CAMBRIDGE, Mass. -- The America of six decades ago now seems achingly familiar. The attack on Pearl Harbor, like the attacks of Sept. 11, evoked feelings of pride and citizenship - as well as anxiety and helplessness - in every American. In the days and weeks following Dec. 7, 1941, Americans sought meaning and comfort in their communities, just as we do now. And we can find inspiration in the very institutions and practices they created 60 years ago.A durable community cannot be built on mere images of disaster, however vivid or memorable. It arises from countless individual acts of concern and solidarity. Television images of ash-covered firefighters cannot create community bonds any more than radio reports of burning battleships could.What created the civic community in the United States in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor? The victory gardens in nearly everyone's backyard, the Boy Scouts at filling stations collecting floor mats for scrap rubber, the affordable war bonds, the practice of giving rides to hitchhiking soldiers and war workers - all these taught "the greatest generation" an enduring lesson in civic involvement.Their involvement was as varied as it was deep. The Civilian Defense Corps grew to 12 million Americans in mid-1943, from 1.2 million in 1942. In Chicago, 16,000 block captains in the corps took an oath of allegiance in a mass ceremony; they practiced first aid, supervised blackouts and planned gas decontamination. Nationwide, Red Cross volunteers swelled to 7.5 million in 1945, from 1.1 million in 1940. By 1943, volunteers at 4,300 civilian-defense volunteer offices were fixing school lunches, providing day care and organizing scrap drives.
All these endeavors represented cooperation between the federal government and civic society. Sometimes the government merely offered encouragement and approval, as it did with the victory gardens. Often it played an active role, or even the prime role. The United States financed the war effort in part through small-denomination war bonds sold to the general public, not because it was economically efficient - Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau conceded it wasn't - but because of the importance of weaving the actions of millions of Americans together in pursuit of larger national goals.America's young people, especially, were taught practical civic lessons. Over a two-year period, the historian Richard Lingeman writes in his book "Don't You Know There's a War On?" eighth graders in Gary, Ind., were especially busy. They sold an average of $40,000 worth of war stamps a month. They campaigned against buying black-market goods. They took auxiliary fire- and police-training courses. They held tin-can drives. And this was just in one medium-sized Midwestern city.Such sacrifice was reinforced by popular culture from radio shows to comic strips. All Americans felt they had to do their share, thereby enhancing each American's sense that her commitment and contribution mattered. As one said later in an oral history of the home front: "You just felt that the stranger sitting next to you in a restaurant, or someplace, felt the same way you did about the basic issues."Society is different now, of course, as is the war we are fighting. Americans have become more transient, and involvement in civic institutions is in decline. The war itself involves far fewer Americans in battle; it creates few material hardships; the enemy is largely invisible. Nonetheless, we can take action to ensure that this resurgence of community involvement continues.Since Sept. 11, we Americans have surprised ourselves in our solidarity. Roughly a quarter of all Americans, and more than a third of all New Yorkers, report giving blood in the aftermath of the attacks. Financial donations for the victims and their rescuers have reached almost $1 billion. Attendance at places of worship has increased.
Still, underneath all this mutual concern lies an unsettling question: Will this new mood last?I believe it can. Even 60 years ago, civic involvement took hold and flourished only with government support. It was not all spontaneous. This is both instructive and reassuring; instructive because it shows that the most selfless civic duties cannot be performed without government help, reassuring because it shows us a path toward a more civil society today.President Bush's recent call to America's children and teenagers to wash cars or rake yards to earn money to benefit the children of Afghanistan was well-intentioned. But government can do more. It should urge America's religious congregations to plan interfaith services over Thanksgiving weekend. It should also expand national service programs like AmeriCorps. And just as those Boy Scouts at filling stations learned firsthand the value of civic life, this new period of crisis can make real to us and our children the value of deeper community connections.
