Esta obra expone los resultados de un proyecto de análisis e investigación sobre conflictos y disputas territoriales en América Latina y el Caribe desarrollado por Diálogo Interamericano y originalmente impulsado por iniciativa del Embajador Luigi Einaudi, actual Secretario General Adjunto de la Organización de Estados Americanos, con el propósito de comprender mejor las posibilidades y estrategias de solución de disputas territoriales en el marco de los procesos de democratización de la región. El hilo conductor de este volumen, resultante del proyecto, apunta a resolver dos interrogantes clave. En primer lugar, por qué, pese a la existencia de una vasta gama de disputas y controversias limítrofes sin resolución, ha habido tan pocas guerras en nuestra región. Y, en segundo lugar, hasta qué punto la democracia ha jugado un papel en la limitada proliferación de conflictos fronterizos en América Latina y el Caribe. Ambos interrogantes orientan tanto el capítulo introductorio de este libro, que presenta un panorama y un análisis de los conflictos territoriales y limítrofes en América Latina y el Caribe, a cargo del doctor Jorge Domínguez, de la Universidad de Harvard, compilador del presente volumen, como el capítulo del doctor David Mares, profesor de la Universidad de California, quien realiza un análisis de los diferentes conflictos territoriales y su vinculación con el tipo de sistema político prevaleciente en los países en disputa.
Social classes, like fortunes, are made and remade, and invariably the two are linked. Tracing the shifting fortunes and changing character of New York City's economic elite over half a century, this book brings to light a neglected—and critical—chapter in the social history of the United States: the rise of an American bourgeoisie.
How a small and diverse group of New Yorkers came to wield unprecedented economic, social, and political power is the story that Sven Beckert pursues from 1850 to the turn of the nineteenth century. Blending social, economic, and political history, his book reveals the central role of the Civil War in realigning New York City's economic elite, as merchants began to shed their old allegiances to slavery and the Atlantic economy, and to cede a greater share of economic power to industrialists. We then see how in the wake of Reconstruction the New York bourgeoisie reoriented its ideology, abandoning the free labor views of the antebellum years for laissez-faire liberalism. Finally, in the 1880s and 1890s, we observe the emergence of a fully self-conscious and inordinately powerful New York upper class.
Drawing on a remarkable range of sources from tax lists to personal papers, credit ratings to congressional testimony The Monied Metropolis provides a richly textured historical portrait of society redefining itself. Its reach extends well beyond New York, into the most important issues of social and political change in nineteenth-century America.
Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 27–30, 2003. The authors thank Alicia Llosa, Peter Schwartzstein, Hillel Soifer, and Jonathan Taylor for their assistance in carrying out the research for this paper.
The post–Cold War literature on regime change has drawn considerable attention to the "international dimension" of democratization (Whitehead 1996a). Whereas the dominant literature on democratization during the 1980s downplayed the importance of international factors (O?Donnell and Schmitter 1986), these factors are now widely seen to have played an important – and even decisive – role in shaping post–Cold War regime outcomes (Huntington 1991; Starr 1991; Whitehead 1996a; Kopstein and Reilly 2000). Thus, scholars have highlighted the democratizing impact of the diffusion of democratic norms and institutions, the globalization of new technologies such as the internet, the increased propensity of the U.S. and other Western powers to encourage democracy abroad, the unprecedented use of political conditionality, the spread of transnational human rights and democracy networks, and an emerging international infrastructure of democracy promotion andelectoral observation.
This chapter presents a social–psychological approach to the analysis and resolution of international and intercommunal conflicts. Its central focus is on interactive conflict resolution (see Fisher, 1997), a family of models for intervening in deep–rooted, protracted conflicts between identity groups, which is anchored in psychological principles.
This article uses a two–level framework to explain variation in Latin American populist parties? responses to the neoliberal challenge of the 1980s and 1990s.First,it examines the incentives for adaptation,focusing on the electoral and economic environments in which parties operated. Second,it examines parties? organizational capacity to adapt,focusing on leadership renovation and the accountability of office–holding leaders to unions and party authorities.This framework is applied to four cases:the Argentine Justicialista Party (PJ),the exican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),the Peruvian APRA party,and Venezuelan Democratic Action (AD). In Argentina,the combination of strong incentives and substantial adaptive capacity resulted in radical programmatic change and electoral success.In Mexico,where the PRI had high adaptive capacity but faced somewhat weaker external incentives,programmatic change was slower but nevertheless substantial,and the party survived as a major political force.In Peru,where APRA had some capacity but little incentive to adapt,and in Venezuela,where AD had neither a strong incentive nor the capacity to adapt,populist parties achieved little programmatic change and suffered steep electoral decline.
