The Republic of Korea has an elaborate diaspora management policy since the 1990s. But what accounts for the variation in policies toward Koreans in China, Japan, North America, and the former Soviet Union? In this issue brief I explore various explanations for this variation: ethnic hierarchy, with some of these communities considered as more purely Korean than others; the timing and reasons behind the emigration of each group; the skills that each community has; the degree of organization abroad; and, finally, the nature of interstate relations and balance of power between South Korea and the respective host states.
What drives a state's choice to assimilate, accommodate, or exclude ethnic groups within its territory? In this innovative work on the international politics of nation-building, Harris Mylonas argues that a state's nation-building policies toward non-core groups—any aggregation of individuals perceived as an ethnic group by the ruling elite of a state—are influenced by both its foreign policy goals and its relations with the external patrons of these groups. Through a detailed study of the Balkans, Mylonas shows that how a state treats a non-core group within its own borders is determined largely by whether the state's foreign policy is revisionist or cleaves to the international status quo, and whether it is allied or in rivalry with that group's external patrons. Mylonas injects international politics into the study of nation-building, building a bridge between international relations and the comparative politics of ethnicity and nationalism. This is the first book to explain systematically how the politics of ethnicity in the international arena determine which groups are assimilated, accommodated, or annihilated by their host states.
This book examines the foreign policy decisions of the presidents who presided over the most critical phases of America's rise to world primacy in the twentieth century, and assesses the effectiveness and ethics of their choices. Joseph Nye, who was ranked as one of Foreign Policy magazine's 100 Top Global Thinkers, reveals how some presidents tried with varying success to forge a new international order while others sought to manage America's existing position. Taking readers from Theodore Roosevelt's bid to insert America into the global balance of power to George H. W. Bush's Gulf War in the early 1990s, Nye compares how Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson responded to America's growing power and failed in their attempts to create a new order. He looks at Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to escape isolationism before World War II, and at Harry Truman's successful transformation of Roosevelt's grand strategy into a permanent overseas presence of American troops at the dawn of the Cold War. He describes Dwight Eisenhower's crucial role in consolidating containment, and compares the roles of Ronald Reagan and Bush in ending the Cold War and establishing the unipolar world in which American power reached its zenith.The book shows how transformational presidents like Wilson and Reagan changed how America sees the world, but argues that transactional presidents like Eisenhower and the elder Bush were sometimes more effective and ethical. It also draws important lessons for today's uncertain world, in which presidential decision making is more critical than ever.
This week, the Canadian province of Quebec announced controversial, wide-ranging legislation keeping religion out of the workplace, called the "Quebec Charter of Values." The measure would include a ban on state employees from wearing overt religious symbols, including Muslim hijabs (headscarves), Jewish yarmulkes (skullcaps) or Christian crosses. RT's Ameera David talks to Jacob Remes, a research fellow at Harvard University's Canada Program, about the debate on religious freedom versus secularism in Quebec.
In this volume, leading scholars in anthropology, religion, and area studies engage global and local perspectives dialectically to develop a historically grounded, ethnographically driven social science.The book's chapters, drawing on research in East and Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas, are also in conversation with the extensive work of editor and contributor Stanley J. Tambiah: They all investigate some aspect of what Tambiah has called "multiple orientations to the world." The implicit focus throughout is on human cultural differences and the historically constituted nature of the political potentialities (both positive and negative) that stem from these. As a whole, then, the volume promotes an approach to scholarship that actively avoids privileging any one conceptual framework or cultural form at the expense of recognizing another-a style of inquiry that the editors call "radical egalitarianism."Together, these scholars encourage a comparative examination of contemporary societies, provide insights into the historical development of social scientific and sociopolitical categories, and raise vital questions about the possibilities for achieving equality and justice in the presence of competing realities in the global world today. Michael M.J. Fischer's Afterword provides a brilliant exegesis of Tambiah's multifaceted oeuvre, outlining the primary themes that inform his scholarship and, by extension, all the chapters in this book.
The Federal Reserve's mandate has evolved considerably over the organization's hundred-year history. It was changed from an initial focus in 1913 on financial stability, to fiscal financing in World War II and its aftermath, to a strong anti-inflation focus from the late 1970s, and then back to greater emphasis on financial stability since the Great Contraction. Yet, as the Fed's mandate has expanded in recent years, its range of instruments has narrowed, partly based on a misguided belief in the inherent stability of financial markets. We argue for a return to multiple instruments, including a more active role for reserve requirements.
