From the Director

In Memoriam: Albert J. Weatherhead III, 1925–2011

On September 20, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs lost one of its greatest benefactors and friends: Albert J. Weatherhead III. As many of us know, Al came to the support of the Center at a particularly difficult financial time, giving international research a much needed boost through his extraordinary generosity. In April 1998, through the Weatherhead Foundation and with the strong support of his wife, Celia, the Foundation’s vice president, he endowed the Center and put international relations research on a firm financial footing at Harvard. Beyond the founding gift, Al and Celia made additional significant endowment grants through the Weatherhead Foundation in May 2003 and February 2004.

Al’s generosity to our research center was all the more remarkable because he himself was never especially interested in international affairs for his businesses. The head of a family that donated millions over his lifetime to universities nationwide—including not only Harvard but also Columbia, Tulane, the University of Texas Medical School in Houston, and, most especially, Case Western Reserve University in his native Ohio—Al Weatherhead got his start after taking over his father’s automobile-parts manufacturing business. He later founded Weatherchem, a plastics company that makes products for dispensing and storing food and medicines. Neither of these businesses have had a particularly strong international orientation. Ironically, the fund he endowed for research in international affairs is guided by his personal instructions to invest only in the stocks of domestic US companies.

Al was interested in supporting people with cutting-edge ideas who would have an impact on the world. He found that opportunity in the then-Center for International Affairs here at Harvard. Not himself a scholar, Al Weatherhead was especially attracted to the Fellows Program, which brings distinguished...
practitioners from the world of government, business, the military, media, and non-profit work to the Center for a year of academic immersion. He was also a big fan of the Graduate Student Associates program, which he saw as an incubator for ideas that would shape the future. One of the boldest moves he made as a donor to the WCFIA was to endow the Weatherhead Initiative, designed to fund game-changing research in international affairs. The Initiative has funded projects stretching from globalization’s influence on public opinion, to religion in international politics, to development in Africa, and to pollution detection and abatement programs in China. Beginning this year, Weatherhead Initiative funds are supporting a three-year Research Cluster on Global History and a wide range of related seminars, conferences, and new undergraduate courses (see page 13).

I did not have the good fortune to know Al Weatherhead well. I met with him only twice during my tenure as director, during meetings of the WCFIA Advisory Committee in which he occasionally participated. One of the great things about Al was that his generosity to the Center was not matched by officiousness. Al was interested in what the Center does, but he never tried to grab the wheel or steer the Center in his preferred direction. He was a supporter, not an interloper. I have fond memories of the two dinners we had together during the Advisory Committee’s visits. As I recall, our discussions were not about research or even international matters. Nor did we speak in any detail about how the Center was spending his money (which is all available of course in our annual report). We chatted instead of Al’s undergraduate years at Harvard—and his penchant on occasion for pushing the envelope of decorous collegiate behavior. Al relished telling stories about his mischievous behavior as an undergraduate, whether jumping into the Charles River or being detained by police for some minor transgression and being “rescued” by Harvard along the way.

Jorge Domínguez, who directed the Center when Al decided to endow the CFIA, knew that Al wanted more than anything to support his alma mater, which he saw as a force for transforming the world. “All he had needed were reassurances that we were still the Harvard that he knew, admired, and loved,” Jorge recently told me. “Al fell in love with Harvard probably before he arrived in the College as a freshman. He remained a loyal alumnus ever since.”

Loyal, indeed. Over the years, he funded four professorships at Harvard, one of which was a university professorship held by Samuel P. Huntington. Al saw these as good ways to advance the mission of the university, as well as to honor his father and his brother who also cherished Harvard.

Al Weatherhead remained actively engaged as a philanthropist until the last few weeks of his life. From medical research to international affairs, what united all of his endeavors was a commitment to the big picture. In conversations with Harvard, he apparently never wanted to discuss programs smaller than, say, $500,000. His generosity was matched by his belief, as Jorge Domínguez put it, “that the world was improvable, and that bright, hard-working individuals were the right vehicle to advance this vision.” We Weatherhead Center scholars, staff, and innumerable annual visitors are directly indebted to Al Weatherhead, the man—and to his vision.

Beth A. Simmons, Center Director
Weatherhead Faculty Associate Receives the Mary Parker Follett Award

Daniel Ziblatt received the Mary Parker Follett Award for Best Article published in 2010 in politics and history, given by the politics and history section of the American Political Science Association. The title of the article is “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond,” co-authored with Giovanni Capoccia (Oxford) and published in Comparative Political Studies in August 2010. The article is the introduction to a special double issue of the journal entitled The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies, and develops a new approach to the historical study of processes of democratization. The award ceremony took place at the September APSA Annual Convention in Seattle.

Former Weatherhead Center Director Wins Award for Academic Excellence in Studies about Cuba

Former Weatherhead Center Director, Jorge I. Domínguez, is the 2010 winner of the Award for Academic Excellence in Studies about Cuba, LASA Cuba Section. Domínguez’s innovative contributions to the study of Cuban politics and society may be seen in the books that he has published, several of which have become classic texts in Cuban studies. A member of the award committee noted that Professor Domínguez’s studies “have the virtue and originality to combine economic and social as well as specifically political dimensions, thus providing an integrative account of his research cases.”

Weatherhead Faculty Associate Receives Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award

Robert D. Putnam, the Peter and Isabel Malkin Professor of Public Policy and faculty director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Saguaro Seminar, is a co-winner of the 2011 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for American Grace, co-authored by David E. Campbell. The book analyzes the role of religion in American public life.

“We think this impressive book is exemplary in its combining the highest standards of social scientific rigor, with a clarity and accessibility that is too rare in the social sciences,” wrote the award committee. “The authors have produced a major work of political science that illuminates some of the most important questions of our time, and in a form that is fully accessible to the attentive lay reader.”

The Woodrow Wilson Award is given annually for the best book on government, politics, or international affairs. The $5,000 award is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation at Princeton University.

Weatherhead Faculty Associate Awarded Kathleen Fitzpatrick Australian Laureate Fellowship

Pippa Norris, the Paul F. McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the Harvard Kennedy School, has been awarded the inaugural 2011 Kathleen Fitzpatrick Australian Laureate Fellowship by the Australian Research Council in recognition of her role in the humanities and social sciences.

The Kathleen Fitzpatrick Australian Laureate Fellowship provides funding for mentoring and recognition of excellence for women in the humanities and social sciences. A well-known public speaker and author of almost forty books, Norris’s research in comparative politics examines democratic institutions and culture, public opinion and elections, gender politics, and political communications.

Weatherhead Faculty Associate Chosen as Young Global Leader for 2011

Professor Gita Gopinath was recently chosen as one of the Young Global Leaders for 2011 by the World Economic Forum.

The Forum of Young Global Leaders consists of more than 700 exceptional young leaders, under age 40, who share a commitment to shaping the global future by serving society at large. They come from all regions of the world and represent business, government, civil society, arts and culture, academia and media, as well as social entrepreneurs.

Weatherhead Faculty Associate Awarded Medal of the City of Toulouse

Emma Rothschild, the Jeremy and Jane Knowles Professor of History and director of the Center for History and Economics, was awarded the Medal of the City of Toulouse on June 16, 2011, for her work on Adam Smith. Professor Rothschild is the author of Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment (Harvard University Press, 2001) with translations in Italian, Portuguese, and Chinese.

