International law has enjoyed a recent renaissance as an important subfield of study within international relations. Two trends are evident in the recent literature. First, the obsession with theoretical labels is on the decline. Second, empirical, especially quantitative, work is burgeoning. This article reviews the literature in four issues areas—security, war, and peace; international trade; protection of the environment; and human rights—and concludes we have a much stronger basis for assessing claims about compliance and violation now than was the case only a few years ago. Still, the literature suffers from a few weaknesses, including problems of selection and endogeneity of treaties themselves and an enduring state-centric focus, despite the fact that researchers recognize that nonstate and substate actors influence treaty behavior. Nonetheless, the quality and quantity of new work demonstrates that international law has regained an important place in the study of international politics.
, Theory and Society 39, no. 3-4: 397-413.Abstract
Historically, the study of state formation has involved a focus on the urban and national conditions under which states monopolize the means of coercion, generate legitimacy, and marshal sufficient economic resources to wage war against enemies while sustaining citizen allegiance through the extension of social programs, new forms of national solidarity, and citizenship. In Charles Tilly’s large body of work, these themes loomed large, and they have re-emerged in slightly reformulated ways in an unfinished manuscript that reflected on the relationship between capital and coercion in which he also integrated the element of commitment—or networks of trust—into the study of state formation. This article develops these same ideas but in new directions, casting them in light of contemporary rather than historical developments. Taking as its point of departure the accelerating rates of criminal violence and citizen insecurity in cities of the developing world, this essay suggests that random and targeted violence increasingly perpetrated by “irregular” armed forces pose a direct challenge to state legitimacy and national sovereignty. Through examination of urban and transnational non-state armed actors who use violence to accumulate capital and secure economic dominion, and whose activities reveal alternative networks of commitment, power, authority, and even self-governance, this essay identifies contemporary parallels with the pre-modern period studied by Charles Tilly, arguing that current patterns challenge prevailing national-state forms of sovereignty. Drawing evidence primarily from Mexico and other middle income developing countries that face growing insecurity and armed violence, the article examines the new “spatialities” of irregular armed force, how they form the basis for alternative networks of coercion, allegiance, and reciprocity that challenge old forms and scales of sovereignty, and what this means for the power and legitimacy of the traditional nation-state.
, International Organization 64, no. 2: 225-256.Abstract
The creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute war crimes poses a real puzzle. Why was it created, and more importantly, why do states agree to join this institution? The ICC represents a serious intrusion into a traditional arena of state sovereignty: the right to administer justice to one’s one nationals. Yet more than one hundred states have joined. Social scientists are hardly of one mind about this institution, arguing that it is (alternately) dangerous or irrelevant to achieving its main purposes: justice, peace, and stability. By contrast, we theorize the ICC as a mechanism to assist states in self-binding, and draw on credible commitments theory to understand who commits to the ICC, and the early consequences of such commitments. This approach explains a counterintuitive finding: the states that are both the least and the most vulnerable to the possibility of an ICC case affecting their citizens have committed most readily to the ICC, while potentially vulnerable states with credible alternative means to hold leaders accountable do not. Similarly, ratification of the ICC is associated with tentative steps toward violence reduction and peace in those countries precisely least likely to be able to commit credibly to forswear atrocities. These findings support the potential usefulness of the ICC as a mechanism for some governments to commit to ratchet down violence and get on the road to peaceful negotiations.
Historically, the study of state formation has involved a focus on the urban and national conditions under which states monopolize the means of coercion, generate legitimacy, and marshal sufficient economic resources to wage war against enemies while sustaining citizen allegiance through the extension of social programs, new forms of national solidarity, and citizenship. In Charles Tilly’s large body of work, these themes loomed large, and they have re-emerged in slightly reformulated ways in an unfinished manuscript that reflected on the relationship between capital and coercion in which he also integrated the element of commitment - or networks of trust - into the study of state formation. This article develops these same ideas but in new directions, casting them in light of contemporary rather than historical developments. Taking as its point of departure the accelerating rates of criminal violence and citizen insecurity in cities of the developing world, this essay suggests that random and targeted violence increasingly perpetrated by “irregular” armed forces pose a direct challenge to state legitimacy and national sovereignty. Through examination of urban and transnational non-state armed actors who use violence to accumulate capital and secure economic dominion, and whose activities reveal alternative networks of commitment, power, authority, and even self-governance, this essay identifies contemporary parallels with the pre-modern period studied by Charles Tilly, arguing that current patterns challenge prevailing national-state forms of sovereignty. Drawing evidence primarily from Mexico and other middle income developing countries that face growing insecurity and armed violence, the article examines the new “spatialities” of irregular armed force, how they form the basis for alternative networks of coercion, allegiance, and reciprocity that challenge old forms and scales of sovereignty, and what this means for the power and legitimacy of the traditional nation-state.
