To recognize the 10 years of Jorge I. Domínguez’s directorship of the Weatherhead Center, family, friends, colleagues, and staff gathered on Tuesday, May 23, on the lawn outside of the Knafel Building to celebrate and reminisce. Among the celebrants was the band, Mariachi Veritas. 

Photo: Martha Stewart

On July 1, 1996, I became director of the Center for International Affairs in Coolidge Hall. On June 30, 2006, I will step down as director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, now housed at the Center for Government and International Studies. Those slight changes in words summarize what, I hope, has been a change for the better for the over one thousand faculty associates, graduate and undergraduate students, Fellows, visiting scholars, postdoctoral fellows, staff, and others who have been associated with the Center during my decade of its stewardship.

It took us 350 pages to summarize as briefly as possible the work of the Center to inform the external academic review committee that visited the Center in May 2006. I limit this last “From the Director” article to the concluding paragraph of my own statement for that review committee:

The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs has succeeded because it is co-owned by its members. It is committed to excellence today, as it has been throughout its distinguished history. Excellence rests on helping the brightest people of all ages and ranks do their best work. Excellence is nurtured best when the institution is both capable and humane. The Center believes, today as in 1958, that it and Harvard have “unusual resources for basic research” on international and comparative work in the social sciences.

Finally, I want to express my gratitude to Robert Bowie, who made the Center possible; to Joseph Nye, who first invited me to join the Center as a graduate student; to Samuel Huntington and Karl Deutsch, who served on my dissertation committee and mentored me; to Henry Rosovsky and Derek Bok, who agreed to tenure me and keep me; to Robert Putnam, whose ideas for the Center helped to shape mine; to Jeremy Knowles, who appointed me Center Director, and to William Kirby, who retained me; to Jeffry Frieden, who served as acting director during my sabbatical; to Anne Emerson, James Cooney, and Steven Bloomfield, who worked with me as executive directors; to Deborah-Lee Vasquez, Theresa Spinale, Amanda Pearson, and Kathleen Hoover, who staffed my work as Director; to Al and Celia Weatherhead who were the Center’s generous “miracle makers” of these years; and to Mary.

It has been humbling to serve the Center and the University, my colleagues and my students, and it has been a thrill to do so. Thank you.

Jorge I. Domínguez
Caroline Elkins, Pulitzer Prize–winning author

Caroline Elkins, the Hugo K. Foster Associate Professor of African Studies, won the general nonfiction prize for her book *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya.* The book, which evolved from her doctoral dissertation, uncovers the truth of how the colonial British administration put down the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya during the 1950s and 1960s.

*Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya*
by Caroline Elkins

As part of the Allied forces, thousands of Kenyans fought alongside the British in World War II. But just a few years after the defeat of Hitler, the British colonial government detained nearly the entire population of Kenya’s largest ethnic minority, the Kikuyu—some one and a half million people. The compelling story of the system of prisons and work camps where thousands met their deaths has remained largely untold—the victim of a determined effort by the British to destroy all official records of their attempts to stop the Mau Mau uprising, the Kikuyu people’s ultimately successful bid for Kenyan independence.

Caroline Elkins is the Hugo K. Foster Associate Professor of African Studies in the Department of History at Harvard University and a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

**Erratum**

We wish to correct an error in the last edition of the *Centerpiece.* Sten Ask, a Fellow in 1992-93, is the Swedish Ambassador to the Caribbean, including Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. He is based in Stockholm.
Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century
by Jeffry A. Frieden

International trade at unprecedented levels, millions of people migrating yearly in search of jobs, the world’s economies more open to one another than ever before. . . . Such was the global economy in 1900. Then as now, many people considered globalization to be inevitable and irreversible. Yet the entire edifice collapsed in a few months in 1914. Globalization is a choice, not a fact. It is a result of policy decisions and the politics that shape them. Jeffry A. Frieden’s insightful history explores the golden age of globalization during the early years of the twentieth century, its swift collapse in the crises of 1914–45, the divisions of the cold war world, and the turn again toward global integration at the end of the century. His history is full of character and event, as entertaining as it is enlightening. It deepens our understanding of the century just past and sheds light on our current situation.

