Since the late 1990s, the relative weight of ultra–nationalist parties in Russian parliamentary and extra–parliamentary politics has, after reaching a certain peak in the mid–1990s, declined. The paper argues that this trend can, for a number of reasons, not be taken as proof for a lasting evaporation of right–wing extremist ideas from high politics in Russia. In particular, parallel developments within the voluntary sector, namely the emergence of a multifaceted uncivil society, suggest that Russian right–wing extremism may currently experience a period of transition rather than decay. The example of the rise of the notorious neo–fascist Alexander Dugin from a lunatic fringe publicist to a highly placed political advisor with close links to both, the legislative and executive branches of the Russian state, in 1998–2001, is used as an illustration that radically anti-Western ideas will continue to have an impact on Russia's elite thinking, and policies.
We analyze two cross–country data sets that contain information on attitudes toward trade as well as a broad range of socio–demographic and other indicators. We find that pro–trade preferences are significantly and robustly correlated with an individual's level of human capital, in the manner predicted by the factor endowments model. Preferences over trade are also correlated with the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed: individuals in non–traded sectors tend to be the most pro–, while individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage are the most protectionist. Third, an individual's relative economic status, measured in terms of either relative income within each country or self–expressed social status, has a very strong positive association with pro–trade attitudes. Finally, non–economic determinants, in the form of values, identities, and attachments, play an important role in explaining the variation in preferences over trade. High degrees of neighborhood attachment and nationalism/patriotism are associated with protectionist tendencies, while cosmopolitanism is correlated with pro–trade attitudes. Our framework does a reasonable job of explaining differences across individuals and a fairly good job of explaining differences across countries.
For some years, my colleagues and I have been actively engaged in the development and application of an approach to the resolution of international conflicts for which we use the term ‘interactive problem–solving’. The fullest – indeed, the paradigmatic – application of the approach is represented by problem–solving workshops (Kelman, 1972, 1979, 1992, 1996b; Kelman and Cohen, 1986), although it involves a variety of other activities as well. In fact, I have increasingly come to see interactive problem–solving as an approach to the macro–processes of international conflict resolution, in which problem–solving workshops and similar micro–level activities are integrally related to official diplomacy (Kelman, 1996a).The approach derives most directly from the work of John Burton (1969, 1979, 1984). While my work follows the general principles laid out by Burton, it has evolved in its own directions, in keeping with my own disciplinary background, my particular style, and the cases on which I have focused my attention. My work has concentrated since 1974 on the Arab–Israeli conflict, and particularly on the Israeli–Palestinian component of that conflict. I have also done some work, however, on the Cyprus conflict and have maintained an active interest in several other intense, protracted identity conflicts at the international or intercommunal level, such as the conflicts in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland.
In recent theories of comparative development the role of institutional differences has been crucial. Yet what explains comparative institutional evolution? We investigate this issue by studying the coffee exporting economies of Latin America. While homogeneous in many ways, they experienced radically different paths of economic (and political) development which is conventional traced to the differential organization of the coffee industry. We show that the different forms that the coffee economy took in the 19th century was critically determined by the legal environment determining access to land, and that different laws resulted from differences in the nature of political competition. Our analysis suggests that explanations of institutional differences which stress economic fundamentals can only be part of the story. At least in the economies we study, while geography, factor endowments and technology are clearly important, their implications for the institutional structure and thus development are conditional on the form that political competition takes in society. Endowments are not fate.CEPR Discussion Papers 3206, Centre for Economic Policy Research, February 2002.
To quantify the implications of common currencies for trade and income, we use data for over 200 countries and dependencies. In our two–stage approach, estimates at the first stage suggest that belonging to a currency union/board triples trade with other currency union members. Moreover, there is no evidence of trade–diversion. Our estimates at the second stage suggest that every one percent increase in a country's overall trade (relative to GDP) raises income per capita by at least one third of a percent. We combine the two estimates to quantify the effect of common currencies on output. Our results support the hypothesis that important beneficial effects of currency unions come through the promotion of trade.
