The rise of global financial markets in the last decades of the twentieth century was premised on one fundamental idea: that capital ought to flow across country borders with minimal restriction and regulation. Freedom for capital movements became the new orthodoxy.In an intellectual, legal, and political history of financial globalization, Rawi Abdelal shows that this was not always the case. Transactions routinely executed by bankers, managers, and investors during the 1990s—trading foreign stocks and bonds, borrowing in foreign currencies—had been illegal in many countries only decades, and sometimes just a year or two, earlier.
How and why did the world shift from an orthodoxy of free capital movements in 1914 to an orthodoxy of capital controls in 1944 and then back again by 1994? How have such standards of appropriate behavior been codified and transmitted internationally? Contrary to conventional accounts, Abdelal argues that neither the U.S. Treasury nor Wall Street bankers have preferred or promoted multilateral, liberal rules for global finance. Instead, European policy makers conceived and promoted the liberal rules that compose the international financial architecture. Whereas U.S. policy makers have tended to embrace unilateral, ad hoc globalization, French and European policy makers have promoted a rule-based, "managed" globalization. This contest over the character of globalization continues today.
The historiographies of Mexico and Brazil have implicitly stated
that business networks were crucial for the initial industrialization of
these two countries. Recently, differing visions on the importance of
business networks have arisen. In the case of Mexico, the literature
argues that entrepreneurs relied heavily on an informal institutional
structure to obtain necessary resources and information. In contrast,
the recent historiography of Brazil suggests that after 1890
the network of corporate relations became less important for
entrepreneurs trying to obtain capital and concessions, once the
institutions promoted financial markets and easy entry for new
businesses. Did entrepreneurs in Brazil and Mexico organize their networks differently to deal with the different institutional settings?
We examine whether in Mexico businessmen relied more on
networks of interlocking boards of directors and other informal
arrangements to do business than in Brazil. Our hypothesis
is confirmed by three related results: (1) the total number of
connections (i.e., the density of the network) was higher in Mexico
than Brazil; (2) in Mexico, there was one dense core network,
while in Brazil we find fairly dispersed clusters of corporate board
interlocks; and most importantly, (3) politicians played a more
important role in the Mexican network of corporate directors
than their counterparts in Brazil. Interestingly, even though Brazil
and Mexico relied on very different institutional structures, both
countries had similar rates of growth between 1890 and 1913.
However, the dense and exclusive Mexican network might have
ended up increasing the social and political tensions that led to the
Mexican Revolution (1910–1920).
This volume is intended to help readers understand the relationship between international law and international relations (IL/IR). As a testament to this dynamic area of inquiry, new research on IL/IR is now being published in a growing list of traditional law reviews and disciplinary journals. The excerpted articles in this volume, all of which were first published in International Organization, represent some of the most important research since serious social science scholarship began in this area more than twenty years ago. They are important milestones toward making IL/IR a central concern of scholarly research in international affairs. The contributions cover some of the main topics of international affairs to provide readers with a range of theoretical perspectives, concepts, and heuristics that can be used to analyze the relationship between international law and international relations.
The third edition of International Human Rights in Context continues to bring sophisticated and thought-provoking analysis to the study of human rights within its wider social and cultural context. This widely acclaimed interdisciplinary coursebook presents a diverse range of carefully edited primary and secondary materials alongside extensive text, editorial commentary, and study questions.Within its conceptual framework, the book thoroughly covers the major topics of international human rights: the basic characteristics of international law; evolution of the human rights movement movement; civil, political, economic and social rights; the humanitarian laws of war; globalization; self-determination; women's rights; universalism and cultural relativisim; intergovernmental and nongovernmental institutions; implementation and enforcement; internal application of human rights norms; and the spread of constitutionalism.The third edition has been considerably revised and restructured to incoroprate new themes and topics including: human rights in relation to terrorism amd national security; responsibility of nonstate actors for human rights violations; recent substantial changes in sources and processes of international law; achieved and potential reforrm within UN human rights institution; theories about international organizations and their influence on state behavior.Its scope, challenging enquiries, and clarity make it the ideal companion for human rights students, scholars, advocates and practitioners alike.
We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to
sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral
bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice
between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the
equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate
equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not
achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates
both "building bloc" and "stumbling bloc" effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an
equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a
building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade
agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these
Richard D. McKelvey was a pioneer in the use of mathematical modeling for understanding the nature of political choices. Positive Changes in Political Science
brings together his most important articles, accompanied by original
essays from contemporary political scientists, some his colleagues or
students, who reflect upon his contributions, their continuing
relevance today, and how they are still shaping research for the future.
