In the aftermath of a civil war, former enemies are left living side by side—and often the enemy is a son-in-law, a godfather, an old schoolmate, or the community that lies just across the valley. Though the internal conflict in Peru at the end of the twentieth century was incited and organized by insurgent Senderistas, the violence and destruction were carried out not only by Peruvian armed forces but also by civilians. In the wake of war, any given Peruvian community may consist of ex-Senderistas, current sympathizers, widows, orphans, army veterans—a volatile social landscape. These survivors, though fully aware of the potential danger posed by their neighbors, must nonetheless endeavor to live and labor alongside their intimate enemies.Drawing on years of research with communities in the highlands of Ayacucho, Kimberly Theidon explores how Peruvians are rebuilding both individual lives and collective existence following twenty years of armed conflict. Intimate Enemies recounts the stories and dialogues of Peruvian peasants and Theidon's own experiences to encompass the broad and varied range of conciliatory practices: customary law before and after the war, the practice of arrepentimiento (publicly confessing one's actions and requesting pardon from one's peers), a differentiation between forgiveness and reconciliation, and the importance of storytelling to make sense of the past and re-create moral order. The micropolitics of reconciliation in these communities present an example of postwar coexistence that deeply complicates the way we understand transitional justice, moral sensibilities, and social life in the aftermath of war. Any effort to understand post-conflict reconstruction must be attuned both to devastation as well as to human tenacity for life.
My work has brought me up close to leaders of all kinds. There is one thing they share: highly developed technical and intellectual capacities, many of them graduates of some of the world’s most prestigious educational institutions.
They also share something else; what many of them report as a major leadership challenge: knowing what to do in charged emotional situations. In spite of their technical expertise, they rarely feel confident when faced with subordinates who are experiencing outrage; who feel they are being treated unfairly; whose unacknowledged grievances have changed them into fighting men and women. In other words, they don’t know what to do when faced with people who have experienced repeated violations of their dignity, which are, by definition, highly charged emotional events.
Their default reaction is often to use their authority and the power of their position to control the situation, often leaving the aggrieved people angrier, more resentful, and less willing to extend themselves in their jobs or their roles within an organization. The dignity violations remained unaddressed, contaminating the work environment.A reason why the default reaction is to exert authority and control over a volatile emotional situation is that they are afraid of it. They are especially fearful of being exposed and embarrassed by a bad move or a flawed policy for which they were responsible.I have seen otherwise brilliant leaders get caught in all of the predictable traps that ignorance of how to best handle dignity violations creates. They are not bad people who deliberately try to make life difficult for those whom they lead; they simply don’t have the knowledge, awareness and skills they need to navigate through emotional turmoil. Without an education in matters related to dignity, a most vulnerable aspect of being human, even technically gifted and well-intentioned leaders can unknowingly create an undignified work environment.
The need has never been more urgent for people in leadership positions to be educated in all matters related to dignity; both the human vulnerability to being violated, and the positive effect it has on people when they feel seen, heard, understood, and acknowledged as valuable and worthy. The emotional impact of treating someone well and honoring their dignity has benefits that are incalculable. It’s the easiest and fastest way to bring out the best in people. The opposite is equally as true: treat people as if they don’t matter and watch how fast a destructive, if not violent, emotional storm erupts.
Leading with dignity means that leaders recognize this; that they are willing to embody what it looks like to treat others as valuable, to know what to do with people when they have been violated, and to know what to do when they have violated them. Below are some steps leaders can take to establish a culture of dignity in the workplace:
1. Make a company-wide commitment to learn about the role dignity plays in establishing a healthy and productive (and profitable) work environment.
2. Make a conscious effort to honor the dignity of your employees; both in everyday interactions and in the policies you create.
3. Create a work environment where your employees feel safe to speak up about the dignity violations they are experiencing. Make it easy for them by inviting them on a regular basis to talk to you about ways that you or company policies may be unknowingly harming them.
4. When it is reported to you that other managers and supervisors are violating the dignity of others, take action to address the situation. Make it company policy to take responsibility for the harm one causes others. No one should be above accountability.
There is no greater leadership challenge than to lead with dignity, helping us all to understand what it feels like to be honored and valued and to feel the expansive benefits that come from experiencing it. Employees yearn to see good leadership from their executives and managers. They all knows how difficult it is for their leaders to take courageous steps that could leave them vulnerable such as overriding the need to save face by admitting to having made a mistake; stepping beyond what is safe and comfortable by apologizing for hurting employees; confronting a fellow leader who has repeatedly violated people; championing one’s employees when their voices are not strong enough to speak up to a failed policy that violates their dignity.
While we all recognize how difficult leadership can be, we still have the expectation that the title of leader means something. We want it to mean that by watching dignified leadership, we, too, can expect more of ourselves and not succumb to the all-too-familiar default mode of making excuses for not opting to do what is right.
Since achieving independence from Spain and establishing its first constitution in 1824, Mexico has experienced numerous political upheavals. The country's long and turbulent journey toward democratic, representative government has been marked by a tension between centralized, autocratic governments (historically depicted as a legacy of colonial institutions) and federalist structures. The years since Mexico's independence have seen a major violent social revolution, years of authoritarian rule, and, finally, in the past two decades, the introduction of a fair and democratic electoral process. Over the course of the thirty-one essays in The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics some of the world's leading scholars of Mexico will provide a comprehensive view of the remarkable transformation of the nation's political system to a democratic model. In turn they will assess the most influential institutions, actors, policies and issues in its current evolution toward democratic consolidation. Following an introduction by Roderic Ai Camp, sections will explore the current state of Mexico's political development; transformative political institutions; the changing roles of the military, big business, organized labor, and the national political elite; new political actors including the news media, indigenous movements, women, and drug traffickers; electoral politics; demographics and political attitudes; and policy issues.
