Publications

2009
The Sacco-Vanzetti Affair: America on Trial
Temkin, Moshik. 2009. The Sacco-Vanzetti Affair: America on Trial. Yale University Press. Publisher's VersionAbstract
What began as the obscure local case of two Italian immigrant anarchists accused of robbery and murder flared into an unprecedented political and legal scandal as the perception grew that their conviction was a judicial travesty and their execution a political murder. This book is the first to reveal the full national and international scope of the Sacco-Vanzetti affair, uncovering how and why the two men became the center of a global cause célèbre that shook public opinion and transformed America’s relationship with the world. Drawing on extensive research on two continents, and written with verve, this book connects the Sacco-Vanzetti affair to the most polarizing political and social concerns of its era. Moshik Temkin contends that the worldwide attention to the case was generated not only by the conviction that innocent men had been condemned for their radical politics and ethnic origins but also as part of a reaction to U.S. global supremacy and isolationism after World War I. The author further argues that the international protest, which helped make Sacco and Vanzetti famous men, ultimately provoked their executions. The book concludes by investigating the affair’s enduring repercussions and what they reveal about global political action, terrorism, jingoism, xenophobia, and the politics of our own time.
Selected for the long list of the 2009 Cundill International Prize in History at McGill University. 
Frankel, Jeffrey. 2009. “Addressing the Leakage/competitiveness Issue in Climate Change Policy Proposals”.Abstract
We will likely see increasing efforts to minimize leakage of carbon to non-participating countries and to address concerns on behalf of the competitiveness of carbon-intensive industry. Environmentalists on one side and free traders on the other side fear that border measures such as tariffs or permit-requirements against imports of carbon-intensive products will collide with the WTO. There need not necessarily be a conflict, if the measures are designed sensibly. There are precedents—the shrimp-turtle case and the Montreal Protocol—that could justify border measures to avoid undermining the Kyoto Protocol or its successors, if the measures are carefully designed. But if the design is dominated by politics, as is likely, import penalties are likely to run afoul of the WTO, to distort trade, and perhaps even to fail in the goal of preventing leakage. Border measures should follow principles along the following lines:
  • They should follow guidelines multilaterally-agreed by countries participating in the emission targets of the Kyoto Protocol and/or its successors, against countries that are not doing so, rather than being applied unilaterally or by non-participants
  • Measures to address leakage to non-members can take the form of either tariffs or permit-requirements on carbon-intensive imports; they should not take the form of subsidies to domestic sectors that are considered to have been put at a competitive disadvantage
  • Independent panels of experts, not politicians, should be responsible for judgments as to findings of fact—what countries are complying or not, what industries are involved and what is their carbon content, what countries are entitled to respond with border measures, or the nature of the response
  • Import penalties should target fossil fuels and a half dozen or so of the most energy-intensive major industries—perhaps aluminum, cement, steel, paper, glass, iron and chemicals—rather than penalizing industries that are further removed from the carbon-intensive activity, such as firms that use inputs produced in an energy-intensive process
Forthcoming in Climate Change, Trade and Investment: Is a Collision Inevitable? edited by Lael Brainard. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009. This version revised, March 31, 2009.Download PDF
Marks, Stephen. 2009. “The Past and Future of the Separation of Human Rights into Categories.” In . Ruffer & Rub Pub. Publisher's VersionAbstract
It is a commonplace to recall that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) integrated civil and political rights (CPR) with economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR), and that the two International Covenants separated them.Reflecting Cold War divisions, stress on one or the other of these two traditional categories tended to reveal preferences for neoliberal or social democratic understandings of human rights, when it was not more blatantly reflective of competition between the NATO and Warsaw Pact (plus "Non-Aligned") countries, a sort of North–West vs. East–South ideological split. This article explores how the separation of categories of rights has lost its pertinence in the first decade of the 21st century. My purpose is to show how the separation into two categories is perhaps a convenient taxonomy for some, but subject to serious challenge from the perspectives of political history, the theory of rights, and contemporary policy.
Marks, Stephen. 2009. “The Past and Future of the Separation of Human Rights into Categories”.Abstract
It is a commonplace to recall that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) integrated civil and political rights (CPR) with economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR), and that the two International Covenants separated them.Reflecting Cold War divisions, stress on one or the other of these two traditional categories tended to reveal preferences for neo-liberal or social democratic understandings of human rights, when it was not more blatantly reflective of competition between the NATO and Warsaw Pact (plus "Non-Aligned") countries, a sort of North–West vs. East–South ideological split. This article explores how the separation of categories of rights has lost its pertinence in the first decade of the 21st century. My purpose is to show how the separation into two categories is perhaps a convenient taxonomy for some, but subject to serious challenge from the perspectives of political history, the theory of rights, and contemporary policy.
