TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE REDEFINTION OF THE STATE:
VARIATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS

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ABSTRACT

In this article, we examine the shifting policies of sending country states toward communities living abroad, demonstrate the ways in which these are redefining the relationship between the state and its territorial boundaries, and highlight how these reconfigure conventional understandings of sovereignty, citizenship and membership. We begin by delineating the different types of policies that sending states are adapting in order to break down categories like “global nations policies” and to identify similarities and differences between states. We then suggest some possible explanations both for the convergence we see on the “repertoire” of policies that states employ and divergence we see in how far states are willing to go to ensure that migrants remain enduring long distance membership. We draw on material from several countries, but look most closely at Brazil, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.

Key words: transnational migration, state sovereignty, globalization, citizenship.
In her 1990 inaugural address, Ireland’s President-elect, Mary Robinson, proclaimed herself the leader of the Irish around the globe. She claimed to be assuming the helm of a new, more tolerant Ireland that included residents of Ireland as well as emigrants and their descendents. She invited families whose ancestors left Ireland generations ago to reassert their membership in this extended Irish family and offered to represent them on the world stage.

Beyond our state there is a vast community of Irish emigrants extending not only across our neighboring island... but also throughout the continents of North America, Australia and of course Europe itself. There are over 70 million people living on this globe who claim Irish descent. I will be proud to represent them. And I would like to see Aras an Uachtatian (the president’s official residence) serve---on something of an annual basis----as a place where our emigrant communities could send representatives for a get together of the extended Irish family abroad.

Heightened globalization enables some and pushes other migrants into maintaining strong ties to their countries of origin even as they are incorporated into the countries that receive them (Levitt 2001). In response, more and more states, like Ireland, are decoupling residence and membership and extending their boundaries to those living outside their borders. They are creating economic, political, and social mechanisms that enable migrants to participate in the national development process over the long term and from afar.
These dynamics call into question longstanding assumptions about nation state sovereignty (Onuf 1991; Weber 1992). Many scholars argue that the rise in transnational actors and international institutions, the heightened movement of people across borders, and new communication and transportation technologies reconfigure, if not erode, the sovereign state (Appadurai 1996). Soysal (1994), for instance, has posited the emergence of a “post-national citizenship,” fostered by rights claims based not on national membership but on a universal code of human rights. Others argue that though boundaries are more porous and participatory patterns changing, states are not fading but rather reinventing themselves to actively encourage migrant activism from abroad (Levitt 2001, Fouron and Glick Schiller 2001). Rather than disappearing or being subordinated to international regimes, states can potentially play a major role, along with other civic, religious, and political institutions, in creating and reinforcing lasting transnational involvements.

In this article, we examine the shifting policies of sending country states toward communities living abroad. Policies such as the Support Program for Brazilians Living Abroad, we suggest, are redefining the relationship between the state and its territorial boundaries, and hence reconfiguring understandings of sovereignty, citizenship and membership. But how are these shifting boundaries being redefined? What types of policies are states adopting and why? What, moreover, is the impact of such policies on emigrants themselves?

Some researchers have already made important inroads toward answering these questions. Smith (1998), for instance, has contrasted “homelands policies,” which encourage state contact with temporary migrants to facilitate their return, and “global-
nations policies,” whereby states maintain links with permanent settlers abroad not to facilitate their return but rather to maintain a sense of membership and loyalty to the sending state among emigrant communities. Goldring (1998) makes a similar distinction between policies of introversion, which extend protection to sojourners, such as Mexican braceros (or guest workers) in the United States, and policies of extension, which extend protection to settled diasporic communities and thus redefine membership in the country-of-origin. While these writers stress broad distinctions in policy approaches over time, Guarnizo (1998) argues that states in like structural positions vis-à-vis the global economy will adopt more similar policy positions. Itzigsohn (2001) similarly makes the claim that the geopolitical position of many peripheral sending states, their heightened democratization, and the racial barriers migrants encounter explain recent trends toward extending the boundaries of citizenship.

We agree that tendencies toward convergence exist, due to the structural imperatives of sending country states, the potential economic and political windfalls that emigrant communities represent, and to emergent international norms such as those suggested by “world polity theorists” (Ramirez et al. 1997; Meyer et al. 1987). However, we also suggest that these tendencies are mediated by national-level dynamics. In particular, we argue that the size and organization of the emigrant community vis-à-vis its homeland, the capacity of state institutions to make and implement credible policies, and the unique role of political parties have an impact on the form, timing, and effectiveness of state policies toward communities abroad.

We begin by delineating different types of policies which sending states are adopting in the current global context. We present selective examples in order to break
down categories like “global nations policies” and to begin identifying differences among sending states. We then suggest some possible explanations both for the convergence we see on a “repertoire” of policies, expectations and demands and the divergence we see in how far states are willing to go. We draw on material from several countries, but look more closely at Brazil, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. Our findings are based on our own field work in the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Brazil and an extensive review of research done by colleagues working in other areas.

STATE POLICIES

Though some scholars have delineated broad policy categories or examined specific policies directed at emigrants that are adopted by individual states (González Gutierrez 1995; 1993), not enough attention has been paid to why different states adopt different policies. We find that states adopt the following types of measures: 1) ministerial or consular reforms; 2) investment policies which seek to attract or channel migrant remittances; 3) extension of political rights in the form of dual citizenship or nationality, the right to vote from overseas, or the right to run for public office; 4) the extension of state protections or services to nationals living abroad that go beyond traditional consular services; and 5) the implementation of symbolic policies designed to reinforce emigrants’ sense of enduring membership. In this section we explore each of these policy areas more closely. We follow with a critical appraisal of the reasons for and effectiveness of such measures.

