Much of the current scholarship on wartime violence, including studies of the combatants themselves, assumes that women are victims and men are perpetrators. However, there is an increasing awareness that women in armed groups may be active fighters who function as more than just cooks, cleaners, and sexual slaves. In this article, the author focuses on the involvement of female fighters in a form of violence that is commonly thought to be perpetrated only by men: the wartime rape of noncombatants. Using original interviews with ex-combatants and newly available survey data, she finds that in the Sierra Leone civil war, female combatants were participants in the widespread conflict-related violence, including gang rape. A growing body of evidence from other conflicts suggests that Sierra Leone is not an anomaly and that women likely engage in conflict-related violence, including sexual violence, more often than is currently believed. Many standard interpretations of wartime rape are undermined by the participation of female perpetrators. To explain the involvement of women in wartime rape, the author argues that women in armed group units face similar pressure to that faced by their male counterparts to participate in gang rape. The study has broad implications for future avenues of research on wartime violence, as well as for policy.
The Article rethinks law’s role in present-day European debates over Islam in light of its calming effects on the once fiercely-fought abortion reforms across Western Europe. Using examples from Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland the article demonstrates that the role of the legal process in each of these culture-based debates diverged along its two social functions. Reflecting growing public anxieties, legal actions concerning Muslims typically focused on generating social and cultural change, foreclosing the likelihood of political compromises. In contrast, at the time of abortion reform legal measures acted as mechanisms of social and cultural order, contributing to the pacification of the fierce public controversies even as moral disagreements over abortion endured. Drawing on this comparison, the article suggests that Europe’s constitutional review processes present a compromise-building path to deliberate contemporary conflicts over Islam.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II and III analyze the legal developments in the context of Islam and abortion across Western Europe, revealing a contrasting dynamics in the roles of the legal process in each of these debates. Part IV assesses the effects of the legal process in each of the debates and rules out alternative explanations for this divergence. It argues that the factor of time or European secularization cannot account for the current intensity-difference in each of these debates. The article concludes by proposing a path to launch the currently absent constitutional conversation over Islamic-based tensions in Western Europe. Modeled on abortion reform, constitutional courts should reach beyond proportional balancing and dictate policy frameworks addressing both the roots of Muslim disadvantages and the anxieties of the European public.
In the past, industrial countries have tended to pursue countercyclical or, at worst, acyclical ﬁscal policy. In sharp contrast, emerging and developing countries have followed procyclical ﬁscal policy, thus exacerbating the underlying business cycle. We show that, over the last decade, about a third of the developing world has been able to escape the procyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical. We then focus on the role played by the quality of institutions, which appears to be a key determinant of a country’s ability to graduate. We show that, even after controlling for the endogeneity of institutions and other determinants of ﬁscal procyclicality, there is a causal link running from stronger institutions to less procyclical or more countercyclical ﬁscal policy.
When French President François Hollande unveiled a plan in November for a business tax credit and higher sales taxes as a way to revive the economy, he was implementing an idea championed by economist Gita Gopinath. A 41-year-old professor at Harvard University, Gopinath has pushed for tax intervention as a way forward for euro-area countries that can’t devalue their exchange rates. This so-called fiscal devaluation is helping France turn the corner at a time of extreme budget constraints, former Airbus chief Louis Gallois said in a report on France’s business competitiveness commissioned by Hollande.Gopinath’s understanding of the theory took shape through her years teaching at Harvard and the University of Chicago, and particularly as a PhD student at Princeton under the guidance of economists Kenneth Rogoff, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Ben Bernanke, now chairman of the Federal Reserve. While her earlier work on current accounts and balance of payments garnered praise, it’s her recent focus on the 17 euro-zone nations that has national leaders paying attention. “Gita is already a major star, at the top of her cohort in international macroeconomics and still rapidly growing as a scholar,” Rogoff says in an e-mail. He calls her internal devaluation strategy for the euro region “very influential.”
Gopinath, the first Indian woman to receive tenure at Harvard, grew up in the South Indian city of Mysore. Like many Indian high school students, she sought her parents’ advice on what to study after graduation; the Gopinaths wanted their daughter to land a respectable job as a government official in the Indian Administrative Service. The best way to achieve that, friends told them, was a bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Delhi. “It was purely accidental,” Gopinath says. “Luckily, I found out fairly quickly that I had more of an academic leaning and little aptitude for administration.”
Her bachelor’s degree in economics from the university’s Lady Shri Ram College for Women in 1992 was followed by two master’s degrees, and a doctorate from Princeton in 2001. She taught at the University of Chicago from 2001 to 2005 before moving to Harvard.
The idea of fiscal devaluation originates with John Maynard Keynes. Gopinath’s insight was to advocate fiscal devaluation for Europe’s beleaguered currency union in a 2011 paper she co-authored with her colleague Emmanuel Farhi and former student Oleg Itskhoki, now an assistant professor at Princeton. “Despite discussions in policy circles, there is little formal analysis of the equivalence between fiscal devaluations and exchange-rate devaluations,” they wrote. “This paper is intended to bridge this gap.”
The paper examines a “remarkably simple alternative” that doesn’t require countries to abandon the euro and devalue their currencies to revive growth through exports, Gopinath says. By increasing value-added taxes while cutting payroll taxes, a government can affect gross domestic product, consumption, employment, and inflation much as a currency devaluation would.
The higher VAT raises the price of imported goods as foreign companies pay the levy on the products and services they export to that country. The lower payroll tax helps offset the extra sales tax for domestic companies, reducing the need for them to raise prices. Since exports are VAT-exempt, the payroll cost saving allows producers to sell goods more cheaply overseas, simulating the effect of a weaker currency, according to the paper. The policy also can help on the fiscal front, as increased competitiveness can lead to higher tax revenue, Gopinath says.As part of France’s fiscal devaluation, Hollande has offered French companies a €20 billion ($27 billion) tax cut on some salaries as he attempts to turn around an economy that has barely grown in more than a year. He’ll also lift the two highest VAT rates.
The plan was inspired partly by Gopinath’s paper, says Harvard professor Philippe Aghion, an informal campaign adviser to Hollande, who was elected president in May. Aghion co-wrote a column in Le Monde last October urging fiscal devaluation. Airbus’s Gallois then proposed the strategy to Hollande. “We contributed to the adoption of the policy by Hollande, and Gallois called to thank me,” Aghion says. “There is wider interest in the policy. Italy, Spain, Greece - they should all be interested. It’s an idea that would work.”