In recent years, 'transnationalism' has become a key analytical concept across the social sciences. While theoretical approaches to the study of global social phenomena have traditionally focused on the nation-state as the central defining framework, transnational studies views social experience as a complex and dynamic product of multiple regional, ethnic, and institutional identities. Far from being static or bounded by national borders, social, political, and economic forces operate on supra-national, trans-regional, and trans-local scales and scopes. Transnational studies compares and contrasts these dynamics to rethink assumptions about identity, sovereignty, and citizenship.Assembling writings from some of the most important theorists in history, politics, economics, sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies, The Transnationalism Reader explores the ways that transnational practices and processes in different domains, and at different levels of social interaction, relate to, and inform each other. It also compares the spatial organization of social life during different historical periods.Coherent in its vision and expansive in its disciplinary, geographic, and historical coverage, The Transnationalism Reader is a field-defining collection.
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal
work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class
interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution,
and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically
different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR—minimum winning coalitions
versus consensus—we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory
frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were
important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries
with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and
weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This
explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why
they persist over time.
In 1980, India nationalized its large private banks. This induced different bank
ownership patterns across different towns, allowing credible identi cation of the effects of bank ownership on nancial development, lending rates, and the quality
of intermediation, as well as employment and investment. Credit markets with
nationalized banks experienced faster credit growth during a period of nancial
repression. Nationalization led to lower interest rates and lower quality intermediation, and may have slowed employment gains in trade and services. Development
lending goals were met, but these had no impact on the real economy.
Observers often note the glaring contrast between China's stunning economic progress and stalled political reforms. Although sustained growth in GNP has not brought democratization at the national level, this does not mean that the Chinese political system has remained unchanged. At the grassroots level, a number of important reforms have been implemented in the last two decades.This volume, written by scholars who have undertaken substantial fieldwork in China, explores a range of grassroots efforts—initiated by the state and society alike—intended to restrain arbitrary and corrupt official behavior and enhance the accountability of local authorities. Topics include village and township elections, fiscal reforms, legal aid, media supervision, informal associations, and popular protests. While the authors offer varying assessments of the larger significance of these developments, their case studies point to a more dynamic Chinese political system than is often acknowledged. When placed in historical context—as in the Introduction—we see that reforms in local governance are hardly a new feature of Chinese political statecraft and that the future of these experiments is anything but certain.
This paper focuses on the dilemma that humanitarian non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) face in their efforts to gain access to populations
caught up in current wars. Narrow and broad concepts of humanitarian protection
are discussed and it is argued that despite high levels of professionalism,
the space for humanitarian action has constricted sharply since the events
surrounding the attacks of 11 September 2001. Increasingly, aid workers are
now being viewed with suspicion as agents of the great powers and assertions
of humanitarian neutrality are not heeded or rejected. Non-governmental
organizations have evolved a range of options to address this problem, but there is an urgent need to work collectively to find more durable and coherent solutions.
I provide evidence that undervaluation (a high real exchange rate) stimulates economic growth. This is true particularly for developing countries,
suggesting that tradable goods suffer disproportionately from the distortions
that keep poor countries from converging. I present two categories of explanations as to why this may be so, focusing on (a) institutional/contractual
weaknesses, and (b) market failures. A formal model elucidates the linkages
between the level of the real exchange rate and the rate of economic growth.
For two hundred years, social science has provided the lens through which people view society and the visions animating most demands for political reform – at least since Adam Smith’s efforts to unleash the ‘invisible hand’ of the market without destroying the moral sentiments of society.1 However, the perspectives of social science shift, as each new generation questions its predecessors, with import for politics as well as the academy. From time to time, therefore, we should reflect on them. In this essay I do so from the perspective of political science, mainly about American scholarship and with no pretense to comprehensiveness, but with a focus on the disciplinary intersections where so many have found Archimedean points. Intellectual developments in any one field are often ‘progressive’ in the scientific sense of that term.2 But something can be lost as well as gained in the course of them, and there is reason for concern about the fate of social science over the past twenty-five years. What has been lost becomes clear only if we revisit the path taken.
Prevailing theories in political economy hold that a coalition or political party, acting
through parliament, can break down institutions of stable shareholding. In spite of
extremely favourable conditions in the late 1990s—the election and durable rule of a
leftist government supported by a transparency coalition, a bureaucratic elite that
favoured institutional change, and substantial state shareholdings which the government
could privatize in pursuit of its objectives—these reforms failed to affect the
concentration of shareholdings among the largest private companies in Italy. This
disjuncture between legal change and actual practice in Italian corporate governance
suggests that current theories of institutional change in corporate governance systems
are incomplete. The focus of inquiry needs to turn to the political resources of those who
support the existing system: managers and large shareholders.
