One possible outcome of the
economic crash of 2008 was that the majority or mainstream members of a society
would direct their anger and fear against the minority or marginal members of
their society. Commentators on
television or the radio would claim, “it’s all the fault of the immigrants!” or
“if we didn’t hand over so much of our tax dollars to the poor, the economy
would not have deteriorated so much,” or “social benefits to African Americans
[or German Turks] have distorted the housing market.” Citizens would come to believe these assertions,
politicians would echo them—and the upshot would be not only a deteriorating
national and international economy but also increased hostility and fear among
racial, ethnic, or nationality groups in a country. Social solidarity would decline, perhaps
is often described as the most and France as one of the least
successful countries in the realm of immigrant incorporation, the question remains
unresolved of how to evaluate a country’s policies for dealing with immigration
and incorporation relative to that of others.Our strategy is to examine the relationships among 1) countries’
policies and practices with regard to admitting immigrants, 2) their educational
policies for incorporating first and second generation immigrants, and 3)
educational achievement of immigrants and their children.We compare eight western industrialized
countries. We find that immigration regimes, educational regimes, and schooling
outcomes are linked distinctively in each country.>States that are liberal, or effective, on one
dimension may be relatively conservative, or ineffective, on another, and
countries vary in their willingness and ability to help disadvantaged people
achieve upward mobility through immigration and schooling. >We conclude that by some normative standards, France has a better immigration regime than does
Overall, this study points to new ways to study immigration and new normative
standards for judging states’ policies of incorporation.
Imagine you could eavesdrop on a dinner party with three of the
most fascinating historical figures of all time. In this landmark book,
a gifted Harvard historian puts you in the room with Churchill, Stalin,
and Roosevelt as they meet at a climactic turning point in the war to
hash out the terms of the peace. The ink wasn't dry when the
recriminations began. The conservatives who hated Roosevelt's New Deal
accused him of selling out. Was he too sick? Did he give too much in
exchange for Stalin's promise to join the war against Japan? Could he
have done better in Eastern Europe? Both Left and Right would blame
Yalta for beginning the Cold War. Plokhy's conclusions, based
on unprecedented archival research, are surprising. He goes against
conventional wisdom—cemented during the Cold War—and argues that an
ailing Roosevelt did better than we think. Much has been made of FDR's
handling of the Depression; here we see him as wartime chief. Yalta
is authoritative, original, vividly–written narrative history.
This timely and important collection of original essays analyzes China’s foremost social cleavage: the rural-urban gap. It is now clear that the Chinese communist revolution, though professing dedication to an egalitarian society, in practice created a rural order akin to serfdom, in which 80 percent of the population was effectively bound to the land. China is still struggling with that legacy. The reforms of 1978 changed basic aspects of economic and social life in China’s villages and cities and altered the nature of the rural-urban relationship. But some important institutions and practices have changed only marginally or not at all, and China is still sharply divided into rural and urban castes with different rights and opportunities in life, resulting in growing social tensions.
The twenty-first century began with a very unequal distribution of power resources. With five percent of the world's population, the United States accounted for about a quarter of the world's economic output, was responsible for nearly half of global military expenditures, and had the most extensive cultural and educational soft-power resources. All this is still true, but the future of U.S. power is hotly debated. Many observers have interpreted the 2008 global financial crisis as the beginning of American decline. The National Intelligence Council, for example, has projected that in 2025, "the U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished."Power is the ability to attain the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce it vary in different contexts. Spain in the sixteenth century took advantage of its control of colonies and gold bullion, the Netherlands in the seventeenth century profited from trade and finance, France in the eighteenth century benefited from its large population and armies, and the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century derived power from its primacy in the Industrial Revolution and its navy. This century is marked by a burgeoning revolution in information technology and globalization, and to understand this revolution, certain pitfalls need to be avoided.First, one must beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline. Nations are not like humans, with predictable life spans. Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the peak of its power, and even then it did not succumb to the rise of another state. For all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may come from modern barbarians and nonstate actors. In an information-based world, power diffusion may pose a bigger danger than power transition. Conventional wisdom holds that the state with the largest army prevails, but in the information age, the state (or the nonstate actor) with the best story may sometimes win.
For the complete article go to the Foreign Affairs website.