Jeffry A. Frieden is the Stanfield Professor of International Peace at Harvard University. He specializes in the politics of international monetary and financial relations. He is a faculty associate and an Executive Committee member of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia
by Alison Fleig Frank

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Austrian Empire ranked third among the world’s oil-producing states (surpassed only by the United States and Russia) and accounted for 5 percent of global oil production. By 1918, the Central Powers did not have enough oil to maintain a modern military. How and why did the promise of oil fail Galicia (the province producing the oil) and the Empire? In a brilliantly conceived work, Alison Frank traces the interaction of technology, nationalist rhetoric, social tensions, provincial politics, and entrepreneur-
America in the World Today: A European View
By Karl Kaiser

Any European, especially a German, who reviews America's role in the world with a sense of history, will do so with a feeling of attachment, respect, or gratitude. In my case it is all three. World War II ended for me as a ten-year-old amidst enormous chaos, but I did not truly realize that I had been liberated until later, when the horrors of the Nazi regime became known to me and I understood that the Nazis had been defeated by America and its allies at terrific human and material cost. I experienced American soldiers as humane and helpful, from the first one who checked personally (despite the risk) before he tossed a grenade in our cellar where we civilians waited for the battle (then raging above our heads) to end, to the soldiers who later became our friends and allies, without whom the Soviets would have conquered Berlin (not to mention the rest of Germany and Western Europe).

My shock when seeing the pictures of Abu Ghraib was therefore profound, and like many Europeans I asked “What has happened to our America?”

I am a member of the species, “Homo Atlanticus”; I enjoyed part of my education in the United States and continue to maintain close personal networks with Americans, having interacted with America throughout my professional life. Many thousands of Europeans in leading positions in all sectors of society, individuals who benefited from enlightening policies and welcoming openness of this country, today form the backbone of America’s densest external relationship in terms of common values, intellectual interactions, personal relations, and economic integration. Whatever political disagreements may arise between the two sides of the Atlantic, this network forms a tremendously strong basis for cooperation on the global problems they both share.

There have been three watersheds in this relationship since the end of World War II. The first occurred from 1947 to 1949, when in response to the Soviet challenge the core elements of U.S. strategy under President Harry S. Truman were to build up the West with the Marshall Plan and NATO, support European unification, and help to reintegeate Germany and Japan. During this period, multilateral regimes and institutions expanded and, under U.S. guidance, the world economy prospered.

The second watershed occurred when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989-90. The cold war, which could also have ended with a bloodbath, was terminated peacefully. Within the span of one single year Germany was unified, a “Europe whole and free” was re-created, and new international structures were established. It was a period of brilliant diplomacy, multilateral approaches, and creative compromise on extraordinarily complex problems. No doubt, President George H.W. Bush was helped by the particular statesmen with whom he cooperated, notably a courageous Gorbachev, but Bush’s personal leadership drove and guided this process. In European eyes the United States had reconfirmed herself as the powerful and diplomatic leader of the West.

The third defining moment occurred when terrorists’ planes struck the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. A wave of solidarity and empathy swept through Europe and, indeed, the world. It was the perfect moment for American leadership to forge a new alliance and common strategy in order to deal with the mounting threat and root causes of jihadist extremism, to revive anti-proliferation policy, to reform international law and institutions, and so, in short, to redesign the post-cold war world order in order to deal with the new global challenges. Sadly, this chance was lost.

Despite some hopeful new departures immediately after 9/11, such as the Bush administration’s success in enlisting support from the UN Security Council and a wide-ranging group of countries including Russia and China, problems that had
plagued U.S. relations with Europe after the election of George W. Bush reasserted themselves and, in fact, took a turn for the worse.

It is important to remember that although some problems in U.S.-European relations had already arisen under President Clinton, they became more pronounced and dogmatic when George W. Bush was elected president. Europe and the world came to perceive unilateralism as the dominant element of the newly elected administration. Whereas the Clinton administration had only been unable to fulfill America’s commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—a commitment that had been made in exchange for the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—the Bush administration rejected the entire principle of arms control. As an American official in charge of arms control let it be understood, international regimes of this kind were useless and would unnecessarily restrict the freedom of maneuver of a United States that was powerful enough on its own to deal with problems as they arose.

While Europe was undergoing elaborate and costly policy changes to lower emissions, the world’s greatest greenhouse gas emitter flatly rejected the Kyoto Protocol to amend the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), without providing any alternative proposal. President Bush also energetically resisted the International Criminal Court—even though President Clinton had signed on to the statute—by staging a worldwide effort to induce parties to the statute to conclude agreements not to release American citizens to the court. For Europeans this act was particularly disappointing because the country that once led post–World War II efforts to civilize international politics through international law now claimed to be impervious to international law.