Some fifteen years after the collapse of communism, the uniting of Western and Eastern Europe through a substantial enlargement of the EU is perhaps the most important single policy instrument available to further a more stable and prosperous continent. As many as eight post–communist states are poised to conclude negotiations with the EU for full membership by the end of 2002. In this essay we seek to outline in the very broadest strokes the most important structural forces of national interest and influence underlying the dynamics of enlargement itself and its future consequences for EU governance. We do not claim our analysis is comprehensive, only that it seeks to capture the most significant of the underlying forces in play.
Empirical research on the determinants of economic growth has typically neglected the influence of religion. To fill this gap, we use international survey data on religiosity for a broad panel of countries to investigate the effects of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic growth. To isolate the direction of causation from religiosity to economic performance, we use instrumental variables suggested by an analysis of systems in which church attendance and beliefs are the dependent variables. The instruments are variables for the presence of state religion and for regulation of the religion market, the composition of religious adherence, and an indicator of religious pluralism. We find that economic growth responds positively to religious beliefs, notably those in hell and heaven, but negatively to church attendance. That is, growth depends on the extent of believing relative to belonging. These results accord with a model in which religious beliefs influence individual traits that enhance economic performance. The beliefs are an output of the religion sector, and church attendance is an input to this sector. Hence, for given beliefs, more church attendance signifies more resources used up by the religion sector.
Theory synthesis is not only possible and desirable but is constitutive of any coherent understanding of international relations as a progressive and empirical social science. Numerous interesting proposals exist for formulating and empirically testing multitheoretical propositions about concrete problems in world politics. Below the reader will find a set of basic principles that should underlie testable theory syntheses. Yet other contributors to this forum—Friedrich Kratochwil, Yosef Lapid, Iver Neumann, and Steve Smith—do not share this openness to theory synthesis; their views range from deep skepticism to outright rejection. The real issue between us is whether pluralism among existing theories ought to be preserved for its own sake, as these colleagues believe, or whether theories ought to be treated as instruments to be subjected to empirical testing and theory synthesis, as this author maintains.
Since the Iranian Revolution and especially since the end of the Cold War, religion has come to be associated with militancy. Conflicts between gropus of different religions are perceived by many as more intense. Similarly, religious groups involved in conflict are perceived as more militant. Ethnic conflicts that have fueled this perception include the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the ethnic rebellions in Chechnya, Suda, Cyprus, India, and Indonesia and the civil wars in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia. Fundamentalist movements, especially Islamic movements, have also contributed to this perception. This article uses data from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR), as well as data collected independently, to ascertain whether this perception is correct for ethnic conflicts. That is, the article asks: are ethnoreligious minorities really more militant than other ethnic minorities?
The events of December 2001 seemed to transform Argentina?s international status from poster child to basket case. Throughout the 1990s, Argentina had been widely hailed as a case of successful market reform under democratic government. The radical economic transformation undertaken by the government of Carlos Saúl Menem had ended hyperinflation and restored economic growth, while the country enjoyed an unprecedented degree of democratic stability. Elections were free; civil liberties were broadly protected; and the armed forces, which had toped six civilian governments since 1930, largely disappeared from the political scene. Yet in late 2001, Argentina suffered an extraordinary economic and political meltdown. A prolonged recession and a severe financial crisis culminated in a debt default, a chaotic devaluation, and a descent into the deepest depression in Argentine history. A massive wave of riots and protests triggered a strong of presidential resignations, plunging the country into a profound crisis. For several months, Argentina teetered on the brink of anarchy. Widespread hostility toward the political elite raised the specter of a Peruú or Venezuelaústyle partyúsystem collapse. As the 2003 presidential election approached, many observers feared that the vote would be marred by violence or fraud.
Published in Journal of Democracy 14, no. 4 (October 2003): 152-166.