What precisely constitutes an American bourgeoisie? Scholars have grappled with the question for a long time. Economic positions—the ownership of capital, for instance—most obviously define this group but cannot explain the emergence of shared identities or the capacity for collective action: after all, economic interests frequently drove capital-rich Americans apart as they competed for markets or governmental favors. Engaging fundamental questions about American society in the nineteenth century, this book argues that one of the most important factors in the self-definition of the bourgeoisie was its articulation of a shared culture.
On November 1, 2006, Peruvian president Alan García announced he would
be proposing a new law that would include the death penalty as one
sanction for terrorism in the Penal Code. As he
argued, “We are not going to allow Shining Path to return and paint
their slogans on the walls of our universities. Once this law is
approved, anyone who commits the serious crime of terrorism
will find themselves facing a firing squad. A war forewarned does not
Competitive authoritarian regimes—in which autocrats submit to meaningful multiparty elections but engage in serious democratic abuse—proliferated in the post–Cold War era. Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.
The closed and open economy literatures work on estimating real rigidities, but in parallel. We bring the two literatures together to shed light on this question. We use international price data and exchange rate shocks to evaluate the importance of real rigidities in price setting. We show that consistent with the presence of real rigidities the response of reset-price inflation to exchange rate shocks depicts significant persistence. Individual import prices, conditional on changing, respond to exchange rate shocks prior to the last price change.
Presented at the NBER 25th Macroannual Conference, April 9-10, 2010.Download PDF
In a democracy, knowledge is power.—Jerit et al. 2006, 266
The two simplest truths I know about the distribution of political information in modern
electorates are that the mean is low and the variance high.—Converse 1990, 372
If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never
was and never will be.—Thomas Jefferson, letter to Charles Yancey, 1816
It is rare for countries to give up their currencies and thus
their ability to influence such critical aspects of their economies as
interest and exchange rates. Yet ten years ago a number of European
countries did exactly that when they adopted the euro. Despite some
dissent, there were a number of arguments in favor of this policy
change: it would facilitate exchange of goods, money, and people by
decreasing costs; it would increase trade; and it would enhance
efficiency and competitiveness at the international level. A
decade is an ideal time frame over which to evaluate the success of the
euro and whether it has lived up to expectations. To that aim, Europe and the Euro
looks at a number of important issues, including the effects of the
euro on reform of goods and labor markets; its influence on business
cycles and trade among members; and whether the single currency has
induced convergence or divergence in the economic performance of member
countries. While adoption of the euro may not have met the expectations
of its most optimistic proponents, the benefits have been many, and
there is reason to believe that the euro is robust enough to survive
recent economic shocks. This volume is an essential reference on the
first ten years of the euro and the workings of a monetary union.
Alesina, Alberto. Europe and the Euro. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
A founding dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Allison applies a long, distinguished career in government and academia
to this sobering—indeed frightening—presentation of U.S. vulnerability
to a terrorist nuclear attack. While he begins by asserting such an
attack is preventable, the balance of his text is anything but
reassuring. Allison begins by describing the broad spectrum of groups
who could intend a nuclear strike against the U.S. They range from an
al-Qaeda with its own Manhattan Project to small and determined doomsday
cults. Their tools can include a broad spectrum of weapons, either
stolen or homemade from raw materials increasingly available worldwide.
Once terrorists acquire a nuclear bomb, Allison argues, its delivery to
an American target may be almost impossible to stop under current
security measures. The Bush administration, correct in waging war
against nuclear terrorism, has not, he says, yet developed a
comprehensive counter strategy. Arguing that the only way to eliminate
nuclear terrorism's threat is to lock down the weapons at the source,
Allison recommends nothing less than a new international order based on
no insecure nuclear material, no new facilities for processing uranium
or enriching plutonium and no new nuclear states. Those policies,
Allison believes, do not stretch beyond the achievable, if pursued by a
combination of quid pro quos and intimidation in an international
context of negotiation and a U.S. foreign policy he describes as "humble." A humble policy in turn will facilitate building a world
alliance against nuclear terrorism and acquiring the intelligence
necessary for success against prospective nuclear terrorists. It will
also require time, money and effort. Like the Cold War, the war on
nuclear terrorism will probably be a long struggle in the twilight. But
no student of the fact, Allison asserts, doubts that another major
terrorist attack is in the offing. "We do not have the luxury," he
declares, "of hoping the beast will simply go away."