Weatherhead Faculty Associate Receives Bernardin Award

For over forty years, Father J. Bryan Hehir has been among the most distinguished and effective Catholic voices in the American public square. He currently serves the Archdiocese of Boston as secretary of health and social services. He is also the Parker Gilbert Montgomery Professor of the Practice in Religion and Public Life at the Harvard Kennedy School. His service in the past has been at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops where he was director of the Office of International Affairs and secretary for Social and Political Affairs. He has been president of Catholic Charities USA and counselor at Catholic Relief Services. For almost two decades, he taught at Georgetown University where most recently he was Distinguished Professor of Ethics and International Relations.

With deep appreciation for his extraordinary contributions to the life of the church and his longstanding and abiding commitment to fostering communion, the Catholic Common Ground Initiative bestowed its 2011 Cardinal Joseph Bernardin Award on Father J. Bryan Hehir.
Dignity: The Essential Role It Plays in Resolving Conflict
By Donna Hicks and foreword by Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu

The desire for dignity is universal and powerful. It is a motivating force behind all human interaction—in families, in communities, in the business world, and in relationships at the international level. When dignity is violated, the response is likely to involve aggression, even violence, hatred, and vengeance. On the other hand, when people treat one another with dignity, they become more connected and are able to create more meaningful relationships. Surprisingly, most people have little understanding of dignity, observes Donna Hicks in this important book. She examines the reasons for this gap and offers a new set of strategies for becoming aware of dignity’s vital role in our lives and learning to put dignity into practice in everyday life.

Drawing on her extensive experience in international conflict resolution and on insights from evolutionary biology, psychology, and neuroscience, the author explains what the elements of dignity are, how to recognize dignity violations, how to respond when we are not treated with dignity, how dignity can restore a broken relationship, why leaders must understand the concept of dignity, and more. Hicks shows that by choosing dignity as a way of life, we open the way to greater peace within ourselves and to a safer and more humane world for all.

(Yale University Press, 2011)

Weatherhead Center Associate Donna Hicks is the chair of the Herbert C. Kelman Seminar on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

The Inner Life of Empires: An Eighteenth-Century History
By Emma Rothschild

They were abolitionists, speculators, slave owners, government officials, and occasional politicians. They were observers of the anxieties and dramas of empire. And they were from one family. The Inner Life of Empires tells the intimate history of the Johnstones—four sisters and seven brothers who lived in Scotland and around the globe in the fast-changing eighteenth century. Piecing together their voyages, marriages, debts, and lawsuits, and examining their ideas, sentiments, and values, renowned historian Emma Rothschild illuminates a tumultuous period that created the modern economy, the British Empire, and the philosophical Enlightenment.

One of the sisters joined a rebel army, was imprisoned in Edinburgh Castle, and escaped in disguise in 1746. Her younger brother was a close friend of Adam Smith and David Hume. Another brother was fluent in Persian and Bengali, and married to a celebrated poet. He was the owner of a slave known only as “Bell or Be linda,” who journeyed from Calcutta to Virginia, was accused in Scotland of infanticide, and was the last person judged to be a slave by a court in the British Isles. In Grenada, India, Jamaica, and Florida, the Johnstones embodied the connections between European, American, and Asian empires. Their family history offers insights into a time when distinctions between the public and private, home and overseas, and slavery and servitude were in constant flux.

Based on multiple archives, documents, and letters, The Inner Life of Empires looks at one family’s complex story to describe the origins of the modern political, economic, and intellectual world.

(Princeton University Press, 2011)

Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Emma Rothschild is the director of the Center for History and Economics and the Jeremy and Jane Knowles Professor of History in the Department of History.

Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border
By Rachel St. John

Line in the Sand details the dramatic transformation of the western US-Mexico border from its creation at the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848 to the emergence of the modern boundary line in the first decades of the twentieth century. In this sweeping narrative, Rachel St. John explores how this boundary changed from a mere line on a map to a clearly marked and heavily regulated divide between the United States and Mexico. Focusing on the desert border to the west of the Rio Grande, this book explains the origins of the modern border and places the line at the center of a transnational history of expanding capitalism and state power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Moving across local, regional, and national scales, St. John shows how government officials, Native American raiders, ranchers, railroad builders, miners, investors, immigrants, and smugglers contributed to the rise of state power on the border and developed strategies to navigate the increasingly regulated landscape. Over the border’s history, the US and Mexican states gradually developed an expanding array of official laws, ad hoc arrangements, government agents, and physical barriers that did not close the line, but made it a flexible barrier that restricted the movement of some people, goods, and animals without impeding others. By the 1930s, their efforts had created the foundations of the modern border control apparatus.

Drawing on extensive research in US and Mexican archives, Line in the Sand weaves together a transnational history of how an undistinguished strip of land became the significant and symbolic space of state power and national definition that we know today.

(Princeton University Press, 2011)

Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate Rachel St. John is an associate professor of history in the Department of History.
Social Knowledge in the Making
Edited by Charles Camic, Neil Gross, and Michèle Lamont

Over the past quarter century, researchers have successfully explored the inner workings of the physical and biological sciences using a variety of social and historical lenses. Inspired by these advances, the contributors to Social Knowledge in the Making turn their attention to the social sciences, broadly construed. The result is the first comprehensive effort to study and understand the day-to-day activities involved in the creation of social–scientific and related forms of knowledge about the social world.

The essays collected here tackle a range of previously unexplored questions about the practices involved in the production, assessment, and use of diverse forms of social knowledge. A stellar cast of multidisciplinary scholars addresses topics such as the changing practices of historical research, anthropological data collection, library usage, peer review, and institutional review boards. Turning to the world beyond the academy, other essays focus on global banks, survey research organizations, and national security and economic policy makers. Social Knowledge in the Making is a landmark volume for a new field of inquiry, and the bold new research agenda it proposes will be welcomed in the social sciences, the humanities, and a broad range of nonacademic settings.

(University of Chicago Press, 2011)

The Enculturated Gene: Sickle Cell Health Politics and Biological Difference in West Africa
By Duana Fullwiley

In the 1980s, a research team led by Parisian scientists identified several unique DNA sequences, or haplotypes, linked to sickle cell anemia in African populations. After casual observations of how patients managed this painful blood disorder, the researchers in question postulated that the Senegalese type was less severe. The Enculturated Gene traces how this genetic discourse has blotted from view the roles that Senegalese patients and doctors have played in making sickle cell “mild” in a social setting where public health priorities and economic austerity programs have forced people to improvise informal strategies of care.

Duana Fullwiley shows how geneticists, who were fixated on population differences, never investigated the various modalities of self-care that people developed in this context of biomedical scarcity, and how local doctors, confronted with dire cuts in Senegal’s health sector, wittingly accepted the genetic prognosis of better-than-expected health outcomes. Unlike most genetic determinisms that highlight the absoluteness of disease, DNA haplotypes for sickle cell in Senegal did the opposite. As Fullwiley demonstrates, they allowed the condition to remain officially invisible, never to materialize as a health priority. At the same time, scientists’ attribution of a less severe form of Senegalese sickle cell to isolated DNA sequences closed off other explanations of this population’s measured biological success.

The Enculturated Gene reveals how the notion of an advantageous form of sickle cell in this part of West Africa has defined—and obscured—the nature of this illness in Senegal today.

(Princeton University Press, 2011)

The Resurgence of the Latin American Left
Edited by Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts

Latin America experienced an unprecedented wave of left-leaning governments between 1998 and 2010. This volume examines the causes of this leftward turn and the consequences it carries for the region in the twenty-first century.

The Resurgence of the Latin American Left asks three central questions: Why have left wing parties and candidates flourished in Latin America? How have these leftist parties governed, particularly in terms of social and economic policy? What effects has the rise of the Left had on democracy and development in the region? The book addresses these questions through two sections. The first looks at several major themes regarding the contemporary Latin American Left, including whether Latin American public opinion actually shifted leftward in the 2000s, why the Left won in some countries but not in others, and how the left turn has affected market economies, social welfare, popular participation in politics, and citizenship rights. The second section examines social and economic policy and regime trajectories in eight cases: those of leftist governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela, as well as that of a historically populist party that governed on the right in Peru.

