This article makes a conceptual and theoretical contribution to the study of diffusion. The authors suggest that the concept of diffusion be reserved for processes (not outcomes)characterized by a certain uncoordinated interdependence. Theoretically, the authors identify the principal sources of clustered policy reforms. They then clarify the characteristics specific to diffusion mechanisms and introduce a categorization of such processes. In particular, they make a distinction between two types of diffusion: adaptation and learning. They argue that this categorization adds conceptual clarity and distinguishes mechanisms with distinct substantive consequences. Keywords: diffusion; clustering; convergence; policy reform; adaptation; learning; cluster decision making.
This article reviews arguments in favour of a formal, written constitution for Europe, and concludes with a better suggestion – a Basic European Law. The article also criticizes the wholehearted embrace of ?popular constitution–making?. It does so by drawing on comparative evidence from constitution–making processes in various his–torical time periods and world regions. It poses three essential questions to organize the debate. First, why a European constitution? Second, what kind of European con–stitution? Third, how a European constitution?
For 188 independent countries in 2000, 72 had no state religion in 2000, 1970, and 1900; 58 had a state religion at all three dates; and 58 had some kind of transition. Among the 58 transitional countries, 12 had 2 transitions, 4 of which (former Soviet Republics in Asia) involved different forms of state religion. We use a Hotelling-type spatial competition model with a distribution of religion preferences to think about when the religion market would be monopolized. In this model, we can assess how changes in exogenous variables affect the likelihood of monopoly. We argue that these predictions carry over to a political setting in which the government decides whether to institute a state religion.
The absence of a regional military alliance in Asia, and the related tendency of Asian regional institutions to avoid multilateral defence cooperation constitute a key puzzle of Asian regional order. Available theoretical explanations of this puzzle tend to focus heavily on the US role, either the nature and extent of US power, or its perceptions of collective identity. Challenging this, this paper offers a normative explanation. The absence of a "NATO in Asia", argues this paper, is explained by a norm against collective defence which emerged and evolved through early post–war regional interactions. These interactions, which have been ignored in the theoretical literature on international organization, were shaped by the interplay of the ideas of key local agents, and the evolving global norm of non–intervention. The paper's investigation into the normative origins Asian multilateralism contributes to the theoretical literature on the diffusion of sovereignty norms in the international system. International relations scholars generally assume that the "history of sovereignty is largely the history of Westphalia's geographic extension," but ignore the crucial agency of local actors in the developing world in translating the idea of sovereignty into norms of conduct in a regional setting. This article shows how regional interactions in early post–War Asia that led to a regional norm against collective defence, also helped to strengthen the global norm of non–intervention, and shaped subsequent regional institutions in Asia. In this process, Asian interactions made a distinctive contribution to the evolution of post–war international order, which has been seldom acknowledged, much less analyzed, by scholars of international relations.
Revealing that the key to successful economic development in late industrializers rests in the state's capacity to discipline capitalists, this study sheds light on why certain countries (South Korea and Taiwan) have the capacity to discipline capitalists, while others (Mexico and Argentina) find themselves at the receiving end of industrialists' political and economic power. Closer examination of middle classes, especially rural middle classes, reveals the extent to which they achieve sufficient political sway in politics and society, and thus are able to impose such discipline.