The spectacular gap in incomes that separates the world's rich and poor nations is the central economic fact of our time. Average income in Sierra Leone, which is the poorest country in the world for which we have data, is almost 100 times lower than that in Luxembourg, the world's richest country. Nearly two–thirds of the world's population lives in countries where average income is only one–tenth the U.S. level. Since the starting points for all these countries were not so far apart prior to the industrial revolution, these disparities must be attributed almost entirely to differences in long–term growth rates of per–capita income. The world is split sharply between countries that have managed to sustain economic growth over long periods of time and those that have not. How do we make sense of this?
When taking monetary policy decisions, central banks face considerable uncertainty about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the price level. In particular, the role played by monetary developments in the transmission mechanism is not well understood. Two paradigms exist: one assigns monetary developments an entirely passive role; the other gives money an active role, beyond that of an indicator variable. Taking such uncertainty as a starting point for analysis, this paper evaluates a number of monetary policy rules for short–term interest rate decisions in the face of paradigm uncertainty. It describes what constitutes an efficient rule in this context and discusses procedures leading to the adoption of such rules.
The future of dollarization will be determined by political economy considerations. Existing scholarship on the political economy of fixed exchange rates indicates factors of potential importance at both the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level the role of stabilizing currencies to encourage trade, and devaluing for competitive purposes, dominates the politics of these decisions. Greater commercial and financial integration with the United States increase the likelihood of dollarization. Internationally-oriented economic agents (financial institutions, borrowers, international firms) are more likely to want dollarization; tradables producers, especially import competers, are more likely to oppose it.
At the international level, dollarization will implicate regional integration agreements. Countries party to such agreements (such as Mercosur) are more likely to dollarize together than separately. Where such agreements are with the United States, or where they increase the level of commercial and financial integration with the United States, they will also tend to increase the likelihood of dollarization. On the other hand, dollarization is likely to put pressure on countries to harmonize financial regulation with the United States, and to require the implicit or explicit approval of American monetary and financial authorities.
New Crises elsewhere have replaced Afghanistan in the headlines, but this week is an important anniversary.A year ago on Thursday, Afghan leaders signed the Bonn Agreement, a roadmap to take Afghanistan from the wreckage of years of conflict toward democratic elections in 2004. So it is a good time to ask whether Afghanistan is still important to anyone but the Afghans and whether the Bonn roadmap is steering Afghanistan in the right direction.The answer to both questions is yes. Until the Taliban fell, Afghanistan gave haven to the world's most dangerous terrorists, who would be quick to return if coalition troops withdrew. They, the drug barons and the warlords, would plunge Afghanistan back into darkness. Sept. 11 showed why the world must work with the Afghans to prevent this and why we should commit ourselves to achieving a universally acceptable vision for Afghanistan: the establishment of a sovereign, stable, and secure country with a self-sustaining economy, strong institutions, and a broad-based, multiethnic regime committed to eradicating terrorism and opium production, reducing poverty, and honoring its international obligations - most notably the human rights of minority groups and women. These aspirations are undeniably ambitious. They should be more easily achievable if we apply three R's to Afghanistan. Not, in this case, the traditional reading, 'riting and 'rithmetic, but realism, respect, and resilience.Realism reminds us that Afghanistan cannot be magically transformed into a modern democracy. Progress toward anything like it will take time. Meanwhile, holding together the myriad Afghan groups means focusing on the essential and the achievable. This applies even to human rights. Those responsible for past atrocities should be called to account. But not yet. At this stage, Afghanistan's fragile consensus could not survive a comprehensive investigation of past excesses.Nor, realistically, can all the warlords simply be swept away. Instead, the immediate goal must be to draw them into greater dependence on the Kabul administration, with reconstruction aid for their fiefdoms made conditional on good behavior, and to find other work for their foot soldiers. In time, the nascent national army should outgun the private armies.Realism also suggests that those still calling for the deployment of large numbers of foreign troops to several Afghan cities should drop the idea. Static foreign garrisons would be expensive and vulnerable targets. The present "light footprint" system, backed by the threat of US air power, has worked well. Developments on that theme, not garrisons, can best help keep the peace in the provinces.Respect means remembering that Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans. Building Afghan capacity must underpin everything we do. Hence the need to nurture viable Afghan institutions, drawing on Afghanistan's cultural and religious heritage. Hence, too, the importance of eradicating opium production and providing alternative livelihoods for farmers. If the rule of law does not prevail, Afghanistan—and we—will fail.