Featuring a new typology of Left parties in Latin America, an original framework for identifying and categorizing variation among these governments, and contributions from prominent and influential scholars of Latin American politics, this historical–institutional approach to understanding the region’s left turn—and variation within it—is the most comprehensive explanation to date on the topic.

(The John Hopkins University Press, 2011)

Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate
Michèle Lamont is a member of both the Executive and Steering Committees, the Robert I. Goldman Professor of European Studies and professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology, and a professor of African and African American studies. Charles Camic is a professor of sociology at Northwestern University. Neil Gross is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of British Columbia.

Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate
Duana Fullwiley is an assistant professor of African and African American studies and of medical anthropology in the Department of Anthropology.

Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate
Steven Levitsky is a member of both the Executive and Steering Committees, and a professor of government in the Department of Government. Kenneth M. Roberts is a professor of government at Cornell University.
When You Don’t Know, Vote No (or, Why Public Opinion Matters)

Although public opinion is omnipresent in research on national democratic processes, we know much less about the determinants of public opinion about supranational policy (such as that of the EU, NAFTA, or UN). That is because there is usually little opinion to speak of. Citizens’ awareness of supranational policy tends to be low, because such sovereignty issues are complex, non-electoral, and, with few exceptions, insulated from everyday life in the home country. The Weatherhead Center’s Stanley Hoffman has called these matters “high politics.”

Given the scarcity of easily accessible links between citizens and supranational institutions, which are both geographically removed and organizationally opaque, citizens’ main sources of information about supranational policy are national. Party platforms, which pay increasing attention to supranational governance, are among the main channels through which citizens receive information about supranational policy. By contrast, in matters of high impact on everyday life (such as unemployment, health, or welfare), citizens typically have informed and clear preferences, which guide national electoral competition. But the connections between supranational policy, parties, and public opinion are insufficiently explicated—even in the European Union, which has long been the most integrated supranational polity, complete with a 40-year-old repository of public opinion—the Eurobarometer survey. And today, when many indebted countries’ economic fate is decided by the EU’s “rescue policies,” and when referenda on these policies (such as the one narrowly avoided in Greece) could sink the entire world more deeply into economic turmoil, it is particularly important to understand the formation of public opinion on supranational policy.

EU integration is often cited as the quintessential “high politics” area, because it is associated with notoriously low levels of public awareness. Yet, lack of awareness does not necessarily mean lack of opinion; citizens are somehow still able to form and express clear opinions on EU integration, sometimes with significant consequences. An example was the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French, Dutch, and Irish referenda in 2005 and 2008, when citizens voted “no” without being fully aware of the content and implications of the 250-page treaty. In fact, 22 percent of the Irish voted “no” precisely because they were reluctant to accept something so unfamiliar (Flash Eurobarometer 245).

Why vote “no” when you don’t know? Where do opinions come from in lack of information? To what extent do national party positions influence public opinion on supranational policy? And what implications does this influence have on Europeans’ input to political integration in the EU?

By “political integration” I refer to the delegation of policy competence to the EU. It is a highly debated topic among national parties, which are concerned with the impact of political integration on national diplomatic identity (e.g., foreign policy), national security (e.g., asylum policy), or industrial development (e.g., environmental policy). Since these policies are not at the forefront of citizens’ concerns, they should reveal whether citizens look to parties for cues about what to think.

Citizens’ political attitudes are often derived from general ideologies, approximated by the left/right political continuum. As points on this continuum, party positions thus provide a link between these general ideologies and supranational political issues. Thus, EU politics are not only “high politics,” but also “mediated politics,” which have public resonance only if national parties pick them up. And, given that most governing parties support EU integration at least moderately—and after 60 years of integration, it has become politically incorrect not to support it—the positions of those that do not stand out, and their clear Euro-skepticism is easy for citizens to follow—as opposed to an amorphous mass of pro-EU platforms. During the Constitutional Referendum, 68 percent of Irish voters found the “no” campaign more convincing. Today, the financial crisis provides an ideal platform for parties to blame the EU’s policy sluggishness for harsh national austerity measures (see Greece) or simply to boost existing anti-EU tendencies (see the increasingly Euro-skeptic governments and publics in the UK or Poland). Euro-skepticism is vocal and determined because they support vocal and determined parties.

But studies rarely explore party influence on public opinion, focusing instead on sociodemographic determinants like age, education, and occupation. Indeed, voters’ interests are usually aligned to their socioeconomic situations, but in “high politics” it is unclear how a certain issue would relate to someone’s socioeconomic situation. What exact implication does the Lisbon Treaty (a revised and “milder” version of the Constitutional Treaty) have on female students aged 18-24? It is difficult to tell. And yet, these are the most likely to be opposed to it (Flash Eurobarometer 284). The connection between EU integration and socioeconomic identity is politically constructed. Moreover, researchers tend to study public opinion when it is informed, strong, and/or varied enough to yield interesting findings. This means that “high politics” are missing from the sample of is-
issues studied—although they provide more insight into the party-public opinion link.

“High Politics”

To illustrate the arguments above, I look at foreign and security policy, environmental policy, and asylum policy. These span the spectrum of EU competence and public approval. Environmental policy is decided supranationally and has primacy over national regulations. A constant EU priority, it is one of the most visible issues in daily life (the eco-friendly campaigns are hard to miss), and one that citizens tend to support. Foreign policy is decided intergovernmentally, with EU recommendations but with no EU law. It is a source of criticism toward the EU, which does not have a unified diplomatic personality to act effectively on the international scene (as seen during the war in Iraq). However, The Lisbon Treaty addressed this issue by reinforcing the role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by consolidating the EU’s army corps. Finally, asylum policy is decided exclusively by the member states. An EU asylum policy is unpopular in both EU border countries, that would have to guard the EU’s “gates,” and on countries inside the EU whose borders would become open to any asylum grantees.

Combining data on public opinion from the Eurobarometer survey with data on parties from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys, I assess the effects of party positions on the opinion of their supporters between 1999 and 2006. These data confirm that foreign, environmental, and asylum policy are all “high politics,” with low public salience and awareness. First, few Europeans place one of the three policies among the most important issues faced by their country. Foreign affairs are the least salient policy domain, with around 2 percent of respondents having mentioned it in the past seven years; environmental policy is next, mentioned by 2–7 percent of respondents. Immigration is the most salient of the three policies, mentioned by 9–21 percent of respondents, though data was not available on asylum policy specifically. By contrast, the economic situation and unemployment are considered much more important by most respondents—particularly now.

Levels of awareness about the three policies are also generally lower than those for areas with more immediate consequences for daily life, such as the health, welfare, or employment. Europeans seem to know least about foreign policy, and most about environmental policy, although the levels of awareness are likely lower in reality.
Follow the Party

Since foreign, asylum and environmental policy are “high politics,” public opinion on these policies should follow party positions. In several statistical models, I measured the effect of party position on public opinion over time and across countries. I also took into account socioeconomic variables (e.g., knowledge about the EU, occupation, education, utilitarian or affective attachment to the EU) and party-level variables (e.g., importance of EU integration on platform, internal dissent, and position in government).

Party positions generally have the strongest and most significant effect on public opinion on foreign policy, followed by asylum policy, where significance is rarer, and by environmental policy, where significance never occurred. For instance, an increase of 1 percent in a party’s support for an EU foreign policy increases by 0.4 percent its voters’ support of this policy. However, none of the socioeconomic controls has constantly significant effects. Not surprisingly, parties at the extreme left and right are less likely to support an EU-level foreign policy.