Background: There is rising evidence that relationships that bridge between immigrants and long-time residents are critical to immigrant integration and to the overall heath of communities. The processes by which this bridging social capital is built are not well understood. Schools in new immigrant destinations, as spaces in which diverse youth come together, provide a unique opportunity to examine how immigrant and long-time resident youth connect to each other and build relationships.
Purpose: This article examines the processes of building relationships between immigrant and long-time resident youth and explores the meaning and consequences of these processes for the individuals involved. The article further suggests ways in which schools might adopt strategies to promote personal interaction, cooperative action, and collective identification to aid in the development of these relationships.
Setting: Lewiston, Maine is the setting of this study. Between February 2001 and May 2003, 1,200 Somalis arrived in Lewiston, a town of 35,690 people, 97.3% of whom were White at the time of the 2000 Census.
Research Design: Using the methodology of portraiture, this study examines, as an exemplary case, one relationship between two students: a Somali immigrant, and a White long-time resident. Portraiture is a methodology built on relationships, which mirrors the theoretical issues under investigation.
Findings/Results: This study provides new insights into how bridging relationships are built. The participants capitalized on the common space of their new immigrant destination school to transform casual personal interactions into a bridging relationship based on collective identification. Through dialogue, particularly about race, they challenged each other and themselves, and each came to understand the other in new ways; they also became invested in each other and dependent on each other to grow and to understand themselves and their places in a changing town.
Conclusions/Recommendations: The research identifies processes of personal interaction, cooperative action, and collective identification as central to the building of bridging relationships. It also reveals the necessity of a focus on race when researching, analyzing, or cultivating these relationships. Lessons for educators and schools seeking to foster relationships between immigrant and long-time resident youth include engaging students in direct dialogue about race and cultivating skills in empathetic storytelling and listening in order to "double-think,"or receive a counter-story.
In this paper, we exploit a new multi-country historical dataset on public (government) debt to search for a systemic relationship between high public debt levels, growth and inflation. Our main result is that whereas the link between
growth and debt seems relatively weak at “normal” debt levels, median growth rates for countries with public debt over roughly 90 percent of GDP are about one percent lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several percent lower. Surprisingly, the relationship between public debt and growth is remarkably
similar across emerging markets and advanced economies. This is not the case for inflation. We find no systematic relationship between high debt levels and inflation for advanced economies as a group (albeit with individual country exceptions including the United States). By contrast, in emerging market countries, high public debt levels coincide with higher inflation.
Although the positive association between religiosity and life satisfaction is well documented, much theoretical and empirical controversy surrounds the question of how religion actually shapes life satisfaction. Using a new panel dataset, this study offers strong evidence for social and participatory mechanisms shaping religion’s impact on life satisfaction. Our findings suggest that religious people are more satisfied with their lives because they regularly attend religious services and build social networks in their congregations. The effect of within-congregation friendship is contingent, however, on the presence of a strong religious identity. We find little evidence that other private or subjective aspects of religiosity affect life satisfaction independent of attendance and congregational friendship.
Unprecedented in its global impact, the Great Depression sounded the death knell of unfettered capitalism. Four men - all from wildly different backgrounds, all with decidedly disparate temperaments, and all equally devoted to FDR - were the primary authors of what would essentially be America’s new Constitution. Scorpions is the story of their personalities, their relationships, and above all their ideas in the crucial years of depression and war - years in which these men created the national game plan that would save the country by rebuilding the economy and defeating the Nazis and the Soviets in turn. It is also the story of how these men - Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black, Robert Jackson , and William O. Douglas (a Jew, a Klansman, a Yankee, and a Westerner) - advised, cajoled, used, and were used by the man who brought them together and whom they all revered: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
“For Michael Sandel, justice is not a spectator sport,” The Nation’s reviewer of Justice remarked. In his acclaimed book—based on his legendary Harvard course—Sandel offers a rare education in thinking through the complicated issues and controversies we face in public life today. It has emerged as a most lucid and engaging guide for those who yearn for a more robust and thoughtful public discourse. “In terms we can all understand,” wrote Jonathan Rauch in The New York Times, Justice“confronts us with the concepts that lurk...beneath our conflicts.”