This book brings together a diverse group of experts on international monetary policy to examine the basic conceptual issues of currency unions and other monetary regimes, including flexible and fixed exchange rates, and assess the available empirical evidence on the performance of these alternative monetary systems. They also draw some policy conclusions on the desirability of currency unions for countries in various circumstances.Currency Unions reviews the traditional case for flexible exchange rates and countercyclical?that is, expansionary during recessions and contractionary in booms monetary policy and shows how flexible exchange rate regimes can better insulate the economy from such real disturbances as terms-of-trade shocks. The book also looks at the pitfalls of flexible exchange rates and why fixed rates, particularly full dollarization might be a more sensible choice for some emerging-market countries. The contributors also detail the factors that determine the optimal sizes of currency unions, explain how a currency union greatly expands the volume of international trade among its members, and examine the recent implementation of dollarization in Ecuador.
This paper outlines our initial thoughts on treating identity as a variable. It is part of a longer-term project
to develop conceptualizations of identity and, more importantly, to develop technologies for observing
identity and identity change that will have wide application in the social sciences. Heretofore the usual
techniques for analyzing identity have consisted of non-replicable discourse analysis or lengthy individual
interviews, at one extreme, or the use of large-N surveys at the other. Yet, much social science research
relies on historical and contemporaneous texts. Specifically we hope to develop computer-aided
quantitative and qualitative methods for analyzing a large number of textual sources in order to determine
the content, intensity, and contestation of individual and collective identities at any particular point in time
and space. These methods will allow researchers to use identity in a more rigorous and replicable way as an
independent (and dependent) variable in a wide variety of research projects. They will also allow more
rigorous testing among identity-based hypotheses—such as those drawing on social identity theory, role
theory, or cognitive theories—along with other variables in explaining behavior. Researchers may also be
able to develop early warning indicators that might be used to track growing intensity of out-group
differentiation, a development which makes subjected groups more susceptible to identity-based
mobilization for conflict. Perhaps most important, scholars will, using these methods, be able to observe
more systematically the contestation and construction of identity over time.
Paper prepared for presentation at APSA, August 30–September 2, 2001, San Francisco. Download PDF
Social science theories of contentious politics have been based almost exclusively on evidence drawn from the European and American experience, and classic texts in the field make no mention of either the Chinese Communist revolution or the Cultural Revolution—surely two of the most momentous social movements of the twentieth century. China's record of popular upheaval, moreover, stretches back well beyond this century, indeed all the way back to the third century B.C. This is a direct effect of the Confucian "mandate of heaven" which bestowed instant legitimacy on successful rebel leaders. This book, by bringing together studies of protest that span the Imperial, Republican, and Communist eras, introduces Chinese patterns and provides a forum to consider ways in which contentious politics in China might serve to reinforce, refine or reshape theories derived from Western cases.
This paper — a revision of an earlier draft that was entitled "When Do Special Interests Run Rampant? Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises" — develops and tests a model of the effect of political checks and balances on the incentives of elected veto players to cater to special interests. A larger number of veto players reduces political incentives to make deals with special interests, but the effect is declining in the rents available from such deals. Evidence from country responses to banking crises supports these conclusions: governments make smaller fiscal transfers to the financial sector and are less likely to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions the larger the number of political veto players, conditional on the value of rents at stake. This simple explanation for special interest influence is robust to controls for more subtle institutional effects that are prominent in the literature, including the competitiveness of elections, regime type (presidential versus parliamentary) and electoral rules (majoritarian versus proportional).
