The principal mission of the Weatherhead Center is to support scholarly research. The Center’s mission includes support for the research work of graduate and undergraduate students, Fellows, associates, and visiting scholars, but most of the Center’s resources are dedicated to faculty research.

The key diagnosis for the design of Center programs to support professors is simple: professors lack time to conduct their research. Center programs, therefore, respond to this premise by supporting faculty research semester leaves, and providing conference support that includes not only funding but also high-quality comprehensive staff support. The Center’s large Weatherhead Initiative grants provide teams of professors with substantial support to advance simultaneously their work on several research tasks. Individual faculty grants may be used for various purposes but they are targeted, especially, for research assistance.

The faculty set the Center’s research agenda; moreover, the professors applying for the funds (not the Center Director) set the specific topics for inquiry. Grantmaking is, therefore, the responsibility of professorial peer review. The Center’s design of these funding initiatives resulted from a year-long consultation convoked to plan the implementation of the magnificent grant from the Weatherhead Foundation that led to the Center’s re-naming. Professors worked in task forces to identify the procedures that the Center should follow. Since then, modest adjustments have been made to these procedures, generally to simplify the process of application.

During 2002-03, however, the Center created five task forces to re-examine its programs comprehensively. Some of the task forces assessed student programs in response to a second very generous gift for this purpose from the Weatherhead Foundation; another looked at the Center’s Web page and related issues of information technology, publications, and its library; and a third focused on the Center’s major programs and projects. Two task forces considered, in particular, those programs that support faculty research directly: the Weatherhead Initiative, and the panoply of faculty research support policies. I wish to refer to the results from these last two task forces.

The principal conclusion of this long and deliberative assessment process can be summarized in one word: deregulation. The Center will retain various grant programs at different levels of funding, but several of those categories will become more flexible in order to respond more effectively to a wider array of professorial...
From the Director ...

interests. The Center will not abandon any of its existing research policies; it will continue to support research semester leaves and conferences, award small individual faculty grants, and promote the Weatherhead Initiative. But beginning in academic year 2004-05, the Center intends to initiate two new research policies and modify a third.

First, we expect to provide financial support of up to $80,000 for some faculty research projects. These large-scale projects should involve rigorous policy analysis and focus on the Center’s core interests, which cover international, transnational, global, and comparative national topics and may address contemporary or historical topics as well as the study of specific countries and regions besides the United States. (Comparative and international projects may also include the United States, of course.) These grants seek to support research efforts at a level substantially below that of the Weatherhead Initiative but still require a significant marshalling of resources. An external (i.e., non-Harvard faculty) review committee will evaluate proposals for faculty research grants at this level.

Second, we expect to fund some faculty research projects up to the $20,000 range. These would also be focused on the Center’s core interests as previously described. They are intended to support research endeavors larger than those covered through individual faculty grants but that do not require as substantial a mobilization of resources as the other categories. A Weatherhead Center faculty review committee will evaluate these proposals.

Both of these new categories of grants are intended to foster the production of research over and above what the Center already accomplishes with the Weatherhead Initiative and research semester leaves. The fruits of some of these research projects will, in due course, be presented at Center-sponsored conferences.

The third policy change derives from recent experience. At the moment of its founding, one romantic expectation guided the design of the Weatherhead Initiative: its tasks could be accomplished within one year and its funds would be spent accordingly. Projects of that magnitude, however, cannot be completed within a year, nor should they be. Projects of considerable intellectual complexity that engage several scholars, at times located not just at Harvard, ought to take the time they need to succeed. We are, therefore, explicitly changing the rules that govern the Weatherhead Initiative projects to allow them to take longer than a year in completing their activities. We still retain the resources to award a new Weatherhead Initiative grant every year; thus, some Weatherhead Initiative projects will be operating simultaneously.

Since the founding of the Center in 1958, its mission has remained the same: the Center supports scholarly research. Our ambition is to do so ever more effectively in response to the faculty’s research agenda. Professors should feel encouraged and welcome to engage actively with the Center to foster their scholarly work.