Resilience, in terms of commitment and stamina, will be needed to overcome the many daunting challenges we will continue to face. The international community moved Afghanistan from the top of the "in" basket to the "too difficult" basket after the Soviet occupiers left. Warlords, Taliban, and Al Qaeda took advantage. Whatever difficulties and distractions surface now, we must not snatch defeat from victory by abandoning the Afghans again.The solutions we develop must also be resilient. Regional neighbors like Pakistan and Iran now tacitly accept the unacceptable—the presence of Western forces—to underwrite peace in Afghanistan. The West, in turn, must accept that Afghanistan's neighbors should be involved in finding solutions, not dismissed as part of the problem. An imperial outpost in Afghanistan in the face of regional hostility isn't a long-term solution. Ask the British. Ask the Russians.
The Afghans and the international community can be proud of what has been achieved in Afghanistan in the last year, with progress in bringing relative stability and normality to daily life, delivering humanitarian aid, providing education and health care, and removing land mines. The return of so many refugees testifies to that success. But Afghanistan is still fragile, and nobody can be complacent about the size of the task ahead. Realism, respect, and resilience are three essential tools if we are to do the job right. It is in our own interests, as well as those of the Afghans, that we should.
Why should governments delegate decision–making authority over territorial issues to an international institution? This study argues that governments are motivated to reach territorial solutions to reduce the opportunity costs associated with a festering dispute. The evidence suggests that domestic political incapacity to negotiate concessions is associated with a commitment to arbitrate. Compliance is a function of the net costs and benefits involved in accepting the arbitral decision. These costs include the loss of valuable territory, but noncompliance also exacts costs with respect to governments? reputation, both domestically and internationally. This research speaks to a broader debate about the role of international legal institutions in foreign policy making and international outcomes. It shows that governments have good reasons, under certain political and economic conditions, to use international legal processes as a substitute for domestic political decision making.Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 6 (2002): 829-856.
The purpose of this article is to summarize what we know about the role that religion plays in transnational migration and to outline a strategy for further research in this area. While a number of migration scholars now acknowledge the salience of migrants' economic and political transnational activities, they have largely overlooked the ways in which religious identities and practices also enable migrants to sustain memberships in multiple locations. My goals in this article are threefold. First, I provide a brief overview of related bodies of work on global, diasporic, and immigrant religion and differentiate them from studies of migrants' transnational religious practices. Second, I summarize what we have learned about transnational religious life from prior research. And third, I propose an approach to future research on these questions.
Prepared for delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29–September 1, 2002, Boston, Panel 11–25.What is a "perfect dictatorship"? Such a regime provokes little societal resistance at installation. Its leaders act jointly to consolidate the regime and to broaden the support coalition by agreeing upon succession rules to rotate the presidency within the authoritarian regime. They delegate policy– making authority to civilians in areas of their competence. They emphasize consultation, not open contestation, prefer cooptation to repression, eschew ideological appeals, compel social actors into regime– licensed organizations, and deactivate civil society. South Korea under Park Chung Hee is compared on these dimensions to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, all at a time when authoritarian regimes governed them.
This paper argues that governments formed from post–election coalitions (majority coalition governments in PR systems) and pre–election coalitions (majority parties in SMD systems) aggregate the interests of voters in systematically different ways. We show that the multiple policy dimensional policy space that emerges from PR motivates parties in the government coalition to logroll projects among themselves without internalizing the costs in the way that a majoritarian party would. We further show that, although centrifugal electoral incentives dominate in PR systems, some incentives towards coalescence across groups and across parties exist through the greater likelihood that large parties have in becoming a member of a minimal winning coalition of parties. The model predicts that the size of the public sector should should be larger in PR systems. This prediction is tested using data from the 1970's–90's in 17 European countries.
