Drawing on the research and experience of fifteen internationally recognized Latin America scholars, this insightful text presents an overview of inter-American relations during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This unique collection identifies broad changes in the international system that have had significant affects in the Western Hemisphere, including issues of politics and economics, the securitization of U.S. foreign policy, balancing U.S. primacy, the wider impact of the world beyond the Americas, especially the rise of China, and the complexities of relationships between neighbors.Contemporary U.S.-Latin American Relations focuses on the near-neighbors of the United States—Mexico, Cuba, the Caribbean and Central America—as well as the larger countries of South America—including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Each chapter addresses a country’s relations with the United States, and each considers themes that are unique to that country’s bilateral relations as well as those themes that are more general to the relations of Latin America as a whole. This cohesive and accessible volume is required reading for Latin American politics students and scholars alike.
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mso-bidi-language:#0400;}The relationship between the processes of economic development and
international human rights standards has been one of parallel and rarely
intersecting tracks of international action. In the last decade of the 20th
century, development thinking shifted from a growth-oriented model to the
concept of human development as a process of enhancing human capabilities, and
the intrinsic links between development and human rights began to be more
readily acknowledged. Specifically, it has been proposed that if strategies of
development and policies to implement human rights are united, they reinforce
one another in processes of synergy and improvement of the human condition.
Such is the premise of the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by
the UN General Assembly in 1986.This book explores the meaning and practical implications of the right to
development and the related term of human rights-based approaches to
development and questions what these conceptions may add to our understanding
and thinking about human and global development. Opening with an essay by Nobel
Laureate in Economic Science Amartya Sen on human rights and development, the
book contains a score of chapters on the conceptual underpinnings of
development as a human right, the national dimensions of this right, and the
role of international institutions. The authors reflect the disciplines of
philosophy, economics, international law, and international relations.
This article will briefly address the future prospects for the dollar as an internationally acceptable denomination for assets, and then discuss the several ways in which the SDR or some other internationally-agreed reserve asset might partially substitute for the US dollar in its international roles, and even eventually replace it. It concludes that there is no practical substitute for the dollar in the near future, meaning the next decade or two; and that while the SDR could be made a substitute for the dollar along several dimensions in the longer run, it would require a major concerted effort by the leading governments of the world to do so.
It is rare for countries to give up their currencies and thus
their ability to influence such critical aspects of their economies as
interest and exchange rates. Yet ten years ago a number of European
countries did exactly that when they adopted the euro. Despite some
dissent, there were a number of arguments in favor of this policy
change: it would facilitate exchange of goods, money, and people by
decreasing costs; it would increase trade; and it would enhance
efficiency and competitiveness at the international level. A
decade is an ideal time frame over which to evaluate the success of the
euro and whether it has lived up to expectations. To that aim, Europe and the Euro
looks at a number of important issues, including the effects of the
euro on reform of goods and labor markets; its influence on business
cycles and trade among members; and whether the single currency has
induced convergence or divergence in the economic performance of member
countries. While adoption of the euro may not have met the expectations
of its most optimistic proponents, the benefits have been many, and
there is reason to believe that the euro is robust enough to survive
recent economic shocks. This volume is an essential reference on the
first ten years of the euro and the workings of a monetary union.
Alesina, Alberto. Europe and the Euro. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
This paper describes and evaluates the system for trading CO2 emission permits introduced by the European Union to encourage the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to help abate climate change. This system represents a live example of a functioning trading system under the so-called cap-and-trade approach to limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Data are fully available for only one year (2008) of the fully functioning system, and that year was influenced by a sharp economic recession in the final months of the year, making evaluation difficult. Preliminary analysis suggests, however, that the trading system made only a limited contribution to reducing CO2 emissions.
In his first speech to the U.N. Security Council, U.S.
President Barack Obama challenged members to think about the impact of a single
nuclear bomb. He said: “Just
one nuclear weapon exploded in a city—be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or
Beijing, London or Paris—could kill hundreds of thousands of people.”
The consequences, he noted, would “destabilize our security, our
economies, and our very way of life.”
Before the Sept. 11, 2001, assault on the World Trade Center
and Pentagon, who could have imagined that terrorists would mount an attack on
the American homeland that would kill more citizens than Japan did at Pearl
Harbor? As then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified
to the 9/11 Commission: “No one could have imagined them taking a
plane, slamming it into the Pentagon ... into the World Trade Center, using
planes as missiles.”