Shorelines: Space and Rights in South India
Subramanian, Ajantha. 2009. Shorelines: Space and Rights in South India. Stanford University Press. Publisher's VersionAbstract
After a clerical sanction prohibited them from fishing for a week, a group of Catholic fishers from a village on India's southwestern coast took their church to court. They called on the state to recognize them as custodians of the local sea, protect their right to regulate trawling, and reject the church's intermediary role.In Shorelines, Ajantha Subramanian argues that their struggle requires a rethinking of Indian democracy, citizenship, and environmentalism. Rather than see these fishers as non-moderns inhabiting a bounded cultural world, or as moderns wholly captured by the logic of state power, she illustrates how they constitute themselves as political subjects. In particular, she shows how they produced new geographies—of regionalism, common property, alternative technology, and fisher citizenship—that underpinned claims to rights, thus using space as an instrument of justice. Moving beyond the romantic myth of self-contained, natural-resource dependent populations, this work reveals the charged political maneuvers that bound subalterns and sovereigns in South Asia.In rich historical and ethnographic detail, Shorelines illuminates postcolonial rights politics as the product of particular histories of caste, religion, and development, allowing us to see how democracy is always "provincial."
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2009. “Diversity in Diversity”. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Two points about the current elections ought to be noted. First, a rather large number of parties, campaigning for votes, may give the appearance of chaos on the surface, but there is a dominant narrative that ties up the loose political threads. The central issue in these elections is: how will India’s power structure accommodate the nation’s key diversities? Second, though the overall political prognosis is confusing, some of the basic policies that will emerge are easily predictable. The first issue—political incorporation of diversities—has, of course, never left India’s political process. Using politics to knit together a highly diverse nation has been a significant cornerstone of Indian democracy. Historically, India has had four underlying social diversities: language, tribe, religion and caste. The first two are geographically concentrated; the last two are present all over the country. Federalism is the main mechanism through which India has handled its geographically-centred diversities. However, because of their national spread, caste and religion do not submit themselves to a federal solution. Affirmative action for lower castes and personal laws for religious minorities have been the principal methods of political accommodation.In the ongoing elections, though all these diversities are playing a role, the primarily lower caste parties are especially important. Some like the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) are regional in scope, while others like the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) are showing signs of national ambition. The BSP is running from more seats than even the Congress and BJP individually. And both the SP and RJD have demonstrated unexpected assertiveness. To understand these parties in terms of the political ambitions of their leaders alone is inadequate. Even the most overtly ambitious politicians must mobilise voting constituencies. Metropolitan India has no experience of how caste operates in small towns and rural India, which constitute over 85 per cent of the country. Outside India’s big cities, lower castes have been ill-treated for a very long time, and lower caste parties have historically sought to change that through the use of State power. Depending on the region, their fight is against the upper castes or the upper OBCs. Poverty is not just a low-income category in India. For most poor people, it comes with the denial of human dignity. The largest proportion of the poor in India has historically come from the Dalits, OBCs and adivasis, groups that have customarily suffered humiliation and discrimination in a vertical Hindu social order. Being treated badly is not the same as being poor, and that’s why the politics of poverty has taken the form of the politics of dignity. To describe its political thrust, every lower caste party has always used some version of the term ‘samman ki raajniti’. (In the US, when issues like this arose with respect to the African Americans, it was called the politics of civil rights.)Sooner or later, democracy privileges numbers. The numerous lower castes are now exercising their democratically acquired political muscle. Achieving political power in South India since the 1950s and 1960s, the lower caste parties have also made a serious political entry in the North over the last two decades. Moreover, since each region mostly speaks a different language, these parties have fragmented the country’s party system. But they are not simply important in the regions; they are now playing a significant role in the formation of a national government. Basically, little Indias are trying to negotiate their overall place in the larger India. Until India is 50 per cent urban and/or it reaches a per capita income of $5,000, which is a serious possibility in the next 15 years, the ‘little India’ pressures in politics will continue. Until then, the two national parties will have to find ways of incorporating the democratically-induced plebeian thrust. Unlike post-Mao China, India’s villages are not yet part of the bustling Indian economy that the world has celebrated over the last ten years and will take some time to get there. Their relative lack of incorporation in rising urban incomes leads to the continuing influence of lower caste parties. Regional lower caste parties are India's version of plebeian politics. However, regardless of which government comes to power, or its composition, India’s foreign and economic policy will remain basically unaltered—just like under the Third Front government during 1996-98. There is no fundamental political dispute in India over the country’s new economic and foreign policy direction. Serious changes in these two policy realms can be expected only if the communists become central to the next government. For economic policy, that means embrace of markets, with regulations; and for foreign policy, the new consensus favours friendship with the US, albeit with hiccups, as the basic national interests of India and the US are increasingly beginning to converge.India’s big disputes are, and will be, over religion and caste. The three most wrenching political issues in the near future can be easily predicted: whether affirmative action should be expanded to the private sector; whether India should pay special attention to better integrating its Muslims in the socio-economic mainstream; and whether propagation of religious ideas and conversion can be free and without constraints, as the Constitution currently permits. These disputes will require political adroitness. Fundamentally, elections in India are no longer about policy disputes. They have become an occasion for various communities to negotiate a better space in the power structure. Policy discussions acquire seriousness after elections are over and governments come to power.