This paper examines one type of hybrid regime, which we call competitive authoritarianism. Such regimes are authoritarian in that they do not meet standard procedural minimum criteria for democracy. Elections are often unfair and civil liberties are frequently violated. However, they are competitive in that democratic institutions are more facades. Rather, they permit opposition groups to contest seriously for–and sometimes even win–power. The combination of autocratic rule and democratic rules creates an inherent source of tension. Consequently, competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by periodic crises in which opposition challenges force incumbents to choose between cracking down and losing power. These crises have resulted in a variety of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian entrenchment (Malaysia, Zimbabwe) to incumbent turnover without regime change (Ukraine, Zambia) to democratization (Peru, Serbia).Paper prepared for Mapping the Great Zone: Clientelism and the Boundary between Democratic and Democratizing conference, Columbia University, April 4–5, 2003. [This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2002.]
Southern Africa is suffering its worst drought in a decade. The U.N. World Food Program estimates some 13 million people in six countries will need 1.2 million tons of food aid till March 2003 to avoid famine. Yet two countries, Zimbabwe and Zambia, have spent most of the summer rejecting food aid shipments of corn from the U.S. because some varieties of U.S. corn are "genetically modified" (GM). Incredibly, African leaders facing famine are rejecting perfectly safe food. What is going on here?Regulatory Authorities Farmers in the U.S. have been planting (and Americans have been consuming) genetically engineered corn, soybeans and cotton since 1995. Regulatory authorities in the EU and Japan have also approved such GM crops, but in Europe food safety regulators have been mistrusted by consumers ever since the unrelated but traumatizing mad cow disease crisis of 1996. EU Commissioner for Health and Consumer Affairs David Byrne repeatedly states there is no scientific evidence of added risk to human health or the environment from any of the GM products approved for the market so far, and he can point to 81 separate scientific studies, all EU-funded, that bolster this conclusion.But greens and GM critics in Europe say this absence of expected or known risks is no longer a sufficient regulatory standard. Touting the "precautionary principle," they argue that powerful new technologies should be kept under wraps until tested for unexpected or unknown risks as well. Never mind that testing for something unknown is logically impossible (the only way to avoid a completely unknown risk is never to do anything for the first time).Europeans can perhaps afford hyper-caution regarding new crop technologies. Even without planting any GM seeds, European farmers will continue to prosper—thanks to lavish subsidies—and consumers will remain well fed. The same is not true in the developing world, especially in Africa, where hunger is worsening in part because farmers are not yet productive.
Two-thirds of all Africans are farmers, most are women, and they are poor and hungry in part because they lack improved crop technologies to battle against drought, poor soil fertility, crop disease, weeds and endemic insect problems. The productivity of African agriculture, per farm worker, has actually declined by 9% over the past two decades, which helps explain why one-third of all Africans are malnourished.This ought to change the calculus of precaution. If GM-improved crops are kept out of the hands of African farmers, pending tests for the "nth" hypothetical risk, or the "nth" year of exposure to that risk, the misery of millions will be needlessly prolonged.But now we are seeing an even less justified application of regulatory caution toward GM foods. Governments in Africa that are facing an actual famine have been rejecting some food aid shipments because they contain GM seeds. In May 2002, the government of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe rejected 10,000 tons of corn shipped from the U.S. because it was not certified as GM-free. This at a time when four to six million Zimbabweans approached a risk of starvation.Next, the government of Zambia banned all imports of GM corn, including food-aid imports, even though some 2.3 million people in the country were at risk. On Aug. 16, Zambian Information Minister Newstead Zimba announced on state TV that the government had decided, in light of the uncertainties surrounding GM foods, that it would be best to "take the precautionary principle on this matter" and not accept or distribute GM food aid. Silumelume Mubukwanu, Zambia`s High Commissioner to London, explained that food aid was being rejected because "too much is unknown about GM foods yet."Precautionary European policies toward the environment are also keeping Africans from growing their own food. The