Affirmative action, same-sex marriage, physician-assisted suicide, abortion, national service, the moral limits of markets—Sandel relates the big questions of political philosophy to the most vexing issues of the day, and shows how a surer grasp of philosophy can help us make sense of politics, morality, and our own convictions as well.
Justice is lively, thought-provoking, and wise—an essential new addition to the small shelf of books that speak convincingly to the hard questions of our civic life.
Social justice: an ideal, forever beyond our grasp; or one of many
practical possibilities? More than a matter of intellectual discourse,
the idea of justice plays a real role in how—and how well—people live.
And in this book the distinguished scholar Amartya Sen offers a
powerful critique of the theory of social justice that, in its grip on
social and political thinking, has long left practical realities far
The transcendental theory of justice, the subject of Sen’s
analysis, flourished in the Enlightenment and has proponents among some
of the most distinguished philosophers of our day; it is concerned with
identifying perfectly just social arrangements, defining the nature of
the perfectly just society. The approach Sen favors, on the other hand,
focuses on the comparative judgments of what is “more” or “less” just,
and on the comparative merits of the different societies that actually
emerge from certain institutions and social interactions.
At the heart of Sen’s argument is a respect for reasoned
differences in our understanding of what a “just society” really is.
People of different persuasions—for example, utilitarians, economic
egalitarians, labor right theorists, no-nonsense libertarians—might
each reasonably see a clear and straightforward resolution to questions
of justice; and yet, these clear and straightforward resolutions would
be completely different. In light of this, Sen argues for a comparative
perspective on justice that can guide us in the choice between
alternatives that we inevitably face.
Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing—and recovering—their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, “this time is different”—claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. This book proves that premise wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes—from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much—or how little—we have learned.
Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts—as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur.
International law scholars debate when international law matters to states, how it matters, and
whether we can improve compliance. One of the few areas of agreement is that fairly robust levels of
compliance can be achieved by tapping into states’ concerns with their reputation. The logic is intuitively
appealing: a state that violates international law develops a bad reputation, which leads other states to
exclude the violator from future cooperative opportunities. Anticipating a loss of future gains, states will
often comply with international rules that are not in their immediate interests. The level of compliance that
reputation can sustain depends, however, on how the government decision makers value the possibility of
being excluded from future cooperative agreements. This Article examines how governments internalize
reputational costs to the “state” and how audiences evaluate the predictive value of violating governments’
actions. The Article concludes that international law’s current approach to reputation is counterproductive,
because it treats reputation as an error term that makes rationalists’ claims invariably correct.
PRESIDENT OBAMA confronts the most fateful foreign policy decision
so far of his administration. Rapidly deteriorating security in
Afghanistan, the post-election political crisis in Kabul, highlighted
by Abdullah Abdullah’s decision to drop out of the runoff vote, and
General Stanley McChrystal’s request for 44,000 troops rightly spurred
Obama to call a timeout for reflection. Over the past eight weeks, in a
process with little precedent in American presidential decision-making,
the president and his advisers have held more than a half-dozen
no-holds-barred seminars examining and reexamining every dimension of
this challenge.Reduced to a single bottom line, Obama must decide whether to accept
the recommendation of his chosen military commander in the field to
Americanize this war. McChrystal’s call for more troops would expand US
forces in Afghanistan to more than 100,000 in order to execute what he
terms a “classic counterinsurgency campaign.’’Meanwhile, Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, delivered a major speech last week summarizing his
own analysis of the issue and offering advice about the president’s
choices. The judgments are nuanced, but no more so than the realities.On the bottom line question - yes or no on McChrystal’s
request—Kerry says no. He argues that McChrystal reaches “too far, too
fast.’’ Kerry recommends that further troop increases must meet three
conditions: reliable Afghan troops to partner with American forces,
local political leaders, and civilian advisers to speed development.
