SENEGAL:
WHAT WILL TURNOVER BRING?

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On 25 March 2012, Macky Sall of the Alliance for the Republic (APR) won the second round of Senegal’s presidential election with 65.8 percent of the vote, handily defeating incumbent president Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), who had won the most votes in the first round. In contrast to a tumultuous campaign season, election day itself was relatively peaceful. Wade graciously accepted defeat, phoning Sall to congratulate him several hours after the polls closed. French president Nicolas Sarkozy called this gesture “proof of [Wade’s] attachment to democracy.” This appraisal is too generous, however. The peaceful turnover followed months of protests and violent repression, as well as a rumored intervention by military officials to force Wade to accept defeat after the second-round voting. Debates about the constitutionality of Wade’s candidacy, as well as an earlier change that he had proposed in the election law, helped to generate this turmoil, which included at least ten deaths, dozens of arrests, and many injuries.

Wade’s quest for a third term belied Senegal’s democratic reputation. In fact, the country’s regime would be better described as competitive authoritarian—democratic rules exist, but “incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent . . . that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy.” In 2000, when Wade won his first presidential term, which ended forty years of Socialist Party (PS) rule, Senegal appeared to be democratizing. Since then, analysts have tended to ignore the regime’s constant maneuvering aimed at disadvantaging opponents and instead focused on the presidential turnover in order to classify Senegal as a democracy. Yet such a classification is incorrect. Throughout his tenure, Wade employed an array of undemo-
cricatic strategies to stay in power. Although he failed to secure a third term, it was not for lack of (often underhanded) trying. And Wade’s actions concerning the campaign and election have reinforced undemocratic practices that could potentially prolong competitive authoritarianism under Sall.

The 2012 election may prove to be a turning point, however, because the events leading up to it fostered developments that could eventually trigger democratization. The recent politicization of Senegalese civil society has increased the scope of opposition coordination, and the broad citizen mobilization that occurred during the campaign may help to constrain Sall and encourage him to rule with clean hands.

Turnover Without Democratization

Wade’s 2000 runoff victory over longtime president and PS leader Abdou Diouf was widely viewed as marking a transition to democracy. This alternance—the handover of the presidency from one party to another—was the first since Senegal became independent of France in 1960, and one of the first in all of Africa. Although longtime oppositionist Wade had won based on a platform of change (sopi in the Wolof language) and international observers depicted him as a democrat, many of the authoritarian practices that characterized Senegal in the 1980s and 1990s persisted under his administration.

Key state institutions remained politicized. Wade fortified his ruling party by retaining institutions that he could pack with loyalists—a practice that he had condemned during his quarter-century in opposition. One such institution is the Constitutional Court. It is the president who appoints justices to the five-member Court, which therefore generates few if any judicial checks on executive violations of the constitution. In the run-up to the 2012 election, the Court was clearly biased in Wade’s favor; after all, the president had handpicked the justices, set their hefty salaries, and informally doled out prized perquisites such as 4x4 vehicles and gasoline. The Court was legally authorized to validate the presidential candidacies ahead of the 2012 election. The Court was packed in Wade’s favor, but this—and thus the court’s validation of Wade’s candidacy—was perfectly legal under the constitution.

Much like the Constitutional Court, the Autonomous National Election Commission (CENA) lacks the power to enforce fair play. The Ministry of the Interior remains in charge of organizing elections, and CENA can only “monitor and supervise the actions of the administration in electoral matters.” This limited mandate meant that in early 2012, when the Ministry of Interior violated the constitution by refusing to authorize protests at Dakar’s Independence Square, it could simply ignore the public rebuke issued by CENA’s president.

Wade also distributed ample patronage in order to tilt the playing
field in favor of the ruling party, reviving old packable institutions, such as the Economic and Social Council (in February 2008) and the Senate (in January 2007), and filling their salaried posts with PDS allies. Moreover, by using his access to the state to pay monthly salaries, dispense diplomatic passports, and grant government employment to politicians who joined the PDS’s ruling coalition, Wade chipped away at opposition unity. With the president’s encouragement, the number of political parties tripled during his first decade in power.

