The general topic of this Conference points to the link between the concepts of religion and terrorism. The September 11th attacks - and the previous and subsequent terrorist attacks in Bali and other parts of Asia - highlight the importance of gathering as much information as possible on Islam-related terrorism.

Islamic fundamentalism has added new dimensions to the phenomenon of terrorism. Here I would like to mention two. First, the widespread potential or actual support for this terrorism: Muslims make up a large proportion of the world's population and this, along with the current level of technological advance, combine to make Islamic terrorism a truly global problem. Second, Islamic fundamentalism has brought a new lethality to terrorist actions through the suicide attack.

Like all genuinely important matters, terrorism is a complex phenomenon. Any analysis ignoring this complexity will be inadequate and the remedies proposed ineffective if not counterproductive. Not all terrorism is religious in nature, of course. Nor does religion play the same role in all terrorist movements in which it is a significant factor. In Ireland, for example, religion is an important factor in the identification of the two communities in conflict, however, it is not the underlying motivation for violence. Religion does not have any significant role in Basque terrorism in Spain, to cite another example.

Terrorism implies fanaticism on the part of those involved. Here, I take fanaticism to mean subordination of everything, including life itself, to a single end. Religious fanaticism has added a new efficacy to terrorist actions through the legitimisation of suicide attacks in terms of eternal reward, in a way that only religion can do. Thus, one of the aims of global terrorism - to kill as many civilian members as possible of what they see as the enemy society - has also been facilitated. Although suicide is an extreme case not found in all forms of terrorism, joining a terrorist group normally involves high personal cost, irrespective of the setting. In Spain, for example, the active service life of an ETA member is less than three years.1 Members realise that in all likelihood they will be arrested within this time span. Despite this, there are more signs of a reduction of public support for terrorism in the Basque Country, than signs of increasing difficulties in the recruitment of activists.

The element of religious fanaticism may lead us to lose sight of the complexity of the global terrorism that we face today. I do not think that the religious factor in Islamic terrorism is being exaggerated; however, I do feel that we run the risk of excessive concentration on this element to the detriment of other factors which facilitate emergence and development of terrorist organisations. By excessive concentration on the religious factor we are simplifying the problem. Religion cannot be isolated as a constituent factor in present-day terrorism from the enormous inequalities existing between the West and the world of Islam. Rather than

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decreasing, this inequality has in fact risen notably in recent years. Religion is practically the only channel available to youth in Egypt, Pakistan and Algeria to reinforce the consciousness of their identity and in protest against what they see as the injustice and exploitation of western countries.

However, viewing the problem as a clash of religions or civilisations, as a struggle between the West and Islam, would also be to fall into the terrorists' trap, and would lead to a dead end. Such an approach would be akin to blaming or demonising all Basque nationalism for the terrorism of ETA. With this attitude the political problem in the Basque country could never be solved, since the violence can only be ended through a pact with the democratic nationalists; in other words, violence can only be ended when the lines of division of Basque society are drawn between democrats (whether nationalists or otherwise) and terrorists, as opposed to between nationalists and non-nationalists, as at present.

Similarly, global terrorism can only be ended, or at least reduced, in a context of pacts and agreements with moderate Islamists and through efforts to spread democracy through the Muslim world. This belief must be a pillar of our anti-terrorist policy in the mid term. Another, complementary pillar must be the opening up of our anti-terrorist policy to other nations. This policy cannot be seen as having been established solely to safeguard the interests of just one country, the United States, or as an instrument in the hands of the West, since such a view would make it impossible to receive social and political support from the majority of Arab and Muslim countries. And this co-operation is vital if we are to contain the spread of global terrorism. I see no way of obtaining this level of cooperation apart from conducting the fight against terrorism within the framework of international law, working with our present-day international organisms, and if necessary, alongside new ones; in other words, we need a multilateral approach to the war against terrorism. A belief in one's moral superiority does not provide legitimisation for unilateral actions against other countries, although such an approach may be effective for internal or domestic purposes.