Who’s Where

Fiona Adamson (2000-2001) is a lecturer in international relations and director of the Programme in International Public Policy at University College, London; Robert Angevine (1999-2000) is a research analyst in the Strategic Assessment Center of the Science Applications International Corporation; Lars-Erik Cederman (2000-2001) is a professor for international conflict research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology; Ajin Choi (2001-2002) is an assistant professor at the Graduate School of International Studies of Yonsei University in Seoul; Thomas Christensen (1991-1993) is a professor at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; Timothy Crawford (1998-1999) is an assistant professor of political science at Boston College; Andrew Erdmann (1996-1997) has joined the staff of the National Security Council after returning from Iraq where he was the U.S. government’s liaison on higher education, advising the Ministry of Higher Education on rebuilding Iraq’s universities; Mark L. Haas (2001-2002) is an assistant professor of political science at Duquesne University; Victoria Tin-Bor Hui (2000-2001) is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois; Jacques Hymans (2001-2002) is an assistant professor of government at Smith College; Aaron Lobel (1999-2000) is director of America Abroad Radio; Thomas Mahnken (1995-1996) is a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College; Daniel Markey (2000-2001) is a member of the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State; David Nickles (1998-1999) works on the Historical Advisory Committee of the U.S. Department of State; Gideon Rose (1991-1995) is managing editor of Foreign Affairs; Benjamin Runkle (2001-2002) is country director for Northern Gulf affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mary Elise Sarotte (1996-1997) is an assistant professor at the University of Cambridge; Benjamin Valentino (2000-2001) is an assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College; Leslie Vinjamuri (1999-2000) is an assistant professor in the Master of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, with a joint affiliation in Georgetown’s Department of Government; Fareed Zakaria (1991-1993) is editor of Newsweek International.
The International Relations Council (IRC), one of Harvard’s largest student groups, is partnering with the Weatherhead Center to bring a series of exciting events to undergraduates this year. The IRC will take over the responsibilities of the Weatherhead Student Council, which had been in charge of coordinating undergraduate interaction with Weatherhead Center Fellows as well as organizing other events such as International Careers Week. Those events will now be run through the IRC, a student group with over three hundred members. The IRC already runs six major programs that have worldwide impact, among which are two Model United Nations simulations in Boston, and the International Review, a magazine in the mold of Foreign Affairs that is published in more than 70 countries.

This new collaboration realizes “a natural relationship,” according to IRC President David K. Kessler. The IRC’s extensive contact with undergraduates and efficient organizational structure matches well with the Weatherhead Center’s expertise in international relations and dedication to undergraduate education. The IRC will appoint two directors to focus solely on Weatherhead events; those directors will meet periodically with Weatherhead Center staff to coordinate projects. The IRC-Weatherhead partnership does not represent the first time the two organizations have cooperated, however; as far back as 1976, the IRC and Center for International Affairs worked together on projects such as the funding of senior thesis research grants.

Swati Mylavarapu, the IRC vice president in charge of all on-campus events, and Mina Dimitrova, director of Weatherhead events, coordinate this year’s calendar, which will feature a mix of the old and the new. Planned activities include International Careers Week in the fall and Human Rights Week in the spring, as well as occasional events such as the October 7 dinner discussion with Weatherhead Fellow Michael Small, Canadian ambassador to Cuba, who spoke about Cuba’s past and future. For the first time this year the IRC and the Weatherhead Center will host a forum on International Health and Public Policy in November and an International Relations Week in April. Undergraduates will also have the opportunity to attend other speaker events and student debates on international relations issues.

Speaking about the IRC-Weatherhead collaboration in a recent issue of the Crimson, Clare Putnam, coordinator for student programs and fellowships at the Weatherhead Center, explained that the new relationship “benefits [the Weatherhead Center] because we want to connect more with undergraduates.”
A loyal ally of the United States throughout the Cold War and beyond, Australia’s relative importance in the post-September 11 world continues to increase. Prime Minister John Howard has committed Australia, over the objections of the opposition Labor party and most of the Australian foreign policy establishment, to closer ties with the United States. He is promoting, also, a groundbreaking transformation of Australia’s military forces, which will make them more capable of conducting missions alongside U.S. soldiers.

Unfortunately, Americans are probably missing a political debate going on within Australia that has enormous consequences for the United States. A recent quantitative content analysis of Australian thinking from 1989-2002 demonstrates profound changes in Australian perspectives on relative power and Australia’s relationship with America. Moreover, Australian thinking is not as unified as the image portrayed by Prime Minister John Howard and President George W. Bush together in Crawford, Texas, would lead most people to believe. Dating back to Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in the post-Vietnam war era, Australians have a long history of pushing for strategic independence from America. Despite the continued appearance of alliance solidarity, U.S.-Australian relations began a long downward spiral in the 1970s. A litany of Australian prime ministers prioritized improving Australia’s relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific above Australia’s relations with the United States.

Content analysis of over 1,000 Australian newspaper articles from the 1989-2002 period demonstrates that, as the relative power of China increased and the Cold War became an increasingly distant memory, over time the Australian public has become increasingly reluctant to remain extremely close to the United States. The memoirs of former Prime Minister Bob Hawke poignantly reveal that through the early 1990s Australia was distancing itself from America. The political justification for Australian military interventions in the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, and in Somalia, was to uphold the power of the United Nations to resolve international disputes, not to affirm Australia’s alliance with the United States. While the election of Prime Minister Howard in 1996 helped slow, then reverse, this trend—with Howard promising that Australia could maintain good relations with both the United States and Asia—advocates of the previous policy continue to retain substantial political power.