Working Paper, Social Science Research Network, Development Research Group, The World Bank, October 2001.Download PDF
It is widely accepted, not least in the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), that the purpose of the world trade regime is to raise living standards all around the world — rather than to maximize trade per se. Increasingly, however, the WTO and multilateral lending agencies have come to view these two goals — promoting development and maximizing trade — as synonymous, to the point where the latter easily substitutes for the former. The net result is a confounding of ends and means. Trade has become the lens through which development is perceived, rather than the other way around. Imagine a trading regime in which trade rules are determined so as to maximize development potential, particularly that of the poorest nations in the world. Instead of asking, "How do we maximize trade and market access?" negotiators would ask, "How do we enable countries to grow out of poverty?" Would such a regime look different than the one that exists currently? The answer depends on how one interprets recent economic history and the role that trade openness plays in the course of economic development. The prevailing view in G7 capitals and multilateral lending agencies is that economic growth is dependent upon integration into the global economy. Successful integration in turn requires both enhanced market access in the advanced industrial countries and a range of institutional reforms at home (ranging from legal and administrative reform to safety nets) to render economic openness viable and growth – promoting. This can be ca lled the "enlightened standard view" – enlightened because of its recognition that there is more to integration than simply lowering tariff and non–tariff barriers to trade, and standard because it represents the conventional wisdom.In this conception, the WTO ’s focus on expanding market access and deepening integration through the harmonization of a wide range of "trade–related" practices is precisely what development requires. This paper presents an alternative account of economic development, one which questions the centrality of trade and trade policy and emphasizes instead the critical role of domestic institutional innovations. It argues that economic growth is rarely sparked by imported blueprints and opening up the economy is hardly ever critical at the outset. Initial reforms instead tend to combine unconventional institutional innovations with some elements from the orthodox recipe. They are country–specific, based on local knowledge and experimentation. They are targeted to domestic investors and tailored to domestic institutional realities.
A straightforward extension of the standard Stigler–Peltzman model of regulation, coupled with the Taagepera–Shugart analysis of electoral–system effects, suggests: (a) that the greater the seat–vote elasticities of majoritarian electoral systems will tilt policy in favor of consumers, while proportional systems should strengthen producers; and (b)that the pro–consumer bias of majoritarian systems should be manifested in systematically lower prices. Empirical tests, controlling for structural determinants of national price levels established in the earlier "law of one price" literature, establish majoritarian electoral systems as a significant and robust predictor, lowering national price levels in the mean OECD country by between ten and seventeen percent.
In overlapping–generations models of public goods provision, in which the contribution decision is binary and lifetimes are finite, the set of symmetric subgame–perfect equilibria can be categorized into three types: seniority equilibria in which players contribute (effort) until a predetermined age and then shirk thereafter; dependency equilibria in which players initially shirk, then contribute for a set number of periods, then shirk for the remainder of their lives; and sabbatical equilibria in which players alternately contribute and shirk for periods of varying length before entering a final stage of shirking. In a world without discounting we establish conditions for equilibrium and demonstrate that for any dependency equilibrium there is a seniority equilibrium that Pareto–dominates it ex ante. We proceed to characterize generational preferences over alternative seniority equilibria. We explore the aggregation of these preferences by embedding the public goods provision game in a voting framework and solving for the majority–rule equilibria. In this way we can think of political processes as providing one natural framework for equilibrium selection in the original public–goods provision game.
The process of European monetary integration varied widely among countries and over time. This paper argues that an important explanation for the evolution of European exchange rate arrangements was the sectoral impact of their expected effects on European trade and investment. In this perspective, the principal benefit of European MI was its expected easing of cross–border trade and investment within the EU, while its principal cost was the loss of national governments' ability to use currency policy to improve the competitive position of their producers. Empirical results indeed indicate that a stronger and more stable currency was associated with variables used as proxies for private economic interests — the importance of manufactured exports to the DM zone, and improvements in net exports. This suggests a powerful impact of private–interest factors in determining national currency policies.
European countries are much more generous to the poor relative to the US level of generosity. Economic models suggest that redistribution is a function of the variance and skewness of the pre–tax income distribution, the volatility of income (perhaps because of trade shocks), the social costs of taxation and the expected income mobility of the median voter. None of these factors appear to explain the differences between the US and Europe. Instead, the differences appear to be the result of racial heterogeneity in the US and American political institutions. Racial animosity in the US makes redistribution to the poor, who are disproportionately black, unappealing to many voters. American political institutions limited the growth of a socialist party, and more generally limited the political power of the poor.
Western US agriculture is an industry that has shaped and been shaped by a peculiar labor policy: the most numerous seasonal workers were assumed to be outsiders who would not remain employed in the industry or live in the community in which they worked for more than 10 to 20 years. Instead of integration policy, the emphasis of farm employers was on how to find new workers willing to accommodate themselves to seasonal employment.