For these reasons, it is misleading to present a possible attack on Iraq as a priority in the war on global terrorism. If we want to fight against terrorism in the mid term, then the battle will be on the streets of El Cairo, in the schools of Saudi Arabia and in the mosques of Morocco. In other words, in addition to the direct fight against terrorists, we must also implement so-called indirect measures, aimed at contributing to the development of these countries, solving present conflict and strengthening failed states. These policies are all closely linked to global policy and the world order, and they require a strategy which encompasses much more than military action. Given the readiness of many to undertake this kind of respond, it is useful to consider its consequences.

**The militarisation of the response to terrorism**

A purely military response to terrorism, or even the belief that the first response should be a military one is, in most cases, an error. A purely military response is inefficient for a number of reasons.

Firstly, there is no clear enemy against which to fight. This lack of a clear target is incompatible with the use of conventional military equipment and arms. So there emerges a
need to find targets in keeping with the military resources being employed. These targets usually take the form of another state. The attack on the other state is then presented as part of the fight against terrorism.

However, as it is widely recognised, the present danger is not so much from states which support terrorism, but rather the fact that global terrorism can easily take root and even use to its advantage the so-called failed states.

The effect of this is to confuse public opinion and prevent genuine public debate on the nature of the fight against terrorism and the difficulties to be overcome. The scenario described above is a mixture of two different wars, and although they do have points in common, they are still different: one is the war on terrorism and the other is the drive to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This approach runs the risk of falling into the trap set by much of global terrorism, which aims to provoke the radicalisation of Islamic governments. An attack on Iraq could provoke popular riots in countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Morocco, all of which are essential to today's delicate balance.

A purely military response to terrorism could unleash the clash of civilisations sought by Islamic terrorism, which is clearly something we should strive to avoid. The Hobbesian view of the international situation could well become a self-fulfilling prophecy if the United States opted for an exclusively military approach to today's international problems.

However, this amalgamation of two different wars (against terrorism and against weapons of mass destruction) which, until now, has led to a purely military response, is actually prejudicial to the battle against terrorism, and indeed, in this amalgam the fight against terrorism has ceased to be an absolute priority. In addition to the consequences pointed out by Madeleine Albright,2 i.e., that we are forgetting about the terrorist problem and that the timetable is wrong, on occasions the objectives of these two wars may be mutually contradictory. A recent report by the Council of Foreign Relations pointed to the lack of cooperation from Saudi Arabia in the drive against Al Qaeda's funding networks and Washington's lack of political will to do anything that might irritate a valuable ally in a hypothetical war against Sadam Hussein. Since the military approach is not the appropriate way to attack the problem, the problem becomes subordinated to other objectives which are more in keeping with military doctrine and resources.

Secondly, the military response to terrorism is, very often, inadequate, because military mechanisms do not normally permit differentiation between terrorists and their support structures and the rest of the population. As has been repeatedly said, the battle against terrorism is a "battle for hearts and minds". Unlike the case of common criminals or drug traffickers, those considered as terrorists by some, may be seen as freedom fighters by others.

In this context, the military approach may play into the hands of terrorist strategy, by leading to a spiral of action-reaction. This is what happened in Spain before the consolidation of democracy: General Franco responded to ETA terrorism by declaring a state of emergency, which was precisely what ETA wanted. ETA prisoners were tried by military courts which had

the effect of delegitimising the state response. With the advent of democracy in Spain, this action-reaction pattern disappeared, since the Government response was proportional, legitimate and did not target the civilian population. So much so, that ETA formally abandoned its strategy of provoking a rising of the Basque people against the State. Instead they adopted the view that outright defeat of the state was impossible and embarked on a war of attrition to force the state to negotiate the conditions of Basque independence.

I will return to this issue, now suffice to say that had the Spanish government deployed the army against ETA, i.e., had the response been military, the fictional idea of the Basque people struggling against the Spanish State would have been much easier to maintain, and the terrorists would have been guaranteed a greater measure of public support. Michael Howard expressed it clearly: "Terrorists can be successfully destroyed only if public opinion, both at home and abroad, supports the authorities in regarding them as criminals rather than heroes."¹ Deploying the army not only facilitates public perception of terrorists as heroes and martyrs, but also encourages public identification and sympathy with terrorist movements. Direct and systematic use of the Israeli army against Palestinian terrorism provides a clear example. Images of military attacks on urban areas and the inevitable and numerous civilian victims serve to consolidate the bond between the civilian population and the terrorists.