Both in the United States and abroad, many influential observers argue that the U.S. is in systemic decline. Not so, says Lee Kuan Yew, the sage of Singapore. Lee is not only a student of the rise and fall of nations. He is also the founder of modern Singapore. As prime minister from 1959 to 1990, he led its rise from a poor, small, corrupt port to a first-world city-state in just one generation.Today, Singapore’s six million citizens have incomes higher than those of Americans. He has served as a mentor to every leader of China since Deng Xiaoping initiated China’s march to the market, and every American president since Richard Nixon has sought his counsel about the U.S. role in Asia. In the pages of Forbes and elsewhere, he has consistently emphasized America’s resilience. Here is how he summarized that judgment to us when we interviewed him in May 2011:
“America will not be reduced to second-rate status. Historically, the U.S. has demonstrated a great capacity for renewal and revival. America’s strengths include an ability to range widely, imaginatively, and pragmatically; a diversity of centers of excellence that compete in inventing and embracing new ideas and new technologies; a society that attracts talent from around the world and assimilates them comfortably as Americans; and a language that the lingua franca of those who rise to the top of their own societies around the world.”
Lee cites America’s “can-do approach,” “entrepreneurial culture,” and “great urge to start new enterprises and create wealth.” He notes the primacy that Americans accord to the “individual’s interest,” which makes them “more aggressively competitive.” Uniquely among analysts of national competitive advantages, perhaps because he speaks both English and Mandarin, he gives great weight to the comparative ease of learning English rather than Chinese. Indeed, he boldly suggested to one of China’s leaders that China adopt English, rather than Chinese, as its first language—as Singapore has done.
In Lee’s assessment, demographics are also an increasingly important factor. Noting that America’s total fertility rate of 2.0 exceeds that of most western European countries as well as that of its chief challenger, China, he recently observed that “the U.S. could become the slowly aging leader of a rapidly aging world” this century. Thus, he believes that “America will remain the sole superpower” for at least two to three more decades.
Nonetheless, Lee is frank in describing what he considers to be fundamental problems with U.S. government and culture. It has been unable to tackle its exploding debt, he asserts, because presidents do not get “reelected if they give a hard dose of medicine to their people.” In a social-media-fueled era of 24/7 news, furthermore, those who prevail in elections are not necessarily those who are most capable in governing, but those who can present themselves and their ideas “in a polished way.” He doubts that such contests “in packaging and advertising” can produce leaders in the mold of “a Churchill, a Roosevelt, or a de Gaulle.” Instead, he laments conditions in which “to win votes you have to give more and more. And to beat your opponent in the next election, you have to promise to give more away.”
Lee warns about the growing risk of America’s losing its “self-help culture” and going “the ideological direction of Europe.” If it continues that slide, he says bluntly, “the U.S. will be done for.” He also gives U.S. immigration practices a failing grade, declaring that “multiculturalism will destroy America.” The key question is: “do you make the Hispanics Anglo-Saxons in culture or do they make you more Latin American in culture?”
Lee sees the 21st century as a “contest for supremacy in the Pacific” between the US and China. In his view, “America’s core interest requires that it remains the superior power” there. But he worries about America’s ability to sustain its strategic focus. About the Obama administration’s much-touted, recent “pivot” toward Asia, this observation of his comes to mind: Americans think of international relations like a movie, imagining that we can hit the “pause” button when we focus elsewhere and push “play” when we return to Asia. But “it does not work like that. If the United States wants to substantially affect the strategic evolution of Asia, it cannot come and go.”
Weighing all of the pros and cons, Lee is still not selling America short. He is betting that despite seemingly overwhelming current economic challenges, “America’s creativity, resilience, and innovative spirit will allow it to confront its core problems, overcome them, and regain competitiveness.”
What is the impact of three decades of neoliberal narratives and policies on communities and individual lives? What are the sources of social resilience? This book offers a sweeping assessment of the effects of neoliberalism, the dominant feature of our times. It analyzes the ideology in unusually wide-ranging terms as a movement that not only opened markets but also introduced new logics into social life, integrating macro-level analyses of the ways in which neoliberal narratives made their way into international policy regimes with micro-level analyses of the ways in which individuals responded to the challenges of the neoliberal era. The book introduces the concept of social resilience and explores how communities, social groups, and nations sustain their well-being in the face of such challenges. The product of ten years of collaboration among a distinguished group of scholars, it integrates institutional and cultural analysis in new ways to understand neoliberalism as a syncretic social process and to explore the sources of social resilience across communities in the developed and developing worlds.
Policing Cities brings together international scholars from numerous disciplines to examine urban policing, securitization, and regulation in nine countries and the conceptual issues these practices raise. Chapters cover many of the world’s major cities, including New York, Beijing, Paris, London, Berlin, Mexico City, Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro, Boston, Melbourne, and Toronto, as well as other urban areas in Britain, United States, South Africa, Germany, Australia and Georgia.
The collection examines the activities and reforms of the traditional public police, but also those of emerging public and private policing agents and spaces that fall outside the public police’s purview and which previously have received little attention. It explores dramatic changes in public policing arrangements and strategies, exclusion of urban homeless people, new forms of urban surveillance and legal regulation, and securitization and militarization of urban spaces. The core argument in the volume is that cities are more than mere background for policing, securitization and regulation. Policing and the city are intimately intertwined. This collection also reveals commonalities in the empirical interests, methodological preferences, and theoretical concerns of scholars working in these various disciplines and breaks down barriers among them. This is the first collection on urban policing, regulation, and securitization with such a multi-disciplinary and international character.