The key finding here is that the size of the effects of party positions on public opinion varies indirectly with the salience and awareness of these policies (i.e., the “height of the politics”). The strongest effect is for foreign policy, an intergovernmental policy with the lowest salience and awareness among the three. The weakest effect of party positions is for environmental policy, a supranational policy with the highest awareness among the three. Thus, the “higher” the politics and the more intergovernmental (i.e., with mixed EU-national jurisdiction) an issue is, the stronger the effect of party positions. This proposition does not hold for the effect of any of the other public or party-level variables.

Thus, despite the EU’s sustained efforts to overcome its alleged democratic deficit by informing citizens and by tracking their attitudes about its polity, political integration remains a domain of “high politics,” about which citizens know little and care even less. And yet, they form and express opinions sometimes strong enough to stop it. But the content and evolution of these opinions seem to have less to do with increased awareness or critical judgment and more with the position of the party one supports, which offers a convenient and quick proxy for opinion formation (a more reliable and systematic proxy than sociodemographic variables).

This has clear implications for the way in which citizens participate in deliberation and decision making at the EU level. First, it shows that supranational policy is filtered through national party politics—not citizens, but parties determine the outcome of publicly evaluated decisions on supranational policy. This is why attempts to overcome the democratic deficit through referenda—such as the ones on the Constitution—backfire into “protest votes” more related to national electoral competition than to the EU. The EU’s failure to communicate directly to its citizens is not corrected, but evidenced by referenda. Second, public opinion follows the parties with the

Figure 3. Change in % of supporters who approve of an EU-level policy with a 1% increase in party approval for that EU-level policy. Circles indicate significance at the .05 level. Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer file updated for the IntUne project by Georgios Xezonakis for David Sanders and Gabor Toka.
Photos: Events

Samuel L. and Elizabeth Jodidi Lecture

“Islam and Peace-Building in West Africa”
Delivered on October 3, 2011, by
Alhaji Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar III
Sultan of Sokoto, Nigeria

The Sultan of Sokoto is the religious leader of Nigeria’s Muslim community, which consists of approximately half of the country’s nearly 160 million inhabitants, and of millions of Muslims in adjoining countries in West Africa. He serves Nigeria as president-general of the National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs. His role continues the leadership of the Sokoto Caliphate that unified the region under Islamic law in the early nineteenth century.

This lecture was presented in partnership with the Harvard Divinity School.

His Eminence Alhaji Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto delivers the Samuel L. and Elizabeth Jodidi Lecture, “Islam and Peace-Building in West Africa” Photo credits: Kris Snibbe/Harvard Staff Photographer (top and bottom left); Megan Countey (bottom right)

The Jodidi Lecture is among the most prominent annual lecture series of the Weatherhead Center and one of the most distinguished at the University. Established in 1955, the lecture series provides for the “delivery of lectures by eminent and well-qualified persons...for the promotion of tolerance, understanding and good will among nations, and the peace of the world.”

WATCH THIS AND OTHER WCFIA LECTURES ON OUR VIMEO CHANNEL
HTTP://WWW.VIMEO.COM/CHANNELS/WCFIA
Educational expansion is one of the most visible, durable, and influential features of modern society. In many countries, there is a widespread tendency of increasing school enrollment across time. Such a process has provided not only more educational opportunity to students, but also more skilled labor force. What are the consequences of educational expansion with regard to education-based inequality and mobility? Particularly, does educational expansion weaken the effects of family background on educational and occupational attainment?

Conventional wisdom might suggest “yes” in both respects. With long-term growth of school enrollments, it was once believed that education becomes an increasingly important mechanism for the transmission of social status. That is, along the process of technological advances and economic development, there tends to be greater equality of opportunity with respect to both educational and occupational attainment. In other words, people’s educational achievements would gradually become independent of their family background; when controlling for education, the association between family background and occupational status would also decline over time.

Empirical findings, nonetheless, do not support such claims. Between family background and educational attainment, scholars report a general pattern of “persistent inequality” of educational attainment in most industrial societies. With few exceptions such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany in which declining educational inequality is found, the impact of family background on schooling is highly stable across time in many industrial countries. Similarly, on the association between family background and occupational attainment, again, research shows that there is a high degree of temporal stability and broad cross-national commonality in a variety of industrial societies. Although significant deviations from these general patterns do appear, changes tend to be slow over time in these industrial societies.

However, in other societies where dramatic social and political changes take place, the results are different from the general patterns observed mainly in industrial societies. For instance, in Soviet-era Russia, where state policy played a strong role, there was a strengthening effect of family background on access to university. Likewise, in the tumultuous late-Soviet and post-Soviet years, when political chaos and economic crisis in Russia quickly changed school enrollment, the magnitude of family background differentials in access to academic secondary schools increased. Furthermore, during Russia’s market transition, the effects of family background on occupational attainment were enlarging, and a pattern of tightening-up social mobility is documented. In China, recent observations suggest the role of family background on educational attainment is growing in certain ways.

By comparing the different results, it is then interesting to ask: Why is there a pattern of largely persistent associations between family background and educational/occupational attainment in most industrial societies, whereas in societies like Russia and China, strengthening associations are found in these aspects? In my dissertation, I address this empirical puzzle by investigating how educational expansion affects the patterns of education-based inequality and mobility in China’s last three decades.

Maocan Guo is a Weatherhead Center Graduate Student Associate and a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology. His research focuses on educational expansion and social inequality in the labor market.

Figure 1: National Statistics of Transition Rates, by Level.
Educational Expansion in China’s Reform Period

Over the past three decades, China has successfully liberalized its planned economy and experienced a high rate of economic growth. Along with this process, China expanded on education at all levels. In 1980, the Chinese government set the target of universalizing primary education by the end of the 1980s. In the mid-1980s, the government released two policy documents requiring all children to complete nine years of compulsory education. With increases in educational resources, these goals were largely achieved by the mid-1990s.

Educational expansion at the upper secondary level was much slower. The rate of transition to senior high school, given the completion of junior high school, experienced an initial sharp drop from about 40 percent in the early 1980s to around 20 percent in the early 1990s, and remained relatively stable in the 1990s. The only discernable expansion at the senior high school level seemed to start from 1999: the transition rate went from 24.93 percent in 1995 to 42.24 percent in 2006, namely, increasing by 69.4 percent in just seven years.

The expansion at the college level was even more striking. As Figure 1 shows, the rate of transition to college upon completion of senior high school grew from 5.74 percent in 1982 to nearly 35 percent in 1992; since 1993, however, the transition rate had increased less than 7 percent by 1998. Yet, starting from 1999, the rate has dramatically increased, jumping from 46.1 percent in 1998 to 63.8 percent in 1999 and to 83.5 percent in 2002. In the following four years, the rate decreased a little but still remained as high as 75 percent. From 1999 to 2006, the number of newly-admitted college students increased by about four times.

The relatively quick growth in senior high school education and the radical expansion in higher education in such a short a time (since 1999) was exactly the intended result of the government’s new policy launched in 1999. In January of that year, the minister of education of the PRC formally released a policy document aiming to enlarge the coverage of upper secondary level and tertiary level education. Because of the policy, the government increased the target number of school enrollment year by year, resulting in a larger and larger body of college students in subsequent years.

Along with the official intention to make tertiary education more available to the youth, there was a sharp simultaneous state-designed increase in the cost of college since 1999, which was to “marketize higher education.” In the 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese college education was mainly funded by the government—being almost free. Starting in 1994, a small amount of money was charged to all college attendants as tuition and fees. Since 1999, however, college tuition has increased by twice or even three to four times, with its amount at least comparable to the average income per capita for the urban residents, but much higher for rural people.