Thirdly, the military approach invariably leads to what is known as "asymmetric war", in which the enemy is fully aware of the state's military capacity, and draws the battle to terrain where this capacity cannot be optimally exploited. Terrorism then attacks weak points, examples being the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11thatrocity. Globalisation and the new communication and computer technologies provide unpredictable turns to asymmetric war. Again, the purely military response can be counter-productive if the terrorists are seeking to mobilise a certain public support.

Fourthly, as the attacks in Bali and the Philippines have shown, the most powerful tool in the fight against terrorism is information and appropriate police action. Generating and acquiring information which enables prompt and effective action requires potent co-operation networks, which often operate on a level which is different if not opposed to the field of military action.

It may be argued that this line of reasoning owes too much to the Spanish experience. Certainly, avoiding use of the military against Basque terrorism has been one of the objectives of all Spanish governments since the advent of democracy. Personally, I had some difficult times in trying to impose civilian authority in the fight against ETA, especially in the aftermath of the kidnapping and murder of an army captain in 1983. However, I was convinced that deploying the armed forces would only play into the terrorists' hands. They aimed to present their struggle as a conflict between the Basque Country and Spain, and not as one between Basques. Involvement of the Spanish army would have improved ETA's standing in Basque public opinion and would not necessarily have improved the effectiveness of the anti-terrorist campaign. In the jihad declared by Al Qaeda (and many other organisations) against - in their words - the Crusades and the Jews, a military attack on Iraq and to a certain extent, exclusively military assistance to countries such as the Philippines, for example, could well serve Islamic terrorism as confirmation that the West is indeed at war with Islam.

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¹ - Michael Howard, “What's in a Name?”, Foreign Affairs, vol81, nº1, January/February 2002, p10
Terrorism and world policy

I have dwelt on the insufficiency (putting it mildly), and unsuitability of a purely military response to terrorism because I am convinced that if we are to respond to the threat of global terrorism we must design a much more complex policy. We must act to renovate our global politics.

This is so because the fight against terrorism must include not only direct action against terrorist organisations but also indirect action against the conditions which nurture the birth and development of terrorism. It has been argued that these indirect actions against terrorism must be conducted by means of international law and the already existing multilateral organisms. I agree with this view, but would not restrict it to the indirect measures. In my view, the direct measures against terrorism should also be conducted in this way.

The terrorism which we are now facing has not changed the pre-existing need to construct a new world order, if anything it has heightened this need. By now it is a cliché to say that globalisation and the end of the Cold War have led to a new international scenario, and that we have been unable to create a new order in response to this. In addition to new opportunities, globalisation has also generated new threats and risks. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union has afforded an opportunity, not yet taken, to construct a new world order if the United States takes the lead with the support of Europe in this difficult task.

We need a new world order because in just a few years three important pillars of the order established after the Second World War have changed radically: the concept of security, the concept of sovereignty and the role of the state. The concept of security has undergone dramatic transformation and can no longer be limited to defence of the national territory: the definition of threats adopted by NATO in its 50th anniversary meeting provides a good example of this change. The concept of sovereignty has undergone a similar transformation, in that the principle of intervention to safeguard human rights has been accepted. In addition, the advent of cyberspace has changed the traditional notion of state sovereignty. As a result, the role of the state is changing. Power is migrating to non-state actors and the state is loosing in favour of the citizen its past role as the only actor in the international order. It is entirely logical that a new world order should reflect all these changes.

The new international order must reinforce applicable international legislation, and strengthen multilateral organisms. It is these multilateral organisms that provide the best and most stable framework for incorporation of China and India, which will be world powers within a few years. To China and India, we can also add Russia if it consolidates democracy and modernisation processes.

