Research Library

Reich, Michael R. 2002. “The Neglected Epidemic: Road Traffic Injuries in Developing Countries.” British Medical Journal 324: 1139-1141.Abstract

Road traffic injuries are a major cause of death and disability globally, with a disproportionate number occurring in developing countries. Road traffic injuries are currently ranked ninth globally among the leading causes of disability adjusted life years lost, and the ranking is projected to rise to third by 2020. In 1998, developing countries accounted for more than 85% of all deaths due to road traffic crashes globally and for 96% of all children killed. Moreover, about 90% of the disability adjusted life years lost worldwide due to road traffic injuries occur in developing countries. The problem is increasing at a fast rate in developing countries due to rapid motorisation and other factors. However, public policy responses to this epidemic have been muted at national and international levels. Policy makers need to recognise this growing problem as a public health crisis and design appropriate policy responses.

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Simmons, Beth A. 2002. “Trade and Territorial Conflict: International Borders as Institutions”.Abstract

International borders are usefully conceptualized as international political institutions that provide joint gains for the polities whose jurisdictions they distinguish. Far from irrelevant in an age of globalization, settled political borders help to make economic integration possible. But the international relations literature that focuses on territorial disputes has put too much emphasis on territory per se and far too little on the institutions of boundary settlement that produce joint gains. Students of international politics have cast the issues relating to territorial settlement in overly zero–sum terms, and may very well be missing an important impetus to conflict resolution in many cases. This paper shows empirically for the case of Latin America that territorial and border disputes entail opportunity costs (operationalized here as bilateral trade foregone). Mutually accepted borders mitigate these costs by reducing uncertainty, transactions costs, and other bilateral externalities of disputing. Theories of territorial settlement should take into account the possibility of such joint gains in their models of state dispute behavior.

Simmons, Beth A. 2002. “Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights Obligations”.Abstract

This research note presents evidence on the conditions that influence governments? decisions to commit themselves to international human rights regimes. Are governments pressured by powerful state actors to make such commitments, as some realists have suggested? Or rather do governments to cede the right to review internal rights policies to external authorities as the result of socialization through persuasion? What role do domestic political conditions and institutions play? This research note offers empirical evidence that addresses these issues. Using global data relating to the six "core" UN human rights treaties, I find the strongest evidence of external socialization, although governments presiding over common law legal systems tend to resist formalizing their rights commitments in external treaty form. There is little evidence of democratic "lock–in" using these data, although this remains a persuasive interpretation of the origins of the European human rights regime.

Besley, Tim, and Ian Preston. 2002. “Accountability and Political Competition: Theory and Evidence”.Abstract

One of the central issues in political economy concerns how to create a form of government that responds to voters needs. The preconditions for achieving this are widely debated. Recent interest has focused on various institutions such as the media or citizens? initiatives in calling the government to account.

The traditional Public Choice view is that government rarely serves the public interest and that a variety of checks and balances are necessary to have a well-functioning polity. This view reached its apotheosis in the Leviathan formulation of government motives in Brennan and Buchanan (1980). However, more modern incarnations of this view place agency problems at centre stage following on from the seminal contributions of Barro (1970) and Ferejohn (1986). The standard setting is a model where an incumbent can commit effort to produce better performance on a valence issue. Voters cannot observe the actions and must infer the amount of effort put in and/or the incumbent's type from the observable outcomes.

This paper focuses on the role of political competition as a device for enhancing accountability. The standard model of political agency pays little attention to some of the structural factors that shape the effort making decisions of incumbents. The typical set up is one of single voter whose action decisively can change the control of government between an incumbent and a challenger. For many theoretical purposes, this formulation is fine. Moreover, the model has a certain amount of plausibility when applied to Gubernatorial elections in the U.S. where the framework fits the institutional setting quite well.

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Roemer, John E. 2002. “Does Democracy Engender Equality?”.Abstract

Many suppose that democracy is an ethos which requires, inter alia, a degree of economic equality among citizens. In contrast, we conceive of democracy as ruthless electoral competition between groups of citizens, organized into parties. We inquire whether such competition, which we assume to be concerned with distributive matters, will engender economic equality in the long run.

The society consists of an infinite sequence of generations, each comprising adults and their children. Adults care about family consumption and the future wages of their children, which are determined by educational policy and parental human capital. A given generation is characterized by the distribution of human capital of its adults. Parties form and propose policies to redistribute income among households, and to invest in the education of children; the educational policy that is victorious determines the distribution of human capital in the next generation of adults.

