In December 2005, I had an experience that changed my perspective on workshops and conferences. I sat around a table in the Knafl Building with my “dream team” of scholarly critics, and we discussed a book manuscript I had been working on in isolation for two years. From early morning to mid afternoon (with a well-deserved lunch break) I benefited from the suggestions and insights of both my colleagues here at Harvard and four scholars from around the country who flew, at Weatherhead Center expense, to give me their undivided attention on the question of how to whip my manuscript into final form for publication. Like a strenuous physical workout, the pain was exceeded only by the gain in the quality of my research and its presentation. The result will be a (much improved and now nearly complete) manuscript on the role of international law in influencing human rights practices around the world.

All of our faculty associates are welcome to apply for conference funds on a competitive basis. But this semester we have initiated a “new deal” for our junior faculty colleagues. As a matter of entitlement, our non-tenured faculty are now guaranteed a major manuscript conference prior to receiving tenure. This is a significant exception to our ethos of competition for faculty research funding. Whenever they are ready—year-round, no deadlines imposed—our junior faculty can claim their book conference entitlement. (The only requirements will be to provide sufficient notice so that our excellent staff can make arrangements and the dream team has time to read manuscripts and travel to Cambridge.) These funds should be sufficient to invite three visitors from other universities to participate. But what if one’s discipline does not emphasize books? The entitlement can be adapted to focus on a manuscript intended for publication in a major peer-reviewed journal.

This junior faculty entitlement supplements the funding opportunities offered for faculty research by the Weatherhead Center. We continue to urge all of our faculty associates to apply for competitive rounds of funding for small individual grants, conferences, and large collaborative research projects. The intellectual energy of our affiliates has never been greater, as evidenced by a number of truly high-quality proposals for our largest chunk of research support, the Weatherhead Initiative, which this year can support up to $220,000 for cutting-edge research in any number of areas related to international affairs. (In December the Weatherhead Center will announce the winner of this year’s competition.)

Since the founding of the Center in 1958, its mission has remained the same: to support scholarly research. This year, we wish to acknowledge in particular our junior faculty, who are often the vanguard of creative and important research. Our funds are available to help them get that manuscript out the door in top form. Nothing could be more consistent with our goals as a center committed to the highest standards of research than to support faculty associates in this way.

Beth A. Simmons
Center Director
These Weatherhead Center affiliates received awards from the 2006 national meetings of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the American Sociological Association (ASA).

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION (APSA) AWARDS

Heinz I. Eulau Award
For the best article published in the American Political Science Review and Perspectives on Politics during the previous calendar year, Jennifer L. Hochschild, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate, Henry L. Barre Jayne Professor of Government and Professor of African and African American Studies, Department of Government, received the Heinz I. Eulau Award for “Editor’s Notes” in Perspectives on Politics.

Helen Dwight Reid Award
For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted in the previous two years in the field of international relations, law, and politics, Alexander B. Downes, postdoctoral fellow, Olin Institute (2002–2003) and assistant professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University, received the Helen Dwight Reid Award for “Targeting Civilians in Wartime” (University of Chicago).

Best Book Award
Given for the best book on European politics and society published in the previous year, Torben Iversen, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate, Harold Hitchings Burbank Professor of Political Economy, Department of Government, received the Best Book Award for Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Michael Wallerstein Award for Best Article
Abhijit Banerjee (MIT) and Lakshmi Iyer, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate, assistant professor, Department of Business, Government and the International Economy, Harvard Business School, received the Michael Wallerstein Award for Best Article for “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India” in American Economic Review 95 (4).

Best Article Award
Given for the best article published on comparative democratization within the last year, Lucan Way, postdoctoral fellow, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies (2004–2005), assistant professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, received the Best Article Award for “Authoritarian Statebuilding and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave” in World Politics 57, no. 2 (January 2005).

Best Book Award
For the best book in the field of conflict processes, Andrew Kydd, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate (2001–2006), Olin Institute Fellow (2000–2001), and associate professor, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, received the Best Book Award for Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton University Press, 2005).

Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award
For the best book in Comparative Politics, Daniel N. Posner, Graduate Student Associate (1992–1995), Academy Scholar (1995–1998), and associate professor, Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, received the Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award for Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Ernst B. Haas Best Dissertation Award

The Doris Graber Award
For the best book published on political communication in the last ten years, Pippa Norris, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate, McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, received The Doris Graber Award for A Virtuous Circle (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Robert L. Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Best Book Award
For the best book on international history and politics published in the previous two years, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Olin Fellow (2000 2001), assistant professor, Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, received the Robert L. Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Best Book Award for *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

**AMERICAN SOCIOCOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (ASA) AWARDS**

Best Article Award, Section on Sociology of Culture
Jason Kaufman, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate, John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Sociology; and Orlando Patterson, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate, John Cowles Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, received the Best Article Award for “Cross-National Cultural Diffusion: The Global Spread of Cricket,” *American Sociological Review*, Volume 70 (February 2005): 82-110.

Distinguished Scholarly Article Award, Section on Labor and Labor Movements
Tamara Kay, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate, assistant professor, Department of Sociology, received the Distinguished Scholarly Article Award for “Labor Transnationalism and Global Governance: the Impact of NAFTA on Transnational Labor Relationships in North America,” *American Journal of Sociology* 111(3): 715-756.

Oliver Cromwell Cox Award, Section on Race and Ethnic Minorities
Prudence L. Carter, Weatherhead Center Faculty Associate, associate professor, Department of Sociology, received the Oliver Cromwell Cox Award for *Keepin' It Real: School Success beyond Black and White* (Oxford University Press).

**Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development**
*by Conor O’Dwyer*

Conor O’Dwyer introduces the phenomenon of runaway state-building as a consequence of patronage politics in underdeveloped, noncompetitive party systems. Analyzing the cases of three newly democratized nations in Eastern Europe—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—O’Dwyer argues that competition among political parties constrains patronage-led state expansion. O’Dwyer uses democratization as a starting point, examining its effects on other aspects of political development. Focusing on the link between electoral competition and state-building, he is able to draw parallels between the problems faced by these three nations and broader historical and contemporary problems of patronage politics—such as urban machines in nineteenth-century America and the Philippines after Marcos. This timely study provides political scientists and political reformers with insights into points in the democratization process where appropriate intervention can minimize runaway state-building and cultivate efficient bureaucracy within a robust and competitive democratic system.

*Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.*

Conor O’Dwyer is an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and an assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida.
**Hip-Hop Japan: Rap and the Paths of Cultural Globalization**
*by Ian Condry*

In this book, Condry interprets Japan's vibrant hip-hop scene, explaining how a music and culture that originated halfway around the world is appropriated and remade in Tokyo clubs and recording studios. Illuminating different aspects of Japanese hip-hop, Condry chronicles how self-described “yellow B-Boys” express their devotion to “black culture,” how they combine the figure of the samurai with American rapping techniques and gangsta imagery, and how underground artists compete with pop icons to define “real” Japanese hip-hop. He discusses how rappers manipulate the Japanese language to achieve rhyme and rhythmic flow and how Japan’s female rappers struggle to find a place in a male-dominated genre. Condry pays particular attention to the messages of emcees, considering how their raps take on subjects including Japan’s education system, its sex industry, teenage bullying victims turned schoolyard murderers, and even America’s handling of the war on terror. *Duke University Press, 2006.*

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**Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power**
*by Alexis Dudden*

From its creation in the early twentieth century, policy makers used the discourse of international law to legitimate Japan’s empire. Although the Japanese state aggrandizers’ reliance on this discourse did not create the imperial nation Japan would become, their fluent use of its terms inscribed Japan’s claims as legal practice within Japan and abroad. Focusing on Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, Dudden gives long-needed attention to the intellectual history of the empire and brings to light assumptions of the twentieth century’s so-called international system by describing its most powerful—and most often overlooked—member’s engagement with that system. She makes clear that, even before Japan annexed Korea, it had embarked on a legal and often legislating mission to make its colonization legitimate in the eyes of the world. *University of Hawai’i Press, 2004.*

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**Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan**
*by David Leheny*