This paper examines empirically how transparency of the budget process affects fiscal
rules and incentives for fiscal gimmickry or creative accounting in the European Union. Using
stock-flow adjustment data for EU countries from 1990–2007, we show that pressure from a
deficit limit rule as in the Stability and Growth Pact creates incentives for fiscal gimmicks, as
does political pressure from the electoral cycle and economic pressure from negative shocks in
the business cycle. However, we show that where institutional transparency is higher, these
incentives are damped and largely disappear. We infer that fiscal rules do not work well when
institutional transparency is low.
To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given society. Part I considers theories about the impact of growing social diversity in Western nations. We classify two categories of society: ORIGINS (defined as Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, including twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (defined as Western Countries of Destination for Muslim migrants, including twenty-two OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations). Using this framework, we demonstrate that on average, the basic social values of Muslim migrants fall roughly mid-way between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination. We conclude that Muslim migrants do not move to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host culture, as assimilation theories suggest.
In 2010 and 2011, the first two years of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, Germany seemed to emerge as the continent’s dominant power, possessing an unrivaled ability to shape its neighbors’ destinies. Enjoying unabated economic strength, Germany agreed to bear the largest burden in the eurozone’s financial rescue, and so it was able to determine the pace and methods of managing the crisis. It also influenced the economic and budgetary policies of Europe’s debt-ridden countries, such as Greece and Spain, and it used that authority to impose an agenda of reform and austerity across the eurozone. Witnessing these developments, some observers went so far as to proclaim the onset of German hegemony and argued that only Berlin could solve the continent’s woes. Although Germany is, to be sure, the most important European country for overcoming today’s problems, its abilities to project its power at the EU level are substantially restricted—and they will diminish further in the months ahead. Germany’s position as the chief backer of the eurozone’s stabilization arrangements does not necessarily translate into political supremacy. And as the euro crisis has escalated and Germany has lost political allies, it will now have to accept that the common currency area will only partly conform to its vision. The first reason Berlin will struggle to implement its plans for Europe is that political developments of the last six months have left Germany a rather isolated giant. In 2010–11, it was largely because of cooperation between Berlin and Paris—and the close partnership between their two leaders that came to be known as Merkozy—that Germany was able to set European policy and disregard the attitudes of other eurozone members, generally the southern countries with large deficits. Now, France’s new president, François Hollande, has advocated a European pro-growth agenda that clashes with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s preference for austerity and, in the view of many Germans, would not encourage national governments to implement necessary reforms. Meanwhile, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands—smaller eurozone members that traditionally side with Germany on economic matters—have ceased to be reliable partners for Berlin, as populist forces have pressured their governments to withdraw from rescue mechanisms or demand stricter regulation of the recipient countries’ budgets in exchange for financial help. Berlin’s other usual allies in balancing against Mediterranean-style policy approaches, the United Kingdom and Poland, lack importance in the present crisis. Neither country uses the euro, and the eurozone is where the main political decisions on the future of Europe will be made.
In this new context, Germany risks losing out in several regards. For starters, it can no longer demand substantial debt reductions and budget cuts in return for financial backing, nor can it threaten to veto any rescue package that does not include its preferred policies. This was not the case last year, when Germany was able to impose a budget-balancing fiscal compact on eurozone member states. Then, Germany’s threat to withhold financial support was credible. Now, however, the crisis has escalated to such a degree that a German veto of a rescue package would trigger a systemic crisis—one that could unravel not only the common currency but also other, larger achievements of European integration such as the single market. Because Germany is liable for approximately 27 percent of the European rescue mechanisms and enjoys a singular position as the largest economy in Europe, it cannot refuse to back the euro without causing continent-wide damage. On the flip side, because they are less important to the overall functioning of the eurozone, the smaller, fiscally healthy states that help finance the rescue mechanisms now have more leeway to adopt harsh policies toward the deficit countries. They can ask for guarantees, as the Finns did of the Greeks. They can call for throwing noncompliant member states out of the eurozone, as the Austrian foreign minister did in August. They might even threaten to withdraw from the eurozone themselves—something that would be unthinkable for Germany or France. If the crisis deteriorates and the euro’s breakup seems likely, these small member states with comparatively low public debt levels may seek an early exit. By preemptively leaving the euozone, they would avoid getting stuck with the mess resulting from southern European countries’ abandoning the common currency. Germany, however, cannot make such threats—mainly because no one would believe them. A German exit would spell the imminent death of the single currency, which would not only be an economic disaster but also carry a historical legacy that even Germany’s euro skeptics would not want to assume. If a disorderly German exit pushed southern European states into political, social, and economic chaos, German voters would no longer remember that the move was supposed to serve their best interests and would punish their government for letting the European idea fail. Moreover, the economic and financial losses for Germany would be incalculable. If Germany introduced a new currency, its value would skyrocket, destroying the country’s export competitiveness. Germany’s nearly two trillion euros of claims in Target 2, an interbank payment system for processing cross-border transfers throughout the EU, would make its withdrawal from the eurozone extremely costly, as much of that money would be lost. As the continent’s crisis worsens, Germany will find it increasingly difficult to influence other European countries’ domestic policies according to its own norms. Berlin may want sanctions and controls to go into effect automatically when eurozone members run up large deficits, but in practice the decision to implement such measures will remain a political choice in each individual country. And as European publics grow more disillusioned with Germany’s agenda of structural reforms and austerity, they will demand a loose interpretation of the recently redesigned fiscal rules