In 2009 the management of Vale, a Brazilian diversified mining company and the largest iron ore producer in the world, was under pressure from at least two fronts. First, the emergence of China as the most important consumer of iron ore in the last few years had changed the pricing system for iron ore from long-term contracts based on negotiated "benchmark prices" to contracts based on spot prices, usually forcing mining companies to pay for shipping. Second, for Brazil's charismatic president, Lula, a former union leader, Vale's layoffs during the global financial crisis and its perceived move away from Brazil (as Vale increased its exports to China and purchased Chinese vessels to ship iron ore to Asia) were reasons to start an open campaign to pressure Vale and Agnelli to invest in integrated steel mills in Brazil. In October of 2009, the CEO of Vale, Roger Agnelli was going to meet with Lula and had to decide what to do to attenuate these political pressures. What could Agnelli do to deal with political pressures at home? Was the purchase of large vessels to ship iron ore to Asia a good decision at a time when the shipping industry had spare capacity?
, Theory and Society 39, no. 3-4: 397-413.Abstract
Historically, the study of state formation has involved a focus on the urban and national conditions under which states monopolize the means of coercion, generate legitimacy, and marshal sufficient economic resources to wage war against enemies while sustaining citizen allegiance through the extension of social programs, new forms of national solidarity, and citizenship. In Charles Tilly’s large body of work, these themes loomed large, and they have re-emerged in slightly reformulated ways in an unfinished manuscript that reflected on the relationship between capital and coercion in which he also integrated the element of commitment—or networks of trust—into the study of state formation. This article develops these same ideas but in new directions, casting them in light of contemporary rather than historical developments. Taking as its point of departure the accelerating rates of criminal violence and citizen insecurity in cities of the developing world, this essay suggests that random and targeted violence increasingly perpetrated by “irregular” armed forces pose a direct challenge to state legitimacy and national sovereignty. Through examination of urban and transnational non-state armed actors who use violence to accumulate capital and secure economic dominion, and whose activities reveal alternative networks of commitment, power, authority, and even self-governance, this essay identifies contemporary parallels with the pre-modern period studied by Charles Tilly, arguing that current patterns challenge prevailing national-state forms of sovereignty. Drawing evidence primarily from Mexico and other middle income developing countries that face growing insecurity and armed violence, the article examines the new “spatialities” of irregular armed force, how they form the basis for alternative networks of coercion, allegiance, and reciprocity that challenge old forms and scales of sovereignty, and what this means for the power and legitimacy of the traditional nation-state.
International law has enjoyed a recent renaissance as an important subfield of study within international relations. Two trends are evident in the recent literature. First, the obsession with theoretical labels is on the decline. Second, empirical, especially quantitative, work is burgeoning. This article reviews the literature in four issues areas—security, war, and peace; international trade; protection of the environment; and human rights—and concludes we have a much stronger basis for assessing claims about compliance and violation now than was the case only a few years ago. Still, the literature suffers from a few weaknesses, including problems of selection and endogeneity of treaties themselves and an enduring state-centric focus, despite the fact that researchers recognize that nonstate and substate actors influence treaty behavior. Nonetheless, the quality and quantity of new work demonstrates that international law has regained an important place in the study of international politics.
Already cited by the Financial Times, Forbes.com, The Economic Times, WSJ/Mint and several other prominent global business publications, Winning in Emerging Markets is quickly becoming the go-to book for mapping a strategy for entering new markets—and then quickly gaining a competitive edge in those high growth regions.
Advancing the discussion about emerging markets themselves and how organizations can best leverage the potential of these regions, Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu – both well respected thinkers on the subject – argue there is more to sizing up these markets than just evaluating data points related to size, population, and growth potential. In fact, they say the possibility to expand a company’s progress in developing economies is to first asses the area’s lack of institutional infrastructure—and then to formulate strategies around what the authors call “institutional voids” to the firm’s advantage. Khanna and Palepu say the primary exploitable characteristic of an emerging market are such voids, and though they create challenges, they also provide major opportunity both for multinationals and local contenders.
Winning in Emerging Markets serves as a playbook for measuring a market’s potential and for crafting a strategy to succeed there.
, International Organization 64, no. 2: 225-256.Abstract
The creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute war crimes poses a real puzzle. Why was it created, and more importantly, why do states agree to join this institution? The ICC represents a serious intrusion into a traditional arena of state sovereignty: the right to administer justice to one’s one nationals. Yet more than one hundred states have joined. Social scientists are hardly of one mind about this institution, arguing that it is (alternately) dangerous or irrelevant to achieving its main purposes: justice, peace, and stability. By contrast, we theorize the ICC as a mechanism to assist states in self-binding, and draw on credible commitments theory to understand who commits to the ICC, and the early consequences of such commitments. This approach explains a counterintuitive finding: the states that are both the least and the most vulnerable to the possibility of an ICC case affecting their citizens have committed most readily to the ICC, while potentially vulnerable states with credible alternative means to hold leaders accountable do not. Similarly, ratification of the ICC is associated with tentative steps toward violence reduction and peace in those countries precisely least likely to be able to commit credibly to forswear atrocities. These findings support the potential usefulness of the ICC as a mechanism for some governments to commit to ratchet down violence and get on the road to peaceful negotiations.