Truth be told, none of these three will be in place soon.Kerry’s analysis begins with the most important consideration: US
national interests. What should Americans care about here? What matters
more than other things that matter? Kerry says: Pakistan—not
Afghanistan. His focal question about Afghanistan is how developments
there impact Pakistan. Over the past months he has led efforts to
spotlight the anomaly that allocates 30 times more American time and
resources to Afghanistan when our much larger interests lie in
Pakistan. Thanks to his efforts with Senator Richard Lugar, the United
States has committed $7½ billion over five years to help stabilize this
nuclear-armed nation at risk of becoming the “epicenter of extremism in
the world.’’Second, what are America’s vital interests in Afghanistan? Kerry
answers that it is to “prevent the Taliban—with their long-standing
ties to Al Qaeda—from once again providing terrorists with an
unfettered Afghan safe haven.’’ Period. Note what this sparse summary
does not include: nation-building of a stable centrally-governed
Afghanistan. Like all Americans, Kerry applauds the progress
Afghanistan has made in becoming more democratic, expanding rights for
women, building schools. None of these, however, is included in his
minimum essentials for success.Third, he defines success as “the ability to empower and transfer
responsibility to Afghans as rapidly as possible and achieve a
sufficient level of stability to ensure that we can leave behind an
Afghanistan that is not controlled by Al Qaeda or the Taliban.’’ He
does not say an Afghanistan in which some Taliban are not ruling in
some areas.Fourth, he rejects “all-in’’ counterinsurgency. In its place he
recommends “smart counterinsurgency,’’ the crux of which is “limited
geographic area…as narrowly focused as possible.’’ Counterinsurgency’s
central objective is to “foster development of effective governance by
a legitimate government.’’ In contrast, the strategy Kerry recommends
could be achieved by “good enough’’ stability in Kabul and the major
population centers of a minimalist state cooperative enough to rent
bases and supply lines, provide an operating environment for attacks
against Al Qaeda, and assist with intelligence gathering.Kerry’ advances the argument by distinguishing between the vivid and
the vital, lowering ambitions to “what is achievable, measured against
the legitimate interests of the United States’’ and outlining a
strategy to that end. It is a speech that the president should, and no
doubt will, examine closely.Graham Allison is director of the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government
and author of “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable
IN the year since his election, as he has since he first appeared on the national stage, Barack Obama has embodied the fundamental paradoxes of race in America: that we live in a still racially fragmented society; that we share a public culture with an outsized black presence, but that in the privacy of homes and neighborhoods we are more segregated than in the Jim Crow era; that we worship more fervently than any other advanced nation, in churches and synagogues that define our separate ethnic identities and differences, to gods proclaiming the unity of mankind. Why are we this strange way? Is President Obama the ultimate expression of our peculiarities? Has he made a difference? Can he? Will he?We became this way because of the peculiar tragedies and triumphs of our past. Race and racism scar all advanced nations, but America is peculiar because slavery thrived internally and race became a defining feature of personal identity.Slavery was quintessentially an institution of exclusion: the slave first and foremost was someone who did not belong to and had no claims on the public order, nor any legitimate private existence, since both were appropriated by the slaveholder. The Act of Emancipation abolished only the first part of slavery, the master’s ownership; far from removing the concept of the ex-slave as someone who did not belong, it reinforced it. The nightmare of the Jim Crow era then extended and reinforced the public slavery of black Americans right up through the middle of the 20th century.At the same time, the status of blacks as permanent outsiders made whiteness a treasured personal attribute in a manner inconceivable to Europeans. Whiteness had no real meaning to pre-immigration Swedes or Irishmen because they were all white. But it became meaningful the moment they landed in America, where it was eagerly embraced as a free cultural resource in assimilating to the white republic. In America race had the same significance as gender and age as defining qualities of personhood.The great achievement of the civil rights movement was to finally abolish the lingering public culture of slavery and to create the opportunities that fostered the black middle class and black political leadership. This was a sea change. But Mr. Obama, by virtue of his unusual background as a biracial child reared by loving, though not unprejudiced, white caregivers, is acutely aware that the crude, dominating racism of the past simply morphed into a subtler cultural racism of the private sphere—significantly altered though hardly less damaging.Seeing blacks as culturally different—a perception legitimized by the nation’s celebration of diversity and identity—permits all kinds of complicated attitudes and misjudgments. Their differences can be celebrated on playing fields, dance floors and television, in theaters, hip-hop and cinema, and not least of all in that most public and ambivalently regarded arena of mass engagement: politics. But in the disciplined cultural spaces of marriages, homes, neighborhoods, schools and churches, these same differences become the source of Apollonian dread.What then can we expect of Mr. Obama? One thing we can be sure of is that he will not be leading any national conversations on race, convinced as he must be that they exacerbate rather than illuminate. During the campaign last year he spoke eloquently on the subject, but only when he was forced to do so by the uproar over the Rev. Jeremiah Wright. And since he took office, his one foray into racial politics—his reaction to the arrest of Henry Louis Gates Jr.