of the eurozone. What is more, the EU’s past experiences with big reform projects suggest that any attempt to establish a fiscal or full-fledged political union would involve complicated negotiations that would result in a compromise, not a German-made solution. So although Germany knows that market pressure is on its side, it will not simply be able to rearrange the euro area and the EU in its own image. Berlin must also consider the possible political fallout from its intransigent fiscal conservatism: Germany’s reputation in Greece, Italy, and Spain has already deteriorated, and it is beginning to erode elsewhere, too. If Berlin continues to demand balanced budgets, it could damage its bilateral relations with not only the eurozone’s debt-ridden countries but also European governments that normally favor German self-restraint. In the struggle to stabilize the euro, Germany does not enjoy sufficient ideological power to forge a consensus behind fiscal consolidation. Throughout Europe, the Merkel government’s call for austerity is perceived as a self-interested plea that would only stifle growth, not stimulate it. Pushing relentlessly for a Europe that abides by its vision, Germany risks losing many of its partners and turning its friends into skeptics. Furthermore, the Merkel government’s preferred solutions for the future of the eurozone would carry underestimated financial and political costs for Germany itself, making voters less likely to go along with its plans. A political bargain enabling the great leap forward toward a European political union could involve countries’ sharing debt responsibilities, forming a banking union, and transferring money across political borders -- all of which would impose great costs and risks on German taxpayers. Moving forward, eurozone countries will most likely establish what is known as a liability union, sharing responsibility for one another’s debts, either private (in the banking sector) or public. Neither of these outcomes would match Germany’s preference for minimizing collective risks. Even pushing Greece out of the eurozone, so that Germany would not have to back it up, would probably lead to some sort of joint liability. If Greece leaves the eurozone, bank runs and bond market contagion would threaten the rest of the common currency area and require immense financial firewalls, a mutualization of debt, and some sort of union in the banking sector. If it pushes Greece to the brink, Germany may end up having to accept substantial responsibility for the rest of Europe’s fiscal and financial woes. And it would have to do so in an uncontrolled way, without being able to guarantee any further economic coordination or regulation of member states’ budgets. Berlin needs to be aware that stabilizing the euro and reforming the EU will not lead to a Germanized Europe. And indeed, Germany’s leaders are already coming to realize the limits of their particular vision. They know that the measures taken under strong German influence in 2010–11 were not sufficient to contain the crisis, which can be achieved only through further integration and reforms following a long negotiation process. Germany alone will not be able to push reluctant member states into surrendering more of their national sovereignty, nor will it be able to determine the outcome of the process. If it is to exert a strong influence, Berlin must reestablish close ties with Paris and buttress that partnership by bringing various other countries on board to advocate for deeper integration. This new openness will have to include both eurozone countries -- to consolidate the common currency—as well as outsiders such as the United Kingdom and Poland, whose inclusion will be necessary to reshape the institutions of the EU. Germany must take the lead in building bridges between south and north, between givers and takers, and between the pro-austerity and pro-growth caucuses. In short, it is unlikely that Germany will be able to dictate how Europe resolves its sovereign debt crisis or reforms its institutions. Going it alone is not possible, because even the biggest payer and member state cannot unilaterally shape the rules. The coalitions necessary to rebuild the economic and political architecture of Europe will dilute German plans. Market pressure on crisis countries may have allowed Berlin, for some time, to implement its supply-side policy approach in the eurozone. But the crisis will not enable Germany to push through, without restriction, its own vision of European integration.
Countries with oil, mineral or other natural resource wealth, on average, have failed to show better economic performance than those without, often because of undesirable side effects. This is the phenomenon known as the Natural Resource Curse. This paper reviews the literature, classified according to six channels of causation that have been proposed. The possible channels are: (i) long-term trends in world prices, (ii) price volatility, (iii) permanent crowding out of manufacturing, (iv) autocratic/oligarchic institutions, (v) anarchic institutions, and (vi) cyclical Dutch Disease. With the exception of the first channel--the long-term trend in commodity prices does not appear to be downward--each of the other channels is an important part of the phenomenon. Skeptics have questioned the Natural Resource Curse, pointing to examples of commodity-exporting countries that have done well and arguing that resource exports and booms are not exogenous. The relevant policy question for a country with natural resources is how to make the best of them.
After briefly reviewing the new institutionalism, this article uses the history of political reform in Africa to test its key tenet: that power, if properly organized, is a productive resource. It does so by exploring the relationship between changes in political institutions and changes in economic performance, both at the macro- and the micro-level. The evidence indicates that political reform (Granger) causes increases in GDP per capita in the African subset of global data. And, at the micro-level, it demonstrates that changes in national political institutions in Africa strongly relate to changes in total factor productivity in agriculture.
What kind of deal do you make with a 20-something who just inherited not only a country, but also the mantle of one of the world’s most sophisticated crime families? When Kim Jong-un, who is thought to be 28 or 29, became North Korea’s leader in December after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, he became the de facto head of a mafia state.
How the new leader combines the roles of head of state and mafia don will influence the regime’s future behavior. Crime bosses have different incentives, and dealing with them requires different policies. And any deal—including last week’s agreement by North Korea to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for American food aid - will eventually falter if that reality is ignored.
Kim Jong-un confronts the same problem faced by every dictator: how to generate enough money to pay off the small group of elite supporters—army generals, party and family—who keep him in power. Other autocrats use oil wealth or parcel out whole industries to cronies.
But whoever rules North Korea has less to work with than most. The country defaulted in the 1970s, losing access to international credit, and Soviet subsidies ended with the cold war. In the 1990s, the founder and “eternal president,” Kim Il-sung, died just as a series of natural disasters devastated food production. The country has been an economic and humanitarian basket case ever since.