The bottom line: Gopinath’s theory has so impressed the French that Hollande has proposed a $27 billion tax cut for French companies.
The collection of materials in this latest edition of Health and Human Rights: Basic International Documents has been updated and expanded from the first two editions to provide the practitioner, scholar, and advocate with access to the most basic instruments of international law and policy that express the values of human rights for advancing health. The topics covered include professional ethics; research and experimentation; bioethics and biotechnology; the right to health; the right to life; freedom from torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide; the right to an adequate standard of living; women and reproductive health; children; persons with disabilities; the rights of other vulnerable groups; infectious diseases; business, trade, and intellectual property; non-communicable diseases; the right to a clean environment; and sustainable development. This book will be an indispensable reference for everyone working at the intersection of health and human rights.
The aim of this book is to understand the causes and consequences of new scales and forms of territorial restructuring in a steadily globalizing world by focusing on urban megaproject development.
Contributions focus on the principal actors, institutions, and innovations that drive capitalist globalization, socio-economic and territorial restructuring, and global city formation by exploring the architectural design, planning, management, financing and impacts of urban megaprojects as well as their various socio-economic, political and cultural contexts.
This is the first work on urban megaprojects to be global in scope, with chapters about Korea, Bilbao, Kuala Lumpur, Budapest, Milan, Abu Dhabi, New York, Paris, Sao Paulo, Beijing, Shanghai, Hamburg, Vienna, Detroit, Philadelphia, Stuttgart, Afghanistan and Mexico City.
It is also the first work on the subject to include contributions from sociologists, planners, geographers and architects from top universities around the world, thus making it a truly multidisciplinary project.
Why do religious and political ideologies sometimes produce social and political conflict and other times co-mingle peacefully? The answer must consider both the content of competing ideologies along with the socio-political interests of their believers. In this case study of ideological competition in Central Asia, I show how both philosophical and material concerns explain why many Muslims, while openly retaining their religious-ethnic identity, became active members of an atheistic Community Party. This phenomenon did not occur amongst Christians who necessarily discarded, at least publicly, their religious identities when becoming Communists. So while religious and political conflict openly occurred in Communist societies which were predominantly Christian, many Muslims were able to accommodate their religious convictions with Soviet Communism. In the end, the creation of “Muslim Atheists” depended on not only socio-economic differences between Muslim and Christian societies but also theological differences between Muslim and Christian religions.
After decades of “history from below,” focusing on women, minorities and other marginalized people seizing their destiny, a new generation of scholars is increasingly turning to what, strangely, risked becoming the most marginalized group of all: the bosses, bankers and brokers who run the economy.Even before the financial crisis, courses in “the history of capitalism”—as the new discipline bills itself—began proliferating on campuses, along with dissertations on once deeply unsexy topics like insurance, banking and regulation. The events of 2008 and their long aftermath have given urgency to the scholarly realization that it really is the economy, stupid.The financial meltdown also created a serious market opportunity. Columbia University Press recently introduced a new “Studies in the History of U.S. Capitalism” book series (“This is not your father’s business history,” the proposal promised), and other top university presses have been snapping up dissertations on 19th-century insurance and early twentieth-century stock speculation, with trade publishers and op-ed editors following close behind.The dominant question in American politics today, scholars say, is the relationship between democracy and the capitalist economy. “And to understand capitalism,” said Jonathan Levy, an assistant professor of history at Princeton University and the author of “Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America,” “you’ve got to understand capitalists.”That doesn’t mean just looking in the executive suite and ledger books, scholars are quick to emphasize. The new work marries hardheaded economic analysis with the insights of social and cultural history, integrating the bosses’-eye view with that of the office drones—and consumers—who power the system.“I like to call it ‘history from below, all the way to the top,’ ” said Louis Hyman, an assistant professor of labor relations, law and history at Cornell and the author of “Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink.”The new history of capitalism is less a movement than what proponents call a “cohort”: a loosely linked group of scholars who came of age after the end of the cold war cleared some ideological ground, inspired by work that came before but unbeholden to the questions — like, why didn’t socialism take root in America?—that animated previous generations of labor historians.
Instead of searching for working-class radicalism, they looked at office clerks and entrepreneurs.“Earlier, a lot of these topics would’ve been greeted with a yawn,” said Stephen Mihm, an associate professor of history at the University of Georgia and the author of “A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men and the Making of the United States.” “But then the crisis hit, and people started asking, ‘Oh my God, what has Wall Street been doing for the last 100 years?’ ”In 1996, when the Harvard historian Sven Beckert proposed an undergraduate seminar called the History of American Capitalism—the first of its kind, he believes—colleagues were skeptical. “They thought no one would be interested,” he said.But the seminar drew nearly 100 applicants for 15 spots and grew into one of the biggest lecture courses at Harvard, which in 2008 created a full-fledged Program on the Study of U.S. Capitalism. That initiative led to similar ones on other campuses, as courses and programs at Princeton, Brown, Georgia, the New School, the University of Wisconsin and elsewhere also began drawing crowds—sometimes with the help of canny brand management.After Seth Rockman, an associate professor of history at Brown, changed the name of his course from Capitalism, Slavery and the Economy of Early America to simply Capitalism, students concentrating in economics and international relations started showing up alongside the student labor activists and development studies people.“It’s become a space where you can bring together segments of the university that are not always in conversation,” Dr. Rockman said. (Next fall the course will become Brown’s introductory American history survey.)While most scholars in the field reject the purely oppositional stance of earlier Marxist history, they also take a distinctly critical view of neoclassical economics, with its tidy mathematical models and crisp axioms about rational actors.Markets and financial institutions “were created by people making particular choices at particular historical moments,” said Julia Ott, an assistant professor in the history of capitalism at the New School (the first person, several scholars said, to be hired under such a title).To dramatize that point, Dr. Ott has students in her course Whose Street? Wall Street! dress up in nineteenth-century costume and re-enact a primal scene in financial history: the early days of the Chicago Board of Trade.Some of her colleagues take a similarly playful approach. To promote a two-week history of capitalism “boot camp” to be inaugurated this summer at Cornell, Dr. Hyman (a former consultant at McKinsey & Company) designed “history of capitalism” T-shirts.The camp, he explained, is aimed at getting relatively innumerate historians up to speed on the kinds of financial data and documents found in business archives. Understanding capitalism, Dr. Hyman said, requires “both Foucault and regressions.”It also, scholars insist, requires keeping race and gender in the picture.As examples, they point to books like Nathan Connolly’s “World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida,” coming next year, and Bethany Moreton’s “To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise” (Harvard, 2009), winner of multiple prizes, which examines the role of evangelical Christian values in mobilizing the company’s largely female work force.The history of capitalism has also benefited from a surge of new, economically minded scholarship on slavery, with scholars increasingly arguing that Northern factories and Southern plantations were not opposing economic systems, as the old narrative has it, but deeply entwined.And that entwining, some argue, involved people far beyond the plantations and factories themselves, thanks to financial shenanigans that resonate in our own time.In a paper called “Toxic Debt, Liar Loans and Securitized Human Beings: The Panic of 1837 and the Fate of Slavery,” Edward Baptist, a historian at Cornell, looked at the way small investors across America and Europe snapped up exotic financial instruments based on slave holdings, much as people over the past decade went wild for mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations—with a similarly disastrous outcome.Other scholars track companies and commodities across national borders. Dr. Beckert’s “Empire of Cotton,” to be published by Alfred A. Knopf, traces the rise of global capitalism over the past 350 years through one crop. Nan Enstad’s book in progress, “The Jim Crow Cigarette: Following Tobacco Road From North Carolina to China and Back,” examines how Southern tobacco workers, and Southern racial ideology, helped build the Chinese cigarette industry in the early twentieth century.Whether scrutiny of the history of capitalism represents a genuine paradigm shift or a case of scholarly tulip mania, one thing is clear.“The worse things are for the economy,” Dr. Beckert said wryly, “the better they are for the discipline.”