For most Americans, the idea of international
terrorists conducting a successful attack on their homeland, killing thousands
of citizens, was not just unlikely. It was inconceivable.
As is now evident, assertions
about what is “imaginable”
propositions about our minds, not about what is objectively possible.
Prior to 9/11, how unlikely was a megaterrorist attack on
the American homeland? In the previous decade, al Qaeda attacks on the World
Trade Center in 1993, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000 had together killed
almost 250 and injured nearly 6,000. Moreover, the organization was actively
training thousands of recruits in camps in Afghanistan for future terrorist
Thinking about risks we face today, we should reflect on the
major conclusion of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission established to investigate
that catastrophe. The U.S.
national security establishment's principal failure prior to Sept. 11, 2001,
was, the commission found, a “failure of
in a single sentence, the question now is: Are we at risk of an equivalent
failure to imagine a nuclear 9/11? After the recent attempted terrorist attack
on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, this question is more urgent than ever.
The thought that terrorists could successfully explode a
nuclear bomb in an American city killing hundreds of thousands of people seems
incomprehensible. This essential incredulity is rooted in three deeply ingrained
presumptions. First, no one could seriously intend to kill hundreds of thousands
of people in a single attack. Second, only states are capable of mass
destruction; nonstate actors would be unable to build or use nuclear weapons.
Third, terrorists would not be able to deliver a nuclear bomb to an American
city. In a nutshell, these presumptions lead to the conclusion: inconceivable.
Why then does Obama call nuclear terrorism “the single
most important national security threat that we face” and "a threat
that rises above all others in urgency?” Why the unanimity among those who
have shouldered responsibility for U.S. national security in recent years that
this is a grave and present danger? In former CIA Director George Tenet's assessment,
“the main threat is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where [Osama
bin Laden] and his operatives desperately want to go.” When asked recently
what keeps him awake at night, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates answered: “It's
the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction,
Leaders who have reached this
conclusion about the genuine urgency of the nuclear terrorist threat are not
unaware oftheir skeptics'
presumptions. Rather, they have examined the evidence, much of which has been
painstakingly compiled here by Rolf
Mowatt-Larssen, formerhead of the CIA’s terrorism and weapons-of-mass-destruction
efforts, and much of which remains classified. Specifically, who is
seriously motivated to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans? Osama bin Laden,
who has declared his intention to kill “4 million Americans—including 2
The deeply held belief that even if they wanted to, “men
in caves can't do this”
was then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's
view when Tenet flew to Islamabad to see him after 9/11. As Tenet (assisted by
Mowatt-Larssen) took him step by step through the evidence, he discovered that
indeed they could. Terrorists’ opportunities to bring a bomb into the
United States follow the same trails along which 275 tons of drugs and 3
million people crossed U.S. borders illegally last year.
In 2007, Congress established a successor to the 9/11
Commission to focus on terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. This
bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
issued its report
to Congress and the Obama administration in December 2008. In the commission's
unanimous judgment: “it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass
destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the
end of 2013.”
Faced with the possibility of an American Hiroshima, many
Americans are paralyzed by a combination of denial and fatalism. Either it hasn’t
happened, so it's not going to happen; or, if it is going to happen, there's
nothing we can do to stop it. Both propositions are wrong. The countdown to a
nuclear 9/11 can be stopped, but only by realistic recognition of the threat, a
clear agenda for action, and relentless determination to pursue it.