Walker, Ruth. 2009. “"what Just Happened? What’S Next?" an Interdisciplinary Examination of the Current Economic Crisis”. Publisher's VersionAbstract
You might think of the little bits of good news that came out last week as the macroeconomic equivalent of the first crocuses of spring. There was the heartening word that initial jobless claims are slowing. The stock market continues its modest rebound. And some analysts are cautiously suggesting that there might be economic growth again before 2009 is out.But over at Two Arrow Street, participants in a daylong conference offered April 15 by the Weatherhead Center’s Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics were looking at the economy through a much longer lens. The conference was called "What Just Happened? What’s Next?" and its subtitle was "An Interdisciplinary Examination of Our Current Economic Crisis."In a presentation titled “The Crisis as an Opportunity for Structural Change,” Thomas Pogge, Ph.D. ’83, of Yale University set forth his proposal for what he calls a Health Impact Fund (HIF). It’s meant to do nothing less than revolutionize the way medicines are provided to the global poor. The fund, he explained, would reconfigure financial incentives for drugmakers. The current system rewards them for selling lifetime "maintenance" drugs to rich Westerners, rather than curative or even preventive medications to fight the diseases of the developing world. But Pogge’s fund "promises to reward... any new medicine on the basis of its global health impact."Under Pogge’s proposal, worked out with University of Calgary economist Aidan Hollis, affluent nations would chip in a share of their gross national income to support the fund. He suggested that a 0.01 percent contribution would yield about $6 billion a year, which should be a large enough pool to start the program. Each year’s pool would be divided up among the manufacturers whose drugs were listed at any given time. He foresees about 20 drugs on the list at a time. “It’s registered and you get health impact rewards,” Pogge said. “You don’t give up any intellectual property rights.” A pharmaceutical manufacturer would, however, give up the right to a profit on the sales price. Under the Pogge/Hollis proposal, “the registrant must agree to make the new medicine available wherever it is needed at the lowest feasible cost of manufacture.” The reward is for contributing to public health, not for selling pills, in other words. “Perverse incentives” is a phrase on the lips of many analysts of the current financial crisis: Too many actors have been rewarded for taking risks but not punished for poor performance. But Pogge made the case that the current system of compensating drugmakers has its own perversities as well. He explained that under the current system of international commerce, a country joining the World Trade Organization must sign on to a package of accords including the so-called Trips Agreement, which covers trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.This agreement obliges signatories to grant 20-year product patents for, among other things, drugs. This locks countries into the high-markup business model for medicine, and that, in turn makes it hard if not impossible to make drugs available at low cost.The current system provides incentives for counterfeiting, Pogge said. In the pharmaceutical world, this means making knockoffs with just enough of the active ingredient to pass for the real thing but not enough to be medically effective. Instead, these underpowered fakes help create drug-resistant strains of diseases.And by making it profitable for drugmakers to serve the poor, the Health Impact Fund would also protect against diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that fester largely untreated in the developing world for years and then burst suddenly onto the scene in the developed world. SARS apparently originated in China and spread to 37 countries, infecting thousands and killing nearly 800 during a near pandemic from November 2002 and July 2003. It could have been much worse, Pogge suggested. “We were lucky with SARS,” he said. One challenge to the Health Impact Fund concept was raised in a question from the floor posed by Norman Daniels, Mary B. Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics and Professor of Ethics and Population Health at the Harvard School of Public Health, who told Pogge, “A presupposition of your scheme is that we know how to measure the contribution of a specific drug. I’m not sure we do.” He went on to say that many drugs are delivered in systems, which themselves make a contribution to patient health. Nonetheless, Pogge ticked off the advantage of the Health Impact Fund as a “focal point of structural reform”: It isn’t driven only by concern for the poor—it helps benefit the pharmaceutical industry, too. It’s scalable: The fund could be increased or adjusted in light of experience. And manufacturers could decide to transfer some drugs from the patent track to the fund track depending on whom they benefit. The fund “strengthens those with objective interest in reform” and thus leads to “the empowerment of global poor.” It is an exemplar of realistic moral leadership, genuine moralization, and global public good.It would lead, he suggested, to “a reduction in global public evil.”