The ideal introduction to U.S.-Mexican relations, The United States and Mexico moves from the conflicts all through the nineteenth century up to the current democratic elections in Mexico. Domínguez and Castro deftly trace the path of the relationship between these North American neighbors from bloody conflict to (wary) partnership. By covering immigration, drug trafficking, NAFTA, democracy, environmental problems and economic instability, this volume provides a thorough look back and an informed vision of the future.
For much of Canadian history, particularly during the critical era of mass migration that straddled the decades of the turn of the century, the government may have welcomed immigrants with an open hand, but that same hand was also forcefully pressing immigrants into a narrowly–defined geographic and economic corner. Indeed, what distinguishes Canadian immigration history during the first half of this century, and makes it so different from that of the United States, is the degree to which Canadian immigration policy and practice was predicated on the notion that the place for non–English speaking immigrants, foreigners as they were commonly called, and for their Canadian–born children and children's children through the generations was in the Canadian hinterland, engaged in farming and extractive labor.
In this paper I argue that there is a significant isomorphism between a host country?s political system and newcomers? participation. During the "first wave" of mass migration to North America from 1880 to 1920 some immigrants brought radical new ideas, significantly influencing worker and socialist movements. The influence of "second wave" immigrants appears more subtle, a careful jockeying for space within existing political structures. I suggest that political institutions exert a selection effect on potential immigrant community leaders both before and after migration. These selection processes reinforce prevailing political discourses and ways of participating.
This book creates a comprehensive understanding of the status of national security in the Middle East. The essays break new ground by integrating five variables into a new national security paradigm: political legitimacy, ethnic and religious tolerance, economic capabilities, availability of essential natural resources, and military capabilities. The impressive group of contributors provides data and analysis on both a country and a regional level to underscore the interrelationships among the variables in the paradigm.
It appears likely that the number of currencies in the world, having proliferated along with the number of countries over the past fifty years, will decline sharply over the next two decades. The question I plan to pose here is, where, from an economic point of view, should we aim for this process to stop? Should there be a single world currency, as Richard Cooper (1984) boldly envisioned? Should there remain multiple major currencies but with a much stricter arrangement among them for stabilizing exchange rates, as say Ronald McKinnon (1984) or John Williamson (1985) recommended? Building on Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (2000b,d), I will argue here that the status quo arrangement among the dollar, yen and the euro (which I take to be benign neglect) is not far from optimal, not only for now but well into the new century. And it would remain a good system even if political obstacles to achieving greater monetary policy coordination – or even a common world currency — could be overcome. Again, this is not a paper on, say, the pros and cons of dollarization for small and medium–sized economies, but rather on arrangements among the core currencies.
This research examines how the expansion of education, and its changing role in labor markets, has shaped employment experiences of newly–arriving immigrants to American and Canadian cities over the period 1970 to 1990. Earlier expansion of education levels in the U.S., particularly in immigrant–intensive cities, lowered the relative employment success of its immigrants compared to those in Canada in the 1970s, while the more recent rapid expansion of education in Canada has reduced this cross–national difference and fostered convergence. Three potential aspects of these effects are examined: (i) higher native–born educational levels create or increase an immigrant skills gap, (ii) the impact on immigrants is magnified by the lower relevance (actual or perceived) of their credentials to employers? requirements, and (iii) associated shifts toward knowledge–based or professionalized occupations alters the credential validation processes in ways which disadvantage immigrants. These effects are conditional upon labor market institutions and processes. Data are drawn from U.S. and Canadian census microdata files for 1980/81 and 1990/91. The impact of educational change on immigrants is shown in inter–temporal decomposition analysis.
My purpose in this essay is to raise some questions about what is involved in
research on political violence. Since 1995 I have conducted ethnographic research in rural
villages throughout Ayacucho, the region of Peru most heavily affected by the war between
the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso, the rondas campesinas (armed peasant patrols) and the
Peruvian armed forces. A key factor motivating my research was a desire to write against
the culture of violence arguments that were used to "explain" the war. The concept of a"culture of violence" or "endemic violence" has frequently been attributed to the Andean
region, particularly to the rural peasants who inhabit the highlands. I wanted to understand
how people make and unmake lethal violence in a particular social and historical context, and
to explore the positioning and responsibilities of an anthropologist who conducts research in
the context of war.