The government also engaged in electoral manipulation, especially after the 2007 presidential election, in which Wade defeated his former prime minister Idrissa Seck, whom Wade had sacked in 2004 and expelled from the PDS. Wade won the 2007 contest in the first round with 56 percent of the vote, but he remained concerned that Seck’s newly formed political party, Rewmi, would undercut the PDS in the legislative balloting set to take place three months later. Wade postponed these elections (originally slated for 2006) twice, and local elections (originally scheduled for 2008, but ultimately rescheduled for 2009) once. These delays appear to have been “maneuvers on the part of the ruling party aimed at influencing the electoral process . . . by generating a crisis of confidence among the protagonists,” including several opposition-party leaders who challenged the legitimacy of Wade’s 2007 presidential victory. The basis for their challenge was a 2004 government-mandated reconstruction of the country’s voter rolls that was supposed to integrate biometrics into the voter-identification system, thereby preventing double registrations. Yet there was no independent audit of the electoral register before the 2007 presidential balloting. Because of these serious concerns about the lack of verification and other electoral irregularities, major opposition leaders boycotted the 2007 legislative elections.

In addition to its other undemocratic tools for holding onto power, the Wade regime also violated civil liberties, frequently cracking down on opposition leaders who posed major threats. In 2003, thugs allegedly linked to the PDS brutally assaulted opposition leader Talla Sylla of the Jëf Jël Alliance, who had criticized Wade in a radio interview. Sylla was beaten so severely that he had to seek medical care in France. The judicial investigation of the crime was never concluded, however, because the government passed the Ezzan Amnesty Law pardoning all political crimes committed between 1983 and 2004. Politically motivated arrests were legion during Wade’s presidency. For example, prominent opposition leaders such as Amath Dansokho of the Independence and Labor Party and Jean-Paul Dias of the Gainde Centrist Bloc were interrogated by the Division of Criminal Investigation (DIC), a secret police force that Wade used primarily for political intimidation. Police arrested Yankhoba Diattara, Idrissa Seck’s political assistant, in late 2005 for trying to rally citizens against the president during his visit to Seck’s stronghold, the city of Thiès.
The regime also stymied opponents by interfering with protests—either suppressing them directly or simply not responding to requests for authorization. After Seck lost his post as premier, he was charged with subversion and embezzlement and subsequently imprisoned. In 2005, “a group of civil society and political leaders attempted to stage a demonstration to demand Seck’s release, despite a ban on such protests. The police detained some of the protestors for 24 hours.” In other cases, the government blocked protests and opposition meetings by ignoring legal requests for authorization. On occasion, police intervened when citizens held “unauthorized” meetings at party headquarters.

Finally, throughout Wade’s presidency, security forces waged attacks on journalists. In 2007, “security forces, especially the DIC, [harassed] journalists and a member of RADDHO [Senegal’s African Assembly for Human Rights],” a prominent NGO in Dakar. In 2006 and 2007 alone, there were a number of major violations: The DIC beat two journalists who had published speculations about the president’s “nighttime whereabouts”; police arrested one journalist who wrote about Senegal’s high cost of living and another who wrote about Wade buying a limousine; and the state shut down a newspaper that published stories about the involvement of Karim Wade, the president’s son, in corruption scandals. In 2008, Wade pardoned people convicted of “ransacking” the headquarters of a private newspaper. Controversial books detailing the regime’s abuses were banned, and one author received “anonymous death threats” after publishing a critical review of Wade’s first three years in office.

**After Alternance**

Why did the 2000 turnover fail to bring democratization? The weakness of Senegal’s opposition is central to the explanation. After alternance, the PS became the major opposition party. It was decimated by defections, however. Having lost their access to state resources, many former PS leaders joined the PDS, which desperately needed officials familiar with the government’s administrative procedures. Weakened by a serious lack of party discipline after alternance, the PS still had not recovered by the time of the 2007 presidential race. The major opposition contender in that contest was Seck, leader of the Rewmi party who had left the PDS only three years earlier.

The opposition splintered under Wade, with the number of parties tripling to 174 by 2010. Yet many of these are mere “telephone-booth parties”—tiny formations that have few members and participate only haphazardly in elections. Party weakness and opposition fragmentation, as well as civil society’s political neutrality and general avoidance of the political sphere altogether in the early 2000s, hampered the opposition’s ability to force Wade’s hand on democratic reforms. Organizations like RADDHO had traditionally remained outside of party politics, and it
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was not until Wade’s violation of the constitution that civil society really began cooperating with opposition parties and participating in political movements that denounced the president and his followers.

Indeed, the president’s ability to perpetuate opposition weakness has been a major factor in Senegal’s robust competitive authoritarianism. Wade could engage in these abuses because strong presidential powers enabled him to use state resources to coopt—and thereby weaken—the major opposition parties. Many of Senegal’s myriad parties did not function as real opposition parties that stayed outside the government in order to monitor it. Instead, leaders of these parties remained in Wade’s ruling coalition to receive diplomatic passports and a monthly salary of US$150.15 Others in the ruling coalition had been second-in-command of a particular party; when the leader of that party left the coalition, the number-two remained with Wade, but created a new party in order to retain bargaining power with the president and within the ruling coalition.