This collection will have a wide readership among upper level undergraduate and graduate level students in several disciplines and countries and can be used in geography/urban studies, legal and socio-legal studies, sociology, anthropology, political science, and criminology courses.
Can US courts sit in judgment of foreigners who commit genocide or torture against foreigners abroad? From 1980 until now, the answer was yes, provided the human-rights violator set foot on US soil or had substantial American contacts. But the Supreme Court, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, has all but closed the doors to international human-rights litigation in our courts. And in a perverse twist, it relied on principles of international law to do so. Civil trials in the US of those who have committed the worst violations of human rights abroad have become relative common over the years, but legally speaking, they have rested on a slender reed. When the global human-rights movement gained traction in the late 1970s, American advocates aspired to do more than shame the worst violators. They hoped to get the credibility and moral authority of the US courts behind their efforts.The key was an obscure 1789 law called the Alien Tort Statute, which gave the federal courts jurisdiction when a noncitizen sued for an injury committed “in violation of the law of nations.” In 1980, Judge Irving Kaufman of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—who first became famous for sentencing the Soviet spy Julius Rosenberg to death—held that the tort statute allowed Paraguayan expatriates living in the US to sue another Paraguayan who happened to have visited New York for torturing and killing their son in Paraguay.
Political ValueSupporters hailed the 1980 decision, Filartiga v. Pena- Irala, as the Brown v. Board of Education of international human-rights law. Later lawsuits against such notorious human-rights violators as the Serbian warlord Radovan Karadzic underscored the political value of suing foreigners domestically. Several major corporations have found themselves on the defensive, including Chevron Corp. (CVX), Coca-Cola Co. and Yahoo! Inc. Although these weren’t criminal trials, and any monetary damages were almost always impossible to obtain, the trials cast a harsh light on torture and genocide. Even people who don’t much care for the US tend to believe that its courts do a thorough and honest job of fact-finding.
Establishing the facts of a human-rights violation in a US court is therefore much more powerful as a tool of condemnation than mere declarations or findings by international bodies that might be politically biased, incompetent or both.
The critics of these domestic trials attack them as legally absurd and diplomatically unwise interventions in foreign affairs. In 2004, in a case involving a Mexican doctor accused of helping kill a US drug-enforcement agent, the Supreme Court came close to shutting them down, but they were saved in a complicated decision by Justice David Souter. (Many observers thought that the court—then in the long, slow process of requiring the George W. Bush administration to extend international legal rights to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—may have thought that the time wasn’t quite right to deal a symbolic blow to human-rights advocates.)
They’re finished after the court’s latest ruling, in a case that alleged the involvement of two Shell units in torture in Nigeria. We now learn that international law can be not only a shield for those captured or tortured but also a sword for avoiding legal obligations. Chief Justice John Roberts, in an opinion joined by the three other conservatives and Justice Anthony Kennedy, relied on a general principle of international law to end litigation under the Alien Tort Statute: the principle of extraterritoriality.
Congress’s SayThat principle, as applied in US law, embodies a presumption that our laws don’t reach to conduct in the territory of the foreign sovereign unless Congress expressly says so. The idea is that what happens in other countries is ordinarily their business, not ours. There are exceptions, such as the Protect Act of 2003, which makes it a US crime for anyone (including a foreigner) to have sex with someone underage (including a foreigner) outside the US But that infringement on the principle of extraterritoriality was clearly intended by Congress.
According to Roberts, the Alien Tort Statute shouldn’t be read to apply to conduct occurring abroad unless the law so specifies.
It must be said that Roberts’s opinion has considerable strengths. The historical origins of the law are shrouded in mystery, and judges have often called it a “legal Lohengrin.” It was probably intended to protect foreign diplomats living in the US Even if that is untrue, it is certainly accurate that before 1980 it was never used as a tool of international human rights. There is a good reason that sovereign nations like the principle of extraterritoriality: It embodies the values of mutual respect, noninterference and sovereign equality.
Yet, there is also something tragic about Roberts’s opinion, which rejects judge-made law that has come to function as an important part of the moral project of enforcing human rights globally. What does it say about our moral responsibility to protect those abroad from genocide if we can’t even sue the perpetrators at home for fear of interfering with their countries’ sovereign rights?
As Justice Stephen Breyer put it in an opinion concurring in the judgment but not the court’s reasoning—and joined by the court’s three other liberals—if the torturer has substantial contacts here, and we have an important national interest in keeping our country from becoming a harbor for torturers, why not subject the “enemy of mankind” to civil liability? Behind that reasoning is the recognition that the most basic human rights are actually special—and are of greater importance than the legal nicety of treating all governments the same, no matter how evil they might be.