Since the start of 2000, five Latin American boundary disputes between neigboring states have resulted in the use of force, and two others in its deployment. These incidents involved ten of the nineteen independent countries of South and Central America. In 1995, Ecuador and Peru went to war, resulting in more than a thousand deaths and injuries and significant economic loss. And yet, by international standards the Americas were comparatively free from interstate war during the twentieth century. Latin Americans for the most part do not fear aggression from their neighbors. They do not expect their countries to go to war with one another.
Published in Peaceworks no. 50 (August 2003): 42. United States Institute of Peace.
Theories that posit complex causation, or multiple causal paths, pervade the study of politics but have yet to find accurate statistical expression. To remedy this situation I derive new econometric procedures, Boolean probit and logit, based on the logic of complexity. The solution provides an answer to a puzzle in the rational deterrence literature: the divergence between theory and case-study findings, on the one hand, and the findings of quantitative studies, on the other, on the issue of the role of capabilities and willingness in the initiation of disputes. It also makes the case that different methodological traditions, rather than settling into "separate but equal" status, can instead inform and enrich one another.
Published in Political Analysis 11, no. 3 (2003): 209-233.
In this paper, I trace the checkered history of ?community? in one south Indian locale — the coastal belt of Kanyakumari District –from its immediate post–independence role as a mechanism of state intervention in fisheries development, to its use in the 1990s in fisher claims to rights and resources and as a means for devolving conflict management to the local level. I show that the expansion of the state system, in part through development intervention, opened up a charged political arena where Kanyakumari?s fishers acquired new tools to negotiate political authority, redefine community, and articulate new rights of citizenship. Most importantly, I demonstrate that the development process furthered the mutual implication of state and community, a process which the state has been reluctant to acknowledge. I end the paper by arguing that the Tamilnadu State government?s neglect of marine conservation is a function of a bureaucratic sensibility that distinguishes ?state policy? from ?community politics,? and resource conservation from social justice, an attitude that has hardened with economic liberalisation. This perspective has prevented the government from taking seriously artisanal fisher demands for trawler regulation and from recognizing artisanal activism as a defense of both sectoral rights and of conservation.
Political parties are critical to Latin American democracy. This was demonstrated in Peru, where an atomized, candidate–centered party system developed after Alberto Fujimori?s 1992 presidential self–coup. Party system decomposition weakened the democratic opposition against an increasingly authoritarian regime. Since the regime collapsed in 2000, prospects for party rebuilding have been mixed. Structural changes, such as the growth of the informal sector and the spread of mass media technologies, have weakened politicians? incentive to build parties. Although these changes did not cause the collapse of the party system, they may inhibit its reconstruction.
Transition economies faced the formidable task of creating financial markets to ensure that enterprises gained access to external sources of funds under circumstances that were unfavorable for such markets to take off. The two major obstacles for financial market development we identify in this paper are highly incomplete law and the absence of reliable company specific information. We argue that in light of these obstacles standard law enforcement practices, including deterrence and reactive law enforcement by courts, and ex ante screening and proactive law enforcement by regulators are not effective. To jumpstart financial markets under these circumstances, other avenues have to be explored. We suggest that China, but not Russia, has been quite successful in seeking such alternatives. We identify the decentralized process of selecting companies for listing on major stock exchanges as a means for collecting company specific information that cannot be easily standardized and would therefore remain unexplored in a system that relied only on financial reporting and disclosure. While state agents involved in the selection process may have incentives to select lemons rather than viable firms for listing, we argue that the competition among different regions and ministries instilled by the so–called quota system has mitigated these dangers. By contrast, Russia?s reliance on a standard Western disclosure system with law enforcement by a combination of courts and regulators not paid off so far. On the contrary, uncertainties about the effectiveness of law enforcement and absence of reliable information have restrained financial market development. Evidence on lower co–movement of stock in China than in Russia lends support to our theoretical analysis.
The process of globalization has been made possible by a series of technological, institutional, and policy changes over the course of the last several decades. As the introduction to this project suggests, governments have often made conscious policy adjustments in the face of innovations perceived as advantageous by competitors, new ideas of policy success, and sometimes as the result of explicit or implicit political pressures from powerful governments or international institutions.
A very important part of this process involves government choices to alter the international legal structure in which economic transactions take place. The most salient accomplishments in the development of an international legal structure to further economic liberalization has clearly been in the trade of goods and services, where the World Trade Organization commands a focal presence. In the monetary and exchange rate area, a growing number of governments have committed themselves through Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund?s Articles of Agreement to keep their current accounts free from restrictions, assuring traders and lenders that hard currencies will be made available to pay for imports and service international debts.