In this book, Leheny posits that when states abide by international agreements to clamp down on transnational crime and security concerns, they respond not to an amorphous international problem but rather to more deeply held and proximate fears. Although opponents of child prostitution and pornography were primarily concerned about the victimization of children in poor nations by wealthy foreigners, the Japanese law has been largely used to crack down on “compensated dating,” in which middle-class Japanese schoolgirls date and sometimes have sex with adults. Many Japanese policy makers viewed these girls as villains, and subsequent legal developments have aimed to constrain teenage sexual activities as well as to punish predatory adults. Likewise, following changes in the country’s counterterrorism policy, some Japanese leaders have redefined a host of other threats—especially from North Korea—as

David Leheny is associate professor of political science at University of Wisconsin at Madison and a former advanced research fellow (2001-02) at the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations.

**Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State**

by Ethan Scheiner

Despite its democratic structure, Japan’s government has been dominated by a single party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 1955. This book offers an explanation for why, even in the face of great dissatisfaction with the LDP, no opposition party has been able to offer itself as a credible challenger in Japan. Understanding such failure is important for many reasons, from its effect on Japanese economic policy to its implications for what facilitates democratic responsiveness more broadly. The principal explanations for opposition failure in Japan focus on the country’s culture and electoral system. This book offers a new interpretation, arguing that a far more plausible explanation rests on the predominance in Japan of clientelism, combined with a centralized government structure and electoral protection for groups that benefit from clientelism. While the central case in the book is Japan, the analysis is also comparative and applies the framework cross-nationally. *Cambridge University Press, 2006.*

Ethan Scheiner is associate professor of political science at University of California at Davis and a former advanced research fellow (2001-02) at the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations.

**Banking on Multinationals: Public Credit and the Export of Japanese Sunset Industries**

by Mireya Solís

This book addresses two fundamental puzzles in Japanese industrial policy: Why does the Japanese state—better known for its attempts to control markets, protect infant industries, and maximize national exports—administer the world’s largest public program to support the expansion of multinational corporations? And why does the Japanese state not fear loss of control over mobile multinational corporations and erosion of the domestic export base through foreign direct investment (FDI)? Solís’s explanation of Japan’s lead in state financing of FDI takes into account both the industrial policy goals behind the extension of FDI and the political uses of subsidized credit to appease economically weak but politically powerful constituencies. *Stanford University Press, 2004.*

Mireya Solís is assistant professor at the School of International Service, American University, and a former advanced research fellow (2000-01) at the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations.

**Changing Japanese Capitalism: Societal Coordination and Institutional Change**

by Michael A. Witt

Economic crisis tends to spur change in the “rules of the game”—the institutions that govern the economic activity of firms and employees. But after more than a decade of economic pain following the burst of the Japanese bubble economy of the 1980s, the core institutions of Japanese capitalism have changed remarkably little. In this systematic and holistic assessment of continuity and change in the central components of Japanese capitalism, Witt links this relatively slow rate of institutional change to a confluence of two factors: high levels of societal coordination in the Japanese political economy, and low levels of deviant behavior at the level of individuals, firms, and organizations. He identifies social networks permeating Japanese business as a key enabler of societal coordination and an obstacle to deviancy, and sheds light on a pervasive but previously under explored type of business networks, intra-industry loops. *Cambridge University Press, 2006.*

Michael Witt is affiliate professor of Asian business and comparative management at INSEAD, Singapore, and a former advanced research fellow (2000-01) at the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations.
In perusing the “recent arrival” shelves of the Harvard Book Store or the Coop one could swing a cat and hit, in one shot, at least a dozen or so new volumes on “empire.” Many of these books are polemical works on the current American empire, while others address the broad comparative question of empires over time, and some, like my own work, look at very narrow moments of the imperial past. The question of empire, of its place in the past and its role in the present, is something very much on the minds of many of today’s social scientists and public intellectuals.