Alexander, Marcus, Matthew C Harding, and Carlos Lamarche. 2009. “The Human Cost of Economic Crises”.Abstract
Policy makers rely on a mix of government spending and tax cuts to address the imbalances in the economy during an economic crisis, by promoting price stability and renewed economic growth. However, little discussion appears to focus explicitly on the costs of economic crises in terms of human lives, especially the lives of the most vulnerable members of society, infants. This paper quantifies the effect that economic crises, periods of prolonged economic recession, have on infant mortality. Moreover, we investigate whether different levels of public spending on health across advanced industrialized democracies can mitigate the impact of crises on infant mortality. We find that economic crises are extremely costly and lead to a more than proportional increase in infant mortality in the short-run. Substantial public spending on health is required in order to limit their impact.
War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War
Baum, Matthew, and Tim Groeling. 2009. War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War. Princeton University Press. Publisher's VersionAbstract
How does the American public formulate its opinions about U.S. foreign policy and military engagement abroad? War Stories argues that the media systematically distort the information the public vitally needs to determine whether to support such initiatives, for reasons having more to do with journalists' professional interests than the merits of the policies, and that this has significant consequences for national security. Matthew Baum and Tim Groeling develop a “strategic bias” theory that explains the foreign-policy communication process as a three-way interaction among the press, political elites, and the public, each of which has distinct interests, biases, and incentives.
Matthew A. Baum is the Marvin Kalb Professor of Global Communications and professor of public policy and government at Harvard University. Tim J. Groeling is associate professor of communication studies at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Elliot, Mark C. 2009. Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World. Prentice Hall. Publisher's VersionAbstract
During the 64 years of Qianlong’s rule, China’s population more than doubled, its territory increased by one-third, its cities flourished, and its manufactures — tea, silk, porcelain — were principal items of international commerce. Based on original Chinese and Manchu-language sources, and drawing on the latest scholarship, this is the biography of the man who, in presiding over imperial China’s last golden epoch, created the geographic and demographic framework of modern China. This accessible account describes the personal struggles and public drama surrounding one of the major political figures of the early modern age, with special consideration given to the emperor’s efforts to rise above ethnic divisions and to encompass the political and religious traditions of Han Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans, Turks, and other peoples of his realm. In addition to becoming familiar with one of the most remarkable figures in world history, readers will find that learning about Emperor Qianlong will add greatly to their appreciation of China’s place in the world of the eighteenth century and will deepen their understanding of China’s place in the world today.