A final route exists for human-rights litigators: The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which allows domestic suits against foreign individuals (not organizations) who have engaged in official torture. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence to point out that this statute still exists. Yet the silence of the other conservatives and Kennedy on that law speaks volumes: They don’t want to invite more human-rights lawsuits. The responsibility to preserve our responsibility to protect now lies squarely with Congress. I wish that made me feel more confident than it does.
The urban has become a keyword of early twenty-first-century economic, political, and cultural discourse. But as its resonance has intensified in social science and in the public sphere, the conceptual and cartographic specificity of the urban has been severely blunted. Is there any future for a distinct field of urban theory in a world in which urbanization has been generalized onto a planetary scale? This article reflects on this state of affairs and outlines a series of theses intended to reinvigorate the theoretical framework of urban studies in relation to emergent forms of urbanization. Several conceptual distinctions - between categories of practice and categories of analysis, nominal essences and constitutive essences, and concentrated and extended urbanization—are proposed to inform possible future mappings of the planetary urban condition.Download the paper: Public Culture, Duke University Press
Watching the musical chairs taking place in the first months of Obama's second term reminds me of how fundamentally unserious America's approach to foreign affairs really is. Kerry and Hagel are now in, but apparently Biden's star is ascending too, while all sorts of other folks are rotating to new jobs, unpacking their offices, or heading back to private life to pen memoirs. You might think this was a great opportunity for fresh thinking and renewed energy, but what it really reveals is how our approach to staffing foreign affairs may be the worst of all possible worlds.For starters, the United States has a relatively small civil service. Compared with other countries, a relatively large percentage of top government jobs are held by presidential appointees. The result: top jobs in the State Department and Pentagon are handled not by career foreign service officers or experienced bureaucrats, but by partisan appointees who rarely last more than a couple of years and then return to private life. Not only does this mean tremendous turnover whenever the White House changes hands, it means we are constantly bringing in people who lack experience or who are not up to speed on current issues.Next, the appointments process itself has gone completely off the rails. Candidates have to go through elaborate vetting procedures that would daunt a saint, and then they also face a Senate confirmation process that is slow, arbitrary, and leaves lots of positions unfilled for months if not years. And sometimes you get an embarrassing circus like the recent Hagel confirmation hearings, which revealed the GOP members of the Armed Services Committee to be spiteful and factually challenged hacks and no doubt confirmed many foreigners' dubious views of America's overall political competence.Third, we are so afraid that our career diplomats will "go native" or develop "localitis," that we discourage them from developing deep regional expertise and instead rotate them around the globe on a frequent basis. There is something to be said for gaining a global perspective, of course, but it also means that unlike some of our rivals, we won't have many diplomats with deep linguistic expertise or lots of in-depth experience in the societies in which they are operating. Yet we then expect them to hold their own against their local counterparts, or against diplomats from other countries whose knowledge and training in particular areas is more extensive.To make matters worse, the United States has a four-year presidential term and a campaign cycle that lasts well over a year. This latter period is far longer than the election periods in any other advanced democracy, and the endless parade of primaries and other forms of electoral hoopla eat up lots of bandwith in our national discourse. The result? The country, the incumbent administration, and the president's various rivals are all distracted for more than 25 percent of each president's term, and less able to make hard political choices. And then there's the question of resources. When there was a Cold War to win, American taxpayers were willing to devote one percent of GDP to non-military international affairs spending (e.g., on development, diplomacy, and things like that). Today, we spend about only 0.2 percent of GDP in this area, which tells you all you need to know about the real priority that Americans place on non-military tools of international influence.None of this would matter if the United States had a less ambitious foreign policy. But instead, we're trying to be the "indispensable power" on the cheap. The results, I am sorry to say, speak for themselves.
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether it violates free speech to bar you from donating more than $117,000 every two years to your favorite political candidates and national party committees.Wait, you say, I thought I already could. Didn’t the Supreme Court already allow unlimited contributions by super-PACs in the Citizens United case? In the answer to your poignant question lies a fascinating constitutional tale of pride and principle.
Technically speaking, the Supreme Court hasn’t (at least not yet) struck down limits on individuals’ collective contributions to the party committees or to the candidates of their choice. Federal laws that trace back to those upheld by the Supreme Court in a 1976 case limited individual contributions to a specific candidate to $2,500 a year and total contributions to all federal candidates to $46,200 over two years; together with a $70,800 aggregate national committee donation limit, the law established the $117,000 ceiling. It is this aggregate limit, not the $2,500-a-customer base level, that the Supreme Court agreed to review.
In Citizens United, by contrast, the Supreme Court lifted limits on corporate contributions for so-called uncoordinated advocacy, in which a political-action committee supports a candidate without formally dealing with his or her campaign. This holding didn’t apply to limits on contributions to specific campaigns or national committees.
Conservative BindThe challenge to the aggregate limits, in a case brought by political activist Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee against the Federal Election Commission, puts the court’s conservatives in a bind. As a matter of principle, they almost certainly want to strike down the limits. The 1976 ruling depended on the paradoxical twin assertions that money is speech but campaign contributions can nevertheless be limited.