Interestingly, there has been very little multilateral development of the legal rules surrounding international investment, and in particular foreign direct investment (FDI). Nevertheless, such investment has grown substantially over the past several decades. According to the United Nations, total foreign direct investment inflows peaked at about 1,450 billion in 2000, before falling back to $735.1 billion in 2001. The growth in global FDI has far outstripped both world GDP and world trade growth. But direct investments are highly skewed geographically: developed countries account for over 93 per cent of outflows and 68 percent of inflows, and these shares have not changed too drastically over the past decade.
The primary legal innovation in the area of foreign direct investment in the post–world war two period has been the proliferation of bilateral agreements that seek to make explicit the contractual arrangements under which a firm invests in a local jurisdiction. Bilateral investment Treaties (BITs) are defined as an agreement establishing the terms and conditions for private investment by nationals and companies of one country in the jurisdiction of another. They are negotiated between governments precisely to create a legal environment to encourage foreign direct investment, typically in those jurisdictions that find it difficult to credibly commit to treat foreign capital in ways that are perceived by investors as transparent, fair, and predictable. These agreements are a way to tie the hands of the host country by agreeing to a wide range of pro–investor terms. By surrendering part of its legal sovereignty – notably the right to use its own courts to adjudicate any disagreements that may arise from a contract to invest – developing countries hope to convince foreign firms that their investments will be safe and sound.
As such, BITs should be understood as a part of the broader neo–liberal project to encourage the free flow of goods, services, capital, and ideas across national borders. They typically include provisions requiring investing nationals of the BIT partner to be treated as well as national firms or as well as the most favored foreign firms (MFN treatment); establish limits on expropriations of investments and require compensation when it occurs; and guarantee investors? right to transfer funds into and out of the country using a market rate of exchange. Sometimes these agreements also explicitly prohibit "performance requirements" on the part of foreign investors, though such clauses are more typically found in US rather than European agreements. Thus, we view these agreements as consistent with the market–oriented trend the editors of this volume have identified.
This article seeks to explain why BITs have proliferated over time. The popularity of BITs is puzzling when contrasted with the collective resistance developing countries have shown toward pro–investment principles under customary international law. Our central contention is that bilateral investment treaties intensify the inter–state competition for foreign investment. Because signing a BIT gives a state an advantage in this competition we expect the probability of acceptance of a BIT by a state to increase when rival states sign such a treaty. The model we have in mind is squarely consistent with the competitive models laid out in the introductory chapter to this project.
The article is organized as follows. The first section describes the BITs terrain in some detail: the history, rationale, and spread of these bilateral arrangements over time. The second section presents a model of competition for investment that could lead to the pattern of treaty diffusion we observe. In this model, one country exogenously "breaks ranks" and agrees to investors terms in order to enjoy the benefits of investment inflows. While competitors may not have preferred to do so, BITs effectively create a negative externality by presenting the prospect of diverting capital to hosts who agree to BITs. One obvious way to mitigate this outcome is to enter into a BIT as well. We entertain the possibility of more sociological explanations which may be plausible in explaining some investment treaties witnessed in more recent years.
The third section reviews the evidence of competitive diffusion. Competitive pressures for BIT proliferation are consistent with the data, but even some of the non–diffusion influences on the pattern of BITs suggest the broader reputational story we develop is apt. While socialization influences appears to be present in recent years, the most important explanations for the growing web of bilateral arrangements are those that postulate rational responses to the globalization of capital.
This article examines the validity of the stereotypical idea which is not endorsed here, that Muslim groups are more violent than groups of other religions, using data on domestic conflict from 1950 to 1996 from the State Failure dataset. The theories of Islam and violence in the literature can be divided into three categories: those that say Muslims in general are more violent, those that say certain Muslims are more violent, and those that say Muslims are no more violent that other religious groups. The results show that while on some measures Muslim groups are more violent that other groups, on others they are not. That is, while on one measure Muslim groups show the highest levels of violence, on other measures, Christians and Buddhist groups score the highest. Thus, while there is some evidence that Musclim groups are more violent, it is not conclusive and is certainly not enough to support the stereotype of the Islamic militant.