The varieties of capitalism literature has put skill systems at the center of
comparative politics. Yet its claims about skill specificity are driven by two
large coordinated economies, Germany and Japan. This article examines
political change of skills in two small coordinated economies. Switzerland
has expanded its general skills orientation, whereas Austria retains a highly
specific skills system. The cause of this divergence is the different interests
of small and large employers: Small employers are more cost sensitive than
are large employers, which leads them to oppose the introduction of more
general education. The study also shows that the primary measure of skill
specificity used in quantitative work—vocational training share—is unreliable.
It fails to distinguish between secondary and tertiary vocational training,
which have opposite effects on skill specificity. The article develops and
justifies an alternative measure—tertiary vocational training—that better predicts
the skills clusters observed in advanced capitalism.
This essay explores the impact of the end of the Cold War on the counter-refugee-crisis
policies of the United Nations and its strongest member states. I argue that during the ColdWar, state interests were subordinated to the refugee interests for two reasons. First, refugees were fewin number and tended to be educated, skilled, and informed (valuable). Second, the WWII experience of the Holocaust in Europe led to the institutionalization
of concern for the fate of persecuted groups at the expense of state interests. After the
end of the Cold War, however, a number of the Soviet Union’s allies and successor
states began to fail, and these state failures, combined with unprecedented access to
information about living conditions abroad, led to refugee flows that impacted powerful
states. Whereas the preferred counter-refugee crisis policy during the Cold War was
resettlement, after the Cold War it shifted to repatriation: voluntary repatriation in
the best cases, and forced repatriation in the worst. The essay’s primary focus is an
assessment of the consequences of this policy shift from resettlement to repatriation
of refugees. After introducing a number of important empirical findings regarding the
frequency and scale of contemporary refugee crises, I conclude that although in some
cases the policy of supporting voluntary repatriation is a good thing, it may have the
unintended consequence of involuntary or forced repatriations as receiving states feel
little compulsion to resettle these refugees within their borders.
Do shifts in the distribution of ethnic group populations within a multinational state make civil war more likely? This article tests the proposition that they do using the competing logic of two core theories of interstate politics: power transition (PTT) and balance of power theory (BPT). The universe of potential population transition types are reduced to nine, and the logic of each of the competing explanations of war likelihood are reduced to four testable hypotheses. Overall, PTT fares better than BPT; although the article concludes that, as is the case at the interstate level, the key determinate of war likelihood rests more with how power is perceived than with raw changes in its distribution across the spectrum of meaningful political actors. Finally, the article offers a useful framework for further specifying the conditions under which population shifts alter the likelihood of an escalation to civil war.
When future economic historians write their textbooks, they will no
doubt marvel at the miraculous turn the world economy took after 1950.
Over the long stretch of history, neither the Industrial Revolution nor the
subsequent economic catch-up of the United States and other “western
offshoots” looks as impressive (Figure 1). The period since 1950 has
witnessed more rapid economic growth than any other period before,
with only the classical gold standard era between 1870 and 1913 coming
close. Even more striking, there has been a quantum jump in the growth
rate of the most rapidly growing countries since 1950. Prior to 1950,
growth superstars experienced growth rates that barely surpassed 2
percent per annum (in per capita terms) over long stretches. Compare
this with the post-1950 growth champions: Japan, South Korea, and
China; each grew at 6-8 percent per annum during 1950-73, 1973-90,
and 1990-2005, respectively. Even allowing for the shorter time slices,
this indicates that the world economy became a much more enabling
environment for economic growth after 1950. Clearly, the architects of
this new world economic system got something right.
When local cost discovery generates knowledge spillovers, specialization
patterns become partly indeterminate and the mix of goods that a country produces
may have important implications for economic growth. We demonstrate this proposition
formally and adduce some empirical support for it. We construct an index of
the "income level of a country’s exports," document its properties, and show that it
predicts subsequent economic growth.
It is tempting, but wrong, to infer from the failures of the EU draft constitution
that all reforms based on increasing citizen participation in the European Union are doomed
to fail. Andrew Moravcsik’s trenchant dismissal of the constitutional project commits this error. Moravcsik’s sweeping claims, based on what he calls empirical social science, speak well beyond the evidence on democratic institutional innovations. Participatory measures such as consultative Citizens’ Assemblies may articulate a citizens’ perspective that can
help to anchor the democratic legitimacy of the EU. We do not know if such innovations
can resolve the problems of the democratic deficit, but we do know that empirical social
science has not spoken decisively on the issue. It is worth examining their democratic
potential rather than dismissing them outright.