EU has been insisting that governments in Africa treat GM crops as a potentially serious threat to rural "biological safety." This helps explain why there are no GM crops yet being planted commercially anywhere on the continent, except in the nation of South Africa. Instead of helping Africa`s hungry to grow more food, European donors are helping them grow more regulations.African governments also must worry that accepting GM food aid will cost them commercial export sales to Europe. The EU has not been importing any U.S. corn since 1998, because U.S. shipments can contain some GM varieties not yet approved in Europe. African governments now worry that any illicit planting of U.S. corn by farmers could jeopardize their own exports to Europe. Trying to remain GM-free for commercial export reasons is a policy that does not help poor subsistence farmers, but it may soon become the norm in Africa, once the EU moves next year toward much tighter labeling and traceability regulations on all imported GM foods and animal feeds.Documentary RecordsEven while professing that GM foods are safe, EU officials will soon require that they be traced individually through the marketing chain, with legal documentary records to be saved by all producers and handlers for five years. African countries won't have the institutional capacity to implement this traceability regulation, so they will have to remain GM-free to retain their access to the EU market. Meat products raised with GM feed are not yet covered by this new EU regulation, but Zambia's initial rejection of GM corn in food aid shipments was partly based on a fear that if the country lost its GM-free animal feed status, poultry and dairy exports to the UK would slump.By inducing African governments to embrace excessively cautious biosafety regulations and by requiring stigmatizing labels and costly traceability certificates for all imported GM foods and feeds, wealthy and comfortable officials in Europe have made it harder for drought-stricken societies in Africa to accept food aid from the U.S. European critics of GM foods did not foresee this potentially deadly misapplication of their precautionary principle. Yet here it is.
Is there a noticeable difference among political parties in a country in their trade policy positions? Do left parties advocate different trade policies than right parties? In the advanced industrial countries where labor tends to be scarce, are left parties more protectionist than right ones, which represent capital owners? Political institutions within these democratic countries may affect the role of partisanship. We also investigate whether increasing globalization has led to more or less partisan polarization over trade policy. We examine 25 developed countries from 1945–98 to see how their parties have competed over trade policy. Controlling for various factors, partisanship matters. In terms of position taking, right parties consistently take more free trade stances than do left ones. Globalization and other international forces have also shaped both the nature and the extent of the debate domestically over exposure to international trade.
Countries that have pursued distortionary macroeconomic policies, including high inflation, large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates, appear to have suffered more macroeconomic volatility and also grown more slowly during the postwar period. Does this reflect the casual effect of these macroeconomic policies on economic outcomes? One reason to suspect that the answer may be no is that countries pursuing poor macroeconomic policies also have weak "institution," including political institutions that do not constrain politicians and political elites, ineffective enforcement of property rights for investors, widespread corruption, and a high degree of political instability. This paper documents that countries that inherited more "extractive" institutions from their colonial past were more likely to experience high volatility and economic crises during the postwar period. More specifically, societies where European colonists faced high mortality rates more than 100 years ago are much more volatile and prone to crises. Based on our previous work, we interpret this relationship as due to the casual effect of institutions on economic outcomes: Europeans did not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions in areas where they faced high mortality. Once we control for the effect of institutions, macroeconomic policies appear to have only a minor impact on volatility and crises. This suggests that distortionary macroeconomic policies are more likely to be symptoms of underlying institutional problems rather than the main causes of economic volatility, and also that the effects of institutional differences on volatility do not appear to be primarily mediated by any of the standard macroeconomic variables. Instead, it appears that weak institutions cause volatility through a number of microeconomic, as well as microeconomic, channels.