By coopting other political parties, Wade was able to contain defections from the PDS that otherwise would have eroded his presidential majority. The risk of defections grew after the president’s conflicts with prime ministers Idrissa Seck and Macky Sall. When Wade expelled Seck from the PDS, many people whom Seck had helped during his time as prime minister left the party with him. When Sall took over as premier, he, too, built a following within the PDS. His ambitions within the party, however, clashed with those of Karim Wade, who was serving as a minister in his father’s government. In 2008, after Sall had directed the president’s reelection campaign and become president of the National Assembly, he asked the National Assembly to audit some of the younger Wade’s activities. The president was furious and interceded, using his parliamentary majority to modify National Assembly rules and end Sall’s tenure as its president.

Soon after this clash, Sall resigned from the PDS and founded his own party, the APR. Former PDS members who were friends, colleagues, and loyalists whom Sall had cultivated during his time in government joined him in forming the new party. As early as the 2009 local elections, the APR garnered 150,000 votes (mostly from voters outside the party who sympathized with Sall after Wade kicked him out of the National Assembly). Sall built on this momentum, traveling all over Senegal and abroad in 2010 and 2011 to develop the APR in advance of the 2012 election.

As the PDS lost popular figures like Seck and Sall, Wade offered inducements to parties in the ruling coalition to keep other rebellious PDS members within the coalition’s ranks. They could express their discontent simply by leaving the president’s party (“exiting” the PDS) without entering the real opposition and thus abandoning the benefits of collaborating with Wade, as they might have done had the president not rewarded PDS splinter parties for integrating with the ruling coali-
tion. Exit was a means for politicians to “voice” their dissatisfaction with their treatment within the PDS and to negotiate better patronage. In democracies, the government-opposition divide is usually clearer with no middle ground allowing for “exit as voice.” Its availability as a political strategy in Senegal has rendered opposition coalitions weak and volatile.

**Seeds of Democratic Change?**

Paradoxically, although Wade failed to democratize Senegal, his abuses may have pushed the regime closer to democratization. Indeed, opposition mobilization increased after the 2007 election boycott. In particular, the coalition that boycotted the 2007 legislative elections, the Front Siggil Senegaal, initiated a dialogue with Senegalese citizens the following year as part of the national conference known as the Assises Nationales. This group of parties, labor unions, and civil society organizations chose as its leader Amadou-Mahtar Mbow, a respected leader and one of Senegal’s oldest living (and long-retired) politicians. Mbow invited President Wade and other members of the ruling coalition to join the Assises. According to an Assises coordinator, however, Wade declined and sought to intimidate leaders of the 83 organizations attending the inaugural meeting.

The Assises initiated a national dialogue elaborating a set of public policies intended to deal with the “multidimensional crisis” that members believed Senegal was facing. Assises members traveled to all 35 administrative departments, where they officiated at “citizen consultations”—forums for citizens to propose and discuss solutions to urgent public-policy problems in a wide range of institutional, social, and economic domains. In May 2009, Mbow’s team released its conclusions, known as the “Charter of Democratic Governance,” which summarized findings from across the country and identified policy reforms commonly suggested by citizens. The team then toured the country, distributing the report in six national languages and informing citizens how to hold accountable the Charter’s signatories, who included leaders of the sponsoring organizations, among them politicians and even some presidential candidates.

The Assises served as a focal point for further opposition coordination. Several Assises participants joined forces in the 2009 local elections, forming the United to Boost Senegal (Benno Siggil Senegaal) coalition. The coalition performed well at the polls that year, defeating the PDS in most of Senegal’s major urban areas. The most important victory came in the capital city of Dakar, where Karim Wade lost the mayoral race.

Karim’s defeat triggered a succession crisis. It had long been presumed that Wade intended for his son to succeed him—in either the
leadership of the PDS, the presidency, or both—when his presidential term ended in 2012. But the younger Wade’s loss of the Dakar mayoral race complicated these plans. With his son’s political future suddenly in question and his party’s popularity declining, the president began asserting something that he never had before—that the constitution allowed him to run again. (In fact, Wade had stated publicly in December 2007 that the constitution constrained him from pursuing a third term.) In May 2011, Wade announced the reversal of his promise to step down with the now-infamous words, “I take back what I said” (Maa waxoon, waxeet in Wolof).