The globalization of accounting standards as seen through the proliferation of IFRS worldwide is one of the most important developments in corporate governance over the last decade. I offer an analysis of some international political dynamics of countries’ IFRS harmonization decisions. The analysis is based on field studies in three jurisdictions: Canada, China, and India. Across these jurisdictions, I first describe unique elements of domestic political economies that are shaping IFRS policies. Then, I inductively isolate two principal dimensions that can be used to characterize the jurisdictions’ IFRS responses: proximity to existing political powers at the IASB; and own potential political power at the IASB. Based on how countries are classified along these dimensions, I offer predictions, ceteris paribus, on countries’ IFRS harmonization strategies. The analysis and framework in this paper can help broaden the understanding of accounting’s globalization.
Media outlets in multiparty electoral systems tend to report on a wider range of policy issues than media in two-party
systems. They thus make more competing policy frames available to citizens. This suggests that a “free press” is insufficient
to hold governments accountable. Rather, we should observe more challenges to the governments’ preferred frames and
more politically aware citizens in multiparty democracies. Such citizens should thus be better equipped to hold their leaders
accountable, relative to their counterparts in two-party democracies. I propose a mechanism through which democratic
publics can sometimes constrain their leaders in foreign policy. I test hypotheses derived from my theory with cross-national
data on the content of news coverage of Iraq, on public support for the war, and on decisions to contribute troops to the
Iraq “Coalition of the Willing.” I find that citizens in countries with larger numbers of parties confronted more critical and
diverse coverage of Iraq, while those with more widespread access to mass media were more likely to oppose the war and
their nations likely to contribute fewer troops to the Coalition.
A Journey with Margaret Thatcher is an extraordinary insider’s account of British foreign policy under Margaret Thatcher by one of her key advisers. Providing a closeup view of the Iron Lady in action, former high-ranking diplomat Robin Renwick examines her diplomatic successes – including the defeat of aggression in the Falklands, what the Americans felt to be the excessive influence she exerted on Ronald Reagan, her special relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev and contribution to the ending of the Cold War, the Anglo-Irish agreement, her influence with de Klerk in South Africa and relationship with Nelson Mandela – and what she herself acknowledged as her spectacular failure in resisting German reunification. He describes at first hand her often turbulent relationship with other European leaders and her arguments with her Cabinet colleagues about European monetary union (in which regard, he contends, her arguments have stood the test of time better and are highly relevant to the crisis in the eurozone today). Finally, the book tells of her bravura performance in the run up to the Gulf War, her calls for intervention in Bosnia and the difficulties she created for her successor. While her faults were on the same scale as her virtues, Margaret Thatcher succeeded in her mission to restore Britain’s standing and influence, in the process becoming a cult figure in many other parts of the world.
In an age of global terrorism, can the pursuit of security be reconciled with liberal democratic values and legal principles? During its "global war on terrorism," the Bush administration argued that the United States was in a new kind of conflict, one in which peacetime domestic law was irrelevant and international law inapplicable. From 2001 to 2009, the United States thus waged war on terrorism in a "no-law zone."In Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists, Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann reject the argument that traditional American values embodied in domestic and international law can be ignored in any sustainable effort to keep the United States safe from terrorism. They demonstrate that the costs are great and the benefits slight from separating security and the rule of law. They call for reasoned judgment instead of a wholesale abandonment of American values. They also argue that being open to negotiations and seeking to win the moral support of the communities from which the terrorists emerge are noncoercive strategies that must be included in any future efforts to reduce terrorism.
When Lee Kuan Yew speaks, presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, and CEOs listen. Lee, the founding father of modern Singapore and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990, has honed his wisdom during more than fifty years on the world stage. Almost single-handedly responsible for transforming Singapore into a Western-style economic success, he offers a unique perspective on the geopolitics of East and West. American presidents from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama have welcomed him to the White House; British prime ministers from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair have recognized his wisdom; and business leaders from Rupert Murdoch to Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, have praised his accomplishments. This book gathers key insights from interviews, speeches, and Lee's voluminous published writings and presents them in an engaging question and answer format.Lee offers his assessment of China's future, asserting, among other things, that "China will want to share this century as co-equals with the US." He affirms the United States' position as the world's sole superpower but expresses dismay at the vagaries of its political system. He offers strategic advice for dealing with China and goes on to discuss India's future, Islamic terrorism, economic growth, geopolitics and globalization, and democracy. Lee does not pull his punches, offering his unvarnished opinions on multiculturalism, the welfare state, education, and the free market. This little book belongs on the reading list of every world leader—including the one who takes the oath of office on January 20, 2013.