My interest is to look at Britain’s imperial past, or more specifically at the end of the British Empire after World War II, and at the various counterinsurgency operations that it undertook in roughly a twenty-five year period. Additionally, what effect, if any, did these counterinsurgency precedents have on the contemporary American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq? That numerous writers have drawn parallels between the former British Empire and the more recent American imperial endeavors is hardly news. Earlier this year, Bernard Porter argued in Empire and Superempire that there are similarities between the Victorian Empire of Britain’s nineteenth century and the American empire of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Pointing to the role of ideology, the spread of influence, and the strength of Britain’s Empire, Porter argues that Britain of the nineteenth century, though sharing many of the same qualities as those of the United States, was neither as imperial nor as influential as the American empire. Conversely, Niall Ferguson contends that Americans need to take a page out of Britain’s imperial playbook: America’s problem is not that it’s imperial, but that it’s not imperial enough. If only the Americans were willing to cultivate a coterie of able colonial administrators and turn the screws enough—or as he puts it, empire requires “the resolve of the masters and the consent of the subjects”—then the periphery would remain orderly and obliging. And perhaps most noteworthy in this context for his analysis of “imperial overstretch,” Paul Kennedy agrees with Porter on numerous points about the marked similarity between the earlier empire of the Victorians and the twentieth-century empire of the United States.

But, as much as I agree that the British and Americans took similar imperial routes and sang similar tunes along the way, I am repeatedly struck by what the aforementioned thinkers omit: the British colonial counterinsurgencies fought in the wake of World War II. My intention is not to demonstrate that the British were more or less violent, somehow better or worse than the Americans. I believe these questions aren’t terribly interesting, nor do they get us very far. Rather, I’m curious about and admittedly somewhat perplexed by this omission because, as an historian, it is process rather than analogy that interests me—a point that I will return to a bit later. In making sweeping conclusions about the British Empire, we simply can’t dismiss the over two decades’ worth of counterinsurgency operations. For example, this past spring in the London Times Kennedy wrote: “For whatever the complaints of the left and the colonial nationalists about the nastier aspects of late British imperialism (such as torture in Kenya, or police brutality in the West Indies), the empire grappled with its Kiplingesque ‘recessional’ with a fair degree of grace and a decent sense of timing.” He then goes on to ask, “Will that also be true, one wonders, of America?” To wit, he answers, “America’s imperial retreat, when it comes, will be far less easy and smooth.”

It is important to assess Kennedy’s statement, because he is one of the foremost authorities on this topic, and his views are shared by others of equal status in the profession. And, such views shape a broad public consensus that the British Empire ended smoothly. But what exactly did the British imperial retreat look like after World War II, and does a reassessment of this retreat affect our understanding of the imperial process—and with it counterinsurgency strategies—that extended from the mid-twentieth century to the present day? In other words, what happens when we interrogate what Kennedy calls the “nastier aspects of late imperialism”—aspects that historians like Porter, Ferguson, and others discuss merely in passing, if at all. What happens when one examines what actually happened?

First, after World War II there were some 30 British counterinsurgency operations. The main theaters of their counterinsurgency operations began in Palestine, coinciding with the end of the war, then Malaya in 1948, followed by the partially contemporaneous war in Kenya, then Cyprus and Northern Ireland. At the same time, other counterinsurgency theaters spanned the globe, from Oman and Aden to Guyana and Nyasaland. But it was the series of wars leveled in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland that witnessed the most significant transfer of ideas and personnel from one hot spot to the next, and with it the development of a model, one that General Sir Frank Kitson—one of the major military
actors in these operations—coined “low intensity operations” in his same-titled book published in 1971. This model is important to consider both in its own right, as well as with regard to the impact that it would have on local colonial populations and on future counterinsurgency operations, most specifically those of the Americans.

First, Britain’s counterinsurgency operations were certainly not “low intensity”; they were asymmetrical wars whereby the insurgents were fewer in number and far more limited in resources than were the counterinsurgents. These counterinsurgencies shared, to varying degrees, five main, interrelated characteristics:

1. They were ideological wars. The cause could be multifaceted and almost always changed over time as the insurgency adapted. Moreover, the mobilization potential of a cause increased when propaganda identified the British counterinsurgents as the root of instability. This was particularly true when heavy-handed tactics were used and insurgents could exploit the weaknesses in the British ideological position.