Bureaucratic Reforms
Many states have implemented bureaucratic reforms in response to emigrants’ heightened importance to policymakers. Brazil’s reincorporation of citizens abroad began when Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then Foreign Minister under the Itamar Franco administration, commissioned a study of Brazilian emigration. During his presidency, the Foreign Ministry, Itamaraty, elevated the status of the office responsible for consular affairs to a General Directorate. This reorganization, implemented in 1995, was put in place to decrease red tape and facilitate access to high ministry officials.¹ The same year, the General Directorate created a Unit for Assistance to Brazilians, staffed by technicians trained to deal with emergency situations faced by nationals abroad. In 1996, as part of the Support Program for Brazilians Abroad, consulates began organizing Councils of Citizens, which called on community leaders to address problems facing the community. They also initiated “mobile consulates” designed to bring consular services “to the people” by periodically holding office hours at churches or other convenient venues. The same year, in a largely symbolic move given the haphazard methods employed, the administration also conducted a census of the estimated 1.5 million Brazilians abroad, thus underscoring their continued membership in the Brazilian nation.

In 1990, the Mexican government set up the General Directorate for Mexican Communities Abroad (DGMCA) within its Secretariat of Foreign Relations [SRE]. The DGMCA was created, in part, in response to demands made by Mexican American organizations of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari during his campaign. While its formal goals are fostering links and mutual understanding between Mexicans on both sides of the border, in practice, the DGMCA has become the agency in charge of state involvement with home-town organizations and with implementing the services that
states offer to emigrants (González Gutierrez 1993, 1995). At the same time, Mexican consulates have also grown, assuming a more significant role in Mexican communities and becoming something akin to “mini-embassies.” Whereas 20 years ago, the purview of Mexican consulates was limited to the standard of issuing documentation, today each consulate has a section in charge of extending protection and legal advise to emigrants, as well as at least one staff person linked to the DGMCA. Finally, one of the early innovations put in place by Vicente Fox after taking office in 2001 was the creation of the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad, a cabinet level office, which during its first year, has functioned primarily as the government’s voice on emigration-related issues. This initiative, in fact, sparked some bureaucratic tensions with the SRE over the duplication of functions, and while the new agency received widespread coverage in the press, it proved short-lived. Understaffed and underbudgeted, Fox announced its closing in July 2002, creating the National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad, under the SRE, to replace it.

The Haitian government of Henry Namphy created the Office of Diasporic Affairs in the late 1980s, which Jean-Bertrand Aristide placed under the Office of the President when he took office in 1991. That year, Aristide suggested to a group of visiting emigrants that they start the 10th Department Organization (a reference to the nine departments or regional administrative units on the island). In April 1991, the organization held an assembly to elect a central committee to oversee regional committees from each city where there were large numbers of Haitian immigrants (Jean Pierre 1994). While independent of the government, the organization maintained close ties with Aristide and lobbied strongly when the Haitian military government drove him
into exile in September 1991 (Jean-Pierre 1994). After Aristide’s return, in 1994, a Ministry for Haitians Living Abroad was created to coordinate relations between the state and those living abroad (Laguerre 1998).

Investment Policies

In many cases, such bureaucratic reforms – and indeed, a number of other policies geared toward emigrants – make up part of a broader effort to attract or channel migrant remittances. Without doubt, leaders at the local, state, national, and even international levels are taking note of the potential economic windfall emigrants represent. In a recently published survey of the twelve Latin American and Caribbean countries receiving the highest levels of remittances, the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) points out that “remittances now constitute a critical flow of foreign currency to the majority of countries” in the region. According to the report, the money sent home by migrants constitutes at least 10% of the GDP in six of these countries.

According to the IDB report, in 1999, the volume of remittances to Mexico reached almost $6.8 billion, accounting for 39% of the total dollars to the region. This sum was equivalent to approximately two-thirds of the country’s oil revenues and roughly equal to the revenues from tourism. Brazil, which receives the second greatest volume, reported $1.9 billion that year, though the figure is most likely much higher. For the Dominican Republic, which receives the third largest volume at just over $1.7 billion in 1999 (MIF 2001), remittances represent the second largest source of foreign exchange after tourism. (Guarnizo 1998). At almost $1.25 billion in 1999, they are similarly
Ecuador’s second source of foreign exchange, after oil and represent the fastest growing level of remittances in the region (MIF 2001). In the mid 1990s, migrant remittances were equivalent to 39% of Haiti’s national budget (Cantave 1996).

At the local level, the impact of this money can be even more dramatic. Governador Valadares, for instance, a city in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, with 15% its population living abroad, is known throughout Brazil for its so-called “Valadolares,” a reference to the dollarization of the local economy. In 1994, the city’s secretary of revenue estimated that about $10 million in remittances were injected into the local economy each month. National media coverage following the devaluation of Brazil’s currency, the Real, in January 1999, included reports of the anomalous windfall which it brought to the city, as Brazilians abroad took advantage of the higher value of their dollars. For the Mexican state of Zacatecas, which has over half of its population living in the United States, the approximately $600 million sent home yearly surpasses the entire state budget.5

To attract money from nationals abroad, governments have adopted policies ranging from investment funds that pay higher interest rates to matching funds for investments in public works. The most elaborate and successful such program is that instituted by the Mexican government. Since its creation in 1990, the DGMCA has fostered the development of hometown and home-state organizations which raise funds for public projects in Mexico. Such hometown organizations have long been present in Mexican communities throughout the United States. González Gutierrez (1995) dates some back to the 1950s and the first state-wide federation, which united 8 clubs from the state of Zacatecas, to 1972. What is new today is the greater involvement of Mexican
state and local officials in these clubs as well as the matching funds offered by the state to promote their activities. Through consular registries of emigrants living in their districts, the DGMCA makes contact with concentrations of migrants from the same hometown or home-state in Mexico. It then contacts local officials in Mexico to encourage their involvement with hometown organizations abroad. Ernesto Zedillo’s administration developed the notion of the “Mexican Nation,” extending the work done by the DGMCA by promoting this more diasporic understanding of nationhood. Officials have also begun lobbying for the creation of Offices for Service to Mexicans Abroad (OFAMs) within state governments. In 2002, 21 of Mexico’s 31 states had OFAMs linked either directly to the state governor’s office or to the secretariat of finance. These offices handle many of the matching-fund programs whereby state officials match remittances sent by emigrants to support public works projects.