Despite Howard’s attempts to restore strong ties between the United States and Australia, two important challenges to U.S.-Australian relations could give the opposition Labor party leader, Simon Crean, the ability to displace Prime Minister Howard. First, like the United States, Australia is faced with an increasing threat of terrorism and must decide how to respond. The October 2002 bombing of a Bali nightclub patronized by Australians, and Osama Bin Laden’s explicit declaration that Australia is a prime target for al Qaeda, demonstrate the enormously similar challenges facing the United States and Australia.

However, the Dibb Review of Australian defense policy in the mid-1980s, institutionalized
until the Howard government took control in the mid-1990s, configured Australia’s military for the coastal defense of Australia, not rapid deployments to enforce shaky peace accords or root out terrorist cells. The mismatch between Australia’s capabilities and the security challenges it faces are beginning to take a toll on the Australian economy. Brigadier General (retired) Jim Wallace in Australia has estimated that Australia had to pay $23 million dollars just to equip Australian forces properly for the war in Afghanistan. While opponents of changing Australia’s defense architecture have seized upon such numbers as proof that Australia’s proposed defense transformation is unaffordable, defense transformation really means spending more efficiently, not necessarily spending vastly greater quantities of money.

Criticism within the Australian foreign policy establishment of Australia’s alliance with the United States was rising even before September 11, 2001. The critics, who for a period of time were quieted by the terrorist attacks, were soon back with a vengeance when Howard proposed sending troops to Iraq. Howard’s primary political opponent, Labor leader Simon Crean, explicitly opposed the war and attempted to bring Australian troops home even after they had been deployed. The opposition to Howard within the Australian foreign policy establishment worries that close relations with the United States will make Australia a target for terrorists and damage Australia’s relations with its Asian business partners.

Australian soldiers have already fought alongside Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia also led the peacekeeping operation that stabilized East Timor in the late 1990s, and recently deployed naval forces between the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea in an attempt to crack down on rampant gun smuggling. Defense transformation will substantially increase Australia’s ability to participate in antiterrorism operations. The recent hotel bombing in Jakarta demonstrated that within Southeast Asia, countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia are a critical front in the global war on terrorism. Given that Australia’s relations with Malaysia and Indonesia are much better than America’s, U.S.-Australian cooperation will be vital for the success of the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. Australia’s cooperation in global forums is also essential to achieve other important American foreign policy goals, such as stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The second challenge to Howard’s policies and U.S.-Australia relations is linked to the rise of China. During the 1990s China became Australia’s second largest trading partner. This development forced Australia—normally a strong proponent of human rights promotion around the world—to defer when asked by the United States to support U.N. resolutions critical of Chinese human rights practices. While it seems unlikely that Australia will be forced to “choose” between the United States and China, it is possible that future crises over Taiwan, for example, in which the United States would expect active Australian support, could seriously stress the alliance. Before the Howard government took control, the Keating government promoted an “Asia-first” policy that explicitly prioritized Australia’s relations with Asian countries before relations with the United States.

How the U.S.-Australia alliance deals with the rise of China could be either its undoing, or its greatest achievement. Those worried about the risks of Australia appearing to be a lackey of the United States should consider an obvious downside to disassociation from America. If the PRC becomes much more powerful and Australia is increasingly drawn into its orbit, Australia may be forced to become a vassal of the PRC. Would those opponents of closer ties with the United States prefer to be cooperative partners with Washington, or beholden to Beijing? Given Australia’s material weaknesses in comparison to both the United States and China, effective balancing would not be a sustainable strategy. Cooperation between the United States and Australia on China policy is much more likely to be successful than the alternative because it will frustrate Chinese efforts to distance America from its allies and it will help hedge against the possibility that China becomes a revisionist state.

The rise of China is also given as a justification for opposing defense transformation. However, this reasoning contradicts the opposition’s simultaneous goal of independence from U.S. strategy. Paul Dibb (author of the Dibb Review) and his protégé Hugh White are proponents of orienting Australian strategy around the homeland. The logic behind an “Asia-first” foreign policy, however, is that Australia will be most secure if it accommodates the rise of China. But opponents of transformation cannot have it both ways with regard to China. If China is not a threat, defense transformation will not increase the risk of an invasion. If Australia adopts defense transformation, with forces designed to root out terrorist cells and **Continued page 8**
In October 2003 the Weatherhead Foundation Board approved a new $3 million grant for faculty research support to the Weatherhead Center. The new grant will be used to fund the Center’s new $20,000 and $80,000 research grants for faculty research.

Timothy Shah, a Weatherhead Initiative Associate, received the Aaron Wildavsky Award from the American Political Science Association (APSA) “Religion and Politics” Section for the best dissertation on that topic.