Historically, the study of state formation has involved a focus on the urban and national conditions under which states monopolize the means of coercion, generate legitimacy, and marshal sufficient economic resources to wage war against enemies while sustaining citizen allegiance through the extension of social programs, new forms of national solidarity, and citizenship. In Charles Tilly’s large body of work, these themes loomed large, and they have re-emerged in slightly reformulated ways in an unfinished manuscript that reflected on the relationship between capital and coercion in which he also integrated the element of commitment - or networks of trust - into the study of state formation. This article develops these same ideas but in new directions, casting them in light of contemporary rather than historical developments. Taking as its point of departure the accelerating rates of criminal violence and citizen insecurity in cities of the developing world, this essay suggests that random and targeted violence increasingly perpetrated by “irregular” armed forces pose a direct challenge to state legitimacy and national sovereignty. Through examination of urban and transnational non-state armed actors who use violence to accumulate capital and secure economic dominion, and whose activities reveal alternative networks of commitment, power, authority, and even self-governance, this essay identifies contemporary parallels with the pre-modern period studied by Charles Tilly, arguing that current patterns challenge prevailing national-state forms of sovereignty. Drawing evidence primarily from Mexico and other middle income developing countries that face growing insecurity and armed violence, the article examines the new “spatialities” of irregular armed force, how they form the basis for alternative networks of coercion, allegiance, and reciprocity that challenge old forms and scales of sovereignty, and what this means for the power and legitimacy of the traditional nation-state.
Background: There is rising evidence that relationships that bridge between immigrants and long-time residents are critical to immigrant integration and to the overall heath of communities. The processes by which this bridging social capital is built are not well understood. Schools in new immigrant destinations, as spaces in which diverse youth come together, provide a unique opportunity to examine how immigrant and long-time resident youth connect to each other and build relationships.
Purpose: This article examines the processes of building relationships between immigrant and long-time resident youth and explores the meaning and consequences of these processes for the individuals involved. The article further suggests ways in which schools might adopt strategies to promote personal interaction, cooperative action, and collective identification to aid in the development of these relationships.
Setting: Lewiston, Maine is the setting of this study. Between February 2001 and May 2003, 1,200 Somalis arrived in Lewiston, a town of 35,690 people, 97.3% of whom were White at the time of the 2000 Census.
Research Design: Using the methodology of portraiture, this study examines, as an exemplary case, one relationship between two students: a Somali immigrant, and a White long-time resident. Portraiture is a methodology built on relationships, which mirrors the theoretical issues under investigation.
Findings/Results: This study provides new insights into how bridging relationships are built. The participants capitalized on the common space of their new immigrant destination school to transform casual personal interactions into a bridging relationship based on collective identification. Through dialogue, particularly about race, they challenged each other and themselves, and each came to understand the other in new ways; they also became invested in each other and dependent on each other to grow and to understand themselves and their places in a changing town.
Conclusions/Recommendations: The research identifies processes of personal interaction, cooperative action, and collective identification as central to the building of bridging relationships. It also reveals the necessity of a focus on race when researching, analyzing, or cultivating these relationships. Lessons for educators and schools seeking to foster relationships between immigrant and long-time resident youth include engaging students in direct dialogue about race and cultivating skills in empathetic storytelling and listening in order to "double-think,"or receive a counter-story.
In this paper, we exploit a new multi-country historical dataset on public (government) debt to search for a systemic relationship between high public debt levels, growth and inflation. Our main result is that whereas the link between
growth and debt seems relatively weak at “normal” debt levels, median growth rates for countries with public debt over roughly 90 percent of GDP are about one percent lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several percent lower. Surprisingly, the relationship between public debt and growth is remarkably
similar across emerging markets and advanced economies. This is not the case for inflation. We find no systematic relationship between high debt levels and inflation for advanced economies as a group (albeit with individual country exceptions including the United States). By contrast, in emerging market countries, high public debt levels coincide with higher inflation.