The Mexican government has also turned its attention to remittance sending agencies. Among the first measures put into place was an initiative begun by the Chicago consulate, dubbed the “Compare Program.” Consular officials, along with Mexico’s Federal Prosecutor for Consumer Rights and the local media in the Mexican community published regular reports comparing the exchange and service rates of different agencies, precipitating a considerable rate decline. Another indication of the economic significance of remittances in Mexico was that within weeks of assuming office, President Vicente Fox met with business leaders in the money transferring industry in the U.S. to negotiate lower rates. The DGMCA encouraged close to 150 such businesses on both sides of the border to form an association of money transferring agencies toward this end. In 2001, Mexico’s development bank, Nacional Financiera (NAFIN), signed an agreement with
the IDB’s Multilateral Investment Fund to develop a pilot program that would direct remittances into productive investments while involving local and state governments. In early 2002, pilot projects were implemented in Zacatecas, Guanajuato, and Puebla.

While the Brazilian federal government has been much less active in initiating programs to attract funds than its Mexican counterpart, state and municipal governments do play this role in Brazil. A fund was created through an arrangement between the Bank of Brazil and city officials in Governador Valadares, which promised emigrants higher interest rates for monies they deposited. Brazilian community newspapers promoted the fund, as did the mayor of Valadares during a visit to the U.S. in 1997. For reasons discussed below, the initiative proved unsuccessful. In 2001, the IDB, Sudameris Bank, and the Brazilian government’s small business credit agency, SEBRAE, also reached an agreement establishing the Mutual Fund for Investment in Emerging Enterprises. The fund is intended to offer support and investment advice to Brazilians abroad, principally those in Japan, who hope to open businesses at home. The Japanese ambassador to Brazil, Katsunari Suzuki, estimated that $2 billion reals are sent back to Brazil each year from Japan, prompting IDB President Enrique Iglesias to claim that, “The fund will contribute to creating employment in Brazil.”

Haitian officials clearly see the economic potential represented by Haitians living overseas. However, as of 2000, the Ministry for Haitian Communities Abroad had not implemented a program to attract funds, in part because officials felt the government had to earn emigrants’ trust before approaching them for support. The Ministry did initiate a program designed to reap the benefits of the human capital represented by the diaspora by creating a database of the technical skills of Haitians abroad. The program’s goal is to
appeal to Haitian emigrants’ enduring loyalty and sense of belonging so they will continue to contribute to Haitian national development. The Brazilian consulate in Boston also tried to stem the flow of brain drain when it hosted the First Brazilian Conference on Science and Technology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1997. Over 80 representatives from Brazil, including the presidents of the Federation of Industries from the states of Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, attended the three-day event to discuss work options in Brazil for Brazilian students in science and technology.

Such measures to draw on human capital abroad underscore that emigrant communities’ potential economic contribution goes beyond the transfer of hard cash and highlight a certain ambivalence surrounding emigration as a source of remittances and the flight of many potentially productive citizens.

While not going as far as the Mexican government, Dominican consulates have initiated efforts to foster investment on the island by creating home-province organizations. As the Dominican Consul General in Boston explained,

We have also organized some associations of Dominicans by Provinces. We have organized about six. This has a number of objectives. First, these communities can remain united, they can maintain the roots in their hometowns. In addition, they can also identify with each other. They can also make some donations and hold some events that can serve to benefit the communities which they represent. We have gotten a lot of donations and gotten a lot of equipment this way . . . ambulances, medical equipment, school buses, fire fighting equipment.
The consulate encourages these fundraising and resource-gathering efforts and offsets some of the shipping costs.

**Political Rights: Dual Citizenship and the Vote Abroad**

The terms “nationality” and “citizenship” are often used interchangeably, though they have somewhat different meanings. Nationality refers to the formal legal status of state membership. Citizenship delineates the character of a member’s rights and duties within the national polity (Jones-Correa 2002). According to Jones-Correa, dual nationality allows individuals to hold memberships in two (or more) states. It does not necessarily guarantee access to all the rights and benefits of national citizenship, such as voting or holding office.

By 2000, ten countries in Latin America had passed some form of dual nationality or citizenship, including Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. Only four countries had such provisions prior to 1991 (Jones-Correa, 2001). Other countries recognize dual membership selectively, with specific signatories. Guatemala has an agreement with other Central American Countries and several countries have such agreements with Spain. At least ten Caribbean basin countries including Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago also recognize dual nationality.

In the Mexican case, political parties agreed in December 1996 to amend articles 30, 32, and 37 of the constitution, so that Mexicans would not lose their nationality upon acquiring citizenship in another country. The extension of dual nationality rather than
dual citizenship meant that Mexicans could retain some rights vis à vis their homeland but that these did not include the political rights of citizenship, such as the right to vote. For Raúl Ross Piñeda, a prominent leader of the Mexican community in Chicago, the approval of dual nationality was only a way-station along the road to the acquisition of the expatriate vote, and one which had little impact on undocumented Mexican emigrants. In 1996, in fact, Article 36 of the Mexican constitution was also amended to permit the vote abroad. However, another article was added which made the vote contingent upon the creation of a new National Citizens Registry and the issuance of a new National Identity Card. Both tasks were assigned to the Government Secretariat, although by 1998, it announced it could not complete them in time for the 2000 general elections. In mid 1999, the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party], which ruled Mexico for seven decades, blocked a vote in the Senate permitting emigrants to vote in the 2000 election. More recently, Zacatecas Governor Ricardo Monreal, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), introduced a bill in the state legislature which would allow emigrants from his state to vote for state officials as well as run as candidates for proportional representation seats in the state legislature (In 2001, there were four emigrants running for mayoral office in the state. Emigrants have also been included on the candidate lists for federal deputy). Zacatecas thus continues its tradition as a pioneer in forging contacts with Mexicans abroad, having been the first state to implement a two-for-one, matching-fund program.