The war in Afghanistan enjoyed widespread support by the European allies who had activated the assistance clause of Article V for the first time in NATO history. By rejecting Europe’s offer, the United States in turn lost its chance to reform NATO. Whereas the Bush administration rejected the entire principle of arms control as an American official in charge of arms control let it be understood, international regimes of this kind were useless and would unnecessarily restrict the freedom of maneuver of a United States that was powerful enough on its own to deal with problems as they arose.

The disagreements over going to war in Iraq have produced the greatest crisis in the history of U.S.-European relations since World War II. Ear-
This is a paragraph from a text document.
The Weatherhead Center’s program for Graduate Student Associates (GSAs) facilitates and supplements students’ independent research toward doctoral and advanced professional degrees. Program members come from many of Harvard’s academic departments and professional schools to work on projects related to the core research interests of the Center. These interests are broadly defined to include research on international, transnational, and comparative topics (both contemporary and historical) including rigorous policy analysis, as well as the study of countries and regions other than the United States. Steven Levitsky, associate professor of government, is the director of graduate student programs.

The Center’s departing Graduate Student Associates and their postgraduate plans are:

**Ben Ansell**
Ben will complete his dissertation entitled “From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Political Economy of Education Spending.” He will be defending in August and he takes up a position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota in fall 2006.

**Pär Cassel**
Pär completed his dissertation entitled “Rule or Law or Rule of Laws: Legal Pluralism and Extraterritoriality in Nineteenth Century East Asia” and graduated in June. This fall, he begins a position as assistant professor of modern Chinese history at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.

**Dan Gingerich**
Dan will be a postdoctoral research associate at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University in fall 2006. He plans to defend his dissertation entitled “Corruption in General Equilibrium: Political Institutions and Bureaucratic Performance in South America” in December, giving him a March 2007 degree.

**Mike Horowitz**
Mike will complete his dissertation entitled “The Spread of Military Power: Consequences for International Politics,” and he will be a postdoctoral research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University next year.

**Phillip Lipsy**
Phillip will complete his dissertation on how international institutions change as a function of underlying variables in the policy area. Beginning in the fall of 2007, Phillip will be assistant professor of political science at Stanford University, where he will also be a Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

**Shannon O’Neil**
Shannon defended her dissertation entitled “Political Participation after Reform: Pension Politics in Latin America” in May and graduated in June. Next year she will be a Visiting Scholar at the Iberian and Latin American Studies Center (ILAS) at Columbia University.

**Hillel Soifer**
Hillel will complete his dissertation entitled “Authority Over Distance: Explaining Variation in State Infrastructural Power in Latin America,” which he plans to defend later this summer for a November degree. In August he takes up a position as assistant professor of Politics at Bates College.

**Sarah Wagner**
Sarah defended her dissertation entitled “Return of Identity: Technology, Memory, and the Recognition of Srebrenica’s Missing” in spring 2006. Sarah will be a lecturer in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University next year.
Kimberly Theidon is a medical anthropologist focusing on Latin America. She is an assistant professor in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University and a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Her book *Entre prójimos: el conflicto armado interno y la política de la reconciliación en el Perú* received the 2006 Premio Iberoamericano Book Award from the Committee of the Latin American Studies Association.

**TURBO, COLOMBIA, SEPTEMBER 2005**

The women arrived one by one, their spirits lifted by the bottles of chilled soda pop awaiting them. In the midst of a busy, sweltering afternoon, they accepted our invitation to talk about the paramilitary demobilization process that was reconfiguring life in their communities. With each sip, the heat ceded to a bit more openness. As we would learn, many of them had husbands, partners, sons, and daughters in the guerrilla, the army, the paramilitary—in some cases, all at once. Several of the women shook their heads as they listed their family members and the armed groups to which they had belonged in the course of this interminable war. Slowly the conversation wound around to our central questions: “What do you think the government should do? We know this process is so controversial. What do you think of all this?” They murmured among themselves, some looked a bit uncomfortable. Finally one woman spoke on behalf of the group: “Well, if we rounded up all the men who’ve ever held a gun and put them in jail—buena, there’d be no men left around here.”

On July 15, 2003, the Santa Fe de Ralito Accord launched official negotiations between the Uribe government and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The Accord provided for the gradual disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion of the AUC or, as they are more commonly known, the paramilitaries. The Accord envisioned the group’s demobilization by December 2005 in exchange for government efforts to reincorporate AUC members into civilian life. To date, 28,357 men and women have demobilized in a series of televised ceremonies, and they have turned in 16,077 weapons. The discrepancy between the number of combatants demobilized and weapons surrendered serves as an entry point into the controversial nature of the process.