Free-speech absolutists and the Republican-appointed judges who love them have long pointed out the absurdity of this position. Finding the aggregate contribution limit unconstitutional would strike a blow for First Amendment consistency. If campaign expenditures are considered speech, so should the donations that pay for them.As a matter of pragmatic politics, however, the conservative justices should feel pretty nervous about announcing that it is now lawful for the rich to spread their wealth across an unlimited number of candidates.The purpose of the aggregate limit—and its constitutional justification - has always been to avoid the appearance of corruption in our politics while affording an opportunity to circumvent the anticorruption policy. Officially stating that this is no longer a constitutional concern would expose the conservatives to the criticism that they are handing our government over to the plutocrats.
The precedent of Citizens United makes the conservatives’ quandary even worse. From President Barack Obama on down, liberals excoriated the Supreme Court for activism that not coincidentally served the moneyed interests more likely to support Republicans. Similar criticism would certainly follow an activist holding in the McCutcheon case.
A signal of conservative concern about this criticism can be found in the opinion of George W. Bush-appointee Janice Rogers Brown, one of the most conservative judges in the country, in the U.S. District Court case now on appeal to the high court. She recited the standard conservative view that “if anything is clear, it is that contributing a large amount of money does not ipso facto implicate the government’s anticorruption interest.” And she acknowledged that Citizens United held that large contributions didn’t implicate corruption, at least when they were to be spent in an uncoordinated fashion.
Cautious ActRather than following that logic to the conclusion that the limits must fall, Brown upheld them. This cautious act avoided getting ahead of the Supreme Court by refusing to prognosticate on what its decision might be. Brown’s caution reflects a worry about the negative public reception of Citizens United.
The conservatives’ troubles won’t be over if they uphold the aggregate limit, because they will still be subject to the charge of absurdism. In a world where I can make unlimited contributions to a super-PAC, what difference does it make if I can’t also funnel unlimited contributions to multiple candidates or to national committees? The only way for the court to distinguish the two situations is to insist that the super-PACs’ uncoordinated advocacy is categorically different from the coordinated efforts of national parties.
After the 2012 election, it is hard to see how anyone could make this claim with a straight face. Acting within the law, super-PACS rented space in the same buildings as official campaigns, hired former campaign officials and magically matched their advertising strategies to those of the candidates. And while the biggest super-PAC users, such as casino billionaire Sheldon Adelson, posted poor results in the election, they certainly affected its dynamics. Remember how Adelson kept Newt Gingrich in the Republican primary race for months after his other sources of funding had dried up?Faced with this dilemma of following principle and being condemned as political, or acting out of political caution and being ridiculed as hypocrites, the conservative justices may simply decide to go with their gut. Maybe they should consider a novel argument in favor of striking down the aggregate limit.At present, you have to be a billionaire, or close to it, to start your own personal super-PAC and put tens or hundreds of millions into it. This seems unfair to the mere decamillionaires who might want to contribute a few lousy million without putting their funds into a super-PAC controlled by someone else. Striking down the aggregate limits will help put them on an equal footing. Equal justice for millionaires. It has a certain ring to it.
In recent years, resource disputes in the South China Sea have made headlines across the world. But another body of water—the Mediterranean—is rapidly becoming as volatile as its eastern cousin. Exploratory drilling near the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey has unearthed vast reserves of natural gas. Competition over the rights to tap those resources is compounding existing tensions over sovereignty and maritime borders. Without more active engagement by outside powers, these disagreements will be difficult to resolve.Israel stands to be the main beneficiary of the eastern Mediterranean’s bounty, due mainly to the geographic distribution of recent discoveries. In 2009 and 2010, a pair of U.S.-Israeli consortiums exploring the seabed near Haifa discovered the Tamar and Leviathan fields, which collectively hold an estimated 26 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. The timing of these discoveries was opportune. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Israel has suffered frequent supply interruptions and the eventual termination of its contract with Egypt, which had previously provided 40 percent of the gas Israel consumed, at below-market rates. The Tamar and Leviathan fields, once developed, could satisfy Israel’s electricity needs for the next 30 years and even allow it to become a net energy exporter...
Contemporary nationalism is typically framed as an oppositional ideology that legitimates the struggles of ethnic minorities for political sovereignty or, alternatively, justifies the xenophobic claims of nativist fringe groups. The emphasis on nationalism’s incendiary varieties, however, has led to the neglect of everyday popular nationalism—the routine and tacit acceptance of the nation-state as a primary object of identification and loyalty, as well as a fundamental unit of political organization. In an effort to address this gap in research, I examine the cross-national variation in popular conceptions of the nation-state using pooled-sample latent class analysis, a method that allows me to account for both within- and between-country heterogeneity and avoid reductive a priori assumptions about the national boundedness of culture. Having demonstrated that the resulting fourfold typology of popular nationalism is predictive of a wide range of political beliefs and is remarkably consistent across countries and over time, I show how the relative prevalence of the four types of nationalism shifts within countries in response to economic and political events that increase the salience of the nation-state. This study breaks new ground in the study of nationalism and offers a novel approach to the use of survey data in comparative research on political culture.