In the Dominican Republic, during the 1980s and 1990s, immigrant business associations and civic groups on the island organized numerous conferences in New York and in Santo Domingo to promote constitutional reforms allowing dual citizenship.
Throughout the 1980s, both the Revolutionary Dominican Party (PRD) and the Party of the Dominican Liberation (PLD) backed the amendment. Former President Joaquin Balaguer’s ruling Reformist Social Christian Party (PRSC) publicly supported the change while impeding its passage in Congress. Like the PRI in Mexico, the PRSC feared that the participation of the expatriate constituency would weaken its position. Balaguer’s ability to block such legislation declined precipitously when a fraudulent presidential election in 1994 further discredited him nationally and internationally. He finally committed to support dual citizenship later that year as part of the Pact for Democracy, signed to resolve the electoral impasse that followed (Levitt 2001).

Both second-round presidential candidates in 1996 also supported a bill that would allow Dominican migrants to vote from abroad rather than having to return to the island to do so. This measure was passed in December 1997 (Electoral Law 275-97), when the Dominican National Congress approved a new electoral code. The revised provisions allowed Dominicans permanently residing overseas to vote in the country’s presidential elections and to run for office, including those who are naturalized U.S. citizens of Dominican descent (Torres-Saillant and Hernández 1998). Dominicans in New York campaigned extensively for these measures, creating a Pro-Vote Movement for Dominicans Living Abroad (Sontag 1997). Once achieved, these electoral reforms moved one step closer to cementing the political importance of Dominican migrants as voters as well as contributors by transforming New York into the second largest voting block outside the Dominican capital of Santo Domingo. As in the Mexican case, however, the new legislation remains only on paper. Despite legislative approval, the
Central Election Board or the Junta Central de Elecciones has no concrete plan for implementing the vote abroad (Levitt 2001).

Unlike the Dominican and Mexican cases, in which citizenship and the right to vote abroad were granted in response to the demands of emigrant activists, Brazilians achieved the right to dual citizenship through a much more top-down process (Jones-Correa 2001). Indeed, the right to vote abroad was already included in the country’s 1965 electoral code, long before Brazil had an appreciable emigrant community. In 1994, dual citizenship was also approved with little pressure from Brazilians overseas as one of a handful of amendments in an otherwise largely unsuccessful constitutional reform process.

**State Services Abroad**

Beyond the extension of political rights, there are several cases of states engaged in service delivery to emigrant communities. Mexico’s government has again gone furthest in this area, facilitating the extension of a number of services abroad. For instance, through an agreement with the National Institute for Adult Education (INEA), the DGMCA instituted a program providing literacy training and primary and secondary schooling for adults through its consulates. The Mexican government also sends books and advisors to train educators in the United States, making it possible to obtain Mexico’s high school equivalency from abroad. The DGMCA also cooperated with the Ministry of Education and with local United States school boards to create the Document for Transference of the Emigrant Bi-national Student which is designed to facilitate a student’s passage from one country to the other without having to repeat grades. Other
agencies have also extended services. In 1990, for instance, the Mexican Institute of Social Security began offering emigrants health insurance packages to cover their families in Mexico (González Gutierrez 1993). Mexican consulates and other state officials have also been increasingly outspoken in condemning human rights abuses committed against undocumented workers in the United States.

Brazilian consulates have implemented similar projects, although on a smaller scale. The Ministry of Education of the state of Paraná, for instance, initiated a pilot program in Japan offering a condensed version of the supletivo, the high-school equivalency course, so that emigrants could earn a high school degree from abroad. The Brazilian consulate in Boston also distributes several thousand books to bilingual education programs in the region. The consulate supported the Brazilian Business Network, a non-governmental pilot project designed to promote small business development in the Brazilian community. There was also discussion, though little concrete action, around opening a branch of SEBRAE in the United States.

To date, the majority of the services the Dominican government offers to emigrants do more to promote their continued participation in island life than to ease their lives in the United States. Customs policies have been revised such that return migrants can import their belongings, including one car per household, without paying taxes. The government placed customs officers at each consulate to help migrants fill out the required paperwork before they leave the U.S. Finally, Dominicans planning to return to live on the island are eligible to buy 1373 housing units built by the government specifically for returnees in Santo Domingo. Prospective buyers take out mortgages with
designated U.S. banks. They have up to 15 years to repay their loans, with the government covering 60% of the original down payment (Dominican Consul 1998).

**Symbolic Politics**

Finally, in addition to the political and economic policies we have described, many states have implemented a number of symbolic measures aimed at reinforcing emigrants’ sense of long-term membership. These relatively low cost policies are, in many ways, an extension of traditional consular efforts to promote national culture abroad. They differ in that they are directed at individuals who will remain permanently abroad. Such policies range from contests to promote an understanding of the homeland among the second generation to cultural festivals or sporting events in communities overseas.

Along these lines, for instance, Brazil’s highest civilian honor, the Order of Rio Branco, was awarded to a Brazilian priest working in the Framingham, MA area and to John Stefanini, a politician from Framingham who has strongly supported the Brazilian community. This recognition of work done in the Brazilian community overseas received broad coverage in community newspapers in the U.S. and in Brazil. *The Brazilian consulate in Boston has similarly sponsored creative-writing contests among second-generation immigrants to begin compiling what one consular official called a literature of the Brazilian diaspora.*

*Dominican consular officials have similarly sponsored cultural events and the Dominican government has established Cultural Houses in areas with sizeable Dominican populations [Peggy – this is something I pulled out of a chapter you sent*
me from your book, but it only mentions allocating funds for these *casas de cultura*, not if they were actually established – do you know if any actually exist? Also can you include the reference, since at the time, there was no date of publication].

According to the Dominican consul in Boston, “Since we arrived here, one of our main tasks has been to penetrate the Hispanic community, especially the Dominican community. . . . In all the Hispanic events that have been held in Massachusetts, the Dominican consulate is involved.”

Of course such symbolic politics also underlie many of the measures discussed above, such as the promotion of hometown organizations and the mechanisms to encourage remittances. Indeed, the success of such policies depends precisely on a symbolic identification with an albeit geographically dispersed imaged community. Beyond a sense of national membership, writ large, moreover, such measures often seek more specifically to promote a sense of political membership: if not always through the extension of citizenship, at least by promoting the notion that the government cares for its nationals abroad.

