ed. 1999. *The Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

⁸ Otto Kirchheimer 1966. 'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems.' In *Political Parties and Political Development*, Eds. J. La Palombara and M. Weiner Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. See also Angelo Panebianco. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁹ For a series of case studies, see David Swanson and Paolo Mancini. 1996. *Politics, Media and Modern Democracy*. NY: Praeger; Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan. Eds. 2000. *Democracy and the Media*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also Kay Lawson. 1980. *Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl. Eds. 1988. *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

¹⁰ For a critique of this view, however, see Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley. 1992. *Labour's Grass Roots: The Politics of Labour Party Membership*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd and Jeremy Richardson. 1994. *True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. 1995. *Citizens, Politics, and Social Communications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹ Neil Postman. 1985. *Entertaining Ourselves to Death*. New York: Viking; Neil Gabler. 1998. *Life the Movie*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Roderick Hart. 1994. *Seducing America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹² John H. Aldrich. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

¹³ See, for example, James Thurber, James and Candice J. Nelson. Eds. 2000. *Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections*. Washington, DC: Brookings; James Thurber, Candice J. Nelson and David A. Dulio. Eds. 2000. *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections*. Washington, DC: Brookings.

¹⁴ Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Post-Industrial Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press Ch.4 and 5.

¹⁵ See Pippa Norris, John Curtice, David Sanders, Margaret Scammell and Holli Semetko. 1999. *On Message*. London: Sage; Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Post-Industrial Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide? Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Political Activism Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁶ For the importance of political discussion see Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. 1995. *Citizens, Politics, and Social Communications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁷ For a general discussion of these trends see Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.

¹⁸ Pippa Norris. Ed. 2001. *Britain Votes 2001*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁹ Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang. 1966. 'The Mass Media and Voting'. In *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication* edited by Bernard Berelson and M. Janowitz. New York: Free Press.

²⁰ Michael Robinson. 1976. 'Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "the Selling of the President".' *American Political Science Review*. 70(3): 409-32 P.425; Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan. 1983. *Over the Wire and on TV: CBS and UPI in Campaign '80*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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²² Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1996. 'News Frames, Political Cynicism and Media Cynicism'. In *The Media and Politics*, edited by Kathleen Hall Jamieson. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Volume 546; Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1997. *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good*. New York: Oxford University Press.

²³ Thomas E. Patterson. 1993. *Out of Order*. New York: Vintage; Thomas E. Patterson. 1996. 'Bad News, Bad Governance'. In *The Media and Politics*, edited by Kathleen Hall Jamieson. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Volume 546.

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²⁵ In European societies, ideally we also need to divide the analysis by public or private broadcasting sector, just as we need to consider the impact of tabloid and broadsheet newspapers, where these represent major structural features in the media systems. See Marc Hooghe. 2002. 'Television and the Erosion of Social Capital: Disentangling the Causal Mechanisms.' *The Harvard International Journal of*

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²⁶ Kenneth Newton. 1997. 'Politics and the News Media: Mobilisation or Videomalaise?' In *British Social Attitudes: the 14th Report*, 1997/8, eds. Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Alison Park, Katarina Thomson and Lindsay Brook. Aldershot: Ashgate; Kenneth Newton. 1999. 'Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise?' *British Journal of Political Science*. 29: 577-599.

²⁷ Christina Holtz-Bacha. 1990. 'Videomalaise Revisited: Media Exposure and Political Alienation in West Germany.' *European Journal of Communication*. 5: 73-85; For Belgium, see Marc Hooghe. 2002. 'Television and the Erosion of Social Capital: Disentangling the Causal Mechanisms.' *The Harvard International Journal of Press-Politics*. 7(2):84-104; John Curtice, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck and Peter Schrott. 1998. 'Do the Media Matter?' Paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the Mid-West Political Science Association*, Chicago. The study found that those most attentive to TV news or newspapers proved more likely to be politically interested and engaged in Britain, Germany, Japan Spain and the US.

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³⁰ See Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Post-Industrial Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.

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³² Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Post-Industrial Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

³³ Russell Hardin. 1998. 'Trust in Government.' In *Trust and Governance*. Eds. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. See also Margaret Levi. 1998. 'A state of trust.' In *Trust and Governance*. Eds. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

³⁴ Pippa Norris and David Sanders. 2001. 'Knows Little, Learns Less? An Experimental Study of the Impact of the Media on Learning during the 2001 British general election.' Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco. 1st September 2001. See also full details of the methodology at www.pippanorris.com.

³⁵ Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Political Activism Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.