—was a near political disaster that must have reinforced his reluctance.Mr. Obama’s writings, politics and personal relations suggest instead that he prefers a three-pronged strategy. First, he is committed to the universalist position that the best way to help the black and Latino poor is to help all disadvantaged people, Appalachian whites included. The outrage of black over-incarceration will be remedied by quietly reforming the justice system.Second, Mr. Obama appears convinced that residential segregation lies at the heart of both black problems and cultural racism. He is a committed integrationist and seems to favor policies intended to move people out of the inner cities.Third, he clearly considers education to be the major solution and has tried to lavishly finance our schools, despite the fiscal crisis. More broadly, he will quietly promote policies that celebrate the common culture of America, emphasizing the extraordinary role of blacks and other minorities in this continuing creation.At the same time, Mr. Obama seems to believe that the problems of black Americans are in part attributable to certain behaviors among them—most notably absentee fathers, dropping out of school and violence—which not only constrain their choices but rationalize the disfiguring processes of white cultural racism that extend the pathologies of the few to all black Americans. As a deeply committed family man, Mr. Obama has already made clear that he will use the bully pulpit of the presidency to encourage internal cultural reformation.All of these approaches are likely to alienate the identity-seeped segment of black leadership, and they will not prevent the extreme cultural right from accusing him of overplaying race, whatever he does.The uniqueness of Mr. Obama provides both obstacles and opportunities. My students have found that many young inner city blacks, while they admire him, find him too remote from their lives to be a role model. His policies, if properly carried out, might very well improve their chances in life, but in the end he is more likely to influence the racial attitudes of middle-class blacks and younger white Americans. This is all we can reasonably expect. It will take far more than a single presidency to fully end America’s long struggle with race.
Orlando Patterson, a professor of sociology at Harvard, is the author of The Ordeal of Integration: Progress and Resentment in America’s "Racial" Crisis.
The purpose of this book is to inform governance advisors about the vital role of the news media for governance reform. This book approaches the issue of news media and governance with three broad questions that it attempts to answer on the basis of quantitative data and case studies. First, a normative approach asks: What ideal roles should media systems play to strengthen democratic governance and thus bolster human development? Second, an empirical approach considers independent evidence derived from cross-national comparisons and from selected case studies, asking: Under what conditions do media systems actually succeed or fail to fulfill these objectives? Third, a strategic approach asks: What policy interventions work most effectively to close the substantial gap that exists between the democratic promise and performance of the news media as an institution?
Timely and pathbreaking, Securing the Peace is the first book
to explore the complete spectrum of civil war terminations, including
negotiated settlements, military victories by governments and rebels,
and stalemates and ceasefires. Examining the outcomes of all civil war
terminations since 1940, Monica Toft develops a general theory of
postwar stability, showing how third-party guarantees may not be the
best option. She demonstrates that thorough security-sector reform
plays a critical role in establishing peace over the long term.Much
of the thinking in this area has centered on third parties presiding
over the maintenance of negotiated settlements, but the problem with
this focus is that fewer than a quarter of recent civil wars have ended
this way. Furthermore, these settlements have been precarious, often
resulting in a recurrence of war. Toft finds that military victory,
especially victory by rebels, lends itself to a more durable peace. She
argues for the importance of the security sector—the police and
military—and explains that victories are more stable when governments
can maintain order. Toft presents statistical evaluations and in-depth
case studies that include El Salvador, Sudan, and Uganda to reveal that
where the security sector remains robust, stability and democracy are
likely to follow. An original and thoughtful reassessment of civil war terminations, Securing the Peace will interest all those concerned about resolving our world's most pressing conflicts.
“Growing up, I don’t know if I ever thought of becoming a teacher,” said Erez Manela, recently tenured professor of history in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. “I was always supposed to become a doctor or a lawyer.”Manela actually began by studying foreign languages as an undergraduate at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, not far from his hometown of Haifa, Israel. He soon discovered that courses in East Asian and Middle Eastern history complemented his interests in Chinese, Arabic, and Persian. Though he saw a future in academia, history was not a field he had expected to pursue.
“I didn’t yet conceive of it as something you could do as a profession, but rather something you might study to know more about the world,” he said.
Previously the Dunwalke Associate Professor of American History, Manela now specializes in modern international history and the history of the United States in the world. His first book, “The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism” (Oxford, 2007), explored the impact of President Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric on nationalist movements in Asia and the Middle East in the wake of World War I. Manela’s current research revolves around the global campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1960s and ‘70s.Manela considers his undergraduate experience the source of some of his main intellectual questions.In college, “I realized that in the modern period—during the 19th and early 20th centuries—there were really fascinating parallels between the history of the Ottoman Empire and the history of East Asia, particularly China,” Manela said. “That really intrigued me…I kept wondering how I could study these parallels in a way that wasn’t simply comparative. I wanted to put everything into one big framework and tell the story as connected.”