**WHY STATES DO WHAT THEY DO**

Thus far, we have highlighted several types of state policies designed to forge a new relationship between emigrant communities and their homelands. These measures constitute a policy repertoire from which states can pick and choose and on which emigrants base their demands. Clearly, there is a great deal of convergence across cases. Even when particular policies, such as the expatriate vote, have not been implemented, they still enter into national debates. In this section, we suggest some explanations for
why particular states adopt particular policy packages. We note areas of convergence and divergence among states, and suggest possible explanations for each.

**Forces for Convergence**

We find at least two global-level factors which contribute to the emergence of a shared policy repertoire: the structural imperatives facing developing nations and the emergence of new international norms.

First, as suggested above, the need for foreign exchange by developing nations and the existence of large remittance-sending communities abroad make the wide range of policies seeking to attract and channel these funds no surprise. Even in Haiti, where there is no official policy in place as of this writing, officials understand the need for such measures and expect that policies will be implemented soon.\(^24\) Moreover, to keep emigrants in their court, as a way to ensure continued remittance flows, sending states implement other policies such as bureaucratic reforms or the extension of voting rights. As the governor of Zacatecas explained, “Listen, if half the Zacatecanos live there; if we depend on them economically, it would be the last straw not to respect their rights! Zacatecanos abroad send $600 million per year, a sum exceeding the state budget.”\(^25\)

The challenges facing developing nations in an increasingly interdependent global economy also require them to seek closer relations with trade partners. As a result, emigrant communities are not only a potential source of foreign exchange but potential ambassadors who can foster closer political and economic relations as well. Hence when lobbying for the passage of NAFTA in the United States Congress, the Mexican government found an ally in some Mexican American groups (González Gutierrez 1993).
Similarly, the former Brazilian consul said this about the link he sees between trade policies and policies aimed at the emigrant community,

> Whatever you do to integrate people into the local society and make sure that they behave accordingly, you are improving the whole image of Brazil… The fact that we have a large community here has also opened doors for me to arrange meetings with political leaders. I would say that some people would have no interest in receiving me if they did not see a reason to meet the Consul General of Brazil. So it has opened doors for me, and also, frankly, it has helped open doors for Brazil.\(^{26}\)

In addition to structural factors, new international norms have also taken hold which make this shared policy repertoire something that is expected by emigrants and states alike. The Brazilian case is perhaps most telling. With only one percent of the Brazilian population living overseas, it would be difficult to attribute policy shifts to emigrants’ economic or political clout. Instead, the debate around dual citizenship in the Brazilian constituent assembly was striking for its references to international norms and modernization. Deputy José Maria Eymael, from São Paulo, for example, argued that the constitutional change would “place our country in line with everyday standards among nations regarding the options for nationality”; and Deputy Nelson Jobim stated that approval of the changes was important “for the modernization of Brazilian nationality.”\(^{27}\)

Brazilian General Consul in Boston Mauricio Costa similarly attributed the changes to a “natural project.” For him, “The process of globalization allows us to see things with less prejudice. Nations today are more open, less inward looking. All of this is a function of the times.”\(^{28}\) Indeed, at least at the level of discourse, the incorporation of emigrant
communities as citizens, with rights and duties in their home countries, is often portrayed as part-and-parcel of broader trends toward democratization and as a natural outgrowth of globalization.

International norms do not just open up new opportunities for migrants. They also function to set limits on how far sending states are willing to go. According to Brazilian Consul General in Boston Mauricio Cortes Costa, for example,

Immigration interests us to the extent that there may be Brazilian nationals living here who might be coerced, either through discrimination or through bad treatment or injustice…then the state will enter and defend the immigrant in those cases. However, in cases that affect the immigrant but are the domain of domestic U.S. politics, then the question is internal to the U.S.  

Emigrants also seem to understand these limitations. As one Brazilian activist in Boston explained: “[The consulate has] been doing a better job. But the consulate also has to be careful with diplomatic issues here that I don't if I work in the community. If I want to fight for someone who was denied a document, I can fight. For the consulate, this would create a diplomatic problem.”

The limits of state action also became clear in a recent conflict among Mexico’s political leadership in the wake of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in March 2002 denying undocumented immigrants the right to receive compensation or back payment if they are unjustly fired. The controversial decision and what many legislators saw as President Fox’s administration’s timid response prompted the Mexican Senate to take the unprecedented step of refusing to approve a presidential trip to the United States and
Canada. Legislators called on the administration, which had quietly registered its displeasure by working through its embassy in Washington, to condemn the ruling more strongly and publicly and to file a case against the United States with the International Labor Organization. In a subsequent televised address objecting to the Senate’s decision, Fox did in fact adopt a stronger stance and administration officials have hinted they may challenge the ruling through the ILO or under the labor agreement of NAFTA.

This incident was noteworthy for several reasons. First, it clearly reflected a step beyond Mexican officials’ historic stance of refraining from entering immigration policy debates in the U.S., lest they be accused of interventionism, as when the Mexican consul in San Diego supported the creation of the Hispanic Pro-Human Rights Coalition in the early 1990s (Dresser 1993). Second, as Soysal’s notion of post-national citizenship would suggest, the Mexican state and migrant communities appealed to international institutions and regimes to defend their rights abroad. Third, the incident also reflects the limits of state action. If policies adopted by sending states reflect a new understanding of sovereignty or nationhood, they also reflect the ways in which states are being reconfigured rather than being erased.

**Forces of Divergence**

We have argued that common structural factors facing sending nations and new international norms have given rise to a shared repertoire of policies and expectations reshaping the relationship between these states and their emigrant communities. What, then, are the factors that explain why states draw on particular pieces of this shared repertoire while rejecting others? What determines which policies are selected and
implemented and when? We suggest that these factors, not surprisingly, are found at the national level.