Kim Jong-il, who began training to run the country in the 1970s and inherited it after his father’s death, came up with an unconventional solution: state-sponsored organized crime. Counterfeit cigarettes and medicine, drugs, insurance fraud, fake money, trafficking people and endangered species - for decades, the Kim regime has done it all. Its operations became so extensive and well coordinated that American officials nicknamed it the “Soprano state,” after the hit HBO television series.
In the 1970s, after the default, North Korea used diplomats as drug mules to keep embassies running. When that got them kicked out of multiple countries and the economy tanked in the 1990s, Kim Jong-il began producing drugs at home, thereby avoiding a major cost plaguing drug lords elsewhere: law enforcement.He managed these operations through Bureau 39, a mysterious office under the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party. But to create plausible deniability, he outsourced distribution to Russian mafia, Japanese yakuza and Chinese triad gangs, who met North Korean military forces for drug drops at sea. The regime also manufactured the world’s best counterfeit dollars - so good that they reportedly forced the Treasury to redesign the $100 bill - and used a crime ring connected to the Official Irish Republican Army, a Marxist offshoot of the I.R.A., to launder them in Europe. They even made fake Viagra.
The Agreed Framework that froze North Korea’s nuclear program in October 1994 didn’t stop these activities; they actually increased. Despite its other benefits, the framework didn’t address the fundamental hard currency needs of the North Korean leadership.
This criminal legacy means that Kim Jong-un has even more on his plate than one might think. In addition to running a country that is an economic and humanitarian disaster and a geopolitical hot spot, he also has to manage a global criminal racket. That’s a lot for any 20-something to handle. (As “Sopranos” fans know, A. J.’s taking over for Tony might not have been good for business.)
Despite the seemingly stable transition so far, Kim Jong-un is under pressure. Elite party members who supported his father will be skeptical of his untested ability to fulfill his side of their cash-for-support bargain. And North Korea needs more money than usual this year to celebrate the anniversaries of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. (In the '70s, one of the first things Kim Jong-il used foreign currency for was a campaign to glorify his father.) Any sign that Kim Jong-un can’t satisfy supporters could crack the facade of elite solidarity.
What’s an aspiring kingpin to do?
First, find the money. Kim Jong-un seems to have done that. One of the last photos released of Kim Jong-il shows him riding a supermarket escalator. Behind him are Kim Jong-un and Jon Il-chun, manager of the infamous Bureau 39.Second, control the people who earn the money. Illicit activity brings the risk of freelancing, especially when you’re forced to let others do the distribution. As North Korea outsourced the drug trade, its profit margins dropped—and more and more insiders skimmed off the system to line their pockets. Today, reports indicate that methamphetamine is widely used in North Korea (partly because it dulls hunger pains), and the state is cracking down on the trade it once monopolized. Even Kim Jong-il couldn’t maintain perfect control and had to send operatives abroad to retrieve misbehaving agents. These are delicate tasks easily botched by a novice.Finally, keep the money coming. Criminal activity was never North Korea’s ultimate objective; the aim was always hard currency. Kim Jong-un needs cash without political conditions to stay in power. But there aren’t many good options for getting it these days, which is why North Korea is likely to pursue new and expanded forms of illicit activity.
Criminal activities are attractive because other sources of money have strings attached. Remittances from defectors, which have risen recently, don’t go to leaders, and they let in information. North Korea could bank on economic reform or Chinese aid, but reform won’t necessarily provide money for the elite, and aid makes Pyongyang uneasily dependent on Chinese patronage.
The cardinal fear of national security experts—which partly motivated last week’s agreement - is that Pyongyang will make money through nuclear proliferation. After all, North Korea is alleged to have helped build the Syrian nuclear reactor that Israel destroyed in 2007. But it may be hard for North Korea to find a buyer; tests of its plutonium warheads have been a questionable technical success, and their uranium-enrichment program may not be advanced enough to make them an attractive seller.
That leaves crime. Last week’s deal does not change the probability that North Korea will engage in it. And new lines of business probably won’t look like the old ones; North Korea’s schemes are creative and highly adaptable.
When drugs and counterfeit dollars got too much exposure, the regime shifted toward cigarettes and insurance fraud. Last summer, South Korean authorities discovered North Korea’s involvement in a hacking ring that exploited online gaming sites to win points and exchange them for cash, making $6 million in two years. Given that cybercriminals across the world gross over $100 billion annually, a country with decent cyberwarfare capabilities could probably do well for itself.Or could North Korea go legit? Publicly at least, there haven’t been major seizures of its drugs or counterfeit currency in several years, leading analysts to speculate that targeting the country’s illicit finances successfully crippled those particular earning schemes. And Kim Jong-il’s death does give North Korea an opportunity to get out of the game.BUT legitimacy won’t solve Kim Jong-un’s problem. Right now his survival is guaranteed by hard currency, and the best source of it is illicit activity. That’s why previous American efforts sought to shut off these activities: to convince the regime it had to reform itself to survive.
That didn’t go quite far enough. Shutting down those activities works only so long as North Korea can’t find new ones. The key to survival was not any one illicit activity but the ability to adapt from one to another—an ability that, with Kim Jong-il gone, likely rests with just a few trusted people. Those people, their loyalties and their relationships are now Kim Jong-un’s biggest vulnerability. If North Korea loses its capacity to adapt, it will lose the ability to make money illicitly—and will have to choose reform.
For America to make successful deals with North Korea, we must first grasp that its leader faces not just a dictator’s problems, but those of a mafia boss. And if you make a deal with the Godfather, you must not overlook the interests of the consigliere standing behind him.
Depois que a primária republicana no Texas deu a Mitt Romney delegados suficientes para garantir formalmente a indicação de seu partido à Presidência, o presidente Obama telefonou ao rival para congratulá-lo. O telefonema foi como o aperto de mão que dois pesos-pesados trocam antes de iniciar a disputa de um título de boxe.