The policy space on which parties compete is very large. A political equilibrium concept is proposed which determines two parties endogenously, and their proposed policies in political competition. One party wins the election (stochastically). This process determines a sequence of human–capital distributions over time.

We show that, whether the limit distribution of human capital is one of equality depends upon the nature of intra–party bargaining. If parties are highly ideological, then equality is obtained in the long–run, while if they are opportunist, it is not. This outcome is starkly different from what occurs in a unidimensional Downsian model, which, we argue, shows the necessity of this more complex analysis.

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Hausmann, Ricardo. 2002. “Economic Development as Self-Discovery”.Abstract

In the presence of uncertainty about what a country can be good at producing, there can be great social value to discovering costs of domestic activities because such discoveries can be easily imitated. We develop a general–equilibrium framework for a small open economy to clarify the analytical and normative issues. We highlight two failures of the laissez–faire outcome: there is too little investment and entrepreneurship ex ante, and too much production diversification ex post. Optimal policy consists of counteracting these distortions: to encourage investments in the modern sector ex ante, but to rationalize production ex post. We provide some informal evidence on the building blocks of our model.

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Spiller, Pablo, and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. “The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina”.Abstract

Public policies are the outcomes of complex intertemporal exchanges among politicians. The political institutions of a country constitute the framework within which these transactions are accomplished. We develop a transactions theory to understand the ways in which political institutions affect the transactions that political actors are able to undertake, and hence the quality of the policies that emerge.

We argue that Argentina is a case in which the functioning of political institutions has inhibited the capacity to undertake efficient intertemporal political exchanges. We use positive political theory and transaction cost economics to explain the workings of Argentine political institutions and to show how their operation gives rise to low–quality policies.

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Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2002. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone. Oxford University Press. Publisher's VersionAbstract

What role should America play in the world? What key challenges face us in the century to come, and how should we define our national interests? These questions have been given electrifying new significance in the wake of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.

Not since Rome has any nation had so much economic, cultural, and military power, but that power is still not enough to solve global problems like terrorism, environmental degradation, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction without involving other nations. In The Paradox of American Power, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., focuses on the rise of these and other new challenges and explains clearly why America must adopt a more cooperative engagement with the rest of the world.

The threat of terrorism, Nye argues, is merely the most alarming example of why we must engage in constructive relations with other nations weak and strong. Now more than ever, as technology spreads and non-governmental organizations ranging from transnational corporations to terrorists increase their power, American leadership must reorient itself toward the global community. Further, for many key issues—from international financial stability to drug smuggling and global climate change to terrorism—military power alone cannot ensure success and at times may undermine rather than enhance our objectives. Nye argues convincingly that in the coming century the U.S. will rely less on our military might and more on the power that derives from the appeal of our culture, values and institutions, what he calls our "soft power." But this soft power cannot flourish in a climate in which the U.S. is viewed as selfish and motivated only by self-interest.

The Paradox of American Power contains the essential roadmap for maintaining America's power and reducing its vulnerability in the years to come. Sure to be controversial, it's a must read for anyone wishing to understand the complicated world in which we suddenly find ourselves.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 2002. “Europe Without Illusions.” Les Relations transantiques. Third Spaak Foundation - Harvard University Conference.Abstract

Future historians may someday look back on the 1990s as the decade when Europeans began to view the European Union without illusions. Although the core of European integration has always been pragmatic, functional cooperation of a largely economic nature—trade liberalization, regulatory harmonization, financial openness—the project was assisted by the existence of a “permissive consensus” of favorable public opinion, which permitted centrist political parties to satisfy the economic demands of powerful producer groups while justifying their actions with arguments about the role of the EU in promoting regional democracy and peace. As a result, European political elites only rarely criticized the EU. In recent years more open skepticism has been voiced. The first part of this essay evaluates the views of five leading European statesmen and thinkers, found in their Spaak lectures at Harvard University, on this issue: Ralf Dahrendorf, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Roy Jenkins, George Papandreou and Renato Ruggiero. The second part evaluates the most serious of recent criticisms of the EU, namely that it is democratically illegitimate. Concern about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ is in fact misplaced. Judged against the practices of existing advanced industrial democracies, rather than an ideal plebiscitary or parliamentary democracy, the EU is legitimate. Its institutions are tightly constrained by constitutional checks and balances: narrow mandates, fiscal limits, super-majoritarian and concurrent voting requirements and separation of powers. The EU's appearance of exceptional insulation reflects the subset of functions it performs – central banking, constitutional adjudication, civil prosecution, economic diplomacy and technical administration. These are matters of low electoral salience commonly delegated in national systems, for normatively justifiable reasons. On balance, the EU redresses rather than creates biases in political representation, deliberation and output.