In recent years, populism has attracted considerable interest from social scientists and political
commentators (Panizza 2005, Bale et al. 2011, Mudde 2004, Berezin 2013, Rovira Kaltwasser
2013), despite the fact that, “[t]he mercurial nature of populism has often exasperated those
attempting to take it seriously” (Stanley 2008, 108). Indeed, the term ‘populism’ is both widely
used and widely contested (Roberts 2006; Barr 2009).1 It has been defined based on political,
economic, social, and discursive features (Weyland 2001, 1) and analyzed from myriad
theoretical perspectives—including structuralism, post-structuralism, modernization theory,
social movement theory, party politics, political psychology, political economy, and democratic
theory—and a variety of methodological approaches, such as archival research, discourse
analysis, and formal modeling (Acemoglu et al. 2011, Ionescu and Gellner 1969, Canovan 2002,
Hawkins 2009, Goodliffe 2012, Postel 2007). As observed by Wiles, “to each his own definition
of populism, according to the academic axe he grinds” (Wiles, in Iunescu and Gellner 1969, p.
Wartime rape is neither ubiquitous nor inevitable. The level of sexual violence differs significantly across countries, conflicts, and particularly armed groups. Some armed groups can and do prohibit sexual violence. Such variation suggests that policy interventions should also be focused on armed groups, and that commanders in effective control of their troops are legally liable for patterns of sexual violence they fail or refuse to prevent.
Wartime rape is also not specific to certain types of conflicts or to geographic regions. It occurs in ethnic and non-ethnic wars, in Africa and elsewhere.
State forces are more likely to be reported as perpetrators of sexual violence than rebels. States may also be more susceptible than rebels to naming and shaming campaigns around
Perpetrators and victims may not be who we expect them to be. During many conflicts, those who perpetrate sexual violence are often not armed actors but civilians. Perpetrators also are not exclusively male, nor are victims exclusively female. Policymakers should not neglect nonstereotypical perpetrators and victims.
Wartime rape need not be ordered to occur on a massive scale. Wartime rape is often not an intentional strategy of war: it is more frequently tolerated than ordered. Nonetheless, as noted, commanders in effective control of their troops are legally liable for sexual violence perpetrated by those troops.
Much remains unknown about the patterns and causes of wartime sexual violence. In particular, existing data cannot determine conclusively whether wartime sexual violence on a global level is increasing, decreasing, or holding steady. Policymakers should instead focus on variation at lower levels of aggregation, and especially across armed groups.
We argue that in pharmaceutical markets, variation in the arrival time of consumer heterogeneity
creates differences between a producer’s ability to extract consumer surplus with preventives and treatments,
potentially distorting R&D decisions. If consumers vary only in disease risk, revenue from treatments—sold after the disease is contracted, when disease risk is no longer a source of private information—always
exceeds revenue from preventives. The revenue ratio can be arbitrarily high for sufficiently skewed distributions
of disease risk. Under some circumstances, heterogeneity in harm from a disease, learned after a
disease is contracted, can lead revenue from a treatment to exceed revenue from a preventative. Calibrations
suggest that skewness in the US distribution of HIV risk would lead firms to earn only half the revenue
from a vaccine as from a drug. Empirical tests are consistent with the predictions of the model that vaccines
are less likely to be developed for diseases with substantial disease-risk heterogeneity.
Modern India is, in many ways, a success. Its claim to be the world’s largest democracy is not hollow. Its media is vibrant and free; Indians buy more newspapers every day than any other nation. Since independence in 1947, life expectancy at birth has more than doubled, to 66 years from 32, and per-capita income (adjusted for inflation) has grown fivefold. In recent decades, reforms pushed up the country’s once sluggish growth rate to around 8 percent per year, before it fell back a couple of percentage points over the last two years. For years, India’s economic growth rate ranked second among the world’s large economies, after China, which it has consistently trailed by at least one percentage point.The hope that India might overtake China one day in economic growth now seems a distant one. But that comparison is not what should worry Indians most. The far greater gap between India and China is in the provision of essential public services—a failing that depresses living standards and is a persistent drag on growth.Inequality is high in both countries, but China has done far more than India to raise life expectancy, expand general education and secure health care for its people. India has elite schools of varying degrees of excellence for the privileged, but among all Indians 7 or older, nearly one in every five males and one in every three females are illiterate. And most schools are of low quality; less than half the children can divide 20 by 5, even after four years of schooling.India may be the world’s largest producer of generic medicine, but its health care system is an unregulated mess. The poor have to rely on low-quality—and sometimes exploitative—private medical care, because there isn’t enough decent public care. While China devotes 2.7 percent of its gross domestic product to government spending on health care, India allots 1.2 percent.India’s underperformance can be traced to a failure to learn from the examples of so-called Asian economic development, in which rapid expansion of human capability is both a goal in itself and an integral element in achieving rapid growth. Japan pioneered that approach, starting after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when it resolved to achieve a fully literate society within a few decades. As Kido Takayoshi, a leader of that reform, explained: “Our people are no different from the Americans or Europeans of today; it is all a matter of education or lack of education.” Through investments in education and health care, Japan simultaneously enhanced living standards and labor productivity—the government