This paper sheds light on the links between media and political polarization by looking at the introduction of broadcast TV in the US. We provide causal evidence that broadcast TV decreased the ideological extremism of US representatives. We then show that exposure to radio was associated with decreased polarization. We interpret this result using a simple framework that identifies two channels linking media environment to politicians' incentives to polarize. First, the ideology effect: changes in the media environment may affect the distribution of citizens' ideological views, with politicians moving their positions accordingly. Second, the motivation effect: the media may affect citizens' political motivation, changing the ideological composition of the electorate and thereby impacting elite polarization while mass polarization is unchanged. The evidence on polarization and turnout is consistent with a prevalence of the ideology effect in the case of TV, as both of them decreased. Increased turnout associated with radio exposure is in turn consistent with a role for the motivation effect.
For a glimpse of the average American’s understanding of the relationship between the United States and Mexico, one only has to watch the critically acclaimed television series Breaking Bad. Set in Albuquerque, New Mexico, a few hundred miles from the border, the series chronicles the rise and fall of Walter White, a high school chemistry teacher who becomes a methamphetamine tycoon.Most of the characters on the US side of the border are portrayed with sympathy and depth. The main protagonist’s step-by-step descent into the drug underworld unfolds with such subtlety that each individual decision he makes along the way seems almost reasonable.
Unfortunately, the other side of the border receives more superficial treatment. In one scene, two Mexican hit men ruthlessly slaughter a dozen innocent compatriots who could bear witness to their border crossing. In another episode, members of the Mexican Federal Police are seen assaulting a drug lord in his hacienda, with the implication that they are only doing the bidding of a rival dealer.“Breaking Bad” is brilliant television, but it is regrettable that so many Americans see only this side of things. Mexico has profound security problems in some regions, but it is also a country that just might be on the threshold of a huge political and economic transformation. Indeed, for a couple of years now, Mexico’s GDP growth rates have been near the top of the OECD, and recently above Brazil’s.
Rather than continue fighting (as in the US) after a heated presidential election, Mexico’s major political parties appear poised to cooperate on a number of critical structural reforms that could energize economic growth for decades to come. The agenda includes an expansion of the tax base to reduce dependency on oil, an initiative to increase competition in media and telecommunications, and a constitutional change that will permit the state-owned oil company Pemex to enter into joint ventures with foreign firms.
This last reform is critical, because much of Mexico’s geology is very similar to that of the southwestern US. In principle, Mexico’s economy should be benefiting from the same shale-gas revolution that is providing a huge boost to the US, where natural-gas prices are now less than one-quarter of what Europeans pay.
Mexico is already enjoying a manufacturing boom that has increased its exports to the US, following a long secular decline. With China’s wages soaring and rising oil prices driving up shipping costs, production in Mexico is suddenly looking much more attractive, even taking security concerns into account.
Of course, any number of things can go wrong. First and foremost, the political elite might suddenly back away from essential structural reforms, and the Mexican business community’s current optimism could collapse. It wouldn’t be the first time.
There is also a risk that foreign investors, who already are starting to like Mexico, might come to love it a little too much. A huge influx of capital could lead to a significant appreciation of the peso’s exchange rate, causing an increase in Mexico’s currently very attractive labor costs. Or the US could slip into recession (though modest growth is certainly the central scenario nowadays).
Then there is the matter of security, which constitutes a huge tax on business in many parts of Mexico. For example, one important achievement of former President Felipe Calderón’s administration was to push through a 140-mile highway connecting the interior city of Durango and the Pacific port at Mazatlán. Traversing extremely rough terrain with 200 tunnels and bridges, it promises to cut the transit time by three or four hours. Except for the weather, the highway has the feel of Switzerland.
But the new road has raised concerns, particularly in the US, that it could serve as a smuggling route for drugs and weapons, so the military feels obliged to set up checkpoints. Unfortunately, early anecdotal evidence suggests that these safeguards may ultimately slow down traffic by roughly the same amount of time that the project was meant to speed it up!Mexican leaders acknowledge the country’s internal problems, but place three of them at America’s doorstep. First and foremost, the US generates the huge demand for illicit drugs that sustains the entire Latin American mafia, just as the US experiment with alcohol prohibition in the 1920’s fueled the rise of gangsters like Al Capone. No one knows precisely the Mexican drug cartels’ annual profits, but they certainly amount to billions of dollars.
Second, the US, with its incredibly lax restrictions on gun purchases, serves as a veritable arms depot for rich Mexican drug lords. True, they could arguably acquire similar weapons elsewhere, but not necessarily as cheaply and conveniently.Finally, the US could do more to curtail money laundering. One simple step would be to restrict the circulation of $100 bills, which are mostly used in the underground economy.Many of the problems that characterize the complex US-Mexican relationship will be ameliorated if Mexico can sustain rapid economic growth. Net immigration to the US, which has already tapered off, might reverse. The US stands to benefit as much as Mexico if conditions south of the border begin breaking good.
The attacks of 9/11 brought us a decade of war with the seemingly endless and bloody occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan—the most intensive period of US military deployments in our history. But, we may now be entering a decade of diplomacy as we learn that military power is not always the answer for many of the difficult problems ahead.That was just one of the major insights from last weekend’s citizen-led Camden Conference, which I moderated this year. Legions of local volunteers succeeded in attracting academics, journalists, and former government officials to cold and snowy Camden on the Maine coast in the middle of February. More than 900 people filled Camden’s venerable 19th-century Opera House and theaters linked to it in Rockland, Belfast, and Ellsworth to debate war and peace in the Middle East. What I heard consistently was the need for the United States to find a way to negotiate with and outwit our adversaries rather than fight them.To be fair, President Obama has been trying to institutionalize just such a restructuring of America’s foreign policy DNA. While President Bush was right to come out swinging against Al Qaeda after 9/11, Obama knows we lost our way in occupying two Muslim nations in wars that exhausted our military and soured the public on foreign adventures. He has pivoted away from reflexively trying to make others bend to our superior force. Instead, he pushed our allies to lead in Libya and Mali and refuses to put American boots on the ground in the Syrian quagmire.