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Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2002. “The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians: How America Should Wield Its Power”. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Shortly after September 11th, President Bush's father observed that just as Pearl Harbor awakened this country from the notion that we could somehow avoid the call of duty to defend freedom in Europe and Asia in World War Two, so, too, should this most recent surprise attack erase the concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism or in anything else for that matter.

But America's allies have begun to wonder whether that is the lesson that has been learned - or whether the Afghanistan campaign's apparent success shows that unilateralism works just fine. The United States, that argument goes, is so dominant that it can largely afford to go it alone.

It is true that no nation since Rome has loomed so large above the others, but even Rome eventually collapsed. Only a decade ago, the conventional wisdom lamented an America in decline. Bestseller lists featured books that described America's fall. Japan would soon become "Number One". That view was wrong at the time, and when I wrote "Bound to Lead" in 1989, I, like others, predicted the continuing rise of American power. But the new conventional wisdom that America is invincible is equally dangerous if it leads to a foreign policy that combines unilateralism, arrogance and parochialism.

A number of adherents of "realist" international-relations theory have also expressed concern about America's staying-power. Throughout history, coalitions of countries have arisen to balance dominant powers, and the search for traditional shifts in the balance of power and new state challengers is well under way. Some see China as the new enemy; others envisage a Russia-China-India coalition as the threat. But even if China maintains high growth rates of 6% while the United States achieves only 2%, it will not equal the United States in income per head (measured in purchasing-power parity) until the last half of the century.

Still others see a uniting Europe as a potential federation that will challenge the United States for primacy. But this forecast depends on a high degree of European political unity, and a low state of transatlantic relations. Although realists raise an important point about the levelling of power in the international arena, their quest for new cold-war-style challengers is largely barking up the wrong tree. They are ignoring deeper changes in the distribution and nature of power in the contemporary world.

Three kinds of power

At first glance, the disparity between American power and that of the rest of the world looks overwhelming. In terms of military power, the United States is the only country with both nuclear weapons and conventional forces with global reach. American military expenditures are greater than those of the next eight countries combined, and it leads in the information-based "revolution in military affairs". In economic size, America's 31% share of world product (at market prices) is equal to the next four countries combined (Japan, Germany, Britain and France). In terms of cultural prominence, the United States is far and away the number-one film and television exporter in the world. It also attracts the most foreign students each year to its colleges and universities.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some analysts described the resulting world as uni-polar, others as multi-polar. Both are wrong, because each refers to a different dimension of power that can no longer be assumed to be homogenized by military dominance. Uni-polarity exaggerates the degree to which the United States is able to get the results it wants in some dimensions of world politics, but multi-polarity implies, wrongly, several roughly equal countries.

Instead, power in a global information age is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely uni-polar. To repeat, the United States is the only country with both intercontinental nuclear weapons and large state-of-the-art air, naval and ground forces capable of global deployment. But on the middle chessboard, economic power is multi-polar, with the United States, Europe and Japan representing two-thirds of world product, and with China's dramatic growth likely to make it the fourth big player. On this economic board, the United States is not a hegemon, and must often bargain as an equal with Europe.

The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside government control. This realm includes actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets at one extreme, and terrorists transferring weapons or hackers disrupting Internet operations at the other. On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of uni-polarity, multi-polarity or hegemony. Those who recommend a hegemonic American foreign policy based on such traditional descriptions of American power are relying on woefully inadequate analysis. When you are in a three-dimensional game, you will lose if you focus only on the top board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them.

A shrinking and merging world

Because of its leading position in the information revolution and its past investment in traditional power resources, the United States will probably remain the world's most powerful single country well into this new century. While potential coalitions to check American power could be created, it is unlikely that they would become firm alliances unless the United States handles its hard coercive power in an overbearing unilateral manner that undermines its soft or attractive power—the important ability to get others to want what you want.

As Josef Joffe, editor of Die Zeit, has written, "Unlike centuries past, when war was the great arbiter, today the most interesting types of power do not come out of the barrel of a gun." Today there is a much bigger payoff in "getting others to want what you want", and that has to do with cultural attraction and ideology, along with agenda-setting and economic incentives for co-operation. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with issues arising from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations.