A campanha presidencial está em curso há meses, mas entrou em nova fase que vai até o começo de setembro.
Ao longo dessas semanas, os dois candidatos arrecadarão dinheiro para suas campanhas incansavelmente, e testarão, em discursos e propaganda, temas que acreditam possam reforçar sua posição junto ao eleitorado.
É o profundo antagonismo entre os partidos que vem dando forma e tom à campanha. Proporção incomumente alta dos discursos e da propaganda consiste em ataques ao adversário, em lugar de articulação positiva de ideias.
Romney critica Obama quase todos os dias por sua conduta ineficiente da economia. A campanha de Obama concentra suas atenções no fracasso do rival quanto a criar empregos, quando governou Massachusetts.
Novas regras de financiamento de campanha ampliarão dramaticamente a presença da propaganda negativa, porque permitem que comitês de ação política (PACs) quase independentes arrecadem fundos ilimitados para "propaganda de ataque" pela qual os candidatos não assumem responsabilidade.
As novas regras devem produzir uma das disputas mais amargas da história recente.
Uma outra característica da campanha em curso é mais tradicional e reflete o sistema de colégio eleitoral usado na eleição dos EUA (sob o qual os votos de todos os delegados de um Estado cabem ao candidato que vença nas urnas naquele Estado).
A campanha daqui por diante será conduzida quase inteiramente nos Estados "incertos" ou "em disputa", entre os quais Flórida, Ohio, Virgínia, Carolina do Norte e Wisconsin. Obama e Romney farão visitas repetidas a esses Estados, e suas máquinas montarão estruturas fortes neles. Seria arriscado prever o resultado da eleição cinco meses antes da votação. Além disso, nas duas eleições passadas, as campanhas sofreram reviravoltas inesperadas.
Obama e Romney sabem que o resultado da disputa pode ser profundamente influenciado por desdobramentos (como os problemas do euro) sobre o qual nenhum deles tem controle.
Barack Obama’s galvanizing victory in 2008, coming amid the greatest economic crisis since the 1930s, opened the door to major reforms. But the president quickly faced skepticism from supporters and fierce opposition from Republicans, who scored sweeping wins in the 2010 midterm election. Here, noted political scientist Theda Skocpol surveys the political landscape and explores its most consequential questions: What happened to Obama’s “new New Deal”? Why have his achievements enraged opponents more than they have satisfied supporters? How has the Tea Party’s ascendance reshaped American politics?Skocpol’s compelling account rises above conventional wisdom and overwrought rhetoric. The Obama administration’s response to the recession produced bold initiatives—health care reform, changes in college loans, financial regulation—that promise security and opportunity. But these reforms are complex and will take years to implement. Potential beneficiaries do not readily understand them, yet the reforms alarm powerful interests and political enemies, creating the volatile mix of confusion and fear from which Tea Party forces erupted. Skocpol dissects the popular and elite components of the Tea Party reaction that has boosted the Republican Party while pushing it far to the right at a critical juncture for US politics and governance.Skocpol’s analysis is accompanied by contributions from two fellow scholars and a former congressman. At this moment of economic uncertainty and extreme polarization, as voters prepare to render another verdict on Obama’s historic presidency, Skocpol and her respondents help us to understand its triumphs and setbacks and see where we might be headed next.
A glance at a newspaper or the wait staff in a restaurant, at high-technology hubs such as Silicon Valley, on the streets of cities like Berlin or Barcelona, or at the students in our classes makes it clear how many immigrants now live in North America and Western Europe, and how important they are to our cultural, economic, and social lives. A glance at the landscape of governance, however, does not give a clear or consistent image of immigrants’ presence. In 2007, only twelve Representatives in the 435-member United States Congress were immigrants, as were only two each of the 50 governors and 100 senators. Immigrants cast only 6.3 percent of the vote in the American presidential election of 2008, despite being almost 13 percent of the total adult population (Garbaye and Mollenkopf forthcoming 2012). As of 2009, 11 deputies in the 622-seat German Bundestag were foreign-born (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2009). As of 2007, no French citizen of Mahgrébin origin had sat in the 555-member National Assembly.
This essay outlines the evolution of my personal thinking about phenomenology and subjectivity. In
previous work, I drew heavily on cultural phenomenology for studying illness, subjective experience, and medical
knowledge across cultures. Here I describe why I have become increasingly dissatisfied with this framework
for understanding subjectivity and the subject and suggest alternatives I consider important for psychological
anthropology. I focus in particular on questions of how to investigate that which is largely unspeakable and
unspoken in everyday speech but at times erupts into awareness as complex specters haunting the present. I
provide a case from my ongoing research in Java of a young man who suffered an acute psychosis, drawing
implications for a theory of subjectivity and methods for psychological anthropology. I point briefly to the relation
of madness and memories of political violence as sites for investigating subjectivity, suggesting the importance
of a “hauntology” for psychological anthropology. Finally, I address questions about whether a method that
addresses hidden aspects of psychological experience requires a stance in which ethnographers “know better
than” those with whom they are interacting.
This paper tests the theory of context-conditional political budget cycles in South Africa’s dominant party framework and demonstrates that the central government has both an incentive and the ability to implement PBCs on the subnational level. Using a unique panel dataset comprising South Africa’s nine provinces over the period 1995–2010 generates two main results: First, provinces where the national ruling party faces greater electoral competition receive higher per capita transfers in the year before an election. Second, this increase is driven by the conditional grant, which is the non- formula-based component of total the intergovernmental transfer. The ability to implement political budget cycles is successfully constrained when it comes to the formula-based equitable share component of the total transfer for which no evidence of electorally-induced funding is found. Overall, the results suggest that even in a dominant party framework, political competition can function as an incentive to implement political budget cycles.