But if Washington wants to emphasize diplomacy and reserve the military for crises of last resort, it will have to counter two sharply negative trends that have nearly hollowed out our diplomatic strength in recent years. The first is the widely recognized and troubling militarization of our foreign policy. We have grown to rely too much on the military and sometimes seem like a “shoot first and ask questions later” nation.
This week’s productive start to negotiations with Iran is a case in point. The airwaves are filled with debates on the merits of an Israeli or American use of force against Iran when the real action, at least for now, is at the negotiating table. As a former ambassador to NATO, I certainly value the military’s unique strength. But it isn’t the right vehicle for some of the critical problems we face this year — assembling a global coalition on climate change, promoting reform in the Arab world, and competing economically with China.
That is why the second trend - the weakening commitment to the State Department budget and the future of the Foreign Service by an inattentive Congress - is so alarming. Until recently, the House and Senate have fully funded the military, intelligence, and homeland security. But the State Department budget seems constantly under threat, and sequestration will do even greater damage. Our first-class Foreign Service is atrophying; we don’t have enough people to staff our embassies and train for the future. It took a secretary of defense, Bob Gates, to make the case for strengthening diplomacy when he pointed to the ludicrous fact that there are more members of the armed services bands than there are American diplomats. That tells you all you need to know about our national priorities.
Obama has a new ally in resurrecting our diplomatic strategy and fully funding it. It is clear from Secretary of State John Kerry’s first month in office that he views diplomacy as a force multiplier for America’s global power. Some of Kerry’s predecessors saw diplomacy as the right answer at times of crisis. George Marshall’s celebrated Marshall Plan employed economic aid to help turn back communism in Western Europe after World War II. More recently, James A. Baker’s masterful negotiation of German reunification and Condoleezza Rice’s pursuit of a strategic opening to India are examples of the application of diplomatic ingenuity to global challenges.
Diplomacy is a more deliberate and sometimes frustrating path for the world’s strongest country. It will not answer all our problems. But we won’t get very far in this complex, chaotic, and unpredictable century without it.
Some argue that sovereign debt incurred without the consent of the people and not for their benefit, such as that of apartheid South Africa, should be considered odious and not transferable to successor governments. We argue that an institution that truthfully announced whether regimes are odious could create an equilibrium in which successor governments suffer no reputational loss from failure to repay odious debt and hence creditors curtail odious lending. Equilibria with odious lending could be eliminated by amending creditor country laws to prevent seizure of assets for failure to repay odious debt and restricting foreign assistance to countries not repaying odious debt. Shutting down the borrowing capacity of illegitimate regimes can be viewed as a form of economic sanction and has two advantages over most sanctions: it helps rather than hurts the population, and it does not create incentives for evasion by third parties. However, an institution empowered to assess regimes might falsely term debt odious if it favored debtors, and if creditors anticipate this, they would not make loans to legitimate governments. An institution empowered only to declare future lending to a particular government odious would have greater incentives to judge truthfully. A similar approach could be used to reduce moral hazard associated with World Bank and IMF loans.
Japan and China have been much in the news lately because of their dispute over seven square kilometers of barren islets in the East China Sea that Japan calls the Senkaku and China calls the Diaoyu Islands. The rival claims date back to the late 19th century, but the most recent flare-up, which led to widespread anti-Japan demonstrations in China in September 2012, began when the Japanese government purchased three of the tiny islets from their private Japanese owner. Then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said that he decided to purchase the islands for the Japanese central government to pre-empt Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s plan to purchase them with Tokyo municipal funds. Ishihara is well known for his provocative nationalist actions, and Noda feared that Ishihara would try to occupy the islands or otherwise use them to provoke China. Chinese officials, however, chose to ignore Noda’s manifest motives. They regard a Japanese government purchase in any form as proof that Japan is trying to disrupt the status quo. When the United States returned Okinawa to Japan in May 1972, the transfer included the Senkakus, which the United States had administered from Okinawa. A few months later, when China and Japan normalized their relations in the protracted aftermath of World War II, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asked Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the Senkakus and was told that rather than let the dispute delay normalization, the issue should be left for later generations. Both countries maintained their claims to sovereignty. Though Japan had administrative control, Chinese ships would occasionally enter Japanese waters to assert China’s legal position. In Chinese eyes, this was the status quo Japan destroyed with the September 2012 purchase.
In October of last year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked me and three other former officials from Democratic and Republican administrations to travel to Tokyo and Beijing to explain the American position and to listen to the concerns of our hosts.1 Top Chinese leaders told us that they believe Japan is entering a period of right-wing militarist nationalism, and that the purchase of the islands was a deliberate effort by Japan to begin a process of eroding the settlement of World War II, including the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. Since then, Chinese ships have continued to intrude regularly on what Japan claims as its own territorial waters. Clearly, there is more going on than a mere squabble over empty islands. And just as clearly, the implications for the United States are hardly trivial, since we are simultaneously allied with Japan and enmeshed in a complex and portentous multilevel relationship with China. Meanwhile, too, every other Asian and Oceanic state, ally and not, from the Philippines to Vietnam to Australia, is watching what we do.The key strategic issue in East Asia is the rise of Chinese power. For nearly three decades, the Chinese economy grew between 7 and 10 percent annually, which means it has more than doubled each decade. China’s defense expenditures grew by an even larger percentage. Chinese leaders speak of China’s “peaceful development”, but some analysts believe that China cannot rise peacefully, and will seek a form of hegemony in East Asia that will lead to conflict with the United States and Japan. Unlike Europe, East Asia never fully came to terms with the 1930s, and Cold War divisions prevented the reconciliation and institutional development that make another war between Germany and France unthinkable. In that climate of lingering mistrust, it is easy for Asian political leaders to turn to populist nationalism to generate support.
In addition to China’s rise, the decline of Japan has caused the balance of power between Japan and China to shift markedly over recent decades. Some analysts find it distracting to describe Japan’s situation as “decline.” As a leading expert, Gerald L. Curtis of Columbia University, correctly pointed out on a Council on Foreign Relations blog last year, “if you think about living standards and the quality of the air you breathe, the water you drink and the food you eat, the health care and other social services you receive, and the number of years you can expect to live, the answer is obvious: better to live in ‘declining’ Japan than in rising China.” True enough, but in terms of the balance of power, the change is clear.