2. These insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations were “war[s] for the people.” Clearly, the main battleground for the ideological war was the civilian population. In an asymmetrical struggle, the insurgents were dependent on the support of local men, women, and children. Without civilian belief in the cause, and the practical support that went along with it, the insurgents would lose the battle. This point was scarcely lost on the British—propaganda was a major part of their campaigns—but colonial forces also deployed other methods, often in tandem with propaganda.

3. Third, is the intelligence factor. For the British counterinsurgents, intelligence was crucial, and, by and large, the British acquired most of it from the civilian population. There were a variety of methods for gathering intelligence, some of which included successful propaganda campaigns and reward systems. Others were far less benign.

4. Nearly all of the postwar counterinsurgencies were protracted operations. A recurring theme from Whitehall at the start of every counterinsurgency was that they would be “three-month wars.” Instead, many went on for several years, and some extended over a decade or more.

5. Counterinsurgent violence punctuated all of these wars. Violence, or the threat of violence, permeated the landscape. Britain routinely found itself in violation of international human rights and labor accords, carrying out such policies as mass detention without trial, torture, forced labor, extrajudicial hangings, scorched earth, food denial campaigns, and the like. These policies were executed in police states where curfews, movement restrictions, the suspension of due process, and other such extreme measures empowered the local colonial administrations and military personnel to take extreme and generally counterproductive measures in order to force the insurgents and the civilians to acquiesce.

In effect, what unfolds in nearly all of these wars, to varying degrees, is a steady reliance on more and more force when the more benign attempts to gain the trust and support of the civilian population fail (if other methods were even considered). The ideological cause or causes of the insurgency continued to evolve and harden, preying as they did on the weaknesses in the British campaigns, as evidenced by the counterinsurgent violence and terror.

Eventually, nearly all of Britain’s counterinsurgency operations were successful, but not because the British won the allegiance of the civilian population with full-scale hearts-and-minds campaigns—a notion to which many observers at that time as well as many contemporary thinkers ascribe. Instead, when considering the empirical evidence and examining closely the British counterinsurgency operations, one finds that hearts-and-minds campaigns were scarcely executed, and when they were, they were carried out on shoestring budgets with very little administrative support. Instead, Britain’s counterinsurgency successes demonstrate that full-scale repression works—at least in the short term. Repression, characterized by intensifying and broadening methods of violence, will eventually wear down a civilian population, dividing it from the armed insurgents and bringing both groups to eventual submission, or, if need be, death.

One of the long-term consequences of Britain’s short-term counterinsurgency successes is that the resulting nations were born in crucibles of violence. Britain bequeathed a host of institutions and laws that repressed political opposition and populist participation, and created stark socioeconomic differentiation that was rooted in individuals’ willingness, or lack thereof, to support an illegitimate colonial state and draconian counterinsurgency policies. These are some of the legacies of the British imperial failure. Surely, many of these issues can be traced to the decades preceding the insurrections, but the years of counterinsurgency warfare and accompanying manifold evidence and examining closely the British counterinsurgency operations, one finds that hearts-and-minds campaigns were scarcely executed, and when they were, they were carried out on shoestring budgets with very little administrative support. Instead, Britain’s counterinsurgency successes demonstrate that full-scale repression works—at least in the short term. Repression, characterized by intensifying and broadening methods of violence, will eventually wear down a civilian population, dividing it from the armed insurgents and bringing both groups to eventual submission, or, if need be, death.

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Professor Laurier Turgeon, an ethnologist and historian from the University of Laval, Québec, was appointed by the Department of History at Harvard University as the William Lyon Mackenzie King Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies for spring 2006. Under his leadership, eight of the Harvard College students enrolled in his course, *The French in North America* (History 1617), embarked on a three-day field trip to Québec City.

The spring field trip aimed to enrich the students’ understanding of the city’s history in the North American context. This essential urban center of French North America was the first permanent establishment of Canada, the capital of colonial New France, the site of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (1759)—which determined the outcome of the French and British colonial rivalry in North America—and Canada’s main nineteenth century port and shipbuilding center. Today, Québec City is the capital of the Québec provincial government.