The field of political demography—the politics of population change—is dramatically underrepresented in political science. At a time when demographic changes—aging in the rich world, youth bulges in the developing world, ethnic and religious shifts, migration, and urbanization—are waxing as never before, this neglect is especially glaring and starkly contrasts with the enormous interest coming from policymakers and the media.
“Ten years ago, [demography] was hardly on the radar screen,” remarks Richard Jackson and Neil Howe of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, two contributors to this volume. “Today,” they continue, “it dominates almost any discussion of America’s long-term fiscal, economic, or foreign-policy direction.”
Demography is the most predictable of the social sciences: children born in the last five years will be the new workers, voters, soldiers, and potential insurgents of 2025 and the political elites of the 2050s. Whether in the West or the developing world, political scientists urgently need to understand the tectonics of demography in order to grasp the full context of today’s political developments. This book begins to fill the gap from a global and historical perspective and with the hope that scholars and policymakers will take its insights on board to develop enlightened policies for our collective future.
Daniel Ziblatt may have been born with political science in his DNA. Even if he wasn’t, his fate was sealed to enter the field during a year abroad and a memorable night with a glass of bubbly.
The California native was fascinated as a child by tales about his grandfather, an immigrant from Eastern Europe. He spent the year after high school in southwest Germany amid an era of political upheaval and transformation. Only months before his arrival, the Berlin wall had tumbled amid celebration and shocked surprise.Then, on Oct. 3, 1990, Germany, after decades of partition, officially reunited.“I remember this vivid scene. Everyone came outside, and we were toasting with Champagne. It was such an amazing time, and it really got me excited about studying this part of the world,” said Ziblatt.
Later, a ride through the countryside with a friend, past villages that seemed out of the 1920s, helped to crystalize his sense that history could be a vital window to the past, present, and future. “You could see the legacies of the past were so present there, and there was so much to understand about where these places came from.”
Using history as a lens to explore future political trends has been a constant throughout Ziblatt’s career and informs his work as an author, educator, and researcher. The Harvard professor of government says he likes to delve into “major, and sometimes understudied historical puzzles that make one rethink big theories in political science.”
He did that with his 2006 book Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism. Ziblatt wondered how Italy and Germany, two countries that shared so many characteristics and were both forged as modern states in the 1860s, could have turned out so differently: Italy was formed as a centralized unitary state, while Germany became a federal one. His research showed that some well-developed institutional systems long in place in Germany forged the building blocks of federalism. In Italy, those systems were missing, and federalism failed.“The answer,” he said, “led to fundamentally new paradigms for understanding how states form.”
In his forthcoming book he turns his attention again to Germany, comparing its development with Britain’s embrace of democracy. Ziblatt hopes to show how the disposition of conservative parties helps to explain why “Germany’s path of democratization was so murderous and disaster-filled, while Britain’s was relatively smooth.
“In large part, you have to look closely at authoritarian incumbents and how they cope with the process of democratization,” said Ziblatt. “If there are elements inside the regime that are willing to compete with the opposition, democratization has a chance.” People often tend to overlook such political players because they are considered the losers of the democratization process, or opponents to democracy, said Ziblatt. But they are powerful actors who often play pivotal roles in determining a country’s future.
“In a way, the conservative parties are the hinges as to whether or not democracy is stable.”
Can such political lessons be applied to the current situation in Egypt? Ziblatt thinks so. If the old-regime elites who previously served ousted leader Hosni Mubarak are able to reorganize themselves politically and agree to free and fair elections, he said, the democratization process could take hold. Only time will tell.Ziblatt forged his path to political science around a lively dinner table that included heated conversations about politics. His grandmother was a leader in the Democratic Party in the ’50s, his father was a political scientist at Sonoma State University, and his mother and two brothers all studied political science in college.
“I was doomed from the start,” he said, laughing.
He majored in political science and German in college and received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. Then he headed east to Harvard.When not teaching, researching, writing, or traveling, Ziblatt spends extra time with his wife and two young daughters. In the future, he hopes to get back to his other love: music. In his office, works by Beethoven, Mozart, and Chopin sit piled in a corner. He studied the piano for years, and for a time considered a degree in music.“There were too many interesting political things going on to spend eight hours a day playing and missing out on everything.”
A new climate change treaty must address three current gaps: the absence of emissions targets extending far into the future; the absence of participation by the United States, China, and other developing countries; and the absence of reasons to expect compliance. Moreover, to be politically acceptable, a post-Kyoto treaty must recognize certain constraints regarding country-by-country economic costs. This article presents a framework for assigning quantitative emissions allocations across countries, one budget period at a time, through a two-stage plan: (a) China and other developing countries accept targets at business-as-usual (BAU) levels in the coming budget period, and, during the same period, the United States agrees to cuts below BAU; (b) all countries are asked to make further cuts in the future in accordance with a formula that includes a Progressive Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a Gradual Equalization Factor. An earlier proposal (Frankel 2009) for specific parameter values in the formulas achieved the environmental goal that carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations plateau at 500 ppm by 2100. It met our political constraints by keeping every country’s economic cost below thresholds of Y = 1 percent of income in Present Discounted Value, and X = 5 percent of income in the worst period. The framework proposed in this article attains a stricter concentration goal of 460 ppm CO2 but only by loosening the political constraints.
Long before the Arab republics in the Middle East and North Africa grabbed the world’s attention with inspiring democratic protests, they shared another curious political reality: leaders who, despite having been “elected,” claimed power like kings.
By the end of 2010, Roger Owen, A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History, thought he was almost finished with his book on the phenomenon of these “presidents for life.”