The real challenges to American power are coming on cat's feet in the night and, ironically, the temptation to unilateralism may ultimately weaken the United States. The contemporary information revolution and the globalization that goes with it are transforming and shrinking the world. At the beginning of this new century, these two forces have combined to increase American power. But, with time, technology will spread to other countries and peoples, and America's relative pre-eminence will diminish.

For example, today the American twentieth of the global population represents more than half the Internet. In a decade or two, Chinese will probably be the dominant language of the Internet. It will not dethrone English as a lingua franca, but at some point in the future the Asian cyber-community and economy will loom larger than the American.

Even more important, the information revolution is creating virtual communities and networks that cut across national borders. Transnational corporations and non-governmental actors (terrorists included) will play larger roles. Many of these organizations will have soft power of their own as they attract citizens into coalitions that cut across national boundaries. It is worth noting that, in the 1990s, a coalition based on NGOs created a landmines treaty against the opposition of the strongest bureaucracy in the strongest country.

September 11th was a terrible symptom of the deeper changes that were already occurring in the world. Technology has been diffusing power away from governments, and empowering individuals and groups to play roles in world politics—including wreaking massive destruction—which were once reserved to governments. Privatization has been increasing, and terrorism is the privatization of war. Globalization is shrinking distance, and events in faraway places, like Afghanistan, can have a great impact on American lives.

At the end of the cold war, many observers were haunted by the spectre of the return of American isolationism. But in addition to the historic debate between isolationists and internationalists, there was a split within the internationalist camp between unilateralists and multilateralists. Some, like the columnist Charles Krauthammer, urge a "new unilateralism" whereby the United States refuses to play the role of "docile international citizen" and unashamedly pursues its own ends. They speak of a uni-polar world because of America's unequalled military power. But military power alone cannot produce the outcomes Americans want on many of the issues that matter to their safety and prosperity.

As an assistant secretary of defense in 1994-95, I would be the last to deny the importance of military security. It is like oxygen. Without it, all else pales. America's military power is essential to global stability and an essential part of the response to terrorism. But the metaphor of war should not blind us to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient, unspectacular civilian co-operation with other countries. The military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem, and al-Qaeda retains cells in some 50 countries. Rather than proving the unilateralists' point, the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for co-operation.

The perils of going alone

The problem for Americans in the 21st century is that more and more things fall outside the control of even the most powerful state. Although the United States does well on the traditional measures, there is increasingly more going on in the world that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing in a way that means Americans cannot achieve all their international goals by acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the co-operation of others to ensure it. Global climate change too will affect Americans' quality of life, but the United States cannot manage the problem alone. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, America must mobilize international coalitions to address shared threats and challenges.

The barbarian threat

In light of these new circumstances, how should the only superpower guide its foreign policy in a global information age? Some Americans are tempted to believe that the United States could reduce its vulnerability if it withdrew troops, curtailed alliances and followed a more isolationist foreign policy. But isolationism would not remove the vulnerability. The terrorists who struck on September 11th were not only dedicated to reducing American power, but wanted to break down what America stands for. Even if the United States had a weaker foreign policy, such groups would resent the power of the American economy which would still reach well beyond its shores. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism, which some see as anathema.

Moreover, American popular culture has a global reach regardless of what the government does. There is no escaping the influence of Hollywood, CNN and the Internet. American films and television express freedom, individualism and change, but also sex and violence. Generally, the global reach of American culture helps to enhance America's soft power. But not, of course, with everyone. Individualism and liberties are attractive to many people but repulsive to some, particularly fundamentalists. American feminism, open sexuality and individual choices are profoundly subversive of patriarchal societies. But those hard nuggets of opposition are unlikely to catalyze broad hatred unless the United States abandons its values and pursues arrogant and overbearing policies that let the extremists appeal to the majority in the middle.

On the other hand, those who look at the American preponderance, see an empire, and urge unilateralism, risk an arrogance that alienates America's friends. Granted, there are few pure multilateralists in practice, and multilateralism can be used by smaller states to tie the United States down like Gulliver among the Lilliputians, but this does not mean that a multilateral approach is not generally in America's interests. By embedding its policies in a multilateral framework, the United States can make its disproportionate power more legitimate and acceptable to others. No large power can afford to be purely multilateralist, but that should be the starting point for policy. And when that great power defines its national interests broadly to include global interests, some degree of unilateralism is more likely to be acceptable. Such an approach will be crucial to the longevity of American power.