The field trip was designed, too, to provide students the opportunity for practicing their mastery of the French language. As a continuation of Professor Turgeon’s French group, which accompanied his history course, all of the lectures, tours, and discussions were conducted in French.

The trip included a variety of academic and cultural activities, beginning with a one-hour lecture on the city’s strategic role in Canadian history, and a two-hour walking tour of the colonial and fortified section of the city, conducted by David Mendel, one of Canada’s leading specialists on the history of Québec City. Mendel took students on a guided tour of the Parliament Building, the seat of the Québec Legislative Assembly, and the Ursuline Monastery and Museum, the first monastery and school founded in Canada to educate Indian and French girls. The students also had time to explore, independently, the many cafés, restaurants, discotheques, art galleries, shops, museums, and churches of the historic area of the city. On the final day of the trip, an excursion was organized to the Island of Orleans, located in the middle of the Saint Lawrence River, about ten miles downstream from Québec City. The island is the site of the establishment of the first French settlers and remains a place that marks the mythical origins of New France.

For the students, the high point of the excursion was a tour of a maple sugar farm. Maple sugar is considered a national food in Québec, and, as such, it is a powerful marker of ethnic identity. Students visited a sugar shack in order to learn about traditional methods of production and to touch and taste maple sugar toffee. Their tour ended with a meal of French-Canadian fare, which was accompanied by traditional song, music, and dance. Students participated actively and enthusiastically in this highly charged performance of heritage and history. Inspired by the euphoric, intercultural context of these events, they invented a new dance, named by them “the maple shake”—an interesting combination of minuet, salsa, and disco—which has since attracted attention in Québec City as well as in Cambridge.

The field trip was co-sponsored by the Canada Program at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the Québec Delegation in Boston, and the Institute for Cultural Heritage of Laval University.
In the Spirit of Tolerance: Kelman Earns UNESCO Recognition

Herbert C. Kelman received an honorable mention for the 2006 UNESCO-Madanjeet Singh Prize for exceptional contributions and leadership in the promotion of tolerance and nonviolence. The 2006 edition of the prize was awarded to Veerasingham Anandasangaree from Sri Lanka, president of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). Dedicated to advancing the spirit of tolerance in the arts, education, culture, science, and communication, the aim of the prize is not only to recognize and reward tolerance but also to encourage emulation by highlighting exemplary activities in this field. Herbert Kelman is the Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics (emeritus) in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University and a faculty associate (emeritus) at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. For three decades, Kelman has been engaged in international and intercommunal conflict resolution, focusing on Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. He is a Holocaust survivor and, as a public voice against intolerance in the world, Kelman is a symbol of peaceful alternatives to conflict. Having earned his Ph.D. in Social Psychology and Personality from Yale University, his involvement with the Weatherhead Center has spanned 30 years, during which he directed the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR). Kelman continues to co-chair the Middle East Seminar and is active with the seminar named in his honor, the Herbert C. Kelman Seminar on International Conflict and Resolution. The $100,000 UNESCO-Madanjeet Singh Prize was created in 1995 to mark the 125th anniversary of the birth of Mahatma Gandhi, thanks to the generosity of the Indian writer and diplomat Madanjeet Singh, a UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador. Roseli Fischmann, UNESCO Expert for the International Cities Coalition Against Racism, Discrimination, and Xenophobia, accepted the honorable mention in Professor Kelman’s name at a ceremony held in the context of the International Day for Tolerance on November 16 in Paris.