Finally, we need a new world order led by the United States so as to maintain the cohesion of the western world, in the aftermath of the Cold War and given the disappearance of the common enemy.
We needed this new world order well in advance of September 11th. The attack by Al Qaeda has only strengthened and made more urgent this need. However, the actions of the US government over the last twelve months were not precisely moving in the direction of that world order. The Bush administration has wholeheartedly opted for a unilateral approach to foreign policy. Condoleezza Rice provided a modern definition of unilateralism in her proposal to base foreign policy on national interest as opposed to the interests of an "illusory international community". The danger of this approach does not lie in defence of the national interests but rather in the assumption that national interest is in opposition to the interests of the international community. Two years later, we were provided with another definition of unilateralism by, Donald H. Rumsfeld in that "the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission. Otherwise, the mission will be reduced to the lowest common denominator." Another step in the same direction is the recently published National Security Strategy which, by including the option of pre-emptive strikes on the so-called "rogue states", may demolish the edifice of international law so painstakingly built up since the end of the Second World War.

With some qualifications, which we must be careful not to underestimate (including for example President Bush's speech to the United Nations Assembly), the Bush administration has ratified a unilateral foreign policy in which the military response is first and foremost. In the introduction to the National Security Strategy, President Bush rightly claims "Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength." After an attack such as that of September 11th, it is difficult not to fall into the temptation to employ the factor which makes the US such an unrivalled power. This temptation also leads to a rejection of multilateral approaches and the use of international law, since they could limit the use of this factor that marks the US out as superior.

However, an effective response to global terror demands action at the level of global policy. The fight against terrorism requires reinforcement and strengthening of international organisms and legislation, co-operation by all countries - all equally subject to common rules; in other words, the battle against terrorism must be a multilateral one. To date, the confidence in military capacity has led the U.S. away from the approach that could lead to stable solutions. The military approach means rejecting Joseph Nye’s "Try multilateral first" plea. Since the United States is superior in military terms to all other states, it proposes unilateral solutions which are not fully effective against terrorism. What is really needed are international communities providing the legitimisation and the intelligence that are essential for a more effective approach.

The United States needs this multilateral approach since even their immense military might not be able to guarantee domestic security. In fact, depending on how US military power is deployed on the international scenario, terrorist attacks against US citizens could increase. Above all, internal US security is dependent on international security, which can only be guaranteed by collaborative multilateral action.

6 For the full text see www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
We need multilateral solutions and, once again, not only in the realm of indirect measures against terrorism (aimed at changing the conditions which generate violence and terrorism), but also in direct actions such as destruction of terrorist networks, police action, intelligence sharing, and action against terrorist funding mechanisms).

One dilemma associated with the so-called indirect measures is as follows: if we take action against the causes of terrorism, and modify political conditions and solve conflicts, then some may argue that we are accepting the validity of terrorism as a means to achieve political objectives. However, the existence of terrorism cannot be a reason to ignore injustice or issues of national identity, to mention just two examples.

The Northern Ireland peace process provides a good example. The process led to design of a system of government which placed a limit on the power of the majority so as to protect the minority. John Hume has described the key elements of the process:
- All the parties must be seated at the negotiating table with the single condition that they reject the use of violence.
- All subjects may be discussed and decisions or agreement may be reached, with the condition that they will not be definitive until democratically ratified by means of a parliamentary accord, referendum or law, according to the nature of the agreements.

In other words, in Ireland, the condition that all parties reject violence was accepted as a solution to the dilemma mentioned above. The appropriate approach needs to be found for the complexities of each situation. In contrast, it could be said that Ariel Sharon's demand for a cessation of Palestine suicide attacks before initiating talks only serves to place the agenda in the hands of extremists on either side.

In any case, it is surprising that Zbigniew Brzezinski's call to "focus on the political roots of Sept. 11th" has received so little support in the United States. For it is difficult to disagree with his views that "almost all terrorist activity originates in and is sustained by a political conflict", and "the war on terrorism should have two objectives: first, to defeat the terrorists, and second, to initiate a political effort to deal with the conditions that led to their emergence."

Tackling the conditions on which terrorism feeds will demand a huge effort in at least three specific areas:

- Resolution of major present-day conflicts which have global repercussions, including the Israel-Palestine conflict, Kashmir, Chechnya, Central Africa, Philippines and Colombia. This will require both political and military action.
- Large-scale nation building campaigns both in failed states and in conflict zones where international intervention has taken place. The purpose of these measures is to increase global security and stability.
- Political action to address the increasing inequalities arising from globalisation. We cannot simply leave it to market forces to correct this situation.