The paramilitaries have been consistently cited for gross human rights violations. Additionally, this 30-40,000 member organization appears on the U.S. government’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, and there is ample evidence that the paramilitaries control much of the drug trafficking in Colombia. One of the greatest concerns arising from the paramilitary demobilization process is that it will provide combatants with an opportunity both to be absolved of their crimes and to benefit from lenient amnesty measures. National and international human rights organizations insist the process jeopardizes victims’ rights to truth, justice, and reparations.

For the past nine months, with funding from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, I have been conducting qualitative research on the paramilitary demobilization process. With my Colombian research assistant, Paola Andrea Betancourt, we have focused on three field sites: government-sponsored shelters in Bogotá; shelters and two barrios in Medellín; and several communities in Turbo-Apartado. By focusing on these case studies, we have sought to capture the complexity of regional histories.

We have used semi-structured interviews with demobilized combatants from the AUC as well as from two guerrilla movements: the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Aware that formal interviews are of limited utility when investigating sensitive topics in a climate of great distrust, we have complemented these interviews with sustained participant observation. We have been committed to moving beyond the “black and white” of statistics to explore the gray zone that characterizes the complex reality of a fratricidal war. Additionally, we have been guided by the conviction that the unit of analysis and intervention must extend beyond the former combatants to include the communities to which they return. By focusing on the “R” of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration), we hope to articulate national policies and processes with local and regional initiatives.

We stress the importance of disaggregating the figure of the “paramilitary” or the “guerrilla” in order to capture the great variations that exist in each group—variations that include motivations, geography, and rank. Clearly, policymakers cannot make universal recommendations based on the shelter model used in Bogotá. Nor can we assume that the reality of an urban mafia of “demobilized” combatants in Medellín means the entire process is a sham. Nor do we wish to offer a romanticized reading of local processes as though the “local” is an intrinsically harmonious or democratic space. Rather, we insist on the need to capture regional specificities that might help to develop programs that reflect the fact that in Colombia there is not one war, there are several.
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

Much of the literature on DDR approaches the topic from a military-centered or security perspective, paying less attention to the social and cultural elements that influence the success or failure of reintegration efforts. We locate DDR squarely within the field of transitional justice and its concerns with historical clarification, justice, reparations, and reconciliation. This approach in turn leads us to investigate how former combatants are reintegrated into the social, economic, and political life of civilian communities, as well as to analyze how civil society sectors respond. To avoid conflict between the local community and former combatants, the needs of the wider community should be considered—and these needs may well involve listening to victims’ demands for forms of justice and reparation.

To date we have conducted 112 interviews with former combatants, as well as with representatives of state and private entities, members of the military and the intelligence service, Catholic and Evangelical religious leaders, and members of the host communities. In this brief text, we present a few of our preliminary findings, seeking to answer a number of key concerns: How might the government and the newly formed National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation capitalize on the fact that the majority of these demobilized combatants wish to leave the war behind? How might we support the majority of them in their desire to change their lives? How might the government learn from and strengthen local and regional initiatives, and elaborate peaceful alternatives even in the midst of war? Finally, what role should the Colombian state—and international actors—play in this complicated de-mobilization process?

“In Search of Respect”

We have focused on demobilized male combatants because they are the majority of both our sample and the armed combatants waging war in Colombia. The degree to which they live with images of “militarized masculinity” is striking. Many of these young men assured us that carrying a weapon, earning easy money, and having the capacity to inspire fear results in benefits they would have trouble obtaining legally. For these young men, particularly those who were in the AUC, joining the paramilitaries allowed them to “feel like a big man (gran hombre) in their barrio,” to “go out with the prettiest young women” and to “dress well,” possibilities that, according to them, would not have been options without joining an armed group. We use the term “young men” quite intentionally, as fully 65 percent of these ex-combatants joined an armed group when they were mere minors.

One goal of the reintegration process will be demilitarizing the model of masculinity that these men and women have, particularly given that so many of these men have scant access to civilian symbols of virility such as education, legal income, or decent housing. We stress both men and women because this militarized masculinity is performative: the audience is composed not only of the other men with whom these combatants struggle for a place within the hierarchy of the armed group, but also the women who seek out these gran hombres as desirable partners in the economy of war.