Charles G. Cogan Awarded the 2006 Ernest Lémonon Prize

Dr. Charles G. Cogan received the Ernest Lémonon Prize for his book entitled Diplomatie à la Française (Editions Jacob-Duvernet, 2005). The Association of Moral and Political Sciences (ASMP) of the Institut of France awards the prize annually to French-language authors of contemporary international politics or books dealing with social and economic issues in France and globally. Dr. Cogan is an affiliate at the Weatherhead Center’s John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and a research associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research focuses on European issues and French-American relations. Diplomatie à la Française was conceptualized in 2001 as part of the Cross-Cultural Negotiations Project at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and is the sixth book in an international series titled French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing with ‘la Grande Nation’ (USIP Press, 2003). The French-language version of the book, which received the Ernest Lémonon Prize, includes a preface by French foreign minister Hubert Védrine. “The book is not so much on the nuts and bolts of negotiations as it is on the cultural and historical strands which together form the tissue of French diplomacy and negotiations. Though I am aware of the dangers of generalization, I contend that there is a French model that is unique and identifiable,” wrote Dr. Cogan after learning about the book award. Dr. Cogan worked for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency for more than three decades, living in India, Congo, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, and France. Before retiring from the CIA in 1991, he was chief of the Near East and South Asia Division in the Directorate of Operations (1979–1984) and the CIA chief in Paris (1984–1989).
The Weatherhead Center’s Undergraduate Associates Program supports undergraduates at Harvard College in social science disciplines who are researching and writing theses on topics related to international affairs. These students, who won competitive grants from the Weatherhead Center and traveled abroad last summer to conduct their thesis research, are the Center’s 2006-2007 Undergraduate Associates. The Weatherhead Center encourages and facilitates connections between the Undergraduate Associates and Center Fellows, faculty, visiting scholars, and graduate students. Throughout the year, the Weatherhead Center holds several workshops especially designed for the Undergraduate Associates focusing on thesis research and writing. During the early part of the spring semester, the Undergraduate Associates present their thesis findings in Weatherhead Center seminars four to six weeks before their theses are due. The purpose of these seminars is to support the undergraduates in the final stage of completing their theses. Weatherhead Center Graduate Student Associates and Harvard Academy Scholars chair these seminars, which are attended by graduate students, Fellows, faculty, and staff. The 2006-2007 Undergraduate Associates are:

Alexander Bevilacqua (History), a Samuels Family Research Fellow, conducted research in France and Germany on the early development of the European International Project, 1918-1933.

Megan Camm (History and Literature), a Rogers Family Research Fellow, looked at the impact of the Xhosa Cattle-killing in South Africa by examining oral narratives dating back one hundred years.

Leanne Gaffney (Social Studies) researched the effect of storytelling in Northern Irish schools on the integration of Protestant and Catholic students.

Olivia Gage (Romance Languages and Literatures), a Samuel Family Research Fellow, carried out a cross-cultural study of barriers to maternal care in the Mayan culture and among Mayan immigrants to North Carolina.

Wei Kevin Gan (Biomedical Sciences), a Rogers Family Research Fellow, researched the establishment and evaluation of a pilot HIV treatment center near Durban, South Africa.

Kafui Gbewonyo (Environmental Science and Public Policy), a Rogers Family Research Fellow, conducted a comparative study of the use of wastewater in agriculture in Ghana and Kern County, California.

Joshua Gottlieb (Economics) investigated whether corruption causes socialism, using Argentina as a case study.

Norman Ho (History) researched Christianity in late-Ming to early-Qing China.

Travis Kavulla (History), a Rogers Family Research Fellow, conducted an historical study of British colonial regulation of witchcraft and witchfinding practices in Tanzania and Nigeria.

Jinu Koola (Social Studies), a Rogers Family Research Fellow, conducted an investigation in India of the differential impacts of international migration and remittance behavior on Kerala’s Hindus, Muslims, and Christians and their support for the welfare state.

William Marra (Government), a Samuel Family Research Fellow, investigated newspapers’ decisions to print the Danish cartoons depicting Muhammad.

Rabia Mir (Social Studies and Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations) researched the issue of trafficking of women and children from Pakistan to the United Arab Emirates.

Xin Wei Ngiam (Social Studies) studied the meaning and structure of social protest in post-apartheid South Africa.

Oludamini Ogunnaike (Psychology), a Rogers Family Research Fellow, conducted research in Morocco on implicit attitudes in African and colonial languages.

Hong Nhung Pham (Government), a Samuel Family Research Fellow, conducted a comparative study of anti-corruption at the level of civil society in Vietnam and Malaysia.