2009. “Eighteen Faculty, Affiliates Named to 2009 Class of Aaas Fellows”. Publisher's VersionAbstract
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) today (April 20) announced the election of leaders in the sciences, the humanities and the arts, business, public affairs, and the nonprofit sector. The 210 new AAAS Fellows and 19 Foreign Honorary Members join one of the nation’s most prestigious honorary societies and a center for independent policy research. Included among this field are 17 Harvard faculty members and a Radcliffe Institute Fellow. The academy, established in 1780 by founders of the nation, undertakes studies of complex and emerging problems. Current projects focus on science, technology, and global security; social policy and American institutions; the humanities and culture; and education. The academy’s membership of scholars and practitioners from many disciplines and professions gives it a unique capacity to conduct a wide range of interdisciplinary, long-term policy research endeavors. Harvard’s new AAAS inductees include Philippe Aghion, Robert C. Waggoner Professor of Economics; Richard Cavanagh, adjunct lecturer on public policy; Scott Edwards, Alexander Agassiz Professor of Zoology and curator of ornithology at the Museum of Comparative Zoology; Paul Farmer, Maude and Lillian Presley Professor of Social Medicine in the Department of Global Health and Social Medicine; Benjamin Friedman, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy; James Haber, fellow, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study; Jeffrey Hamburger, Kuno Francke Professor of German Art and Culture; Lene Hau, Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics and Applied Physics; Guido Imbens, professor of economics; Stein Jacobsen, professor of geochemistry; Jamaica Kincaid, visiting lecturer, African and African American studies and on English and American literature and language; Michael Klarman, Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law; Carol Mancusi-Ungaro, founding director of Harvard’s Center for the Technical Study of Modern Art; Anjana Rao, professor of pathology; Mark J. Roe, David Berg Professor of Law; Gary Ruvkun, professor of genetics; Steven Shapin, Franklin L. Ford Professor of the History of Science; and Beth Simmons, director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs.The scholars, scientists, jurists, writers, artists, civic, corporate, and philanthropic leaders come from 28 states and 11 countries and range in age from 33 to 83. They represent universities, museums, national laboratories, private research institutes, businesses, and foundations. This year’s group also includes Nobel laureates and recipients of the Pulitzer and Pritzker prizes; MacArthur fellowships; Academy, Grammy, and Tony awards; and the National Medal of Arts. "These remarkable men and women have made singular contributions to their fields, and to the world," said Academy President Emilio Bizzi. "By electing them as members, the academy honors them and their work, and they, in turn, honor us."The new class will be inducted at a ceremony on Oct. 10, at the academy’s headquarters in Cambridge, Mass.
Rodrik, Dani. 2009. “An Imf We Can Love?”. Publisher's VersionAbstract
What a difference the crisis has made for the International Monetary Fund. It was just a few months ago that this important but unloved institution, a landmark of post-war global economic arrangements, seemed destined to irrelevance.The IMF has long been a whipping boy for both left and right—the former because of the Fund’s emphasis on fiscal rectitude and economic orthodoxy, and the latter because of its role in bailing out indebted nations. Developing nations grudgingly took its advice, while advanced nations, not needing the money, ignored it. In a world where private capital flows dwarf the resources at its disposal, the IMF had come to seem an anachronism. And, when some of the IMF’s largest debtors (Brazil and Argentina) began to prepay their debts a few years ago with no new borrowers in sight, it looked like the final nail in the coffin had been struck. The IMF seemed condemned to run out of income, in addition to losing its raison d’être. It shrank its budgets and began to downsize, and, while it was handed some new responsibilities in the meantime—surveillance over "currency manipulation," in particular—its deliberations proved largely irrelevant. But the crisis has invigorated the IMF. Under its capable managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the Fund has been one of the few official agencies ahead of—instead of behind — the curve. It moved quickly to establish a fast-disbursing emergency line of credit for countries with "reasonable" policies. It ardently championed global fiscal stimulus on the order of 2 per cent of world GNP—a position that is all the more remarkable in view of its traditional conservatism on all fiscal matters. And, in the run-up to the G-20 summit in London, it thoroughly overhauled its lending policies, de-emphasising traditional conditionality and making it easier for countries to qualify for loans. Even more significantly, the IMF has emerged from the London meeting with substantially greater resources, as well as new responsibilities. The G-20 promised to triple the Fund’s lending capacity (from $250 billion to $750 billion), issue $250 billion of new Special Drawing Rights (a reserve asset made up of a basket of major currencies), and permit the Fund to borrow in capital markets (which it has never done) if necessary. The IMF was also designated as one of two lead agencies—along with an expanded Financial Stability Forum (now renamed the Financial Stability Board)—charged with providing early warning of macroeconomic and financial risks and issuing the requisite policy recommendations. Another piece of good news is that the Europeans have now given up their claim on naming the IMF’s managing director (as have the Americans their corresponding claim on the World Bank presidency). These senior officials are henceforth to be selected "through an open, transparent, and merit-based selection process." This will provide for better governance (although Strauss-Kahn’s leadership has been exemplary), and will enhance both institutions’ legitimacy in the eyes of developing nations. So the IMF now finds itself at the centre of the economic universe once