At the moment, the United States is unlikely to face a challenge to its pre-eminence from other states unless it acts so arrogantly that it helps the others to overcome their built-in limitations. The greater challenge for the United States will be to learn how to work with other countries to control more effectively the non-state actors that will increasingly share the stage with nation-states. How to control the bottom chessboard in a three-dimensional game, and how to make hard and soft power reinforce each other are the key foreign policy challenges. As Henry Kissinger has argued, the test of history for this generation of American leaders will be whether they can turn the current predominant power into an international consensus and widely-accepted norms that will be consistent with American values and interests as America's dominance ebbs later in the century. And that cannot be done unilaterally.

Rome succumbed not to the rise of a new empire, but to internal decay and a death of a thousand cuts from various barbarian groups. While internal decay is always possible, none of the commonly cited trends seem to point strongly in that direction at this time. Moreover, to the extent it pays attention, the American public is often realistic about the limits of their country's power. Nearly two-thirds of those polled oppose, in principle, the United States acting alone overseas without the support of other countries. The American public seems to have an intuitive sense for soft power, even if the term is unfamiliar.

On the other hand, it is harder to exclude the barbarians. The dramatically decreased cost of communication, the rise of transnational domains (including the Internet) that cut across borders, and the "democratization" of technology that puts massive destructive power into the hands of groups and individuals, all suggest dimensions that are historically new. In the last century, Hitler, Stalin and Mao needed the power of the state to wreak great evil. As the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security observed last year, "Such men and women in the 21st century will be less bound than those of the 20th by the limits of the state, and less obliged to gain industrial capabilities in order to wreak havoc... Clearly the threshold for small groups or even individuals to inflict massive damage on those they take to be their enemies is falling dramatically."

Since this is so, homeland defense takes on a new importance and a new meaning. If such groups were to obtain nuclear materials and produce a series of events involving great destruction or great disruption of society, American attitudes might change dramatically, though the direction of the change is difficult to predict. Faced with such a threat, a certain degree of unilateral action, such as the war in Afghanistan, is justified if it brings global benefits. After all, the British navy reduced the scourge of piracy well before international conventions were signed in the middle of the 19th century.

Number one, but...

The United States is well placed to remain the leading power in world politics well into the 21st century. This prognosis depends upon assumptions that can be spelled out. For example, it assumes that the American economy and society will remain robust and not decay; that the United States will maintain its military strength, but not become over-militarized; that Americans will not become so unilateral and arrogant in their strength that they squander the nation's considerable fund of soft power; that there will not be some catastrophic series of events that profoundly transforms American attitudes in an isolationist direction; and that Americans will define their national interest in a broad and far-sighted way that incorporates global interests. Each of these assumptions can be questioned, but they currently seem more plausible than their alternatives.

If the assumptions hold, America will remain number one. But number one "ain't gonna be what it used to be." The information revolution, technological change and globalization will not replace the nation-state but will continue to complicate the actors and issues in world politics. The paradox of American power in the 21st century is that the largest power since Rome cannot achieve its objectives unilaterally in a global information age.

Simmons, Beth A. 2002. “To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO”.Abstract

This paper seeks to understand the factors that cause disputes at the World Trade Organization to move from the negotiation stage to the panel stage. We hypothesize that transfer payments between states are costly to arrange and that the lowest–cost transfers are those that relate directly to the issue in dispute. This implies that when the subject matter of the dispute has an all–or–nothing character and leaves little room for compromise (for example, health and safety regulations), the parties? ability to reach an agreement through the use of transfers is restricted. In contrast, if the subject matter of dispute permits greater flexibility (for example, tariff rates), the parties can more easily structure appropriate transfer payments through adjustments to the disputed variable. We conduct an empirical test of this hypothesis, finding support for it among democratic states.

Reich, Michael R. 2002. “Ethical Analysis in Public Health”.Abstract

Public–health regularly encounters serious ethical dilemmas, such as rationing scarce resources, influencing individuals to change their behaviour, and limiting freedom to diminish disease transmission. Yet unlike medical ethics, there is no agreed–upon framework for analysing these difficulties. We offer such a framework. It distinguishes three philosophical views, often invoked in public–health discourse: positions based on outcomes (utilitarianism), positions focused on rights and opportunities (liberalism), and views that emphasise character and virtue (communitarianism). We explore critical variations within each approach, and identify practical problems that arise in addressing the ethical dimensions of health policy. We conclude by examining challenges posed by the feminist argument of ethics–of–care and by postmodern views about the nature of ethics. Health professionals need enhanced skills in applied philosophy to improve the coherence, transparency, and quality of public deliberations over ethical issues inherent in health policy.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2002. “Lessons from Afghanistan”. Publisher's VersionAbstract

The battle in east Afghanistan is winding down, and President Bush has offered to train other governments for the second stage in the war on terrorism. Though the American military officials assure us that much remains to be done in Afghanistan, the lessons of the campaign are already being drawn. And, before they become engraved in conventional wisdom, we should distinguish the accurate lessons from the misleading ones.