Because of these changes, China’s educational system in the reform-era has two notable structural and institutional features that differ significantly from those in most industrial societies. First, there is a bottleneck structure in school enrollment, with the increase in the rate of transition to senior high school failing to follow the increase in the rate of college transition. As shown in Figure 1, the probability of transition to college was higher than the transition to senior high school since the mid-1980s, and the gap between the two probabilities increased over time, particularly after 1999. Second, recent educational expansion in China (especially since 1999) went through increasing educational cost at the college level, which is seldom the case in previous comparative studies of education-based inequality and mobility.

China in Transition: Increasing Educational Inequality, Less Social Mobility

What are the consequences of China’s educational expansion given the important structural and institutional features in the educational system? Can we expect a similar pattern of persistent inequality and stable mobility in China, as compared to industrial societies? My empirical analyses suggest that in many cases China presents a different set of patterns that can shed light for comparative studies.

First, urban–rural and class differentials with regard to access to senior high school increased in the 1990s. After 1999, when expansion of senior high school education occurred, such differentials decreased. I also find that after 1999, when higher education was radically expanded and largely marketized, urban–rural inequality in the transition to college increased, and a father’s class status began to play a more significant role in determining one’s likelihood of entering college. As a result, the rapid expansion of higher education in China since 1999 mainly helped urban children and children from better-off families. In contrast, in spite of the overall increasing college opportunity, children from rural families experienced a drop in the transition rate in access to higher education. For them, it was not that they “benefited less” from the dramatic expansion of college opportunities, but they did not benefit much at all. As Figure 2 illustrates, the cumulative probability of transition from primary school to college for rural children is rather stable since the late 1990s.

Second, compared to the 1980s, a father’s occupation was a more important determinant for a son’s occupational attainment in the 1990s, controlling for education. The parameter of intergenerational class immobility is highest since the late 1990s, suggesting even less social mobility under the rapid educational expansion starting from 1999. Rural children, again, were worse off in recent years. Compared to their urban counterparts, their chances of using education for social upward mobility were limited most since the late 1990s. Empirical analysis shows that the association parameter between education and current occupation for rural people is the highest in the 1980s, but...
Explaining the Chinese Pattern: Why is China Different?

How to interpret the Chinese pattern? Why is it different from the general patterns observed in many industrial societies? To achieve a compressive understanding of the differences, I initiate a theoretical framework to integrate the existing theoretical accounts and results. The framework has three components. The first component is the mobility strategies adopted by different classes. This part sets up the foundation for a micro-based behavioral model in which we can observe whether different classes’ strategies tend to converge or diverge under educational expansion. The second component is the structural and institutional features in the educational system. They represent the scope conditions that restrict class mobility strategy and behavior. The third component is the sociopolitical institutional context, which is particularly about how the state affects the organization of the education system and class structure. In my view, analyzing the interactions between the three components provides a way to interpret how educational expansion affects educational and occupational attainment.

Specifically, when educational expansion happens, if there is a reduction of class differentials in the relative affordability of education and/or in the cognitive ability and educational aspiration, we should naturally expect that the mobility strategies of different classes are inclined to be similar. That is because in this situation education may be as affordable to the lower class as to the higher class, and the risk of maximizing educational attainment downgrades for the lower class. This is exactly the case in many industrial societies where educational opportunity is widely provided and educational cost is uniformly declined. In these societies, education is relatively easy to access and the risk of educational failure weakens. This explains why we find educational inequalities to be stable or declining in these societies.

On the contrary, if a society’s educational opportunity is increasing but inadequate and if educational cost is rising at the same time, the lower class’s mobility strategies tend to be constrained by their relative ability to afford education and the risk of continuing education. Because educational cost is increasing, education becomes relatively more difficult to afford for the lower class than for the higher class. Because the risk of educational attainment and subsequent job placement can grow with the increasing educational cost, any selection barrier in the educational system tends to prevent a relatively higher proportion of children from the lower class than from the higher class for further education. If this is the case, the mobility strategy for the lower class tends to diverge from the higher class under educational expansion, and education-based inequalities should strengthen.

This is what happens in reforming China. Recent educational expansion in China pushes class differentials in the relative affordability of education to rise, and drives the most selective process in the educational system from the college level to the senior higher school level. These institutional and structural changes reinforce the importance of class-based social resources in educational attainment. They also enhance class differentials in the cognitive ability at the senior high school level because the barrier of selection at this level stops a higher proportion of qualified children from the lower class than from the higher class. Combining these factors, I argue that China’s particular features in the educational institution (rising educational cost) and educational opportunity structure (the bottleneck structure, i.e., early selection bias at the senior high school level) help to explain why the Chinese pattern is rare in the field.

However, it should be noted that the institutional and structural features in China’s educational system are produced by political intervention in a short period of time. In China, the state has a strong tendency to intervene educational expansion through its control over school enrollment and educational cost, which can suddenly change the prospects of educational attainment. In contrast, in many industrial societies, the educational system has gradually expanded over a long time, and state intervention during the process of educational expansion is not as apparent as in China. Based on these considerations, I also incorporate the dimension of sociopolitical institutions into my theoretical framework.
Global history is one of the leading new approaches in recent years that has helped to transform the study of the past. The contemporary trends summarized under the term globalization have lent urgency to research that examines historical processes, networks, identities, and events across the boundaries of the nation states that traditionally served as the privileged framework for much of the discipline. Historians worldwide have contributed to exciting research on the trends that so many societies have undergone together—whether economic and demographic, religious and cultural, or political and military. In the process, global history has drawn on the expertise of political scientists, sociologists, art historians, economists, anthropologists, and others.

Harvard University has among the greatest concentrations of scholars anywhere who are interested in this approach to the study of the human past. At the same time, the study of global history at the University lacks any programmatic cohesion and profile as a field. This fall, Sven Beckert, Laird Bell Professor of History, and Charles Maier, Leverett Saltonstall Professor of History, with the encouragement of Beth Simmons, Weatherhead Center director, have taken the initiative to create what they hope will be an institutional framework for global history at Harvard. Their goal is to make Harvard one of the world’s leading centers for research and teaching in global history.

The Weatherhead Center has been instrumental in launching the Weatherhead Initiative on Global History (WIGH) as the first of its planned “research clusters” designed to build on and focus its faculty associates’ leadership in new directions for international study. The Center has provided funding for a three-year program and will be the institutional home for the program. As co-directors, Professors Beckert and Maier will organize a steering committee among the many faculty in history and the social sciences who have already expressed interest in the new initiative and will also seek to raise outside support so that it can continue on a long-term basis. In the current academic year, they are organizing a steering committee; scheduling a spring-term workshop, including notable global historians from outside the University, to survey approaches and areas for research; and providing grants to support student summer research travel. During subsequent years, they will inaugurate an ongoing seminar in global history, hold the first of a planned series of annual conferences, each built around a major integrative theme—for year one, perhaps the global history of agriculture—expand the predoctoral fellowship program, and begin a competition for year-long postdoctoral scholarshipships. The first postdoctoral scholars will arrive in the fall of 2013. The Weatherhead Initiative on Global History also plans to develop undergraduate courses in global history.

Envisaged as well is the negotiation of strategic partnerships with leading centers for global history abroad in Africa, South and East Asia, Latin America, and Europe. Embedding the Weatherhead Initiative on Global History in a network of like-minded institutions around the globe will insert Harvard students and scholars into the networks of research on global history and provide bases for their research sojourns abroad. Global history is in fact a global activity, and with the Weatherhead Initiative to focus its own contributions, Harvard can play a key role in helping to shape this cooperative endeavor.