His claim to a third term rested on two clauses in the 2001 Constitution. Article 27 established a five-year presidential term, renewable once. Article 104 allowed Wade, as sitting president, to complete the term that he had started before the constitutional referendum, but stated that all other clauses of the new constitution applied to him. Most independent constitutional experts interpreted these articles to mean that Wade could serve only two terms—regardless of their length and constitutional context—since Article 104 ensures that the two-term rule applies to the president who was in office during the 2001 referendum. Wade loyalists, however, claimed that the seven-year term he won in 2000 did not count against the two-term limit and that he could therefore pursue an additional five-year term.

After declaring his intent to run for a third term, the president submitted a constitutional amendment to the legislature. The amendment, which failed to pass in June 2011, proposed two reforms: one allowing a presidential candidate to avoid a runoff by winning just 25 percent of the popular vote in the first round, and the other establishing a single ticket for a party’s presidential and vice-presidential candidates. This measure would have given the president power to choose his running mate, and Senegal’s word-of-mouth radio trottoir (sidewalk telegraph) teemed with rumors that Wade would make Karim his successor by choosing him as the vice-presidential candidate.

With majorities in the National Assembly and the Senate, Wade surely assumed that these amendments would pass, but his calculations were wrong. Alioune Tine, president of RADDHO, held a press conference on June 21 calling for parties, unions, civil society, and independent personalities to combat the amendment with the slogan, “Don’t touch my constitution!” (Touche pas à ma Constitution!). Both Tine and the young mayor of Saint Louis, Cheikh Bamba Dièye of the Front for Socialism and Democracy, called for a protest at the National Assembly on June 23. As the legislature considered the constitutional amendments, opposition leaders and ordinary citizens took to the streets of downtown Dakar. Rocks flew, government security forces evacuated PDS ministers, and Dièye chained himself to the gates of the National Assembly. A social movement created by young rappers called Fed Up With It
(Y’en a Marre) soon joined forces with the other demonstrators to contest Wade’s candidacy.

From this mobilization, the June 23 Movement (M23) was born. A novel type of broad-based political movement in Senegal, it initially comprised more than fifty parties, civil society movements, and others opposed to Wade’s candidacy and his proposed constitutional amendments. Alioune Tine headed this conglomeration, which eventually included several presidential candidates, including Sall, and served as a basis for their coordination. Sall’s participation was short-lived, however. Ultimately, only three candidates (Seck, Dièye, and Ibrahima Fall of the Taxaw Temm movement) consistently attended the ongoing M23 protests against Wade’s candidacy.

The Constitutional Court announced the eligible presidential candidates one week before the campaign started. Given the executive branch’s dominance over the Court, it came as no surprise that Wade received clearance to run. The verdict generated large-scale protests across the country. From that moment, casualties began accumulating; five days after the pronouncement, the death toll was already six.17

The June 23 mobilization did not deter Wade from running. His government applied a range of repressive strategies to intimidate voters, protesters, and other candidates and used the state treasury for political purposes. For instance, Wade allegedly funded some other presidential candidates, paying the almost $130,000 legally required for them to run. This would have ensured the veneer of a competitive election even if certain opposition candidates had decided to boycott it in protest of Wade’s bid for a third term. Some opposition leaders with past careers in government or the private sector—including Sall, Seck, and Moustapha Niasse, another former prime minister and standard bearer of Benno Siggi Senegaal—had substantial nonstate sources of campaign funding, but Wade’s access to state coffers still tilted the playing field significantly in favor of his own ruling coalition.

During the campaign, the government harassed opponents and suppressed their civil liberties. The DIC pursued Alioune Tine and several Rewmi party leaders.18 PDS thugs allegedly loitered outside opposition leaders’ homes and workplaces in an effort to intimidate them. Most casualties (including one charge of death by torture), however, were suffered at the hands of the police.19 In the protests that pitted the M23 against the police in Independence Square, demonstrators formed blockades against police-brigade advances and burned refuse in the streets. In response, police deployed “the dragon,” a tear-gas-launching tank, killing a University of Dakar student, and one officer threw a tear-gas grenade inside a mosque of the Tidjane religious sect.20

Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior sought to control opposition activity by forbidding protests even if they met the constitutional requirements for acceptance. The constitution and the electoral code permit can-
candidates to assemble anywhere in the country during the campaign as long as they notify the proper administrative authorities 24 hours in advance. Despite these rights of assembly and the candidates’ timely announcements, the Ministry denied approval of several protests in downtown Dakar as the first-round balloting approached. When demonstrators gathered despite the ban, the police responded harshly. They even launched tear-gas grenades at opposition candidates Seck and Fall. Police also injured internationally renowned singer and opposition figure Youssou N’dour, as well as Dièye (who was hospitalized).  