collaborating with the market.Despite the catastrophe of Japan’s war years, the lessons of its development experience remained and were followed, in the postwar period, by South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and other economies in East Asia. China, which during the Mao era made advances in land reform and basic education and health care, embarked on market reforms in the early 1980s; its huge success changed the shape of the world economy. India has paid inadequate attention to these lessons.Is there a conundrum here that democratic India has done worse than China in educating its citizens and improving their health? Perhaps, but the puzzle need not be a brainteaser. Democratic participation, free expression and rule of law are largely realities in India, and still largely aspirations in China. India has not had a famine since independence, while China had the largest famine in recorded history, from 1958 to 1961, when Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward killed some 30 million people. Nevertheless, using democratic means to remedy endemic problems—chronic undernourishment, a disorganized medical system or dysfunctional school systems—demands sustained deliberation, political engagement, media coverage, popular pressure. In short, more democratic process, not less.In China, decision making takes place at the top. The country’s leaders are skeptical, if not hostile, with regard to the value of multiparty democracy, but they have been strongly committed to eliminating hunger, illiteracy and medical neglect, and that is enormously to their credit.There are inevitable fragilities in a nondemocratic system because mistakes are hard to correct. Dissent is dangerous. There is little recourse for victims of injustice. Edicts like the one-child policy can be very harsh. Still, China’s present leaders have used the basic approach of accelerating development by expanding human capability with great decisiveness and skill.The case for combating debilitating inequality in India is not only a matter of social justice. Unlike India, China did not miss the huge lesson of Asian economic development, about the economic returns that come from bettering human lives, especially at the bottom of the socioeconomic pyramid. India’s growth and its earnings from exports have tended to depend narrowly on a few sectors, like information technology, pharmaceuticals and specialized auto parts, many of which rely on the role of highly trained personnel from the well-educated classes. For India to match China in its range of manufacturing capacity—its ability to produce gadgets of almost every kind, with increasing use of technology and better quality control—it needs a better-educated and healthier labor force at all levels of society. What it needs most is more knowledge and public discussion about the nature and the huge extent of inequality and its damaging consequences, including for economic growth.
Political science can gain from incorporating richer conceptions of social relations into its analyses. In place of atomistic entities endowed with assets but few social relationships, social actors should be seen as relational entities embedded in social and cultural structures that connect them to others in multifaceted ways. Understanding those relationships requires a deeper understanding of how institutional and cultural frameworks interact to condition the terrain for social action. More intensive dialogue with sociology can inform such an understanding. We review the analytical tools cultural sociology now offers those interested in such a perspective and illustrate it in operation in studies of inequalities in population health and the effects of neoliberalism. We close by outlining several issues to which this perspective can usefully be applied, including the problems of understanding social resilience, how societies build collective capacities, and why some institutions remain robust while others deteriorate.
Sub-Saharan Africa is an increasingly important theater of operation for the U.S. military. From al-Shabaab, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and Ansar Dine, the Department of Defense is recognizing that Africa will be a vital strategic battlefield in the next century.
Yet in discussions of future African security policy, the potential role of opposition political parties in Africa has received virtually no attention. Following are three reasons why the Department of Defense should pay close attention to African opposition parties.
1) Opposition parties can be barometers of domestic opinion about foreign presence. Opposition parties’ rhetoric on US foreign policy and intervention—when it exists—can reveal local attitudes that incumbent governments may not openly share. This is especially helpful in countries such as Djibouti, Niger, and Ethiopia, where the U.S. military is currently engaged in a wide range of activities including military training, crisis management exercises, drone activities against al-Qaeda, and operating the United States’ only military base on the continent; Camp Lemonnier.
Foreign policy debates tend to have scant prominence in African elections, precisely because of the limited range of choices available to some of the world’s weakest states. But major opposition party leaders almost invariably have more social and cultural capital than foreign diplomats, and thus have the potential to function as intermediaries between the US government and the wider African public on potentially contentious issues.
2) Today’s opponents could be tomorrow’s incumbents. Being cordial to (and even cautiously supportive of) opposition parties is deeply important in states where regime changes—electoral or otherwise—are likely. The absence of such a contingency plan in the event of a regime transition limits US policy options. In late March 2012, for instance, the United States offered few critiques as Djibouti’s president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, repressed supporters of the Union for National Salvation (USN) opposition coalition. Were the USN ever to control the presidency, the United States could potentially face expulsion from the U.S. military base Camp Lemonnier. Given Djibouti’s geographic proximity to volatile and strategically important countries in the Horn of Africa, the loss of such a geostrategic foothold would profoundly undermine the United States’ already modest security assistance capabilities throughout the region.