However, although the image is “grand,” the reality is not. Of the 112 male ex-combatants we interviewed, 90 percent were common soldiers or low-level squadron leaders with ten to fifteen men under their command. These men are the “cannon fodder” of the war. It is crucial to disaggregate these men according to rank and to acknowledge that if indeed the majority of these demobilized foot soldiers blur the line between victim and victimizer, they are not among the true beneficiaries of this war. Their rank in turn translates into differences in terms of earnings, intellectual authorship, and the severity of their crimes. An ex-combatant’s rank also contributes to his sense of guilt, and to the guilt that others attribute to him. It is clear that the civilian population has ideas regarding the severity of the crime and the corresponding punishment; within the calculations used in these assessment figures, they consider both the rank of the ex-combatant and the degree of “conciencia” (consciousness or free will) that he could exercise in the heat of combat.

“Volver al monte”: Returning to the Mountains

“Volver al monte” is a phrase that appears with great frequency in our interviews. This symbolically rich term invokes much more than geography. For these ex-combatants, life in “el monte” is synonymous with: gnawing hunger; sleeplessness; illness and no access to medical care; and anxiety from living clandestinely. Combatants have also killed or witnessed the killing of many people, frequently people that “I didn’t even know — innocent people.” Indeed, among the reasons given for deserting, more than half the interviewees replied “I was exhausted” and “I was sick of war.” Additionally, the majority of the ex-guerrillas expressed their great disappointment with the ELN and the FARC: “They said we would work for the poor. Lies! The comandantes are rich—they get rich from drug trafficking. This war is big business.”

“Volver al monte” means being far away from their families and the humanizing emotional ties.
These men have impressive family bonds; their family ties, which were a factor in making them desert the battlefront, continue to pull on these individuals now. Importantly, thoughts of family reminded many of the men that they were still human beings out there in "el monte."

Our research reveals a deep desire on the part of these demobilized combatants to leave war behind them and return to civilian life, but they live this desire in the midst of war. The irony? These men and women are indeed "transitional subjects"; unfortunately, the social context is not.

Peace and Justice?

The concepts of justice these former combatants express are noteworthy, as are their opinions of the collective demobilization process and the possibilities for peace in Colombia. Ninety-six percent of them expressed profound doubts regarding the paramilitary demobilization process, questioning the motivations of other combatants and of president Uribe himself: "Uribe? He is the leader of the paracos (paramilitaries)!" Equally striking is their profound pessimism regarding the possibility for peace in their country. Especially in the shelters of Bogotá, where these former combatants are far from their home communities, peace seems unthinkable:

"Peace is not just turning in weapons. There are lots of civilians who want to enter the war.";

"Peace? How can there be peace when war is such a big business?"

The most optimistic response we received, except for in Turbo-Apartado, was "Peace? Maybe someday."

Their concepts of justice are also impressive:

"Justice is everyone paying for what they’ve done.";

"Justice is everyone doing justice as they see it.";

"Justice is…well, if someone kills my dad, I kill him."; or,

"Justice? The word has no meaning."

We want to highlight the complete absence of the state in people's responses. The state as an actor, intermediary, or protagonist simply does not appear: the idea of turning to the judicial system is not even considered when thinking of peace or justice. This is indeed quite an indictment of the Colombian state.

Regional Differences

Ninety-five percent of the demobilized combatants in Bogotá were born in other parts of the country and 99 percent are demobilized individually. These young men were brought to the shelters—the majority of which have been shut down owing to complaints from people living in surrounding neighborhoods—and subsequently relocated to rural areas outside of the capital city.

Our research indicates that the shelter model is of limited utility, and that it conflates legal and social processes. If indeed there is a change in legal status for the ex-combatants, this does not necessarily translate into the social transformations that would allow them to feel they are once again part of civilian life. Indeed, in our interviews with members of the communities in which the government established shelters, it was clear the government developed and implemented their methodology without consulting these communities.

Thus we return to the idea of the social environment and family ties. These ex-combatants are isolated from both surrounding communities and their families. Stigma marks them, as well as mutual fear. Members of the surrounding communities expressed their concern that they live alongside "assassins"; the former combatants assured us they are "marked men," targeted by the still-active armed groups to which they belonged. The shelter model, which reproduces their marginality without thinking of how best to assist these former combatants and the communities that receive them in coexisting without mutual fear and distrust, is tainted by the impurity that until now has characterized the process of "reconciliation" as dictated by the state.