again. How will it choose to deploy its newfound power?The greatest risk is that it will once again over-reach and over-play its hand. That is what happened in the second half of the 1990s, as the IMF began to preach capital-account liberalisation, applied over-stringent fiscal remedies during the Asian financial crisis, and single-handedly tried to reshape Asian economies. The institution has since acknowledged its errors in all these areas. But it remains to be seen if the lessons have been fully internalised, and whether we will have a kinder, gentler IMF in lieu of a rigid, doctrinaire one.One encouraging fact is that developing countries will almost certainly get a larger say in how the Fund is run. This will ensure that poorer nations’ views receive a more sympathetic hearing in the future. But simply giving developing nations greater voting power will make little difference if the IMF’s organisational culture is not changed as well. The Fund is staffed by a large number of smart economists, who lack much connection to (and appreciation for) the institutional realities of the countries on which they work. Their professional expertise is validated by the quality of their advanced degrees, rather than by their achievements in practical policymaking. This breeds arrogance and a sense of smug superiority over their counterparts—policymakers who must balance multiple, complicated agendas. Countering this will require proactive efforts by the IMF’s top leadership in recruitment, staffing and promotion. One option would be to increase substantially the number of mid-career recruits with actual practical experience in developing countries. This would make the IMF staff more cognizant of the value of local knowledge relative to theoretical expertise. Another strategy would be to relocate some of the staff, including those in functional departments, to "regional offices" in the field. This move would likely face considerable resistance from staff who have gotten used to the perks of Washington, DC. But there is no better way to appreciate the role of context than to live in it. The World Bank, which engaged in a similar decentralisation a while back, has become better at serving its clients as a result (without facing difficulties in recruiting top talent).This is an important moment for the IMF. The international community is putting great store in the Fund’s judgment and performance. The Fund will require internal reforms to earn that trust fully.
The author, Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University’s John F Kennedy School of Government, is the first recipient of the Social Science Research Council’s Albert O Hirschman Prize. His latest book is One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth.
Nye, Joseph S., Jr.. 2009. “Which Globalization Will Survive?”. Publisher's VersionAbstract
The world economy will shrink this year for the first time since 1945, and some economists worry that the current crisis could spell the beginning of the end of globalization.Hard economic times are correlated with protectionism, as each country blames others and protects its domestic jobs. In the 1930s, such "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies worsened the situation. Unless political leaders resist such responses, the past could become the future.Ironically, however, such a grim prospect would not mean the end of globalization, defined as the increase in worldwide networks of interdependence.Globalization has several dimensions, and, though economists all too often portray it and the world economy as being one and the same, other forms of globalization also have significant effects—not all of them benign—on our daily lives.The oldest form of globalization is environmental. For example, the first smallpox epidemic was recorded in Egypt in 1350 B.C. It reached China in 49 A.D., Europe after 700, the Americas in 1520, and Australia in l789.Bubonic plague, or the Black Death, originated in Asia, but its spread killed a quarter to a third of Europe's population in the fourteenth century.Europeans carried diseases to the Americas in the 15th and 16th centuries that destroyed up to 95 percent of the indigenous population.In 1918, a flu pandemic caused by a bird virus killed some 40 million people around the world, far more than the recently concluded world war. Some scientists today predict a repeat of an avian flu pandemic.Since 1973, 30 previously unknown infectious diseases have emerged, and other familiar diseases have spread geographically in new, drug-resistant forms. In the 20 years after HIV/AIDS was identified in the 1980s it killed 20 million people and infected another 40 million around the world.Some experts project that that number will double by 2010. The spread of foreign species of flora and fauna to new areas has wiped out native species, and may result in economic losses of several hundred billion dollars per year.Global climate change will affect the lives of people everywhere. Thousands of scientists from more than 100 countries recently reported that there is new and strong evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities, and average global temperatures in the 21st century are projected to increase between 2.5 and 10 degrees Fahrenheit.The result could be more severe variations in climate, with too much water in some regions and not enough in others.The effects will include stronger storms, hurricanes, and floods, deeper droughts, and more landslides. Rising temperatures have lengthened the freeze-free season in many regions, and glaciers are melting. The rate at which the sea level rose in the last century was 10 times faster than the average rate over the last three millennia.Then there is military globalization, consisting of networks of interdependence in which force, or the threat of force, is employed. The world wars of the twentieth century are a case in point. The prior era of economic globalization reached its peak in 1914, and was set back by the world wars.But, while global economic integration did not regain its 1914 level until half a century later, military globalization grew as economic globalization shrank.During the Cold War, the global strategic interdependence between the United States and the Soviet Union was acute and well recognized. Not only did it produce world-straddling alliances, but either side could have used