Jennifer Claire Provost (Special Concentration in Urban Planning and Sustainable Development), a Rogers Family Research Fellow, studied the environmental and economic impact of refugee camps on host communities in northern Kenya.

Ravi Ramchandani (History), a Rogers Family Research Fellow, conducted research on the transition to colonial rule in the Indian city of Madras in the late eighteenth century.
tactics exacerbated and hardened the failures, and bred a culture of violence that was embedded in the institutions and structures of the postcolonial era.

Regarding America’s present-day wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, we can observe continuities with the imperial process and its execution of counterinsurgency campaigns. The United States developed its counterinsurgency strategies during the Vietnam era, when Sir Robert Thompson and other British military strategists worked closely with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. The counterinsurgency model (e.g., detention without trial and “villagization”) was carried over, though some would argue without the necessary ruthlessness. If only Americans could have stomached more body bags and burning villages, the neoconservative thinkers argued, the United States would have won the Vietnam War.

But the question remains unanswered: have times dramatically changed since Vietnam? Has September 11 ushered in a new era, and a stronger stomach, for the collective American public?

America’s counterinsurgency operations share the first four characteristics of Britain’s twentieth-century campaigns that I outlined earlier. At issue is the fifth point, the use of violence. In many of its counterinsurgency theaters, the British resorted to unbridled force in order to undermine the causes and demands for self-determination or independence, however broadly defined. Neoconservative thinkers such as Max Boot and Ferguson have advocated a similar use of force. Indeed, it was Ferguson who wrote in the New York Times that the United States needed to confront the Iraqi insurgency with the same “severity,” including “punitive village-burning expeditions,” used by the British there in 1920. Based upon what we know about Britain’s postwar counterinsurgency operations, he’s right. However, it is these same counterinsurgency wars leveled by the British that are notably absent in Ferguson’s assessment of imperial legacy, and the processes that continued into the postcolonial era. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, he’s not alone in this omission, but if one looks for the continuities, and dare I say lessons, from the British Empire, and seeks to understand the long durée of historical process, then we cannot dismiss out of hand the hard empirical evidence: the actual nature of these counterinsurgency campaigns and the toll that they took on civilian populations.

Most importantly, we must honestly assess the long-term impacts that these campaigns have had on processes of nation-state development, as well as the positions that these states now hold in the international context.

Two final questions: Is there an alternative to repression in executing counterinsurgency strategies? And, what would happen if a hearts-and-minds campaign were truly executed, with a full-scale commitment that included significant financial and military resources as well as socioeconomic reform programs such as those earlier touted by the British and by the Americans in Vietnam? We know that the war in Malaya turned in Britain’s favor when real wages went up with the boom in rubber prices, which stemmed the escalating violence that accompanied the counterinsurgency campaign. This brings to mind the old quip, “Show me a revolutionary on a full stomach.” Undoubtedly, the solutions to America’s problems in Iraq and elsewhere are far more complex than this, but filling stomachs, I would suggest, gives us something to think about as an alternative to what could potentially lie on the horizon.
On July 8, 2006, Jacques Olivier Manent, a fellow of the Center for International Affairs in 1994-95, died suddenly in Papua New Guinea on a trip to Western Province. At the time he was serving as Ambassador of France to Papua New Guinea. He is survived by his wife, Jana Navratil Manent, and their three children, Jan, Kevin, and Vladimir. He was 58 years of age. Jacques had a most distinguished diplomatic career that took him, among other places, to Beijing, Hong Kong, Jakarta, and Prague. After his year as a fellow he was posted to Bosnia from 1995 to 1996 in order to help coordinate its reconstruction. He then served as France’s ambassador to Mongolia from 1996 to 2003. He had always expressed a special appreciation for his years of residence in Asia. He was a man wholly alive to the challenge and to the fun of life. Jacques had arrived in Port Moresby in March 2005. His colleague as a fellow at the Center, Ninna Rösiö, who had visited him there, said upon hearing of his death, “That Jacques should die on his post came as no surprise to me. He was a hard working, hands-on diplomat, daring, curious, enterprising. He didn’t spare himself.” He will always remain vividly in the memories of those of us at Harvard who knew him and loved him.