This paper considers the effect of taxation on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) and taxable income reported by multinational firms. Confidential affiliate–level data are used to compare the investment and income–reporting behavior of American–owned foreign affiliates. Ten percent higher tax rates are associated with 5.0 percent lower FDI, controlling for parent company and observable aspects of local economies, and 0.66 percent lower returns on assets, controlling for parent company and level of FDI. Tax effects are particularly strong within Europe, where ten percent higher tax rates are associated with 7.7 percent lower FDI and 1.4 percent lower returns on assets. Indirectly owned foreign affiliates exhibit even stronger tax effects, ten percent higher tax rates being associated with 15.3 percent lower FDI and 1.6 percent lower returns on assets. American firms finance a growing fraction of their foreign operations indirectly through chains of ownership, which now account for more than 30 percent of aggregate foreign assets and sales. Ownership chains are particularly concentrated among European affiliates. Since multinational firms from countries other than the United States face tax environments similar to those faced by indirectly owned affiliates of American companies, these results suggest a greater sensitivity of FDI to taxes for non–American firms. The results also suggest that European economic integration may have the effect of intensifying tax competition between European jurisdictions.
We consider a model of policy choice in which appropriate policies depend on a country's own circumstances, but the presence of a successful leader generates an informational externality and results in too little "policy experimentation." Corrupt governments are reined in while honest governments are disciplined inefficiently. Our model yields distinct predictions about the patterns of policy imitation, corruption, and economic performance as a function of a country's location vis–á–vis successful leaders. In particular, it predicts a U–shaped pattern in economic performance as we move away from the leader in the relevant space of characteristics: close neighbors should do very well, distant countries moderately well on average with considerable variance, and intermediate countries worst of all. An empirical test with the experience of post–socialist countries provides supportive results.
When social scientists talk about the adoption of new governance arrangements in a given policy area, their questions are most often functional: What will those new arrangements do better than the previous way of making policy? Yet politicians do not always, or even usually, pick policy solutions because they offer the best functional answer to a policy problem. Instead, they adopt solutions at a given time that advance their electoral or partisan interests as well as responding to a perceived policy problem (cf. Kingdon 1984). Thus, they not only want to do things (provide child care, increase economic development), but to do things that are politically useful (fortify their local political machine, distribute benefits to political supporters). It in this light that I evaluate in this paper two of the most significant innovations in collaborative governance arrangements in Europe in the 1990s. The first is the 1993 French reform that created regional–level multi–partite institutions to develop proposals for regional education and training initiatives that aimed to spur private investment in human capital. The second is the institution of territorial pacts as the cornerstone of Italian development policy in the 1990s. The development pacts were to sponsor the participation of local secondary associations and politicians in proposing territorial development plans, with the goal of promoting ongoing cooperation among these actors at the territorial level. These reforms are especially significant because they took place in two unitary states with weak regional governments and weak traditions of corporatist policy–making. They were innovative, at least in form, because they attempted to build institutions of public/private collaboration to provide collective goods at a local level. As such, they simultaneously marked an attempt to break radically with the nature of past policy and with the institutions through which those policies had been designed. These were not equivalent to sectoral neocorporatist policies practiced especially widely in northern Europe (Lehmbruch 1984) both by virtue of the scope of private actors involved and of the delegation of policy autonomy to these actors. In terms of scope, they attempted to involve a wide range of local stakeholders, rather than monopolistic employers and unions. And in terms of policy autonomy, these new instances were empowered not merely to implement policies decided at the center, but to develop their own analyses of local problems and proposed responses to them. They were not merely bodies of decentralized implementation, but of decentralized policy design, with the institutions for designing policy moved away from national politicians and to local actors (among which politicians were just one, if still the primus inter pares). The actual institutions have, so far, shown themselves to be quite heterogeneous. In this paper, I first summarize their experiences?both their political origins and their successes and failures in fulfilling the institutional mandate delegated to them. After reviewing the major developments in each institutional experiment, I draw parallels between the two ongoing experiments, focusing in particular on the organizational prerequisites for their success and the dilemmas they pose for public actors who would attempt to expand collaborative governance arrangements.