Japan’s economy has suffered two decades of slow growth because of poor policy decisions after a speculative bubble burst in the early 1990s. In 2010, China’s economy passed Japan’s in total size as measured in dollars (though it remains far behind Japan in per capita terms). In 1988, eight of the top ten companies in the world by market capitalization were Japanese; today none are Japanese.It is difficult to remember that a little over two decades ago, many Americans feared being overtaken by Japan after Japanese per capita income surpassed that of the United States. A 1989 Newsweek article put it succinctly: “In boardrooms and government bureaus around the world, the uneasy question is whether Japan is about to become a superpower, supplanting America as the colossus of the Pacific and perhaps even the world’s No. 1 nation.” Books predicted a Japanese-led Pacific bloc that would exclude the United States, and even an eventual war between Japan and the United States. Futurologist Herman Kahn forecast that Japan would become a nuclear superpower, and that the transition in Japan’s role would be like “the change brought about in European and world affairs in the 1870s by the rise of Prussia.” These views extrapolated an impressive Japanese record, but today they serve as a useful reminder about the danger of linear projections based on rapidly rising power resources.
On the eve of World War II, Japan accounted for 5 percent of world industrial production. From 1950 to 1974, Japan averaged a remarkable 10 percent annual growth, and by the 1980s it had become the world second-largest national economy, with 15 percent of world product. It became the world’s largest creditor and largest donor of foreign aid. Its technology was roughly as sophisticated as that of the United States and even slightly more so in some areas of manufacturing. Japan armed only lightly (restricting military expenditures to about 1 percent of GNP) and focused successfully on managed economic growth.
Japan has an impressive historical record of reinventing itself twice. A century and a half ago, Japan became the first non-Western country to successfully adapt to modern globalization. After centuries of isolation, Japan’s Meiji restoration selectively borrowed from the rest of the world, and within half a century the country became strong enough to defeat a European great power in the Russo-Japanese War. After 1945, it rose from the ashes of World War II.
Can it reinvent itself again? In 2000, a Prime Minister’s commission on Japan’s goals in the 21st century called for a new reinvention, and some thought the 2011 earthquake and tsunami might provide a shock to jump-start the process. But little has happened. Given the slowing of economic growth, the weakness of the political process, the aging of the population and the resistance to immigration, change will not be easy. Japan faces severe demographic problems, with its population projected to shrink to one hundred million by 2050. But Japan retains a high standard of living, a highly skilled labor force, a stable society, and areas of technological leadership and manufacturing skills. Despite its weak recent performance, Japan retains impressive power resources. It possesses the world’s third-largest national economy and has the best-equipped conventional military forces among Asian countries. Moreover, its culture (both traditional and popular), its overseas development assistance and its support of international institutions provide ample resources for soft or attractive power. In December 2012, newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe campaigned on a promise to revive Japanese economic growth.
Could a revived Japan, a decade or two hence, become a global challenger economically or militarily, as was predicted two decades ago? It seems unlikely. Roughly the size of California, Japan will never have the geographical or population scale of China or the United States. Its success in modernization and democracy and its popular culture provide Japan with soft power, but ethnocentric attitudes and policies undercut it. Some politicians have talked about revising Article 9 of the postwar constitution, which restricts Japan’s forces to self-defense, and a few have spoken of nuclear armament, but neither seems likely anytime soon. Alternatively, if Japan were to ally with China, the combined resources of the two countries would make a potent coalition. In 2006, China became Japan’s largest trade partner, and the new government formed by the Democratic Party of Japan in 2009 sought improved relations with China. However, not only have the wounds of the 1930s failed to heal, but China and Japan have conflicting visions of Japan’s proper place in Asia and in the world. For example, China has blocked Japan’s efforts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. China would want to constrain Japan, but Japan would chafe at the restraints. In the unlikely prospect that the United States were to withdraw from the East Asian region, Japan might join a Chinese bandwagon, but Japan is more likely to maintain its American alliance to preserve its independence from China.
In domestic politics, Japan’s December 2012 election marked a turn to the right; the LDP and Komeito coalition achieved a parliamentary supermajority of 327 seats. But it would be wrong to describe this turn as militarist. Shinzo Abe, president of the Liberal Democratic Party and now two-time Prime Minister, has a reputation as a nationalist. He recently visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a Tokyo war memorial that is controversial in China and Korea, and just hours after his election he warned China over the Senkakus issue. More basic to the present mood, however, is the fact that Japanese politics is showing the signs of two decades of low economic growth, which have led to fiscal problems and a more inwardturning attitude among the younger generation. Thirty years ago, Harvard professor Ezra Vogel published a book, Japan as Number 1, but recently, Vogel has described Japan’s political system as “an absolute mess” that replaces Prime Ministers almost every year. Yoichi Funibashi, former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, also worries about Japan becoming too inward-looking: “There’s a sense in Japan that we are unprepared to be a tough, competitive player in this global world.”
Many younger Japanese are “fed up”, in their own parlance, with stagnation and drift. Theirs is a reactive more than an aggressive nationalism. Japan is not about to return to the 1930s, and the military is firmly under civilian control. When asked about the rightward trend in politics, some young Diet members say they hope it might produce a realignment among political parties that would lead to greater longevity of Prime Ministers and more effective national government. If a moderate nationalism is harnessed to produce political reform, the results could be good for Japan as well as the rest of the world. But an increased nationalist mood can also lead to symbolic and populist positions that win votes at home but irresponsibly antagonize Japan’s neighbors.
In the 1980s, after China turned to market mechanisms to foster economic development, Deng Xiaoping warned his compatriots to eschew external adventures that might jeopardize internal development. In 2007, President Hu Jintao told the 17th Party Congress that China should invest more in its soft power, and China has spent billions of dollars in that effort. This is a smart strategy for a country making enormous strides in economic and military power. China has sought to reduce the fear and the tendencies to balance Chinese power that might otherwise grow among its neighbors. After the 2008 financial crisis, however, many Chinese mistakenly concluded that the United States was in decline. “People are now looking down on the West, from leadership circles, to academia, to everyday folks”, said Professor Kang Xiaoguong of Renmin University.2 Such overconfidence in power assessment (combined with deep insecurity in domestic politics) led to more assertive Chinese foreign policy behavior in the latter part of 2009. China disregarded Deng Xiaoping’s advice that China should proceed cautiously and “skillfully keep a low profile.” Indeed, with a few choice missteps over a remarkably brief period, Chinese leaders squandered the benefits of an otherwise impressive charm offensive.