Continued from page 8

Loudest and clearest positions—and these are often those that are critical of EU integration. Thus, the EU’s democratic deficit leaves ample room for Euroskepticism.

The normative implications of these findings for the functioning of the EU (or for any supranational polity that aims to reach the EU’s level of integration) are also clear. First, EU policymakers should find a more effective way to communicate with national parties, especially in matters of “high politics.” The half-empty EU parliamentary sessions attended mostly by those detached from national politics do not seem to be effective channels for this dialogue. Second, EU policymakers should use party positions as a vehicle for reaching out to citizens. Finally, referenda—such as the one recently proposed by the Tories regarding the UK’s leaving the EU or by Greek Prime Minister Papandreou regarding his country’s accepting the debt deal or leaving the eurozone—should occur only if and when citizens know and care enough about the EU to vote about the EU, not about national politics. During a complex eurozone crisis which could end in either fiscal union or economic disintegration, citizens will focus on keeping their jobs and defer to parties for selecting macroeconomic plans to save the EU economy—and parties turn EU policy into national politics.

NOTES
Undergraduate Researchers in the Field

Nineteen Harvard College students received summer travel grants from the Weatherhead Center to support their thesis research on topics related to international affairs. Since their return in August, the Weatherhead Center has encouraged these Undergraduate Associates to take advantage of the Center’s research environment. During the 2012 spring semester, the students will present their research in a conference (February 9–11, 2012) that is open to the Harvard community. Four Undergraduate Associates write of their experiences in the field:

Sharon Kim
Anthropology
Williams/Lodge International Government and Public Affairs Research Fellow
Traveled to Cambodia to conduct fieldwork research at the Tuol Sleng Genocidal Museum

This summer, with support from the Weatherhead Center of International Affairs, I was able to spend nine weeks in Phnom, Cambodia, interning with the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) and conducting fieldwork research at the Tuol Sleng Genocidal Museum. I had the freedom to visit the museum and conduct interviews with foreign tourists, look through photographs and prisoners’ confession records, go on tours with the museum staff, and meet with the director and deputy-director.

The museum was first opened in 1980 as a tool of political propaganda by the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), the successor regime of the Khmer Rouge, to demonize the Pol Pot-Leng Sary’s clique while highlighting its own role in the nation’s liberation. The exhibits that had been placed at that time—the victims’ mug shots and their clothes, torture materials, paintings by former survivor Vann Nath—all came together to present a demonized narrative against the Khmer Rouge regime, for the state to govern the historical narrative of what should be remembered or forgotten—when such discourses will occur and on what terms. This is significant because the displays have remained the same throughout the years—mug shots used by the state in asserting its own authority upon the population and legitimating its means of governance.

There will be two parts to my research. First, I will focus on how the Cambodian state uses the Tuol Sleng Museum, a public commemorative site, in constructing a certain kind of social memory for both the local communities and the international public. And second, I will place the site in a broader context of discourse concerning international tourism and political economy, to study how trauma and memory have become politicized and commodified. It is important to note that the museum, as it stands today, misses its local audience. The local residents do not care to visit the museum, even when admission is free. The older generation does not see the point of re-experiencing the pain they had suffered in the past, while the younger generation is more interested in development and modernization. Furthermore, the Cambodian state refused to incorporate Khmer Rouge history into the school curricula because the issues are highly politicized and some current officials are former members of the Khmer Rouge. As a result, many students do not know that the genocide occurred or do not believe the stories their parents tell them regarding that period.

I was absolutely captivated by the people I met along the way: Former genocide victims and their inability to forgive and forget but having to move on, their endless search for missing relatives and friends, and their desire to create a memorial so that the dead can be remembered and honored. Former Khmer Rouge perpetrators and their notions of victimhood, the discrimination they face in their own communities, their desire for national development and amnesia. “Memory culture” organizations with staff who have dedicated most of their time in searching and documenting the truth, seeking a means for national reconciliation, existing as the bridge between the victims and the perpetrators.

The biggest concern I had during the fieldwork was connecting reality to theory: How could the experiences of victims, perpetrators, tour guides, and visitors support or negate the notion of a museum as a power-legitimating, memory-managing institution? But eventually, I learned that I had the process in reverse—nothing should be more important than the individual and the narrative he wished to tell.

It was about immersion, taking part in interactions that are deeply open and personal, going beyond judgments based on temporary facial expressions or outward appearances. The fact that Cambodians respond in initial social interactions with a smile does not necessarily mean that this gesture serves as a coping mechanism for trauma, as some scholars suggest. Nor do such reactions necessarily show the loving nature of Cambodian people, as tourists would like to assert. Certainly, the smiling housekeeper at DC-Cam reminds me of my mom who greets me with a bear hug when I return home for the holidays; but, there is also the moto-driver who had greeted my friends and me with a smile, only to steal my friend’s purse and leave her vulnerable and confused.

As I proceed with my thesis, I hope to do justice to the people I met and interacted with, the people who have made me made me into a better individual and scholar.
The ten weeks that I spent traveling and researching in Peru this summer, were by far the most stimulating, challenging, thought-invoking, and character-building weeks of my life. I stepped off the plane in Lima and was quickly faced with a taste of the bustling, almost erratic energy that filled this city, as well as the political tension that permeated the country as a whole. The airport was closed due to a polarizing presidential election occurring the night I arrived in the country, and the waiting area was eerily empty.

While driving to my apartment that night, I saw restless groups forming in the poor outskirts of Lima, only to quickly break apart. But as I moved into Lima's wealthier areas, the streets became quiet again. Perhaps its inhabitants were sitting in front of their television sets or their radios, waiting with bated breath for election results, which could have large repercussions for Peru's fragile period of economic growth.

My first days in Lima went like a blur. I was faced with new sights and sounds, and I had one of the most diverse and exquisite culinary experiences of my life. Each day I had numerous adventures, ranging from hang-gliding over the Pacific to haggling with clever taxi drivers. In the midst of it all, I prepared to leave the city and travel to remote regions of Peru and begin my research on the role of NGOs working on education projects in those areas. Before I knew it I was on a bus, beginning a ten-hour drive to my first research site.

By the end of my summer, I had conducted nearly 100 interviews with schoolteachers, NGO workers, community leaders, parents, farmers, government workers, politicians, and bureaucrats. I learned what it meant to live and breathe research. I would wake up at 5 o'clock in the morning to take a bus and drive for over one hour to a small village where I would spend the day interviewing. I would often not return home until 7 or 8 p.m. I was both surprised and heartened by the warm welcome I received in the villages and in the schools. I was caught off guard by how people—politicians and schoolteachers alike—were willing to be interviewed and to share their experiences with me. Most of all, I was touched by the generosity and true kindness I felt from the communities I visited.

My time in Peru helped me realize how much people and my own research meant to me. During my sixth week in Peru, I was rushed to the emergency room due to sudden and severe respiratory problems. Hours after I was admitted to the hospital, with an IV drip pumping liquid into my veins and an oxygen mask over my nose, I was told that I suffered from high-altitude edema and would have to abort my research and return to the United States immediately. I was devastated. For the first time since I can remember, I cried openly and inconsolably like a child. The only thought going through my mind was, “not yet!” I could not go home, not yet. In my mind I could see the faces of all the farmers, teachers, and community leaders that I had met during my interviews. I could not give up on them. Nor could I give up on the chance to look for solutions stemming from within their own communities.

The doctors conducted more tests and I was diagnosed not with edema, but with pneumonia—which meant I could stay. I could continue my research, even if it was from a hospital bed. I convinced co-workers to bring interviewees to my hospital room. I remember the puzzled look on the nurses’ faces as politicians in business suits came in one by one and sat at my bedside, as I sat propped up on my bed in nothing more than a hospital gown, holding a recorder between us.