Nevertheless, Wade failed to impose his will on Senegalese voters. In first-round voting on February 26, Wade won 34.8 percent, Sall won 26.5 percent, and Niasse won 13 percent. Eleven other candidates competed; another three—including N’dour—had sought to run, but the Constitutional Court invalidated their candidacies.  In the March 25 runoff, Sall won 65.8 percent of the vote, leaving Wade with 34.2 percent—a more devastating margin than that of Wade’s victory over Diouf in 2000 (17 percentage points). Wade captured 0.4 percent fewer votes in the election’s second round than in the first, and suffered this decline despite the repressive measures that he had employed.

Why did Wade perform worse in the second round? For one thing, all the first-round losers joined Sall’s coalition in the second round. Among the supporters of these former candidates were members of the M23 (which was inherently against Wade) and the Assises (which Wade and the PDS had declined to join). The coming-together of the opposition left Wade with few avenues for increasing PDS support other than courting the country’s powerful marabouts (Islamic religious leaders). All presidential hopefuls sought blessings from Senegal’s religious authorities, who have traditionally influenced public opinion—in the 1980s and early 1990s, Diouf’s reelections depended upon them. In 2012, however, Wade was the only candidate who pressured Islamic leaders to issue holy orders (ndiguels) to their disciples to vote for him. Several minor marabouts endorsed him, but the higher authorities of the Islamic orders were intent upon remaining neutral.

Implications for Democracy

Will the 2012 election result in democratization or in a continuation of competitive authoritarianism in Senegal? There are reasons to doubt the prospects for democratization under Sall. Wade’s former prime minister is not the country’s most tried and true democrat; he was part of the PDS old guard as late as 2008. Moreover, the political institutions that underpinned competitive authoritarianism under Wade are still in place. Now that Sall controls the presidency, he has no inherent incentive to reduce executive powers or to get rid of packable institutions and reinforce democratic ones. If Sall proves unwilling to tie his own hands by
ensuring an independent judiciary, Senegal’s uneven political playing field—a hallmark of competitive authoritarianism—will remain tilted in favor of the regime in power. Finally, the opposition under Sall may revert to the fragmented and weakened state that it was in before the campaign, especially if the PDS is ravaged by defections as the PS was after alternance in 2000.

Despite these major obstacles, the increasing political involvement of civil society in Senegal has the potential to bolster democratization. The debate over Wade’s third term pushed formerly neutral organizations into politics. For instance, by coordinating social movements like Don’t Touch My Constitution and the M23, the RADDHO connected angry citizens and newly enfranchised youth to politicians and parties with similar interests. Along with the Assises, these social movements helped to connect citizens and politicians, and they could continue to strengthen citizens’ ability to monitor the ruling coalition.

Currently, it looks as if Senegal’s democratization will depend on the extent to which the government implements the conclusions of the Assises Nationales, since its Charter demands reforms that would help to level the political playing field and reduce the abuse of state resources. Sall’s commitment to the Assises is ambiguous, however. He and his party did not participate in its establishment or in the citizen consultations; he publicly confirmed his willingness to apply the conclusions of the Charter only after the first round of the 2012 elections, when he needed to construct a coalition for the runoff. During the second-round campaign, Sall made it clear that he did not want to abolish the Senate, one of the institutions that the Charter denounces. Nevertheless, if Senegal’s newly politicized civil society can collaborate effectively with the country’s major opposition parties to hold Sall accountable for the reforms that he signed onto, there may yet be hope for democratization.

NOTES


5. For instance, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson congratulated Senegal on being “a good example of democracy” on the continent.


15. Author interviews, Dakar, September 2011 to April 2012.


20. “Une campagne électorale à sang à l’heure: 10 morts déjà,” *op. cit.*; “La zawiya profané, le pays s’embrase,” *Le Populaire* (Dakar), 18 February 2012.


22. One hypothesis is that Wade convinced the Constitutional Court to reject N’dour, who threatened Wade’s victory with his popularity, his newly founded political movement, and his private media empire.


24. Here I am referring not to the PDS, which is now also an opposition party, but to the PS, Niasse’s AFP, and Seck’s Rewmi, as well as up to fifty smaller signatories of the Assises.