Manela decided to concentrate on international history as a graduate student at Yale, partly because he was reluctant to give up studying any of the countries or languages he had embraced in college.“I couldn’t bear the thought of focusing on just one of them,” he said. “I wanted to put it all to good use.”
Studying international history has allowed Manela to break free of the nation as an analytical framework and devote new attention to transnational actors, organizations, and themes. When Manela arrived at Harvard in 2003, history professors Akira Iriye (now emeritus) and the late Ernest May served as inspirational figures for him, as they too were concerned with these pioneering directions in international history. (May even taught Manela the basics of PowerPoint by jotting a few commands on an index card during his first semester at Harvard.)
“Teaching with them…was a tremendously formative experience for me,” Manela said. “Together, they established an amazing tradition of international history in this department.”
A member of Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Manela considers the interdisciplinary community of scholars and students his “second home” within the University. He served as the Weatherhead’s director of undergraduate student programs for four years, and is now director of graduate student programs.
Manela spends most of his free time with his three daughters, but sometimes revisits an old interest: chess. Occasionally he challenges the regulars in Harvard Square.
“Once upon a time I used to play chess fairly well,” he said, “but that’s history.”
Manela is grateful to have the chance to study a subject that many people can pursue only as a hobby, even though he never did live up to expectations of becoming a doctor or a lawyer.
“I think this is a decent alternative,” he said with a grin.
The book offers a comprehensive account of how the world evolved to its
present state in which humans now exercise a powerful, in many cases
dominant, influence for global environmental change. It outlines the
history that led to this position of dominance, in particular the role
played by our increasing reliance on fossil sources of energy, on coal,
oil and natural gas, and the problems that we are now forced to confront
as a result of this history. The concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere is greater now than at any time over at least the past
650,000 years with prospects to increase over the next few decades to
levels not seen since dinosaurs roamed the Earth 65 million years ago.
Comparable changes are evident also for methane and nitrous oxide and
for a variety of other constituents of the atmosphere including species
such as the ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons for which there are no
natural analogues. Increases in the concentrations of so-called
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are responsible for important changes
in global and regional climate with consequences for the future of
global society which, though difficult to predict in detail, are
potentially catastrophic for a world poorly equipped to cope. Changes
of climate in the past were repetitively responsible for the demise of
important civilizations. These changes, however, were generally natural
in origin in contrast to the changes now underway for which humans are
directly responsible. The challenge is to transition to a new energy
economy in which fossil fuels will play a much smaller role. We need as a
matter of urgency to cut back on emissions of climate altering gases
such as carbon dioxide while at the same time reducing our dependence on
unreliable, potentially disruptive, though currently indispensable,
sources of energy such as oil, the lifeblood of the global
transportation system. The book concludes with a discussion of options
for a more sustainable energy future, highlighting the potential for
contributions from wind, sun, biomass, geothermal and nuclear,
supplanting currently unsustainable reliance on coal, oil and natural
Ha sido presidente de la Asociación de Estudios Latinoamericanos…muchos libros publicados fuera de Cuba supuestamente sobre su política
exterior se dedican en su casi totalidad al estudio de la de otros
países hacia Cuba, omitiendo un estudio serio sobre la política
exterior de Cuba. Por el contrario, los capítulos de este libro
presentan la política exterior de Cuba como un instrumento normal de un
Estado que se defiende, promueve sus intereses internacionales, y busca
ejercer un papel protagónico en el ámbito mundial. Y, sí, Cuba fue
sujeto, no simplemente objeto, en sus relaciones internacionales y ese
comportamiento merece estudio.
This article examines whether the global trend of codifying
rights in entrenched bills accompanied by judicial review to broaden
rights protection is justified. By comparing the religious freedom regimes
in Canada and England, this article finds that although the Canadian
constitutional transformation in the late twentieth century contributed
to strengthening religious freedom, its overall effect has not
been broader than the protection afforded by its primordial English
statutory model. As such, the article challenges the ongoing legal debate
over judicially enforced constitutional systems of rights. Proponents
of such systems praise their extensive contribution to rights protection,
while opponents warn against their obstructive impact on the
separation of powers. This article concludes that both sides of the debate
overstate their arguments by incorrectly presupposing the actual
effects of a judicially enforced constitutional system of rights.