I will never forget my experience in that hospital room or the time I spent in Peru. I believe that because of this wealth of challenging and character-building experiences, I left Peru a better, stronger person than when I first arrived. I felt that I had accomplished more than I would have ever imagined, not only in my thesis research, but also in terms of my own personal development.
This summer, as part of my social-engagement thesis in the Department of African Studies and Social Studies, I implemented and evaluated an arts-literature project in an impoverished high school in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. I trained six teachers and four artists on how to teach literature through the arts, including fine arts, music, poetry, and dance. The purpose of pairing teachers with the professional artists was to allow the pair to work together to combine quality creative activities with genuine literature and pedagogical substance. The teachers and artists then taught approximately seventy students for ten weeks in an after-school program at Nkulumane High School. Using Chinua Achebe’s work, *Things Fall Apart*, as their foundational text, students painted scenes from the book, wrote poems about characters and themes, dramatized scenes, and interpreted character movements though dance. At the end of the program, the school held a one-day showcase where the students performed and showcased their pieces of work to parents, teachers, community members, and officials from the Ministry of Education.

This project was adopted from Harvard Professor Doris Sommer’s literacy model, “Pre-texts for Arts” which she implemented in the US, Colombia, and Mexico. The reason I chose to implement this program specifically in Zimbabwe was twofold. Firstly, I wanted to give the students in this poor, high-density area an opportunity to explore the arts; for many of the students, this program was their first formal exposure to arts. The second, more academic reason I implemented this project, was to answer the research question how a student-learning centered program such as this would contrast or change the current rote-learning and highly disciplinarian teaching methods used in the Zimbabwean education system. In particular, I tested student reading enjoyment levels before and after the program, and I also did pre- and post-program interviews with the teachers, students, and artists. My hypothesis was that the program would give the students an opportunity to learn from one another, to be creative, and to develop critical thinking skills in addition to understanding that reading can be fun. It would differ drastically from the regular classroom situation in which rote-learning bored the students and corporal punishment made them afraid to ask questions and shamed them in front of their peers. Having personally been through the Zimbabwean education system and experienced corporal punishment and rote-memorization teaching methods for 15 years of my life, this project challenged me to question the entire education system and think analytically about student experiences, in addition to my own.

As the school term was coming to an end, the teachers sat me down and told me that they did not believe that these impoverished students would have any incentive to attend the program during the school holidays. The teachers were therefore surprised when the 35 students attended three two- to three-hour sessions a week for three weeks. The students also became actively involved with organizing the showcase that was planned for the end of the program. Two weeks before the show, the students assembled themselves for an extra two hours a day, perfecting the artwork, poetry, dramas, and dances they had been working on throughout the program.

Through my ethnographic recordings and interviews, as the program progressed I began to realize that just as teachers had underestimated the eagerness of the students to learn through arts, they had also underestimated students’ learning capacity, creativity, and personal talents. In the post-program interviews, one teacher stated, “Pupils have got so much talent that is lying idle and does not come out in the classroom. I think these students are more open-minded and expressive. They are also able to analyze the content that they are given. This program made me realize how talented our students are. None of their talents are put to good use with the lecture methods we use in our classroom.”

In terms of my own personal experiences and growth, this program challenged me to think critically about the role of education in society as well as implementing community-development projects. I loved working with the teachers, artists, and students. It was a wonderful feeling to watch their increasing communication and eventual ownership of the project throughout my ten weeks.

The school has since decided to keep the after-school program running, and the Ministry of Education’s Culture and Arts wing has created a seven-member committee, including four of the six teachers, to expand the project to other schools in the district.
For my summer research, I was based in South Africa where I studied how NGOs and the South African government have addressed HIV/AIDS in marginalized sexuality groups with a focus on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people, sex workers, and straight-identified men who have sex with men (MSM). Over the course of the summer, I interviewed activists, clinic workers, government leaders, and educators about the ways in which these marginalized groups have been included (or not) in HIV/AIDS advocacy and how pressure from international funding bodies (such as the United States and United Nations) have influenced the approach taken to addressing “controversial” sexual practices.

I became interested in this topic when I learned about what the US conservatism built into programs like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). I was frustrated to learn that programs receiving funding from PEPFAR were restricted to abstinence-based education and forbidden from openly aiding sex workers. Because my interest was initially so politically charged, I started my project with some significant biases. After I received no responses to my first round of e-mails and calls for interviews, I realized I would have to correct these biases if I was going to have more productive interviews—especially when it came to talking about the politics of funding.

However, what I discovered was that a majority of organizations shared my same distaste for the ideological power America and Europe had in HIV/AIDS funding. All the organizations knew the famous “ABC” method well (Abstinence, Be Faithful, Condomize), but, more importantly, knew the “A” and, to an extent, the “B” to be ineffective (at least in regards to my populations of interest). While it is well known that multiple concurrent partnerships are the leading cause of HIV transmission in South Africa, the problem remains that it doesn’t do much good to preach to a sex worker or a married MSM to “be faithful.” Their needs, when it comes to HIV/AIDS prevention, fall far outside the accepted language and approaches, and it does not seem much is being done to fix this besides handing out condoms anywhere and everywhere.

While my initial hypothesis was that programs like PEPFAR were trying to fit a square peg into a round hole, the new “un-biased me” wanted to figure out what shape that hole actually was. What I discovered was that once a nation becomes overcome by an epidemic such as HIV, it is forced to start talking openly about sex. I was shocked and impressed by how frankly people discuss sexuality and how honestly it is portrayed on TV and other media. What the US and UN need to put money into is to find out why people are not doing what they know they should. The fact that South Africa still has the largest number of persons living with HIV/AIDS in the world means that the country still has a lot of work to do, but they also deserve credit for the things they are trying to do right.

One of the biggest lessons I learned over the course of this research experience was the importance of language, both the language used to talk about HIV/AIDS, sex, and sexuality in South Africa, and the language I use as a researcher to talk to people about these sensitive topics. Because HIV/AIDS is so intrinsically tied to sex and sexuality (always sensitive topics), it requires careful consideration of the language to use. At least within the world of NGOs and government organizations, political correctness was huge. In one interview, I received a very intense scolding from the head of the South African National AIDS Council for using the acronym LGBTQ in an email. Apparently, “queer” is not appropriate to use in South Africa as it is in the US.

As I sort through interviews and research materials, I am finding the topic of language to be incredibly interesting, especially in a comparative sense to the language used in US-based health programs. Through legislation and the equal-rights clause of the Constitution, sexuality itself has become a much politicized topic. I am interested in exploring this politicization and the way sexuality has become constructed and discussed in policy and in the culture of urban South Africa.
During their year at the Weatherhead Center, WCFIA Fellows conduct research and produce a paper. As senior-level practitioners of international affairs—diplomats, military officers, journalists, representatives of NGOs, and others—they bring their professional experience to bear in designing and implementing a research project. For some, their studies result from many years of professional work in a particular area and on specific issues; for others, the research question they ask is something they have thought about for a long time. Many of these papers have been published in journals both here and in the Fellows’ home countries. Still, other Fellows take the work that they began at the Center and produce books or dissertations in pursuit of PhDs. We are pleased to mention here just a few of the many studies that Fellows have produced since the Program’s founding in 1958 and which have had a significant influence on both scholars and practitioners.