He soon learned how wrong he was. What began as a single fruit vendor’s act of self-immolation in Tunisia in December 2010 soon turned into a nationwide protest that spread like wildfire to neighboring Arab nations. At the same time, the website WikiLeaks’ release of a trove of diplomatic cables — including many from the American ambassador in Libya—provided insights into the region’s notoriously secretive regimes.“Suddenly, my book looked as though it was hideously out of date,” Owen said in a talk at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies on Thursday. He delayed publication to add an analysis of the political uprisings, which thus far have successfully overthrown rulers in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.What Owen found was that the dictators’ strength—their ability to share strategies for remaining in power over the decades—had been turned against them, bringing them under the same pressure to resign in their long-suffering countries.“There’s a clubbiness about these dictators,” Owen said in discussing “The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life,” which was released this month. “They learned from each other, and they egged each other on, and now it’s going the other way. The anti-dictatorial forces have learned something” from them.“I think we can say, in light of the Arab Spring, that these monarchical regimes brought on their own destruction,” he said.Still, Owen’s book, and his lecture, focused more on the rise of such presidents than their fall—and for good reason. These leaders, from the bureaucratic Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to the brutal Moammar Gadhafi in Libya, provided fascinating insight into the ways that entire governments came to be embodied in individuals.
Post-colonial countries like those in the Middle East and North Africa, which have both “a desire to protect sovereignty and a desire to have security,” are particularly susceptible to dictatorial rule, Owen said.“The newly independent states place an enormous premium on unity,” he said. “They thought division had led to problems before.…You had to pretend that everybody was on the same page, and that the only people who were making trouble were agents of foreign powers.”That strategy required keeping up appearances of absolute authority, even as some presidents grew old and frail. Mubarak’s health became a state secret; at least one journalist was put in prison for suggesting that the Egyptian president underwent an operation for cancer. In researching the book, Owen and his students became “briefly obsessed” with Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s hair, which looked like “it had been imported from [Silvio] Berlusconi’s hairdresser,” Owen joked, referencing the slick former Italian prime minister’s ’do.“The one thing they could not reveal was that they were getting old,” Owen said, because the presidents feared any inkling of their future death would agitate the population.Over time, Owen said, Arab dictators created “mirror states,” systems that mirrored their beliefs and served to reinforce their centrality and authority.Gadhafi’s sons, for example, had an interest in keeping him calm to prevent him from ordering a dangerous attack, Owen said. Up until the day he was captured by rebels and killed, Gadhafi believed that his people loved him. Recently, Bashar al-Assad, who remains in power in Syria, claimed he has faced no real domestic opposition to his rule despite more than a year of unrest.“It was not in their worldview that there could be real citizens, not just foreign agitators or Zionist agents or terrorists,” who would want them to step down, Owen said.Even without protests spurred by widespread poverty, unemployment, and inequality, such presidents faced a natural deadline on their rule. Many have wrestled with the idea of succession, Owen said. But why would those countries allow their presidents to adopt the airs of a monarch—from grooming their sons for power to abandoning their modest presidential estates for sumptuous palaces?“Everybody knows the rules of the game in a monarchy,” Owen said. “That’s probably one reason why the monarchs have survived as well as they have [in other parts of the Middle East]. I think monarchy is much easier to understand.”Indeed, he said, the constitutional drafting process currently under way in some of the Arab nations is proving just how difficult it is to express the voice of the people without falling into chaos—or back into a pattern of heavy-handed rule. Even two centuries later, America’s example is hardly as enlightening as we’d like to believe, Owen said.“How do you get to a stage where 25 white men produce a document that says, ‘We the people’?” he wondered. “There’s a trick involved in how we do that.”
The perception of politics as an obstacle to the advancement of the Caribbean must be removed. In Power, Politics and Performance, Winston Dookeran argues that for meaningful change, politics must be visionary and pursued with principled purpose. He argues for partnership through regionalism and explores the issues facing small developing states and their sovereignty. Dookeran identifies the imperatives of financial stability and the structures required for building a knowledge-based economy. Power, Politics and Performance focuses on key issues of leadership and the political processes suggesting that ultimately, leadership is about finding solutions, and such solutions require radical transformation of political parties and political institutions. The book examines and analyses specific problems and distortions in small states and the challenge of building effective leadership while providing a blueprint for the way forward. Power, Politics and Performance is a welcomed addition to the Caribbean Integration arena and sets the stage for a paradigm shift in the governance of small states.
The two traditional ways of thinking about justice at the global level either limit the applicability of justice to states or else extend it to all human beings. The view I defend rejects both these approaches and instead recognizes different considerations or conditions based on which individuals are in the scope of different principles of justice. Finding a philosophically convincing alternative to those approaches strikes me as the most demanding and important challenge contemporary political philosophy faces (one that in turn reflects the significance of the political issues that are at stake). My own view, and thus my attempt at meeting this challenge, acknowledges the existence of multiple grounds of justice. This book seeks to present a foundational theory that makes it plausible that there could be multiple grounds of justice and to defend a specific view of the grounds that I call pluralist internationalism. Pluralist Internationalism grants particular normative relevance to the state but qualifies this relevance by embedding the state into other grounds that are associated with their own principles of justice and that thus impose additional obligations on those who share membership in a state. The grounds that I discuss are shared membership in a state; common humanity; shared membership in the global order; shared involvement with the global trading system; and humanity’s collective ownership of the earth. (It is probably in the conceptualization of common ownership as a ground of justice that my view seems strangest.) Within this theory one must explore what obligations of justice pertain to states and other institutions. International institutions must be understood as agents of justice (rather than as entities that merely advance particular state interests). Moreover, it is international organizations or other entities of global administrative law that most plausibly create the context in which states give account to noncitizens for their contributions to justice.