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Resolving the conflicts outlined in item number one, will call for, in addition to reinforcement of the capacities of today's world order, serious study of the enormous complexity of each individual case, including the conditioning effect of democratic public opinion in the democratic countries. In order to address the inequalities created by globalisation, item number three, further frameworks for international co-operation will be needed and the world order will need to be given the necessary power to offset the polarisation of wealth.

Let us now turn to item number two, nation-building, which I want to analyse with more attention. Considering the importance of nation-building, it is surprising how little we are prepared to spend on it. Some weeks ago, Javier Solana told me that the total funding allocated by the US to political, social and domestic security reconstruction in Afghanistan is equivalent to seven hours of the Pentagon's annual budget, if we divide the yearly endowment into its 8,760 hours. It is hardly necessary to say that this amount bears no comparison to the funds provided for the strictly military operation of overthrowing the Taliban regime. Such underfunding means it is virtually impossible to destroy the Al Qaeda support networks in Afghanistan. If this occurs in Afghanistan, one must also ask what happens in other cases which are not priorities for either the US government or American public opinion.

A completely different case serving to confirm the above example, is Colombia, where there is also a great disproportion between US funds allocated for military purposes and for other measures. In Colombia, matters are made worse by the lack of a European presence.

The conflict in Colombia will not be nor could it ever have been solved by exclusively military means. The economic and political leaders of Colombia delegated the fight against the guerrilla forces entirely to the military. In return the military was granted full autonomy; there is no civilian intervention in internal military matters. The recently elected President, Álvaro Uribe aims to remedy this by becoming personally involved in the struggle against the guerrillas, by leading strategy decisions and even certain operations. However, the situation in Colombia is one of almost zero public confidence in political institutions. Assistance for the homeless, promotion of alternative crops to cocaine, and ensuring regional presence of state institutions are all just as important as military action.

Burning a coca plantation and yet not providing alternative crops to small farmers is equivalent to setting up a factory to produce guerrilla fighters, or at least outlaws. Furthermore, if state institutions are not re-established (or established for the first time) after the army has occupied an area, then the previous military action is meaningless and may even be counterproductive. If zones from which the guerrilla or paramilitary forces have been driven, do not soon see the presence of a police station, schools, health care centres, postal and legal services, then the inhabitants will soon think "it would have been better that they never had come." The creation of two "rehabilitation zones" would seem to be a move in the right direction. However, as yet there are no signs that this problem is nearing a solution.

I hope these examples serve to highlight that in Colombia (as in numerous other conflicts), the military approach in itself cannot solve the problem. Another point which is equally if not more important, though perhaps less obvious, is that to be efficient, military interventions must be accompanied by nation-building. Armies, out of control from civilian power, can no longer
be effective in today's world. The civilian leadership which is necessary for the campaign against terrorism should not only set clear political objectives for the army, it should also undertake reform of the army so as to prepare it to face the new situation.

Let us consider one illustrative example. According to the established plan, the United States delivered several helicopters to the Colombian armed forces. These however could not be used, since a dispute between the army and the airforce as to which branch had to manage them meant that there were no pilots trained to fly them. In a country with its governmental institutions intact and functioning, the Ministry of Defence would have rapidly intervened to solve this internal military dispute on time.

Such operational problems also occur in numerous other fields including logistics, organisation, recruitment, training (especially at non-commissioned officer level); they are reflected in a lack of mobility and in the military doctrine itself. These problems will not be overcome in armies that are adrift without political and democratic accountability. A comprehensive nation-building programme, i.e., establishment of a real Ministry of Defence, is required if military support is to bear fruit. At the same time, it is necessary that there be the political will to take control of the army, with all the consequent implications. This is especially necessary if we are to uphold respect for human rights and cut all contacts between the military and the paramilitary forces. Nevertheless, in Colombia, as in many Latin American countries, the direct connection between the US forces and the state army has led to a weakening of the government's position. In addition to handing over military equipment and providing training for some units, the United States ought to consider engaging in the necessary nation-building exercises so as to make the army a valid tool for intervention. In this area, co-operation with Europe might prove fruitful.

Once again, I would point out that even direct measures against terrorism (and not just indirect measures aimed at correcting the conditions which give rise to it and feed it) require two complementary policies which do not appear to enjoy the confidence of the Bush administration: multilateral agreements and co-operation, and secondly, nation-building actions.