Most important, in an age of globalization, the United States cannot ignore problems in distant regions. During the Cold War, we thought Afghanistan important enough to support its struggle against the Soviet invasion. During the 1990s, to the extent that we noticed the deteriorating conditions, we felt it was not our affair. Yet we learned on Sept. 11 that events in poor countries half way around the world can do us great harm. Our military success in Afghanistan has shown clearly to any state ready to support terrorism that this is no longer a safe option.

Terrorism is to this century what piracy was to an earlier era when some governments gave pirates and privateers safe harbor to earn revenues or harass their enemies. In this era, some states have harbored terrorists in order to attack their enemies or because they were too weak to control powerful fanatical groups.

For too long our country simply looked the other way on the mistaken assumption that such alliances would have little world consequence. The United States and its allies must consistently condemn state support for terrorism and use the stick of the Afghanistan campaign to demonstrate the consequences that can befall these states.

The success to date in Afghanistan also shows that force can be used effectively and with discrimination even in difficult settings. Although there were civilian casualties, the combination of US Special Forces on the ground and precision air power proved to be a powerful one.

On the other hand, we would be mistaken if we concluded that the Afghanistan formula can fit all sizes and situations. The Northern Alliance provided important proxy forces already on the scene, and without them, air power would not have been sufficient.

Indeed, some military critics believe that the United States failure to insert more of its own ground forces led to the failure to capture Al Qaeda fighters in the battle of the Tora Bora caves. We also have to realize that the last act in Afghanistan is far from over, and more outside forces will be needed to keep the peace if our success is not to erode.

Perhaps the most dangerous lesson learned is by those in the administration and outside commentators who believe that Afghanistan shows that unilateralism works.

It is true that the United States accomplished the military tasks with little help from allies except Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Britain. But the lesson is misleading because it implies that there is a purely military solution to the war on terrorism.

According to the CIA, while the fighting in Afghanistan toppled the Taliban government, it killed or captured less than a quarter to a third of the Al Qaeda network.

The military success in Afghanistan dealt with the tip of the iceberg of terrorist threats. Al Qaeda retains cells in some 50 countries, few susceptible to military solutions. We are not about to bomb Rome, Hamburg, or Jakarta.

And Al Qaeda is not the only transnational terrorist organization. Suppressing terrorism will take years of patient international civilian cooperation involving intelligence sharing, police work, tracing financial flows, customs and immigration. Rather than proving the unilateralists' point, the partial success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for international cooperation.

Sept. 11 was a terrible symptom of deeper changes occurring in the world. Technology has been diffusing power away from governments and empowering individuals and groups. With the use of desktop computers and the Internet, terrorist networks can now exchange high-tech secrets and coordinate complex campaigns across continents that only governments could conduct 20 years ago.

Privatization has been increasing, and terrorism is the privatization of war. Nor is terrorism the only issue. Many other important problems that can cause great harm&madash;such as international financial instability, global climate change, or the spread of diseases—are inherently multilateral.

The ultimate lesson of Afghanistan is that the United States is so large that these crucial problems cannot be solved without us, but we are not large enough to solve them alone.

Kelman, Herbert C. 2002. “Needed: A Manifesto for Mideast Peace”. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Israel and the Palestinian territories are on the brink of an all-out war with disastrous consequences for these two traumatized nations.

The Israeli government and the Palestinian street are controlled by elements that see such a war as an opportunity to achieve their maximalist goals. Under the circumstances, there is a compelling need for vigorous intervention by outside powers—the Arab League, the European Union, the United Nations, and, perhaps most important, the United States—to pull the parties away from the brink and back to the negotiating table.

Outside intervention, however, cannot by itself restore the working trust required for negotiating an agreement conducive to the stable peace and mutually enhancing relationship between the two nations on which their survival in the small land they share ultimately depends. To succeed, the outside intervention must be accompanied by creative, courageous acts of leadership emanating from the two societies themselves.

The most likely candidates to perform such leadership roles are the two surviving members of the triad that received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994: Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat and Israel's Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Both men have suffered losses in power and prestige. Both have been criticized for their roles in legitimizing the extremes of violence in their respective communities.