For a complete list of Fellows’ research papers and other publications, please contact Kathleen Molony, director, Fellows Program. Papers are also available http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers/index.htm

Sir Crispin Tickell, a British diplomat, arrived at Harvard in the fall of 1975 with only a general idea of the topic he wished to pursue as a Fellow. By the time he left in the spring, he had produced a paper on climate change, one of the earliest on this important topic, and one that would subsequently influence generations of scholars and policymakers. In Climatic Change and World Affairs, first published by the Center for International Affairs in 1977 and revised in 1984, Tickell noted that, among the many causes of climate change, human beings bore some responsibility. He suggested, moreover, that the time had come to monitor the changes to the earth’s climate, even though the climate had been changing for hundreds of thousands of years. He recognized that achieving coordination among countries in dealing with the deleterious effects of climate change, whether warming or cooling, would not be easy. Even so, he argued, it was necessary for countries to use their power and leverage to support an international system of agreements.

Cameron Hume had spent three years with the US Mission to the United Nations as a regional affairs expert for the Middle East. As a Fellow, he decided to write something based on his UN experience, and he produced a paper, and subsequently a book, on the Iran-Iraq War. In his 1994 book, The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed (Indiana University Press), Hume examined how the UN Security Council changed over time, becoming by the late 1980s an effective body for settling regional disputes—in this case, the decades-long series of conflicts between Iran and Iraq. His is a carefully and well-documented account of how the Security Council evolved steadily from its very early days as a place where diplomats engaged in boisterous arguments to an early post-Cold War era characterized by a greater amount of agreement and, most importantly, diplomacy. Hume saw the Kuwait crisis as an important turning point, as it helped to transform and advance the UN’s role in promoting collective security. The UN, in which he worked in the late 1980s and which he observed in the early 1990s, saw the evolution of a more “muscular” Security Council. Indeed, the new practice of collaboration that came about at the time, and which Hume observed and documented in the Security Council, was used to help end conflicts elsewhere, including Namibia, Central America, Cambodia, and the Persian Gulf.

In his 1997 book, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991–1992 (Praeger), Michael Libal drew on his perspective as head of the Southeast European Department of the German Foreign Ministry in the four years immediately preceding his year as a Fellow (1995–1996). His study offers insights into the issues that German diplomacy faced, both at the time and which were also raised later by critics. Libal begins by providing a chronological and detailed account of the responses of the international community, in particular the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to developments in Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992. He argues that Germany’s policies with respect to the crisis in Yugoslavia must be seen as responses to the crisis itself as it unfolded; the determination of the smaller nations to avoid becoming victims of Serb nationalism were at the heart of the conflicts. And yet, as Libal notes, Germany could not really contribute to the protection of the smaller Yugoslav republics against Serb aggression—certainly, not militarily, either directly or even indirectly through military burden sharing. The initiative was soon to be passed on to those Western states willing and able to commit troops to the region.

Continued on page 20
Fall 2011 brought an important new addition to the WCFIA—the first five fellows in the new Program of Prize Fellowships in Economics, History, and Politics. Chosen from a worldwide competition, these five postdoctoral Prize Fellows hail from Canada, Germany, Malaysia, and the United States. With work covering diverse topics from the neuroscience of poverty to the legacies of empire and decolonization in Malaysia and Singapore, they are all linked by their focus on questions of lasting importance to the understanding of economic change.

The Program of Prize Fellowships, which is headed by a group of Senior Fellows consisting of Professors Abhijit Banerjee (MIT), Allan Brandt, Walter Johnson, Emma Rothschild, Amartya Sen, and Richard Tuck, first grew from the idea that the period since 2000 has been a time of extraordinary inventiveness across the disciplinary frontiers of economics, history, and politics, and of new challenges to all these disciplines. Senior Fellow Allan Brandt describes the role of the program: “The new Prize Fellowships offer an intensive postdoctoral experience to a group of scholars of exceptional promise. At a time of heightened awareness of the impact of the global economy on societies and development, the fellowship brings together economists, historians, and political scientists with deep interests in broad interdisciplinary questions linking these fields.”

While housed administratively with the Center for History and Economics at the Weatherhead Center, the Program of Prize Fellowships brings together four research programs and two universities. Those programs are the Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics (also a WCFIA program), the History and Philosophy of Political Economy in the Department of Government, and the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL) at MIT. Each Prize Fellow has an affiliation with the program that most closely matches his or her research and is provided with an office and an intellectual community (the first class has two economists who are based at JPAL at MIT). Of course, the Program of Prize Fellowships also develops its own community through regular dinners, lunches, conferences, and social events. As the group grows—the program expects to add four fellows in 2012–2013, and another four in 2013–2014—it will become an even stronger presence at Harvard.

During their three-year postdoctoral experience, Prize Fellows will have a great deal of freedom to work independently and may undertake sustained projects of research or other original work. It is hoped that they will take advantage of the interdisciplinary nature of the program by devoting time to the acquisition of accessory disciplines to prepare themselves for the investigation of problems lying between conventional fields. Teaching is not required, though if they wish, Prize Fellows may teach up to one course per year.

The Center is delighted to have found this extraordinary group of scholars, and views their presence as a sign of the intellectual legacy of the Program of Prize Fellowships. The Center looks forward to witnessing their achievements while at Harvard, and to see a true interdisciplinary community blossoming from this collaboration. The five Prize Fellows are:

**PRIZE FELLOWS IN ECONOMICS, HISTORY, AND POLITICS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ben Golub</td>
<td>Social and economic networks, with applications to economic development and information diffusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel Leow</td>
<td>Asian intellectuals and the history of ideas in Asia, with focus on Southeast and East Asia.</td>
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<td>Noah Millstone</td>
<td>Political history, intellectual history, and history of the book in early modern Europe.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexia Yates</td>
<td>History of urban development, entrepreneurialism, and practices of speculation and investment, particularly in modern France.</td>
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The Weatherhead Center is pleased to announce its inaugural class of Juster Fellows. This new grant initiative, for undergraduates whose projects may be related to thesis research but may have experiential components as well, has been made possible owing to the generosity of the Center’s Advisory Committee chair, the Honorable Kenneth I. Juster, who has devoted much of his education, professional activities, and nonprofit endeavors to international affairs and is deeply engaged in promoting international understanding and advancing international relations. The newly named Juster Fellows and their projects are:

**Emily Guo**, a senior Economics concentrator. Emily will travel to Kenya to complete field research for her senior thesis by conducting focus groups in order to study the effect of social influence on health beliefs and behaviors, focusing particular attention on the usage of chlorine dispensers toward safe water practices.

**Lillian Kivel**, a junior Anthropology concentrator. Lillian will travel to Beijing to conduct preliminary thesis research on the education of migrant children. She hopes to examine the role that schools play in affecting the social mobility of the children.

**Dalumuzi Mhlanga**, a junior Social Studies concentrator. Dalumuzi will visit Zimbabwe and Kenya this spring, in the midst of his study-abroad term at the University of Cambridge, to conduct preliminary thesis research on citizen responses to the 2007 Kenyan and 2008 Zimbabwean presidential elections.

**William Rafey**, a junior Social Studies concentrator. Will plans to spend three-and-a-half-weeks in January in South Africa to conduct preliminary thesis research on South Africa’s climate policy. He will assess its actors and their values, perspectives, and decision-making strategies in the contexts of international development and climate-change governance.

**Michael Stanley**, a junior Human Developmental and Regenerative Biology concentrator. Michael will travel to Uganda to conduct research on and participate in a program that seeks to end childhood malnutrition via creating an affordable, effective, and locally sustainable model to produce food and to treat malnutrition.

**Anna Trowbridge**, a senior Government concentrator. Anna will return to Chile for a second field stint to complete data gathering to support her thesis on the rightist political orientations held among Chileans of Palestinian origin toward domestic Chilean issues.