The politics of food is changing fast. In rich countries, obesity is now a more serious problem than hunger. Consumers once satisfied with cheap and convenient food now want food that is also safe, nutritious, fresh, and grown by local farmers using fewer chemicals. Heavily subsidized and under-regulated commercial farmers are facing stronger push-back from environmentalists and consumer activists, and food companies are under the microscope. Meanwhile in developing countries, agricultural success in Asia has spurred income growth and dietary enrichment, but agricultural failure in Africa has left one third of all citizens undernourished. The international markets that link these diverse regions together are subject to sudden disruption, as noted when an unexpected spike in international food prices in 2008 caused street riots in a dozen or more countries. In an easy-to-navigate, question-and-answer format, Food Politics carefully examines and explains the most important issues on today's global food landscape, including the food crisis of 2008, famines, the politics of chronic hunger, the Malthusian race between food production and population growth, international food aid, controversies surrounding "green revolution" farming, the politics of obesity, farm subsidies and trade, agriculture and the environment, agribusiness, supermarkets, food safety, fast food, slow food, organic food, local food, and genetically engineered food.Politics in each of these areas has become polarized over the past decade by conflicting claims and accusations from advocates on all sides. Paarlberg's book maps this contested terrain through the eyes of an independent scholar not afraid to unmask myths and name names. More than a few of today's fashionable beliefs about farming and food are brought down a notch under this critical scrutiny. For those ready to have their thinking about food politics informed and also challenged, this is the book to read.Features
Concise, straightforward introduction to the range of phenomena the media has dubbed nullfood politicsnull.
Will act as a counterpoint to the overwhelmingly alarmist literature on the food crisis.
Paarlberg is an expert on food policy, a viewpoint underrepresented in the current popular literature.
Lively writing, highly readable Q&A format; part of the popular What Everyone Needs to Know series.
The twenty-first century began with a very unequal distribution of power resources. With five percent of the world's population, the United States accounted for about a quarter of the world's economic output, was responsible for nearly half of global military expenditures, and had the most extensive cultural and educational soft-power resources. All this is still true, but the future of U.S. power is hotly debated. Many observers have interpreted the 2008 global financial crisis as the beginning of American decline. The National Intelligence Council, for example, has projected that in 2025, "the U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished."Power is the ability to attain the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce it vary in different contexts. Spain in the sixteenth century took advantage of its control of colonies and gold bullion, the Netherlands in the seventeenth century profited from trade and finance, France in the eighteenth century benefited from its large population and armies, and the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century derived power from its primacy in the Industrial Revolution and its navy. This century is marked by a burgeoning revolution in information technology and globalization, and to understand this revolution, certain pitfalls need to be avoided.First, one must beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline. Nations are not like humans, with predictable life spans. Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the peak of its power, and even then it did not succumb to the rise of another state. For all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may come from modern barbarians and nonstate actors. In an information-based world, power diffusion may pose a bigger danger than power transition. Conventional wisdom holds that the state with the largest army prevails, but in the information age, the state (or the nonstate actor) with the best story may sometimes win.
For the complete article go to the Foreign Affairs website.
All managers face a business environment in which international and macroeconomic phenomena matter. International capital flows can significantly affect countries' development efforts and provide clear investment opportunities for businesses. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the world witnessed an explosion in capital flows at the global level. Gross foreign assets and liabilities stood at two or three times GDP for many countries, as compared to just two decades ago. This explosive growth, especially in emerging markets, has been fueled both by changes in world politics (e.g., the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union, shifting political climate in China, and political changes in Latin America and Asia) and advances in technology. Private capital flows—debt finance, equity capital, and foreign direct investment (FDI)—became larger than current and past official capital flows. This new era of foreign capital mobility has also been characterized by low interest rates in industrial countries, growing external imbalances in the US economy, and the rise of China, all of which posed new challenges to policy management. In 2009, the global economy remained mired in a deep crisis following the subprime meltdown in the US. The situation was also a true testimony of how intertwined individual economies had become over the years. The effect of policies to deal with the ongoing global crisis and new policy choices remain to be seen. Understanding these phenomena—the determinants of capital flows, the effects of foreign capital on host countries, the impact of exchange-rate movements, and the genesis of financial and currency crises—is a crucial aspect to making informed managerial decisions. The cases in this book have been designed to give students an appreciation of the critical role of institutions and policies in affecting patterns of international capital flows and the abilities of government to manage them effectively. The case studies are tied together by two broad themes: (1) the determinants and effects of international capital, and (2) policy-makers' management of these flows. The cases approach these themes by exploring institutional detail in deep local context. The cases expose students to recent key events that have shaped the way economists think about these subjects. The events covered have a clear global perspective as the cases are set in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, as well as the United States. The cases also cover events that occurred during the last three decades as not only do they affect the business environment that managers face today but they also hold important lessons. An important feature the cases reveal is the cyclical nature of international capital flows. Global Capital and National Institutions: Crisis and Choice in the International Financial Architecture is composed of three intellectual segments: (1) Determinants and Effects of International Capital Flows, (2) Policies and Strategies for Harnessing the Benefits of Financial Globalization, (3) Challenges and Policies of Large Economies. Chapter I presents a detailed overview of the cases and readings in the module and relates the cases included to the main patterns of international capital flows in the last thirty years. Finally, the chapter also presents the key insights from the field of international economics covered in the cases as well as the current state of debate among policy-makers.