As Jones Correa (2002) notes, the costs of particular policies (or, put differently, the capacity of individual states to cover such costs) are one factor that explains how far states are willing to go to keep migrants within their fold and the differences we find among them. We might expect states to converge on low cost policies, such as those that fall in the realm of symbolic politics and raise the government’s profile among emigrants. Indeed, we find such policies in all the cases considered here. At the same time, we would expect states to diverge on costlier policies. For instance, while all the countries we consider have debated dual citizenship and extending the vote abroad, only Brazil has fully implemented both measures as of this writing. We believe that this is in part because the costs that such policies represent for Brazil are considerably lower than for the other countries given the relatively large budget and small number of emigrants involved. Furthermore, it comes as no surprise that the Mexican and Brazilian governments have gone further than Haiti or the Dominican Republic to extend state services to emigrant communities, given their greater economic capacity to do so. Indeed, despite its reliance on migrant remittances or emigrant’s active involvement in homeland politics, Haiti’s political instability and financial limitations have impeded the effective extension of almost any of the policies discussed.

Costs can be measured politically as well. In addition to the simple economics of policy implementation, we also find that political parties play a unique role in channeling migrant demands. As a result, the political cost-benefit calculations for different kinds of political actors also help explain when such policies are implemented and by which
states. This has been particularly true in the area of political rights such as the vote abroad. For Brazil, conceding the vote abroad represented a relatively low-cost policy, both financially and politically, given the very few people affected at the time. Indeed, even after the increase in Brazilian emigration in the late 1980s, the vote abroad has amounted to little more than a low-cost symbolic gesture reinforcing long-term, long distance membership. In the 1994 presidential race, for instance, only 10,150 Brazilians registered to vote in the U.S. and 39,357 worldwide, despite the fact that voting is mandatory.32

One reason this measure has not taken root in emigrant communities abroad is that most Brazilian political parties have not actively reached out to them to earn their support. This lack of interest only reinforces the disillusionment and apathy that many Brazilians feel toward politics. Only the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) has a presence abroad, with relatively small “nuclei” in some emigrant communities. Informal interviews with state leaders of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) in Minas Gerais, a state with a relatively large population overseas, revealed that other major parties have not even considered mobilizing compatriots abroad. This lack of interest among Brazilian parties reflects the shallow roots most parties have in the society and the limited role that emigrants play as a voting bloc and as campaign supporters.

In the Mexican and Dominican cases, on the other hand, the size of the emigrant community and its potential to decide electoral outcomes makes extending the vote considerably more costly for some political actors and desirable for others. Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute estimated that had the emigrant community been allowed to
vote in the 2000 election, 15.38% of the vote would have been cast from abroad.\(^{33}\) Similarly, it is estimated that emigrants now represent at least 10 percent of the Dominican population. The Dominican PRD’s 1996 presidential candidate José Francisco Peña Gómez acknowledged, "The part they [migrants] play is absolutely decisive, especially in terms of campaign finances"; while PLD candidate Leonel Fernández’s campaign chief in the United States stated, "The Dominican community in the United States has tremendous economic weight and political prestige, so of course its influence is being felt."\(^{34}\) An estimated fifteen to thirty percent of major parties’ funds for the 1996 Dominican election came from emigrants (Graham 1997). In Mexico and the Dominican Republic, therefore, we find that the issue of voting abroad became a bone of contention in the course of each country’s democratic transition, embraced by opposition parties and resisted by authoritarian regimes, making passage of the measure contingent on opposition victories. In both cases, furthermore, political parties played a crucial role in transmitting emigrant demands to home-country political arenas.

In the Mexican case, the 1988 election which brought Carlos Salinas de Gortari to the presidency under widespread accusations of election-tampering marked a turning point for politics in emigrant communities as for the Mexican polity as a whole. Prior to the election, Mexican communities in California rallied around Salinas’s opponent Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, raising funds, distributing campaign information, and even successfully lobbying for the Democratic Party in California to incorporate a plank in its platform “urging U.S. intervention to assure ‘the honesty of the upcoming presidential elections in Mexico’”(Dresser 1993).\(^{35}\) Following the election, Cardenas’ supporters organized a number of independent groups in the United States, such as Residentes
Mexicanos Unidos and the Foro Democrático Mexicano (Dresser 1993). The PRD, established by Cardenas after the electoral fiasco, organized its first base committees in California in 1989. By 1991, it created a State Executive Council in California (Dresser, 1993). By 1992, the party was operating in Chicago (Pérez-Godoy 1997) and by 2000, it had state committees in California, Illinois, New York and Texas. Since then, the party has campaigned for candidates in Mexico and taken up emigrant demands. It has established close ties with the movement for dual citizenship and the vote abroad, with PRD activists often engaging in doble militancia or participating in both movements. In California, for instance, PRD militants organized and publicized a petition with their demands, collecting 5,000 signatures, which was presented to the Mexican consul in San Francisco (Pérez-Godoy 1997).

For the PRI, the mobilization abroad also represented a challenge. According to the Mexican consul in Los Angeles,

One of the greatest protest marches against the outcome of the election took place in Los Angeles. This led to an awakening in Mexican political circles. The Mexican government realized that there are many anti-PRI Mexicans living in California who return periodically to their communities and have an influence in Mexico. This recognition took place in the context of a radical reformulation of Mexico’s foreign policy. What we want to do now is build bridges with the Mexican community (cited by Dresser 1993: 94)

In response, the party’s 14th Congress, held in 1990, established Support Committees for Compatriots to raise funds, offer legal counseling and promote cultural
events among emigrant groups (Dresser 1993), although these committees have not generally prospered (Martínez Cossío 2001). By so doing, the PRI extended its well-honed strategies of political cooptation, albeit unsuccessfully, to emigrant communities. Many of the new policies directed at emigrants, as well as the PRI’s opposition to the expatriate vote can be read, at least in part, through the prism of these political dynamics.

While the vote abroad was not implemented in time for the 2000 election, the race marked a highpoint in transnational Mexican politics. Both PAN candidate Vicente Fox and PRD candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas made campaign swings in the United States. During the campaign, the Mexican movement, Amigos de Fox, which mobilized grass roots support around Fox’s presidential candidacy, had a U.S. counterpart in Mimexca (Migrantes Mexicanos por el Cambio), which among other activities, handled Fox’s campaign tour in the country. The Fox campaign went so far as to distribute calling cards to emigrants so that they could phone families to urge support for the candidate. In simulated elections organized among emigrants, Fox got 10,985 votes; Cardenas got 2,673; and PRI candidate Francisco Labastida got 1,759. The opposition victory gave considerable impetus for the vote abroad to become a reality in future races.