Michael Hiscox, faculty associate, won the APSA Political Economy prize for the best book on this subject.

James M. Lindsay, John M. Olin Predoctoral Fellow in National Security (1985-86) was recently named Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

Jeana Flahive, the Center’s conference coordinator, gave birth to a daughter, Eliana Pimentel, on September 9. Monica Duffy Toft, associate director of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, gave birth to a daughter, Ingrid Anne Toft, on October 29. We offer our best wishes to both mothers and daughters—and to their husbands and extended families.

Hamutal Bernstein joined the Center in June as a research assistant in the Olin Institute. Hamutal replaced Debbie Lee, who is pursuing a law degree at the University of Virginia.

Violence in God’s Name
Religion in an Age of Conflict
by Oliver McTernan

In the wake of the latest escalations in religious violence, politicians, the media, and religious leaders try to assure us that religion is not to blame for extremist terror campaigns and the ethnic and communal conflicts that increasingly threaten world peace. Yet events themselves demonstrate that religion can play a highly negative role—aggravating polarization, justifying enmity, even fostering deadly fanaticism. From the Balkans to the Middle East, adherents of all the world’s major faiths commit indiscriminate acts of violence on the grounds of protecting their religious identity and serving the cause of God.

Oliver McTernan was a Fellow of the Weatherhead Center in 2000-01 and a Center associate in 2001-02.

Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants
by Jeffrey Reitz

Immigration’s impact on the economy and on society is shaped not only by characteristics of the immigrants themselves, but also by basic features of the society that those immigrants have joined. This book contains eighteen chapters by leading scholars from the United States, Canada, and Europe, who explore this theme theoretically and empirically. An introductory essay by the editor suggests four major dimensions of society which emerge as significant in this new research thrust: pre-existing ethnic or race relations within the host population; differences in labor markets and related institutions; the impact of government policies and programs, including immigration policy; and the changing nature of international boundaries, part of the process of globalization. The book had its origins in a conference sponsored by the Canada Program at the Weatherhead Center.

Jeffrey G. Reitz is professor of sociology and R.F Harney Professor of Ethnic, Immigration and Pluralism Studies at the Munk Centre of International Studies at the University of Toronto. In 2000-01 he was William Lyon Mackenzie King Professor of Canadian Studies at Harvard.
The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory by Monica Duffy Toft

The Geography of Ethnic Violence is the first among numerous distinguished books on ethnic violence to clarify the vital role of territory in explaining such conflict. Monica Toft introduces and tests a theory of ethnic violence, one that provides a compelling general explanation of not only most ethnic violence, civil wars, and terrorism but many interstate wars as well. This understanding can foster new policy initiatives with real potential to make ethnic violence either less likely or less destructive. It can also guide policymakers to solutions that endure.

Monica Duffy Toft is assistant professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and assistant director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at the Weatherhead Center.


The 2000 Mexican presidential race culminated in the election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox and the end of seven decades of one-party rule. This book, which traces changes in public opinion and voter preferences over the course of the race, represents the most comprehensive treatment of campaigning and voting behavior in an emerging democracy. It challenges the “modest effects” paradigm of national election campaigns that has dominated scholarly research in the field.

Jorge I. Domínguez is the Center Director and Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs at Harvard.
Don’t Take Canberra for Granted ...

conduct peace enforcement operations, this could substantially improve Australia-China relations because it would signal that Australia no longer considers China to be a threat. Even though Dibb and White sometimes describe the risks to Australia as not coming from a Chinese invasion, but from a regional arc of instability, as long as Australian forces are oriented toward preventing an attack from the north, it is more likely that China will perceive Australia’s posture as hostile. To ensure Australia’s continued cooperation in the war on terrorism and lock in the improved relations and proposed defense transformation supported by Prime Minister Howard, the Bush administration should give Howard a political boost by demonstrating to the Australian people the benefits of Australia’s alliance with the United States. Given that many of the arguments made by the “Asia-first” school of Australian foreign policy rely on the increasing economic importance of Asia to Australia’s economy, establishing a free trade agreement (FTA) with Australia could help counteract that trend. An FTA will deepen U.S.-Australian trade ties and therefore generate new opportunity costs for opposition Labor leaders looking to publicly rail against the U.S.-Australian alliance.

In order to remain in power, Prime Minister Howard will have to show the Australian people the benefits of close relations with the United States. Providing technical assistance and/or fast-tracking necessary equipment purchases would bolster Australia’s defense transformation which could help create an Australian military more powerful and more capable of participating in expeditionary conflicts with the United States. Supporting Australia’s defense transformation and completing a U.S.-Australia FTA will also demonstrate to the Australian people that America is committed to its ally. With only a small amount of effort, the Bush administration can guarantee the support of an alliance partner whose actions are critical to regional, and perhaps even global, stability.