And yet they are probably the only leaders with the authority and the domestic and international standing to take the initiative proposed here.

The scenario I envisage calls for a meeting or a series of meetings between the two men (and a small number of close advisers) in Arafat's headquarters in Ramallah. Refusal by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to authorize such an initiative would provide the appropriate moment for Peres to resign from the government: He would be resigning in pursuit of an initiative with the potential for achieving a dramatic breakthrough.

The meetings between the two leaders would aim to produce a joint manifesto with the following components: First, a call for an end to the violence and for the resumption of negotiations designed to achieve a just solution to the conflict, addressing the fundamental needs of both parties.

Second, a commitment to the final outcome of the negotiations: an agreement that would end the conflict on the basis of a historic compromise in the form of a two-state solution.

Third, a delineation of the broad outlines of the historic compromise, including: establishment of a viable, independent, and sovereign Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza, with contiguous territory within each of these two units and safe passage between them; acceptance of the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish-majority state with the proviso that it assure full democratic rights for its Arab minority; designation of Jerusalem, including the Old City and the holy sites, as a shared city, containing the capitals of both states; and development of a comprehensive, multifaceted solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees, including resettlement and compensation, which would satisfy Palestinians' sense of justice and Israelis' concern about the stability of their state.

Fourth, a specification of the issues that remain to be negotiated within the framework of the historic compromise, such as border adjustments and territorial exchange, arrangements for governance and security of a shared Jerusalem, and procedures for addressing both the symbolic and the practical aspects of a solution for the refugee problem. Finally, an unambiguous and honest account of the costs that a historic compromise would entail for both peoples, stressing, in particular, the need to recognize that Israeli dreams of settling Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and Palestinian dreams of returning in large numbers to the homes they lost in 1948 cannot be realized.

A manifesto along these lines would demonstrate to the Israeli and Palestinian publics that there are courageous leaders who are prepared to commit themselves to a historic compromise and honestly spell out its implications. It would help revive the belief in each community that there is a credible negotiating partner on the other side and that there is a mutually acceptable formula for a final agreement.

The manifesto would gain symbolic strength if Arafat and Peres dedicated it to the memory of their fellow Nobelist, Yitzhak Rabin, who paid with his life for the pursuit of a historic compromise and whose assassination was a major contributing factor to deterioration of the peace process.

Simmons, Beth A. 2002. “International Organizations and Institutions”.Abstract

International institutions have become an increasingly common phenomenon of international life. The proliferation of international organizations (IOs) (Shanks et al., 1996), the growth in treaty arrangements among states (Goldstein et al., 2000) and the deepening of regional integration efforts in Europe all represent formal expressions of the extent to which international politics has become more institutionalized.

The scholarship on international institutions has burgeoned in response. Moreover, in the past decade, theories devoted to understanding why institutions exist, how they have functioned and what effects they have on world politics have become increasingly refined and the methods employed in empirical work more sophisticated. The purpose of this chapter is to draw together this divergent literature, to offer observations on the development of its various theoretical strands and to examine progress on the empirical front. We predict that a broad range of theoretical traditions – realist, rational functionalist, constructivist – will exist alongside one another for many years to come, and offer some suggestions on research strategies that might contribute to a better empirical base from which to judge more abstract claims.

In Handbook of International Relations (1st edition) edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons. Sage Publications Ltd., March 13, 2002.
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Tambiah, Stanley J. 2002. Edmund Leach: An Anthropological Life. Cambridge University Press. Publisher's VersionAbstract

Edmund Leach is widely regarded as the outstanding figure in Cambridge archaeology in the second half of the twentieth century, and as one of the leading social anthropologists of his generation. Stanley Tambiah's intellectual biography covers his professional career and reviews his writings. The work is organized chronologically—providing an introductory assessment as well as a closing portrait. Two brief chapters discuss Leach's early years, but the bulk of the book deals with his anthropological projects.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna, and Pauline Jones Luong. 2002. “The Ignored Transition: Post-Communist State Development”.Abstract

This study reconceptualizes theories of the state in light of post–communist developments. After the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, scholars overlooked a central aspect of the transition: the need to reconstruct public authority, or state–building. Likewise, theorists of the state have largely ignored the post–communist challenge to existing theories of state capacity and development. Post–communist state development is characterized by the need to reconstruct public authority, or state–building. Two aspects of this process determine subsequent state trajectories: a) the representativeness of elite competition (that is, whether elites compete by representing constituencies, or in self-contained elite conflicts), and b) the mechanisms of elite competition (that is, whether it is channeled via formal institutions, or informal networks and ties.)