After experiencing international criticism and failing to deter the United States from sending arms to Taiwan, top Chinese leaders soon decided to return to Deng’s smart power strategy. That is still the view at the top. One of the new fifth-generation leaders told our visiting team that China would need a peaceful environment for development for 30 to 50 years, and that the United States would remain the most powerful country for at least that long.
But below the top level there flows a strong current of nationalism, both in the bureaucracy and in the blogosphere, that serves as a substitute for public opinion. At that level, Chinese opinion is more impatient. For example, General Liu Yuan argues that China should cast aside restraint, and Major General Luo Yuan urges the dispatch of hundreds of fishing boats to fight a maritime guerrilla war to seize territories claimed by China. Such positions may not be typical, but the danger is that nationalists in China and Japan will provoke each other to greater belligerence. In such a situation, hawks feed each other across national boundaries. Moreover, such views are exacerbated by biased textbooks and government policies. The Chinese Communist Party is not very communist any more. The joke goes that it is “market-Leninist.” It bases its legitimacy on high economic growth and ethnic Han nationalism. Memories of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and Japanese aggression in the 1930s are politically potent and undergird a larger theme of Chinese victimization by imperialist forces.
What is China’s maritime strategy? China used lethal force to expel Vietnamese from the Paracel Islands in 1974 and 1988. And China prevailed upon Cambodia, host of this past year’s ASEAN regional summit, to prevent a final communiqué that would have called for a code of conduct in the South China Sea. It was the first time in the ten-member association’s four decades that it failed to issue a closing communiqué.
Some American defense analysts see a clear and aggressive strategy. They point to increasing defense expenditures and development of missile and submarine technology designed for area denial in the seas out to “the first island chain” of Taiwan and Japan. Others see a Chinese strategy that is confused, self-contradictory and paralyzed by competing bureaucratic interests. They point to the negative results of China’s more assertive policies since the economic crisis of 2008, which have worsened relations with nearly all its neighbors. Take the Senkakus incident in 2010, when a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel, Japan arrested the crew, and China escalated its economic reprisals. The result was a reversal of what had been for China a favorable trend under the new Democratic Party of Japan government. As one Japanese analyst told me, “China scored on its own goal.” And while China spends billions of yuan in efforts to increase its soft or attractive power in Asia, its actions in the South China Sea contradict its own message.
I have asked Chinese friends and officials why China follows such a counterproductive strategy. The formal answer I usually get first is that China inherited historical territorial claims, including a map from the Nationalist period with a nine-dashed, U-shaped line that creates a deep pocket into the South China Sea. Now with technology opening access to underwater resources and fisheries in the area, it is impossible to give up this patrimony. In 2009–10, some mid-ranking officials and commentators even referred to the South China Sea as a sovereign “core interest” on a par with Taiwan or Tibet.
But China has never been clear about the exact location of the nine dashes on that U-shaped line, nor about whether its claims refer to only certain land features or to more extensive continental shelves and seas. When asked why they do not make this clear, my Chinese interlocutors sometimes say that it would raise difficult nationalist issues at home, and would require difficult political and bureaucratic compromises. Sometimes they say they do not want to give away a bargaining position prematurely. In 1995 and again in 2010, the United States declared that the waters of the South China Sea should be governed by the 1982 UN Law of the Seas Treaty (which, ironically, the U.S. Congress has not yet ratified). But the U.S. government takes no position on these third-party territorial claims. Instead, it urges, sincerely but in rather anodyne terms, that they be resolved peacefully by negotiations. In 2002, China and ASEAN agreed on a legally non-binding code of conduct for managing such disputes, but, as a large power, China believes it will do better in bilateral rather than multilateral negotiations with small countries. That belief was behind China’s pressure on Cambodia to prevent an ASEAN communiqué related to a reinforced code of conduct. But this is a mistaken strategy. As a large power, China will have great weight in any circumstance, and it could reduce its self-inflicted damage by agreeing to a code.
During our October 2012 visit to Tokyo and Beijing, my colleagues and I stressed three points. First was a message of deterrence, reminding our interlocutors that the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense had declared publicly that the Senkaku Islands are covered by Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Second, we urged that horizontal communication between Japan and China be improved, but also that more attention be given to vertical communications between the national capitals and actors on the scene who come from many bureaucracies and whose heroics can take governments beyond where they want to go. The 2010 ramming of a Japanese coast guard cutter by a Chinese trawler was not an action ordered from Beijing. Finally, we warned that populist nationalism could destroy the joint-sum gains that China, Japan (and, indirectly, the United States) get from rising prosperity. China and Japan are each other’s main trading partners, and top Chinese leaders told us they were well aware of the costs of disrupting that relationship. At the same time, former Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba has estimated that the September incident alone cost Japanese companies more than $100 million. When populist nationalisms interact and leaders compete for power, economic rationality can be quickly overwhelmed.
In 2011, President Obama announced a “pivot”, later labeled a “rebalancing”, toward Asia. As already noted, some American analysts argue that China’s rise cannot be peaceful and that therefore the U.S. government should now adopt a policy of containing China. Many Chinese officials perceive that to be the current American strategy, but Administration officials have denied that is the case, and they are correct. A glance at history illustrates the point. Cold War containment of the USSR meant virtually no trade and little social contact. Today the United States not only has massive trade with China, but also extensive social contact, including 157,000 Chinese students attending American universities.
With the end of the Cold War, the containment of the Soviet Union could no longer provide a model for U.S.-China relations. Moreover, relations with China cooled after the Tiananmen Square shootings in 1989, and the Clinton Administration had to devise a new approach. As an Assistant Secretary of Defense, I supervised the Pentagon’s East Asia Strategy Review in 1994, and we rejected the idea of containment for two reasons. If we treated China as an enemy, we were guaranteeing an enemy in the future. If we treated China as a friend, we could not guarantee friendship, but we kept open the possibility of more benign futures. In addition, it would have been difficult to persuade other countries to join in a coalition to contain China unless China resorted to bullying tactics such as the Soviets used after World War II. China, by its behavior, would be the only country that could organize the containment of China.Instead of containment, the strategy that the Clinton Administration devised could be termed “integrate but hedge”—something very much like Ronald Reagan’s “trust but verify.” The U.S. government supported China’s membership in the World Trade Organization and accepted Chinese goods and visitors. However, the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration of April 1996 reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was not a Cold War relic that would in due course be discarded, but an operative arrangement whose modernization would provide the basis for a stable and prosperous East Asia. President Clinton also set his sights on a major improvement of relations with India. This strategy has enjoyed bipartisan support. The Bush Administration continued to improve relations with India, while deepening and formalizing the economic dialogue with China. Bush’s Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick made clear that the United States would accept the rise of China as a “responsible stakeholder.” The same policy continues to guide the Obama Administration. In my view, it remains the right policy.