intercontinental missiles to destroy the other within 30 minutes.This was distinctive not because it was totally new, but because the scale and speed of the potential conflict arising from military interdependence were so enormous.Today, al-Qaida and other transnational actors have formed global networks of operatives, challenging conventional approaches to national defense through what has been called "asymmetrical warfare."Finally, social globalization consists in the spread of peoples, cultures, images, and ideas. Migration is a concrete example. In the 19th century, some 80 million people crossed oceans to new homes ― far more than in the 20th century. At the beginning of the 21st century, 32 million U.S. residents (11.5 percent of the population) were foreign-born. In addition, some 30 million visitors (students, businesspeople, tourists) enter the country each year.Ideas are an equally important aspect of social globalization. Technology makes physical mobility easier, but local political reactions against immigrants had been growing even before the current economic crisis.The danger today is that short-sighted protectionist reactions to the economic crisis could help to choke off the economic globalization that has spread growth and raised hundreds of millions of people out of poverty over the past half-century. But protectionism will not curb the other forms of globalization.Modern technology means that pathogens travel more easily than in earlier periods. Easy travel plus hard economic times means that immigration rates may accelerate to the point where social friction exceeds general economic benefit.Similarly, hard economic times may worsen relations among governments, as well as domestic conflicts that can lead to violence. At the same time, transnational terrorists will continue to benefit from modern information technology, such as the Internet.And, while depressed economic activity may slow somewhat the rate of greenhouse-gas build-up in the atmosphere, it will also slow the types of costly programs that governments must enact to address emissions that have already occurred.So, unless governments cooperate to stimulate their economies and resist protectionism, the world may find that the current economic crisis does not mean the end of globalization, but only the end of the good kind, leaving us with the worst of all worlds.
Frankel, Jeffrey. 2009. “The Estimated Trade Effects of the Euro: Why Are They Below Those from Historical Monetary Unions Among Smaller Countries?”.Abstract
Andy Rose (2000), followed by many others, has used the gravity model of bilateral trade on a large data set to estimate the trade effects of monetary unions among small countries. The finding has been large estimates: Trade among members seems to double or triple, that is, to increase by 100-200%. After the advent of EMU in 1999, Micco, Ordoñez and Stein and others used the gravity model on a much smaller data set to estimate the effects of the euro on trade among its members. The estimates tend to be statistically significant, but far smaller in magnitude: on the order of 10-20% during the first four years. What explains the discrepancy? This paper seeks to address two questions. First, do the effects on intra-euroland trade that were estimated in the euro’s first four years hold up in the second four years? The answer is yes. Second, and more complicated, what is the reason for the big discrepancy vis-à-vis other currency unions? We investigate three prominent possible explanations for the gap between 15% and 200%. First, lags. The euro is still very young. Second, size. The European countries are much bigger on average than most of those who had formed currency unions in the past. Third, endogeneity of the decision to adopt an institutional currency link. Perhaps the high correlations estimated in earlier studies were spurious, an artifact of reverse causality. We test the hypotheses regarding lags and size directly; and we address the endogeneity problem by means of a natural experiment involving trade between the CFA countries of Africa and the euro countries of Europe. Contrary to expectations, we find little evidence that any of these factors explains a substantial share of the gap, let alone all of it.
Presented at NBER conference "Europe and the Euro," October 17-18, 2008.Download PDF
Marks, Stephen. 2009. “Access to Essential Medicines as a Component of the Right to Health.” In .Abstract
In Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Andrew Clapham wrote,"Perhaps the most obvious threat to human rights has come from the inability of people to achieve access to expensive medicine, particularly in the context of HIV and AIDS." He was referring to threats to human rights from intellectual property agreements under the World Trade Organization, which are often seen as obeying a different—and many would say utterly incompatible—logic than human rights. The right to health, in the interpretation of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, means that "States Parties ... have a duty to prevent unreasonably high costs for access to essential medicines."
Abdelal, Rawi E, Alastair Iain Johnston, Yoshiko Margaret Herrera, and Rose McDermott. 2009. Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists. Cambridge University Press. Publisher's VersionAbstract
The concept of identity has become increasingly prominent in the social sciences and humanities. Analysis of the development of social identities is an important focus of scholarly research, and scholars using social identities as the building blocks of social, political, and economic life have attempted to account for a number of discrete outcomes by treating identities as causal factors. The dominant implication of the vast literature on identity is that social identities are among the most important social facts of the world in which we live. Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott have brought together leading scholars from a variety of disciplines to consider the conceptual and methodological challenges associated with treating identity as a variable, offer a synthetic theoretical framework, and demonstrate the possibilities offered by various methods of measurement. The book represents a collection of empirically-grounded theoretical discussions of a range of methodological techniques for the study of identities.