In this paper, we exploit a new multi-country historical dataset on public (government) debt to search for a systemic relationship between high public debt levels, growth and inflation. Our main result is that whereas the link between
growth and debt seems relatively weak at “normal” debt levels, median growth rates for countries with public debt over roughly 90 percent of GDP are about one percent lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several percent lower. Surprisingly, the relationship between public debt and growth is remarkably
similar across emerging markets and advanced economies. This is not the case for inflation. We find no systematic relationship between high debt levels and inflation for advanced economies as a group (albeit with individual country exceptions including the United States). By contrast, in emerging market countries, high public debt levels coincide with higher inflation.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed by President Obama
in March 2010 is a landmark in U.S. social legislation. The new law
extends health insurance to nearly all Americans, fulfilling a
century-long quest and bringing the United States to parity with other
industrial nations. Affordable Care aims to control rapidly rising
health care costs and promises to make the United States more equal,
reversing four decades of rising disparities between the very rich and
everyone else. Millions of people of modest means will gain new benefits
and protections from insurance company abuses—and the tab will be
paid by privileged corporations and the very rich. How did such a
bold reform effort pass in a polity wracked by partisan divisions and
intense lobbying by special interests? What does Affordable Care mean—and what comes next? In Health Care Reform and American Politics: What
Everyone Needs to Know, Lawrence R. Jacobs and Theda Skocpol—two of the
nation's leading experts on politics and health care policy—provide a
concise and accessible overview. They explain the political battles of
2009 and 2010, highlighting White House strategies, the deals Democrats
cut with interest groups, and the impact of agitation by Tea Partiers
and progressives. Jacobs and Skocpol spell out what the new law can do
for everyday Americans, what it will cost, and who will pay. Above all,
they explain what comes next, as critical yet often behind-the-scenes
battles rage over implementing reform nationally and in the fifty
states. Affordable Care might end up being weakened. But, like Social
Security and Medicare, it could also gain strength and popularity as the
majority of Americans learn what it can do for them.
On November 1, 2006, Peruvian president Alan García announced he would
be proposing a new law that would include the death penalty as one
sanction for terrorism in the Penal Code. As he
argued, “We are not going to allow Shining Path to return and paint
their slogans on the walls of our universities. Once this law is
approved, anyone who commits the serious crime of terrorism
will find themselves facing a firing squad. A war forewarned does not
One possible outcome of the economic crash of 2008 was that
the majority or mainstream members of a society would direct their anger and
fear against the minority or marginal members of their society.
Commentators on television or the radio would claim, “it’s all the fault of the
immigrants!” or “if we didn’t hand over so much of our tax dollars to the poor,
the economy would not have deteriorated so much,” or “social benefits to
African Americans [or German Turks] have distorted the housing market.”
Citizens would come to believe these assertions, politicians would echo them—and the upshot would be not only a deteriorating national and international
economy but also increased hostility and fear among racial, ethnic, or
nationality groups in a country. Social solidarity would decline, perhaps
One possible outcome of the
economic crash of 2008 was that the majority or mainstream members of a society
would direct their anger and fear against the minority or marginal members of
their society. Commentators on
television or the radio would claim, “it’s all the fault of the immigrants!” or
“if we didn’t hand over so much of our tax dollars to the poor, the economy
would not have deteriorated so much,” or “social benefits to African Americans
[or German Turks] have distorted the housing market.” Citizens would come to believe these assertions,
politicians would echo them—and the upshot would be not only a deteriorating
national and international economy but also increased hostility and fear among
racial, ethnic, or nationality groups in a country. Social solidarity would decline, perhaps
These chapters on the politics of groups push the reader to consider a difficult but
essential question: How, if at all, are old forms of racial and ethnic stratification
changing? A broadly persuasive answer would have powerful implications ranging
from constitutional design and electoral strategies to interpersonal relationships and
private emotions. However, the question is not only difficult to answer for obvious
empirical reasons, but also because, for scholars just as for the general public,
one’s own views inevitably shape what one considers to be legitimate evidence and
appropriate evaluation of it. So the study of racial dynamics is exasperatingly circular,
even with the best research and most impressive researchers.