We identify the major public debt overhang episodes in the advanced economies since the early 1800s, characterized by public debt to GDP levels exceeding 90 percent for at least five years. Consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and most of the more recent research, we find that public debt overhang episodes are associated with lower growth than during other periods. The duration of the average debt overhang episode is perhaps its most striking feature. Among the 26 episodes we identify, 20 lasted more than a decade. The long duration belies the view that the correlation is caused mainly by debt buildups during business cycle recessions. The long duration also implies that the cumulative shortfall in output from debt overhang is potentially massive. These growth-reducing effects of high public debt are apparently not transmitted exclusively through high real interest rates, as in eleven of the episodes, interest rates are not materially higher.
Those who study the role of agriculture in the political economy of development
focus on government policy choices on the one hand and the impact of price shocks
on the other. We argue that the two should be studied together. We nd that civil
unrest (Granger) causes government policies, pushing governments in poor and medium
income countries to shift relative prices in favor of urban consumers. We also nd that
while civil wars are related to food price shocks, when government policy choices are
taken into account, the relationship disappears. We thus learn two things: Policies
that placate urban consumers may in
ict economic costs on governments, but they
confer political benets. And when estimating the relationship between price shocks
and political stability, equations that omit the policy response of governments are
Co-author Brett L. Carter is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University.Download PDF
One of the most rigorous methodologies in the corporate governance literature uses firms' reactions to industry shocks to characterize the quality of governance. This methodology can produce the wrong answer unless one considers the ways firms compete. Because macro-level shocks reverberate differently at the firm level depending on whether a firm has a cost structure that requires significant adjustment, the quality of governance can only be elucidated accurately analyzing a firm's business strategy and their corporate governance. These differences can help one determine whether the fruits of a positive macro-level shock have been expropriated by insiders. Using the example of Indian firms, we show that an influential finding is reversed when these differences are considered. We further argue that the conventional wisdom about tunneling and business groups will need to be reformulated in light of the data, methodology, and findings presented here.
The Cold War and the early post-Cold War periods were relatively easy to define and comprehend. The first was roughly the struggle between two superpowers forming a bipolar system where almost every state had to choose a side. What followed was a period described by Fukuyama as “The End of History” announcing the triumph of liberal ideas. The US was a global hegemon: selecting when to intervene, expanding NATO’s reach, and dominating international institutions. Following the 9/11 attacks unilateralism was exposed and thereafter multilateralism appeared—with its limitations. Today, “regional multilateralism” may be the next paradigm that can bring about peace, cooperation, and stability in global affairs.
The rise and fall of US hegemony during the 1990s has been documented. The Unipolar moment, a Foreign Affairs article by Charles Krauthammer, encapsulates the main point in the title. It was a moment. Once this “moment” was over, Fareed Zakaria and others have been imagining a “post-American world.”
U.S. power and its global role remain at the core of the contemporary discussion. America still is—and probably will remain for a long time - the world’s undisputed leader in military, economic and technological power. However, the politics of austerity at home and pressing realities abroad necessitate a new U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. cannot go it alone.
Indeed, the US has been refocusing its foreign policy and Obama has been using the term multilateralism repeatedly. Multilateralism is a prudent strategy for the U.S. and the international system at large, however it is incomplete. Multilateralism has reached its limits when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program, recognition of Palestine, the six party talks on North Korea, and Kosovo’s independence—to name just a few thorny issues.
In a world of diminished US involvement and unsuccessful multilateralist endeavors, an alternative vision for global engagement is necessary. Instead we are faced with a reluctant China, an unprepared India, an European Union in the midst of a financial debacle and a host of regional powers that focus on their neighborhood rather than claiming a global role. Given these realities, regional multilateralism can serve as the way out from this dead end.
Regionally, the Middle East is as explosive as ever. The Western Balkans are doubtful about their future within the European Union and may again implode. The African continent has many ongoing conflicts and even more potential ones unresolved. In Latin America at least two alternative visions for the region are competing. The Far East is actively searching ways to live with the rise of China. These and other contemporary problems can be better solved at the regional rather than the bilateral or global levels.
This context highlights the importance of regional integration and multilateralism. Regional multilateralism is building on these very ideas. Bringing these two together is necessary in today’s world. The buds of regional integration are everywhere in the making but they have not yet been clearly connected with the principles of multilateralism.
The EU serves as an example of regional integration and others are following its steps. The African Union has also stepped up its peacekeeping efforts and moved toward further economic integration. However, the quest for regional multilateralism should not be confined by a conventional understanding of geography. For instance, Russia may be a force for stability both in the Far East and Central Asia, China may have a stake in the affairs of Latin America and Africa, and different parts of what we call the Middle East may integrate with parts of Central Asia or Europe. The very prospect of Turkey joining the EU may be a sign of such developments.
Cross-regional cooperation is key to regional multilateralism. The transatlantic dialogue model between the US and Europe can and should be exported. For instance, in the Far East the U.S. and the EU both cooperate with ASEAN. China and Russia have extended their ties through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This however did not prevent Russia from establishing the Eurasian Union, in a way reclaiming its sphere of influence. The Middle East, on the other hand, is in dire need of broader—albeit imaginative—regional integration.
The inability of any one power to confront global challenges will lead responsible powers into the fold of regional multilateralism. The transition will be facilitated if it builds on existing regional integration structures. This way, every state will ultimately become a stakeholder in the international system.
For that to happen, regional leaders need to operate as focal points. They need to listen, persuade and inspire insiders, while coordinating with outsiders. This process is different from the traditional spheres of influence system. It is based not on Monroe Doctrine-type of arrangements and coercion but rather on reassuring security umbrellas and mutually beneficial trade blocs.
Within this new paradigm, emerging regional leaders—such as China, Russia, India, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa—will play a more significant role within their regions while at the same time will take part in cross regional and global issues.