The Dominican Republic also has a long history of emigrant political involvement, making the extension of dual citizenship and voting rights much more costly than in Brazil. Dominicans abroad contribute large sums to the political campaigns and often tell their nonmigrant family members how to vote. In response, the three principal political parties have created U.S. infrastructures that form an integral part of the party organization on the island. The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), for example, has a coordinator in charge of U.S. based activities, and migrant chapters
send representatives to sit on the party’s executive committee in Santo Domingo. In 1992, the party also approved the formation of chapters of Dominican-born, naturalized U.S. citizens and children of Dominicans born in the U.S.

As emigration from the island grew, the PRD began articulating a dual agenda. Party leaders believed that by helping emigrants incorporate politically into the U.S., they would improve their access to government programs, enable them to influence policy in favor of Dominican interests, and ensure continued, controllable contributions to the party. They knew they must address the realities emigrants faced in the U.S. and their continued concerns about Santo Domingo in order to retain their loyalties. To do so, they encouraged emigrants to be active in U.S. elections at the same time that they pledged their continued support for initiatives designed to ease return or long distance political participation. In interviews with party leaders, the American Jewish community's influence with respect to Israel often came up as an example that the PRD hoped to emulate (Levitt 2001).

Both the Mexican and Dominican cases, therefore, suggest that a large and politically active emigrant community makes extending the vote abroad a higher stakes gamble, likely to be opposed by some and pushed by others. Two additional factors influence these outcomes. First, our discussion has focused on parties as institutions that follow an economic rationality, with their stances toward emigrants determined by cost-benefit calculations in the competition for votes and campaign contributions. However, as Martínez Cossío (2001) points out, it would be a mistake to attribute political parties’ actions entirely to such calculations and ignore the ideological underpinnings of their positions entirely. It is significant, for instance, that the parties mobilizing abroad in the
cases considered here have tended to oppose authoritarian regimes and generally --
though not always, as in the PAN’s evolving position in favor of emigrant rights -- to be
on the left. In this regard, the Brazil’s PT, and the Mexican PRD’s early support for
emigrant rights, can also be understood as a reflection of a broader paradigm shift taking
place in much of the Latin American left that calls for “deepening” of democracy through
the incorporation of excluded social sectors (Roberts 1998; Ellner 1993).39 Emigration
has been framed by both parties as expulsion and the failure of neoliberal policies to
incorporate productive sectors of society. Both parties’ position, therefore, has been to
reincorporate these sectors into the polity. If, as discussed above, international norms
have contributed to new shared understandings of how states can and should act,
ideological factors have also fostered a new commitment to citizens abroad that also help
explain party actions.

Second, beyond the dynamics of party competition as a factor influencing policy
choices, political parties’ role as privileged institutions for representing interests within
the state realm makes them not only effective promoters of emigrant demands but also
opens up possibilities for directly representing emigrant communities. This occurred both
in the Dominican Republic and Mexico. In Mexico, although the expatriate vote was not
implemented in time for the 2000 election, nothing in electoral law banned emigrants
from running for office. Parties included emigrant activists on their closed candidate lists
for federal deputies. The PRD registered two emigrants on its lists, both of whom lost,
while the PRI registered one candidate, Eddie Varón Levy, who won.40 In the Dominican
Republic, the PLD went so far as to establish a quota of emigrant candidates on its
ballots. The U.S. section meets to nominate candidates, which the party subsequently
includes in races as representatives for their home provinces. Three PLD deputies and five city councilmen were elected in 1998 in this way (Itzigsohn et al. 1999). While these elected members formally represent constituencies on the island, the process of selection clearly indicates that they are unofficial representatives of Dominicans abroad as well.\textsuperscript{42}

CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we differentiated between the kinds of policies which states are adopting to incorporate emigrant communities. By breaking down broad categorizations like “global nations policies,” we suggest that we can begin to identify and explain the commonalities and differences we find among states. We then suggested that structural imperatives facing sending country states as well as new international norms defining democracy and modernity have created a repertoire of policies that are debated across cases. Such policies are reinventing the role of states outside of territorial boundaries and in this way reconfiguring traditional understandings of sovereignty, nation, and citizenship.

At the same time, we noted certain differences in the sorts of policies that states are implementing. We suggested that such differences might be attributed to the costliness of such policies and the capacity of states to cover such costs and to the intervening role of political parties, which also extend national political arenas to emigrant communities and can channel demands back home.

The question remains as to how such changes affect the lives of emigrants themselves. We frame this discussion within broader debates surrounding a transnational
public sphere, which enables some emigrants to participate politically, socially and culturally in two polities. This article has sought to explore how institutional structures – specifically the state and political parties – might encourage or perhaps impede the construction of such a transnational arena. In this sense, it draws a page from social movement literature on political opportunity structures (Gamson et al. 1996, Kurzman 1996), suggesting that emigrants, like social movement activists, respond to their institutional settings. In all cases, opportunities have given rise to, at the very least, an immigrant elite interested in participating in home country politics. In cases where political parties are more active, participation seems to spread beyond this relatively small group to the broader community.

In the case of Mexican emigrants, the activities of political parties as well as the state have reinforced political and economic participation in the homeland among a broad spectrum of the Mexican emigrant population. A 1998 survey of emigrants conducted by Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute showed that 83% wanted to vote in Mexican elections. State policies have also encouraged the growth of hometown organizations and in some instances their partisanship. In 1998, for instance, Mexican politics penetrated the federation of clubs from Zacatecas in southern Southern California. The organization, which had until then been tightly aligned with the PRI and its governor in the state Arturo Romo, divided, with some supporting the PRI and others the PRD gubernatorial candidates.