Although my concerns about circularity lead me to raise questions about all three
chapters, I want to begin by pointing out their quality. Each provides the reader
with a clear thesis, well defended by relevant evidence and attentive to alternative
arguments or weaknesses in the preferred one. Each chapter grows out of a commitment
to the best values of liberal democracy—individual freedom and dignity, along
with collective control by the citizenry over their governors—but commitments
do not override careful analysis. Each chapter is a pleasure to read and teaches us
something new and important.
My observations begin with a direct comparison of Pildes’s and Karlan’s respective
evaluations of the United States’ Voting Rights Act and its appropriate reforms. I
then bring in Hutchings and his colleagues’ analysis of American racial and ethnic
groups’ views of each other, which provides some of the essential background for
adjudicating between Pildes’s and Karlan’s positions. Underpinning my discussion,
and becoming more explicit in the conclusion, is an observation that is not new
to me but is nevertheless important: People who identify as progressives are often
deeply suspicious of attempts to alter current policies about or understandings of
racial and ethnic stratification, whereas people who identify as conservatives are
often most eager to see and promote modifications in current practices. There is
something deeply ironic here—both in the difficulties of many on the left to recognize what has changed and in the difficulties of many on the right to
recognize what has not.
In a democracy, knowledge is power.—Jerit et al. 2006, 266
The two simplest truths I know about the distribution of political information in modern
electorates are that the mean is low and the variance high.—Converse 1990, 372
If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never
was and never will be.—Thomas Jefferson, letter to Charles Yancey, 1816
This book explores diverse but complementary interdisciplinary
approaches to the poetics, intertexts, and influence of the work of C.
P. Cavafy (Konstantinos Kavafis), one of the most important
twentieth-century European poets. Written by leading international
scholars in a number of disciplines (critical theory, gender studies,
comparative literature, English studies, Greek studies, anthropology,
classics), the essays of this volume situate Cavafy’s poetry within the
broader contexts of modernism and aestheticism and investigate its
complex and innovative responses to European literary traditions (from
Greek antiquity to modernity) as well as its multifaceted impact on
major figures of world literature—from North America to South Africa.
Roilos, Panagiotis (ed). Imagination and Logos: Essays on C. P. Cavafy. Harvard University Press, 2010.
is often described as the most and France as one of the least
successful countries in the realm of immigrant incorporation, the question remains
unresolved of how to evaluate a country’s policies for dealing with immigration
and incorporation relative to that of others.Our strategy is to examine the relationships among 1) countries’
policies and practices with regard to admitting immigrants, 2) their educational
policies for incorporating first and second generation immigrants, and 3)
educational achievement of immigrants and their children.We compare eight western industrialized
countries. We find that immigration regimes, educational regimes, and schooling
outcomes are linked distinctively in each country.>States that are liberal, or effective, on one
dimension may be relatively conservative, or ineffective, on another, and
countries vary in their willingness and ability to help disadvantaged people
achieve upward mobility through immigration and schooling. >We conclude that by some normative standards, France has a better immigration regime than does
Overall, this study points to new ways to study immigration and new normative
standards for judging states’ policies of incorporation.
This paper studies the impact of internal migration and remittance flows on wealth accumulation
and distribution in 22 rural villages in Nang Rong, Thailand. Using data from 943 households,
the study constructs indices of household productive and consumer assets with principal
components analysis. The changes in these indices from 1994 to 2000 are modeled as a function
of households’ prior migration and remittance behavior while correcting for potential selectivity
bias with propensity score matching. The findings show that rich households face a decrease in
productive assets due to migration of their members, while poor households with migrants gain
productive assets and improve their relative status in their communities. These results suggest an
equalizing effect of migration and remittance flows on wealth distribution in rural Thailand.