Dryden-Peterson, Sarah. 2009. Barriers to Accessing Primary Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States. Final Report. Save the Children International. Save the Children. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Current educational policy and practice are failing the 77 million out-of-school children globally, 41 million of whom live in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS). This research seeks to identify the factors affecting access to primary education for children in CAFS and to define the mechanisms by which certain factors act as barriers. It does so through a comprehensive review of the literature and field-based case studies of access barriers in Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Most of the literature describes approaches to increasing access that address supply- and demand-side solutions separately. This study suggests the need to integrate supply- and demand-side thinking on both access barriers and the interventions designed to overcome them. The paper will recommend existing and promising practices that, within a framework of intersecting barriers, could become viable solutions to expanding primary school access in CAFS.
Barriers to Accessing Primary Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States (Save the Children)
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. “

Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the ‘International Bill of Rights’

.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 16 (2): 437-481.Abstract
International law has developed what many might consider a constitutional understanding of individual civil rights that individuals can claim vis-a-vis their own governments. This paper discusses the development of aspects of international law relating to civil rights, and argues that if this body of law is meaningful we should see evidence of links between acceptance of international legal obligation and domestic practices. Recognizing that external forms of enforcement of civil rights is unlikely (because not generally in the interest of potential "enforcers"), I argue that international civil rights treaties will have their greatest effect where stakeholders - local citizens - have the motive and the means to demand treaty compliance. This is most likely to be the case not in stable autocracies, where such demands are likely to be crushed, nor in stable democracies, where the motive to mobilize is attenuated due to rights saturation, but in transitional countries where the expected value of mobilization is maximized. Thus, I test the hypothesis that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is likely to have its greatest positive effects in transitional countries - those that have had some fleeting experience with democratic governance. This proposition is tested quantitatively with indicators for freedom of religious practice and fair trials. The proposition is weakly supported by extremely stringent statistical models that control for the endogeneity of the treaty commitments, country and year fixed effects, and other obvious influences on civil rights practices. I conclude that the International Bill of Rights has the power to influence the direction of rights practices in fluid political situations, but cannot magically transform autocracies into liberal guarantors of civil liberties. Still, these effects are important, and the most we can expect from scraps of paper which the international community has been reluctant to enforce.
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Simmons, Beth A. 2009. “

Should States Ratify the Protocol? Process and Consequences of the Optional Protocol of the Icescr

.” Norwegian Journal of Human Rights 27 (1): 64-81.Abstract
Proponents and opponents of ratification of the ICESCR‟s Optional Protocol have both exaggerated the consequences of giving individuals a “private right of standing” before the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. But this article argues that, on balance, ratification should be encouraged. Individuals will bring new and urgent issues to the international agenda, and the dialog will help to encourage a better sense of states‟ international legal obligations under the treaty. The consequences for ESC rights are likely to be modestly positive, if outcomes under the OP of the ICCPR are any guide. Even states that already respect ESC rights in their domestic law should ratify, because there is a tendency, judging by the ratification behaviour relating to similar agreements, for states to emulate ratification practices of other states in their region. Ratification will neither end deprivation nor damage the credibility of the international legal system. It will be a modest step forward in consensus-formation of the meaning of ESC rights, which in turn is a positive step toward their ultimate provision.
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Simmons, Beth A. 2009. “

Should States Ratify the Protocol? Process and Consequences of the Optional Protocol of the Icescr

.” Norwegian Journal of Human Rights 27 (1).Abstract
Proponents and opponents of ratification of the ICESCR‟s Optional Protocol have both exaggerated the consequences of giving individuals a “private right of standing” before the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. But this article argues that, on balance, ratification should be encouraged. Individuals will bring new and urgent issues to the international agenda, and the dialog will help to encourage a better sense of states‟ international legal obligations under the treaty. The consequences for ESC rights are likely to be modestly positive, if outcomes under the OP of the ICCPR are any guide. Even states that already respect ESC rights in their domestic law should ratify, because there is a tendency, judging by the ratification behaviour relating to similar agreements, for states to emulate ratification practices of other states in their region. Ratification will neither end deprivation nor damage the credibility of the international legal system. It will be a modest step forward in consensus-formation of the meaning of ESC rights, which in turn is a positive step toward their ultimate provision.
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