Medellín: A Perverse Calm

Medellín has been the recipient of collectively demobilized combatants and a small percentage of individual deserters, and the much-touted statistical decrease in violence cloaks important dynamics in the city. Every phase of our research indicates that the demobilized paramilitaries are effectively reconfiguring themselves as an economic power, and that they have a vested interest in "administering calm" in this conflictive city.

We are not arguing that the entire process is a facade from an institutional point of view. What we have noted is that there is a great deal of occult control of the city and of the trade in arms and drugs. Although the demobilized combatants superficially obey the public authorities, we were assured that everything—"everything that lives or moves"—is still controlled by Don Berna, the currently imprisoned AUC leader. Indeed, a perverse calm pervades Medellín. When we visited a neighborhood on the outskirts of the city, one woman spoke to us about how she sees the demobilization and reinsertion process: "Before, you couldn’t even walk a block or more because they’d kill you. You always had to ask permission from the people in charge of each barrio. It was dangerous to go out at night, to take the bus. It's different now. You can walk around from one place to another—oh, it's changed. The muchachos (paramilitaries) are a lot calmer. If you have a problem, you just go see them and they take care of it.
This demobilization was a good thing because now we can go about in peace—but we still look for them whenever there is any kind of problem.”

Once again, the state does not even appear in people’s images of peace, justice, or security.

**Turbo-Apartado**

Here the war is not a problem that belongs to “others”: rather, the violence in Turbo-Apartado is intimate. In any given community, victims, victimizers, and beneficiaries of the war live side by side. Importantly, as a representative of the Catholic church insisted, the beneficiaries of the war are not only those in arms but also the economic and political elites who have sponsored much of this violence. As this priest explained, “When we calculate who should finance this process, these elites should have a seat reserved at the table.”

In Turbo, the productive projects that the government is implementing in consultation with the communities are one component of the demobilization process and could serve as a model when designing programs that seek not only to surrender weapons but also to reconstruct coexistence. The income-generating projects attempt to provide a space for socialization and purposely avoid benefitting only the demobilized. For instance, one livestock project includes 50 percent demobilized combatants, 25 percent internally displaced persons, and 25 percent members of the surrounding communities. In the project in Turbo, a former paramilitary commander actively participates and demonstrates his commitment to the demobilization and well-being of the men who served under him. It is worth thinking about how to use the hierarchy and simultaneously dismantle its structures, both military and psychological. Every component of DDR has its temporality and the corresponding strategies.

Moreover, it is easy to imagine how the community could resent the former combatants and any benefits they might receive. Thus, the participants in the livestock project in Turbo explained to us how they manage these feelings. They decided to develop a set of internal rules and elect a governing board, which has the power to impose fines for each insult or fight that project participants might cause. Again, our research does not seek to romanticize these projects but rather to demonstrate the creativity of the population. These sorts of local and regional initiatives should inform national processes and policies.

**Conclusions**

Reflecting upon this first stage of our research, we draw a few preliminary conclusions that we will continue to explore:

- The Colombian state must provide security to fill the void left by demobilized armed groups. The state should also generate economic alternatives for not only the ex-combatants but also the communities that receive them.
- The state should not confuse “justice” operating in these communities—including its concepts and practices—with the justice that the state should administer. Clearly, justice should be administered by state agencies rather than demobilized combatants.
- The international community should oversee and assist the demobilization process. It should also communicate a positive message to those still in arms—especially (FARC), which is most distant from the government—indicating support for all peace processes and demobilization efforts, regardless of whether the combatants are from the ideological right or left.
- There is a need to develop a discourse on reconciliation and reparation that is not monopolized by religious and political leaders.
- Finally, the failure to translate the project of national reconciliation into local reconciliation is a grave danger. We need to remember that to implement grand visions requires concrete mechanisms.

To conclude, during Theidon’s work with the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Ayacucho, she was struck by the creativity of local communities confronted with the need to reconstruct social relationships with intimate enemies. That experience taught her something worth repeating here: If we do not open a path for those who wish to leave war behind and recover their standing in a human community, they will continue to wander in the puna or, in the Colombian case, they may well return to wage war in “el monte.”

**IN THE NEWS**


Sidney Knafel, long-time chair of the Center’s visiting committee, was essential in making possible the construction of Harvard’s new Center for Government and International Studies (CGIS).

Photo: Harvard News Office
In a panel in April, Kenneth McElwain (second from left), Kanako Ida, and Taisuke Kanayama debated the contemporary challenges of Japanese democracy in comparative perspective. Yves Tiberghien (far left), Harvard Academy Scholar, served as a discussant.

Photo: Shannon Rice