The closed and open economy literatures work on estimating real rigidities, but in parallel. We bring the two literatures together to shed light on this question. We use international price data and exchange rate shocks to evaluate the importance of real rigidities in price setting. We show that consistent with the presence of real rigidities the response of reset-price inflation to exchange rate shocks depicts significant persistence. Individual import prices, conditional on changing, respond to exchange rate shocks prior to the last price change.
Presented at the NBER 25th Macroannual Conference, April 9-10, 2010.Download PDF
No self-respecting political scientist will accept the cliché that demography is destiny; political structures, practices, and leaders intervene between raw numbers and electoral or policy outcomes. Nevertheless, as a country’s demography changes, if the politics do not change in accord with the circumstances or desires of the new residents, one sees greater and greater strain and even disruption in governance. That is the situation now with regard to immigration in many wealthy western countries. The crucial question is whether the political effects of native-borns’ anxiety about immigration will slow migration or keep migrants out of the social, economic, and political mainstreams, or conversely, whether migrants and their allies will become strong enough to create political dynamics in their favor. The answer to that question will profoundly affect most countries in the world
Historically, the study of state formation has involved a focus on the urban and national conditions under which states monopolize the means of coercion, generate legitimacy, and marshal sufficient economic resources to wage war against enemies while sustaining citizen allegiance through the extension of social programs, new forms of national solidarity, and citizenship. In Charles Tilly’s large body of work, these themes loomed large, and they have re-emerged in slightly reformulated ways in an unfinished manuscript that reflected on the relationship between capital and coercion in which he also integrated the element of commitment - or networks of trust - into the study of state formation. This article develops these same ideas but in new directions, casting them in light of contemporary rather than historical developments. Taking as its point of departure the accelerating rates of criminal violence and citizen insecurity in cities of the developing world, this essay suggests that random and targeted violence increasingly perpetrated by “irregular” armed forces pose a direct challenge to state legitimacy and national sovereignty. Through examination of urban and transnational non-state armed actors who use violence to accumulate capital and secure economic dominion, and whose activities reveal alternative networks of commitment, power, authority, and even self-governance, this essay identifies contemporary parallels with the pre-modern period studied by Charles Tilly, arguing that current patterns challenge prevailing national-state forms of sovereignty. Drawing evidence primarily from Mexico and other middle income developing countries that face growing insecurity and armed violence, the article examines the new “spatialities” of irregular armed force, how they form the basis for alternative networks of coercion, allegiance, and reciprocity that challenge old forms and scales of sovereignty, and what this means for the power and legitimacy of the traditional nation-state.
Israel and Palestine, is written by the Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace: Alan Berger, Harvey Cox, Herbert C. Kelman, Lenore G. Martin, Everett Mendelsohn, Augustus Richard Norton, Henry Steiner, and Stephen M. Walt.The Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace is comprised of professional and academic members with strong interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some have been intensely engaged with this subject for decades. Others have closely followed the conflict within the context of their professional work in conflict resolution, international law and international relations, religion, and U.S. foreign policy.The Group's principal contribution is the jointly written Policy Statement entitled "Israel and Palestine - Two States for Two Peoples: If not Now, When?" The Statement stands as a collegial, collective enterprise that represents a consensus view of the group.Prior to drafting the policy statement each member undertook to research and write a background paper on one of the topics important to the statement.
The Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace is comprised of professional and academic members with strong interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some have been intensely engaged with this subject for decades. Others have closely followed the conflict within the context of their professional work in conflict resolution, international law and international relations, religion, and US foreign policy.The Group's principal contribution is the jointly written Policy Statement entitled Israel and Palestine—Two States for Two Peoples: If not Now, When? The Statement stands as a collegial, collective enterprise that represents a consensus view of the group.Prior to drafting the policy statement each member undertook to research and write a background paper on one of the topics important to the statement.
The Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace is comprised of
professional and academic members with strong interest in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some have been intensely engaged with
this subject for decades. Others have closely followed the conflict
within the context of their professional work in conflict resolution,
international law and international relations, religion, and U.S.
foreign policy. The Group's principal contribution is the
jointly written Policy Statement entitled "Israel and Palestine—Two
States for Two Peoples: If not Now, When?" The Statement stands as a
collegial, collective enterprise that represents a consensus view of the
group. Prior to drafting the policy statement each member
undertook to research and write a background paper on one of the topics
important to the statement.