One of the major power shifts of the 21st century is the recovery of Asia. In 1800, Asia represented half the world’s population and half the world’s economy. By 1900, because of the industrial revolution in Europe and North America, Asia’s share of world product declined to 20 percent. By the middle of this century, Asia should again represent half the world’s population and product. This is a natural and welcome evolution, as hundreds of millions of people escape from dire poverty. At the same time, however, it has given rise to fears that China will become a threat to the United States.The fear is not necessary, however, if we remember that Asia is not one entity. It has its own internal balance of power. Japan, India, Vietnam and other countries do not want to be dominated by China, and thus welcome an American presence in the region. Unless China proves able to better develop its soft power of attraction, the rise in its hard military and economic power is likely to frighten its neighbors into seeking coalitions to balance against it. For example, after China developed its more assertive foreign policy in 2009, the net result was that, after a short two years, China had worsened its relations with Japan, India, South Korea, Vietnam and others—quite a remarkable record that has confirmed the premise of the American strategy that “only China can contain China.” A strong American economic and military presence in Asia allows us to be a balancer that helps to shape the environment and provide incentives for more responsible Chinese behavior.
But it would be a mistake to focus only on the hedging part of the American strategy. We should not over-militarize the rebalance toward Asia. The United States and China (as well as other countries) have much to gain from cooperation on a range of transnational issues. One cannot manage solutions to global financial stability, climate change, cyber-terrorism or pandemics without such cooperation. If power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants, it is important to remember that sometimes our power is greater when we act with others rather than merely over others. This important dimension of a smart power strategy is not captured by the concept of containment.As a status quo power, the United States has much to gain from a triangle of good relations among itself, Japan and China. Those who evoke the analogy of a rising Germany a century ago forget that the Kaiser’s Germany had passed Britain by the beginning of the 20th century, while China will not pass the United States in overall power for decades, if ever. Unless we succumb to premature fear, we have time to manage the emergence of Chinese power, and our alliance with Japan provides an important hedge in case things go wrong.
But it’s true that nationalism poses dangers that are difficult to control. Despite the fact that China has become Japan’s largest partner in trade and direct foreign investment, one country’s nationalist energies fuel the other’s, and both governments are now developing a habit of playing with fire. The United States has an interest in dampening this trend. American interests rest on stability in the region to allow the continuing growth of trade and investment that benefits all countries. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains crucial to stability in East Asia, but so too are good relations in all three sides of the strategic triangle. One thing is clear: If, despite all we do, Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate toward literal conflict, the United States will be faced with some very tough choices. It is probably not too soon to quietly begin to analyze within government just what some of those choices might look like.
As for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, no swift resolution is likely. Japan’s former Foreign Minister invited China to take the issue to the International Court of Justice, but China is unlikely to accept. At best, we can hope to move the issue to the backburner of regional politics, where it would be less likely to boil over and spoil other dishes. In the meantime, incidents proliferate, as on December 13, when Japan scrambled eight F-15 jets in response to a Chinese intrusion into airspace Japan considers its own.
In my view, the best proposal is that suggested by the Economist. China should refrain from sending official vessels into Japanese waters, and use a hotline with Tokyo to manage crises generated by nationalist hotheads or “cowboys.” At the same time, the two countries should revive a 2008 framework for joint development of disputed gas fields in the East China Sea, and the Japanese government should declare the islets an international marine protected area with neither habitation nor military activities. It’s an excellent idea: balanced, proportional and eminently rational. And that is precisely why, in the present climate, I am not holding my breath waiting for it to be adopted.
Outsiders No More? brings together a multidisciplinary group of scholars to consider pathways by which immigrants may be incorporated into the political processes of western democracies. At a time when immigrants are increasingly significant political actors in many democratic polities, this volume makes a timely and valuable intervention by pushing researchers to articulate causal dynamics, provide clear definitions and measurable concepts, and develop testable hypotheses. By including historians, sociologists, and political scientists, by ranging across North America and Western Europe, by addressing successful and failed incorporative efforts, this handbook offers guides for anyone seeking to develop a dynamic, unified, and supple model of immigrant political incorporation.
Eurozone members are supposedly constrained by the fiscal caps of the Stability and Growth Pact. Yet ever since the birth of the euro, members have postponed painful adjustment. Wishful thinking has played an important role in this failure. We find that governments' forecasts are biased in the optimistic direction, especially during booms. Eurozone governments are especially over-optimistic when the budget deficit is over the 3% cap at the time the forecasts are made. Those exceeding this cap systematically but falsely forecast a rapid future improvement. The new fiscal compact among the euro countries is supposed to make budget rules more binding by putting them into laws and constitutions at the national level. But biased forecasts can defeat budget rules. What is the record in Europe with national rules? The bias is less among eurozone countries that have adopted certain rules at the national level, particularly creating an independent fiscal institution that provides independent forecasts.
The European Union (EU) tax mandate remains narrow. That there was only a limited transfer of tax authority to the EU exempliﬁes the failure of political and ﬁscal integration. Using a political economy framework, this article analyzes why the heads of state rejected tax harmonization proposals in the intergovernmental conferences. The presented ﬁndings of the original data on the Maastricht, Nice and Lisbon negotiations support the main hypothesis derived from the theoretical
framework – namely that resistance against tax harmonization came predominantly from low-tax countries. Moreover, the results indicate that after the accession of the central and eastern European countries the prospects of harmonizing tax policy starkly decreased. The analysis shows that tax heterogeneity and the enlargements have negative effects on tax integration. Based on the empirical ﬁndings and the theoretical framework, the article concludes by discussing how the creation of the monetary union restructured the politics of tax Europeanization and ﬁscal integration.