Henceforth, it must be recognised that a U-turn in US policy is highly unlikely at present. For a multilateral world policy, two conditions are essential.

1. First, the United States would have to accept that placing their military might at the service of international agreements can sometimes be more beneficial in the mid term than unilateral action. This of course would involve a partial surrender of sovereignty, but this is the price to be paid for leadership of an international alliance. Voluntary surrender of power to supranational or international institutions is the essence of multilateralism.

2. Secondly, and even more difficult, a global policy against terrorism requires acceptance that there is international legislation which is binding on all states. In this area the Bush administration's attitude is unfortunately negative, and seems to indicate a view that the rules which apply to all other countries need not apply to the United States. Al Gore has described this attitude as reflected in the pre-emption policy: "An
unspoken part of this new doctrine appears to be that we claim this right for ourselves - and only for ourselves. It is, in this sense, part of a broader strategy to replace ideas like deterrence and containment with what some in the administration "dominance". This is highly lamentable, especially bearing in mind that not only do we need the International Criminal Court but also extension of its powers to cover terrorist offences would be an effective tool for global anti-terrorism policy.

The difficulty of progressing in these two areas was predictable. In an epilogue added in September 2001 to "Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy", John Arquila and David Ronfeldt were already predicting that "something like a social division may emerge between the United States and Europe over whether the response to the attack on America should follow the "war" paradigm or the rule of law."8

It is essential to "convert power into world order" if we are to achieve an effective global anti-terrorism policy. Again, this policy will also have to include measures addressed to correct the conditions which lead to the emergence and growth of terrorism.

Without strengthening the United Nations to enter the battle against terrorism, without making the battle against terrorism into one of its priorities, and without improving the Organism's effectiveness, it will not be possible a strong and stable advance towards guaranteeing the homeland security of the United States.

Bearing in mind that the United States is the most likely target of terrorist attacks, we should discuss and implement measures to achieve these aims. Some measures that could be taken include: reinforcement of the Anti-Terrorism Committee; making military anti-terrorist operations (such as that carried out in Yemen recently using an unmanned plane) part of the mandate of the UN; both preparation of legislation and model actions on the part of the UN to ensure that all states comply with international anti-terrorist requirements; negotiation with the US and other non-signatories for support for the International Criminal Court, and extension of the Court's remit to include terrorist offences; organising a summit meeting on combating terrorism along the lines of those held at Monterrey (International Conference on Development Financing) and Johannesburg (World summit on Sustainable Development).

Large sectors of US public opinion would see the position taken here as one of "Wilsonian" idealism, or as Condoleezza Rice put it, of belief in an "illusory international community". However, it must be pointed out that Wilsonian idealism was essential to construction of the world order in the aftermath of the Second World War and to the international legal framework which provides the level of stability we have achieved today.

Unfortunately, there was little "Wilsonianism" in the Bush administration's reaction to the September 11th attacks. I say unfortunately because a US decision to lead a campaign to strengthen multilateral institutions and international law, would have received massive

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8 For the full speech by Al Gore (September 23, 2002), see www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-09gore-speech.html
international support. This great opportunity was lost, and this is precisely why we must now strive to implement such policies. A UN-based solution to the Iraq issue could provide another opportunity for establishment of multilateral mechanisms, especially if it coincided with delegation of responsibility for the issue of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea to the UN Security Council.

Under this approach, the United States' unparalleled military capacity would still prove vital in ensuring compliance with international resolutions. The US military may prove more useful, even to its own country, when employed for the purposes of international law rather than unilaterally. The United States would then play a role (indeed, it does at present, in part) similar to that of the Central Banks as a "lender of last resort", but instead of money of military power applied to the international security system. This position would not be accepted by the other countries without surrender on the part of the US of some of its power, or sovereignty, to the relevant international organisms. As I have already said, this is the essence of multilateralism. And insofar as I believe that the interests of the United States, at least as far as terrorism is concerned, coincide with those of the International Community, then the use of the American military power in a multilateralist approach is, in the long term, the best guarantee of security for US citizens in their own country.

Narcís Serra, November 2002.