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WCFIA Working Paper 02–02, March 2002.

Frankel, Jeffrey. 2002. “You're Getting Warmer: The Most Feasible Path for Addressing Global Climate Change Does Run Through Kyoto”.Abstract

When I first arrived at the White House in September 1996, I had no idea that one of the issues on which I would spend the most time during my period as a Member of President Clinton?s Council of Economic Advisers was global climate change. But Under Secretary of State Tim Wirth had the month before announced a major change in policy: that the United States would in multilateral negotiations now support "legally binding" quantitative targets for the emission of greenhouse gases. This left 15 months for the US Administration to decide what kind of specifics it wanted, at the Third Conference of Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), scheduled for November 1997 in Kyoto. Because other countries take their cue from the superpower (whether it is to support or oppose US positions), this countdown engendered a certain amount of suspense: What specifically would the U.S. propose at the Kyoto Conference, most notably regarding how the numerical targets should be determined? Outsiders demanded to know –with particular tenacity in the case of the U.S. Congress, who feared the worst. I was a member of a large inter–agency group that worked intensively on what was to become the Kyoto Protocol.

I never thought that the agreement had a large chance of being ratified by the U.S. Senate, or of coming into force in a serious way. There were too many unbridgeable political chasms, as I will explain. Furthermore I understand the reasons why almost all economists, at least in the United States, disapprove of the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, I am prepared to defend the Clinton version of the treaty, and I believe it was a step in the right direction.

I will begin by noting that the weight of scientific opinion seems indeed to have concluded that the Earth is getting warmer, that increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are the major cause, and that anthropogenic emissions are in turn responsible. I am not a scientist. But the latest IPCC report concludes "The globally averaged surface temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius" over the period 1990 to 2100, and "global mean sea level is projected to rise by 0.09 to 0.88 metres." The evidence has become clearer over the last ten or twenty years. President George Bush, the Second, made a big mistake when he initially allied himself with the minority of disbelievers. It was a political mistake if nothing else. Even granting that the incoming administration in 2001 did not want to pursue Kyoto, it was foolish and unnecessary for the White House to dismiss the climate change problem.

This paper will take as given that the problem of global climate change is genuine, and is sufficiently important to be worth addressing by steps that are more than cosmetic. Because the externality is purely global – a ton of carbon emitted into the air, no matter where in the world, has the same global warming potential – the approach must be multilateral. Individual countries will not get far on their own, due to the free rider problem. Specifically, multilateral negotiations have since the Rio Summit of 1992 proceeded under the UNFCCC.

The paper will summarize major decisions that the Clinton Administration had to make, and why it made them as it did. What were the quantitative limits on emissions to be? How would greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide be treated? Would trading across time or across countries be permitted? And so on. In my time in the government, I was surprised to discover that policy makers often must make such technical–sounding decisions with relatively little help from the body of technical knowledge and opinion outside the government. It is not just that academic research is too abstract to be of much direct help with the minutia of specific policy decisions. The pronouncements of think tanks and op–ed writers also ignore practical complexities, because they seek to make big points for general audiences. We were largely on our own.

Robinson, James A. 2002. “The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve”.Abstract

The paper provides a political economy theory of the Kuznets curve. When development leads to increasing inequality, this can induce political instability and force democratization on political elites. Democratization leads to institutional changes which encourage redistribution and reduce inequality. Nevertheless, development does not necessarily induce a Kuznets curve, and it is shown that development may be associated with two types of nondemocratic paths: an "autocratic disaster," with high inequality and low output, and an "East Asian Miracle," with low inequality and high output. These arise either because inequality does not increase with development, or because the degree of political mobilization is low.

Reich, Michael R. 2002. “Reshaping the State from Above, from Within, from Below: Implications for Public Health”.Abstract

The modern state is being reshaped by multiple forces acting simultaneously. From above, the state is actively constrained by agreements promoted by international agencies and by the power of multinational corporations. From within, the state is being reshaped by increasing trends toward marketization and by problems of corruption. From below, the state's role is being diminished by the expansion of decentralization and by the rising influence of non–governmental organizations. This article explores these three sets of processes — from above, from within, and from below — and suggests some implications for public health. Public health professionals require an understanding of the changing nature of the state, because of the consequences for thinking about the metaphors, solutions, and strategies for public health.