3) Certain opposition members are potential interlocutors on issues of conflict and terrorism. Major opposition party leaders can play integral roles in local conflict resolution efforts, and often exhibit the capacity to encourage or stem particular antagonistic behaviors among the populace. For instance, the leaders of six major opposition parties in southern Sudan recently joined rebel groups in “endorsing peaceful and armed opposition to Sudan’s government;” and in Kenya’s 2007 elections, ethnic violence, allegedly fueled by certain ruling and opposition party leaders, reduced regional stability and inflicted devastating human costs.
Although opposition leaders in these contexts can at times exacerbate delicate security situations, their social networks could also potentially facilitate the resolution of other US security concerns. To this end, Eritrea’s opposition parties—some of which apparently launched an unsuccessful coup attempt in January 2013—could be the key to the United States acquiring domestic leverage on President Isaias Afewerki, a known source of regional instability in the Horn of Africa.
This said, although opposition parties might have some role in mediating security outcomes, opposition leaders are almost never the most central players involved in such instances, nor are they necessarily tied to insurgencies that serve as the core security concerns of most African regimes. Nevertheless, cultivating opposition leaders as potential participants in peacebuilding, transparency, or counterterrorism measures could indeed increase the quality of human and state security on the continent.
In summary, although democratization is not yet the norm in Africa, the trends towards greater political opening across the continent signal new opportunities for U.S. military engagement. As such, though it is the Department of State that invariably shoulders the responsibility for crafting US diplomatic policy regarding opposition parties, the Department of Defense—a silent observer on the political front—should be deeply cognizant of the security implications bound up in the politics of African opposition parties. Indeed, given the unavoidable US reliance on a mix of authoritarian and democratic allies for security-related initiatives in Africa, an effective US security strategy must continue evolving to take heed of the unique roles played by opposition parties on the continent.
Will China continue to grow three times faster than the United States to become the No. 1 economy in the world in the decade ahead? Does China aspire to be the No. 1 power in Asia and ultimately the world? As it becomes a great power, will China follow the path taken by Japan in becoming an honorary member of the West?Despite current punditry to the contrary, the surest answer to these questions is: No one knows. But statesmen, investors and citizens in the region and beyond are placing their bets. And U.S. policymakers, as they shape the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, are making these judgments too.
In formulating answers to these questions, if you could consult just one person in the world today, who would it be? Henry Kissinger, the American who has spent by far the most time with China’s leaders since Mao, has an answer: Lee Kuan Yew.
Lee is the founding father of modern Singapore and was its prime minister from 1959 to 1990. He has honed his wisdom over more than a half century on the world stage, serving as adviser to Chinese leaders from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping and American presidents from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama. This gives him a uniquely authoritative perspective on the geopolitics and geoeconomics of East and West.Lee Kuan Yew’s answers to the questions above are: yes, yes and no. Yes, China will continue growing several times faster than the United States and other Western competitors for the next decade, and probably for several more. Yes, China’s leaders are serious about becoming the top power in Asia and on the globe. As he says: “Why not? Their reawakened sense of destiny is an overpowering force.”
No, China will not simply take its seat within the postwar order created by the United States. Rather, “it is China’s intention to become the greatest power in the world — and to be accepted as China, not as an honorary member of the west,” he said in a 2009 speech.
Western governments repeatedly appeal to China to prove its sense of international responsibility by being a good citizen in the global order set up by Western leaders in the aftermath of World War II. But as Kissinger observes, these appeals are “grating to a country that regards itself as adjusting to membership in an international system designed in its absence on the basis of programs it did not participate in developing.”
In Lee’s view, “the Chinese are in no hurry to displace the U.S. as the number one power in the world.” As he told us in an interview, some Chinese, “imagine that the 21st century will belong to China, others expect to share the century with the U.S. as they build up to the Chinese century to follow.”
China’s strategy to achieving preeminence, according to Lee, is “to build a strong and prosperous future and use their huge and increasingly highly skilled and educated workforce to out-sell and out-build all others.”
Militarily, China’s leaders do not envision a confrontation until the country has “overtaken the U.S. in the development and application of technology,” an area in which it still lags.
As Lee says, “the Chinese have figured out that if they stay with ‘peaceful rise’ and just contest for first position economically and technologically, they cannot lose.” But when it comes to hard power, Chinese leaders are primarily still heeding the maxim of Deng Xiaoping: “Hide your strength, bide your time.”
Are we thus entering a Chinese era? Lee expects so, though he notes that “the chances of it going wrong in China are about one in five.” If Lee is correct, leaders in both China and the United States will face a huge challenge in coming decades as a rising power rivals a ruling power. Historically, statesmen have failed this test: 11 of 15 such cases since 1500 ended in war.
Today’s leaders must bear this grim statistic in mind, learn from the success stories, and brace themselves for the fact that massive adjustments of attitudes and actions will be required by both sides to avoid violent conflict in the future.