On the other hand, while the Brazilian state has made some efforts to extend services to Brazilian communities abroad, the impact of these policies has by and large been shallow. Arguably the top down process through which these changes were carried
out explains much about this outcome. One telling example of the problems with such an approach was the investment fund proposed by the mayor of Governador Valadares. With few exceptions Brazilian community leaders saw this as simply as an attempt to capture funds without giving anything back to the community in return. When community leaders proposed the establishment of a Governador Valadares-Framingham sister city project, on the other hand, the same officials ignored their proposals. Similarly while Boston’s Council of Citizens (according to Brazilian officials, the most effective of any Brazilian consulate) has met regularly to discuss community developments and propose solutions, there are relevant criticisms related to the council’s performance. As one member explains,

The council is totally disconnected from the community. The first problem is that the consul selects the council. That is a mistake. People should be elected in the community where they reside. Of the 12 councilpersons we have today, 10 reside in the 617 area code. This means that they are from the same place. And we have Brazilian communities in places like Hyannis that don't have representatives. We have a community in Peabody with no representatives. There are also other states. No one is from Providence, from Maine. The criticism again underscores the importance of the process through which transnational “political opportunity structures” are constructed, and the role of emigrant activists themselves in the formulation and implementation of policies. It is precisely in this area that political parties have played an important role: not just competing for
support and contributions among emigrants by transmitting political demands but also opening a space for direct civic engagement by a wider range of community sectors.
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Regional offices of Itamaraty have also been opened in various Brazilian states. These structures, which are still quite new, are designed to give state governments a greater voice in foreign policy formulation. They may also serve as contact points for Brazilian consulates in arranging official visits from local officials from Brazil or trade missions to Brazilian states. Interview, Mario Vilalva, (Former) Consul General in Boston, August 6, 1998.

Interview, Elsa Borja, Director of Organizacion Comunitaria, DGMCA, 5/23/00.

The twelve countries surveyed are: Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru.

17% in Haiti, 14.4% in Nicaragua, 12.6% in El Salvador, 11.7% in Jamaica, and 10.0% in both Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. Though, as the MIF report underscores, the figures in all cases are probably understated.

María Scherer Ibarra. “Impulsan el voto de zacatecanos desde EU” Proceso, 6/10/01

Interview. DGMCA staff person, 1/24/02.


While still governor of the state of Guanajuato, Fox granted a “strategic importance” to contacts with Texas and California as part of an effort to “globalize” the state’s economy, and instituted a matching-funds program called My Community which directed remittances to the creation of maquila factories. Aguirre

9 “Promueve Mexico Asociacion De Empresas De Envío De Dinero Desde Eu.” Notimex, 11/7/01.

10 Antonio Castellanos. “Otorgará BID a México créditos por más de mil 700 mdd, informó Nafin” *La Jornada*, 12/20/01; “Desarrollan BID-NAFIN programa uso productivo de remesas migrantes” Notimex. 5/22/01.

11 “Participará el BID en el Programa de NAFIN de Uso Productivo de Remesas.” Press Release no. 64/01. 12/19/01.


13 Interview, Andrine Constant, Haitian Consul General in Boston, April 13, 2000.

14 Interview, Mario Vilalva. Former General Consul of Brazil in Boston. August 14, 1997.

15 Interview, Julio Correa, Dominican Consul General in Boston, August 4, 1998.

16 Previously, Art. 36, paragraph 3 required voting “in the appropriate district”; this was changed in November 1996 to read “vote in popular elections where the law indicates.” [Ross, Raúl. “MEXICANOS EN ESTADOS UNIDOS: El voto incómodo”. *Masiosare*, domingo 13 de septiembre de 1998].


18 Quiñones, Sam. “Death of voting-abroad bill in Mexico was simple math.” *The San Diego Union-Tribune* July 03, 1999, Pg. A-1.


20 Interview, DGMCA staff member, 1/24/02.

21 Interview, Elsa Borja, Director of Organizacion Comunitaria, DGMCA, 5/23/00.

22 Interview, Mauricio Cortes Costa, General Consul of Brazil in Boston, February 22, 2000.

23 Interview, Julio Correa, Dominican Consul General in Boston, August 4, 1998.

24 Interview, Andrine Constant, Haitian Consul General in Boston, April 13, 2000.


26 Interview, Mario Vilalva. (Former) General Consul of Brazil in Boston. August 6, 1998.

28 Interview. Mauricio Cortes Costa, General Consul of Brazil in Boston, 2/22/00.

29 Interview. Mauricio Cortes Costa, General Consul of Brazil in Boston, 2/22/00.


31 Jones Correa makes a distinction between high and low cost policies (dual citizenship and the right to vote, respectively).


35 The 1988 election marks an important turning point in relations between emigrants and Mexican political actors. Mexican opposition parties had had sporadic contacts with emigrants prior to 1988 – for instance, contacts by the Partido Socialista Mexicano (PMS) with emigrant communities in the early 1980s. [Dresser, 1993] However, 1988 marks a real change in the extent and permanence of these relations.


39 Indeed, as Martínez Cossío (2001) indicates, early positions in favor of the vote abroad were already adopted by some smaller left parties – like the Mexican Workers Party – which later helped constitute the PRD.


42 Interview, Edilio Carrión, Secretary of the Boston Chapter of the PLD, September 12, 1998.


Dear Rafael,

Just received a letter saying that Ethnic and Racial Studies has accepted our paper for publication with minor revisions:

They say article very informative and theoretically sound. results convincing and this well argued and clear paper.

needs minor revisions:

1. some references missing like in para 2 page 3 ( I can take care of this)

2. page 4 discussion of global nations policy too sketchy

3. page 6 nice to have some details about the field work the author is talking about and why we worked in Mexico, Haiti and Brasil (I can deal with this).

4. page 18-19 paragraph on symbolic politics is less developed than other policy tools. This harms the good balance of the paper.

Do you want to take on 2 and 4 and then I will deal with fixing the rest and final stuff.

I am attaching my final version.

Congratulations. This is a nice way to end the day.

Hope things went well in Mexico. Dylan finally did tell me but we are not talking much more than that. It’s a hard one to call. Best, Peggy