@conference {372946,
	title = {Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention against Torture},
	booktitle = {International Studies Association},
	year = {2015},
	month = {February 18},
	address = {New Orleans, Louisiana},
	abstract = {Human rights treaty bodies have for many years now been criticized as useless and\&nbsp;self-reporting widely viewed as a whitewash. Yet very little research explores what,\&nbsp;if any, influence this periodic review process has on governments{\textquoteright} implementation of\&nbsp;and compliance with treaty obligations. We argue oversight committees may play an\&nbsp;important role by providing information for international and domestic audiences. This\&nbsp;paper examines the effects of self-reporting and oversight review, using original data on\&nbsp;the quality and responsiveness of reports submitted to the Committee Against Torture\&nbsp;(CmAT) and a dynamic approach to strengthen causal inference about the effects of\&nbsp;the periodic review process on rights practices. We find that the review process in\&nbsp;fact does reduce the incidence of torture in self-reporting states. Furthermore, we find\&nbsp;that local media attention to the process in Latin American spikes during the review\&nbsp;process, consistent with domestic awareness and mobilization made possible by media\&nbsp;attention to torture practices and treaty obligations. Thus, this is the first study to\&nbsp;present positive evidence on the effects of self-reporting on torture outcomes, contrary\&nbsp;to the many studies that assert the process is basically useless.},
	author = {Beth A. Simmons and Creamer, Cosette}
}
@conference {339856,
	title = {Innovation and Access to Technologies for Sustainable Development: A Global Systems Perspective},
	booktitle = {Innovation and Access to Technologies for Sustainable Development: A Global Perspective},
	year = {2014},
	month = {April 24, 2014},
	address = {Cambridge, MA},
	abstract = {This workshop report is a summary of themes discussed by five panels during a daylong workshop on {\textquotedblleft}Innovation and Access to Technologies for Sustainable Development: A global Perspective{\textquotedblright} at Harvard University on April 24, 2014. The workshop brought together a diverse group of scholars to explore how the technological innovation needed for sustainable development can be promoted in ways that assure equitable access in current and future generations.
Three key themes that emerged from the workshop include: (1) The central role of power, politics and agency in analyzing technological innovation and sustainable development{\textemdash}an important aspect of this includes the articulation of the roles of actors and organizations within frameworks and models of innovation systems. (2) The importance of focusing both on supply-push and demand-pull mechanisms in innovation scholarship and innovation policy. (3) The need to focus more innovation scholarship around the goals of sustainable development.},
	url = {http://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/68196/1245594/version/1/file/2014-02.pdf},
	author = {Harley, Alicia and Sharmila Murthy and Diaz Anadon, Laura and Chan, Gabriel and Matus, Kira and Moon, Suerie and Timmer, Vanessa and Clark, William C.}
}
@conference {330336,
	title = {Walt Whitman, European National Poetry, and the Revolutions of 1848-49},
	year = {2014},
	abstract = {The failure of the 1848-49 European revolutions was crucial in the evolution of Whitman{\textquoteright}s Leaves of Grass. Whitman shared the revolutionary spirit of 1848-49, portraying an ideal America of unique and growing diversity. How does Whitman as an American national poet with revolutionary sympathies compare with his European contemporaries, such as Mickiewicz of Poland, Pet{\H o}fi of Hungary, or Shevchenko of Ukraine? Whitman sympathized with liberal European revolution, but not with European xenophobia, which after 1848 was increasingly associated with nationalism and the poetry of nationalism. Whitman is spiritually closest not to European national poets but to poets of the East such as Tagore and Iqbal. His identification with America as heir to xenophobic, dying Europe took added force from his father{\textquoteright}s death. Whitman, despairing at the reality of American politics in the 1840s and 1850s, sought an idealized freedom of the Self in a universalist mystical vision. The tolerant inclusiveness of Whitman{\textquoteright}s poetry found a practical outlet in the Civil War, in his saintly, self-sacrificing behaviour as a hospital nurse and the expression in his poetry of the horror, not glory, of war. Through his inner conflicts, in which his sexual identity was central, Whitman spoke for the uncertainties of American national identity after 1848. Whitman{\textquoteright}s poetry revealed his power, and that of the Nation, to contain and resolve painful contradictions and grow through them; and in this way, too, a multicultural America could emerge.},
	author = {Aberbach, David}
}
@conference {190751,
	title = {The Crisis and Beyond: Prospects for International Economic Cooperation},
	booktitle = {Ministero dell{\textquoteright}Economia e delle Finanze and Centre for Economic Policy Research Joint Conference},
	year = {2014},
	month = {23-24 July},
	abstract = {An integrated world economy requires cooperation among major economic powers. Without determined cooperation among the principal powers, globalization is unlikely to survive the inevitable shocks to which it is subjected.
The world faces a difficult adjustment to reduce the macroeconomic imbalances that were a major cause of the current crisis. This means reducing the surpluses of the major surplus countries in East Asia and Europe, and reducing the deficits of the major deficit countries in North America and Europe. Both processes require substantial domestic economic changes; economies and people will be tempted to turn inward, and governments will be tempted to reduce the priority they give to their external ties. This increases the risks of a breakdown in international cooperation.
Historical precedent is instructive. During the interwar period, a global macroeconomic imbalance was a major cause of the eventual economic catastrophe. During the 1920s, Germany borrowed heavily from the United States. But when a crisis hit, it turned out that neither country was politically prepared to maintain cooperative policies. Americans, focused on domestic concerns, were unwilling to help work out a cooperative resolution of the crisis. Germany exploded into social and political unrest and ended up in the hands of rabid nationalists and protectionists. The problem was political: a lack of domestic support for the sacrifices necessary to maintain international cooperation.
As the crisis winds down and post-crisis adjustment begins, major governments will be challenged to work together to support a well-functioning international economy. They will need to address the concerns of constituents who will chafe at the economic changes forced upon them. Governments that can build domestic political support for international economic engagement will be in a stronger position to work to sustain an integrated global economy.},
	url = {http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/12111440/pegged_5th_policy_paper.pdf?sequence=4},
	author = {Frieden, Jeffry}
}
@conference {63561,
	title = {I am an Atheist and a Muslim?: Ideological Competition and Accommodation in Central Asia},
	year = {2013},
	note = {},
	month = {Apr 13, 2013},
	abstract = {Why do religious and political ideologies sometimes produce social and political conflict and other times co-mingle peacefully? The answer must consider both the content of competing ideologies along with the socio-political interests of their believers. In this case study of ideological competition in Central Asia, I show how both philosophical and material concerns explain why many Muslims, while openly retaining their religious-ethnic identity, became active members of an atheistic Community Party. This phenomenon did not occur amongst Christians who necessarily discarded, at least publicly, their religious identities when becoming Communists. So while religious and political conflict openly occurred in Communist societies which were predominantly Christian, many Muslims were able to accommodate their religious convictions with Soviet Communism. In the end, the creation of {\textquotedblleft}Muslim Atheists{\textquotedblright} depended on not only socio-economic differences between Muslim and Christian societies but also theological differences between Muslim and Christian religions.},
	author = {Paul Froese}
}
@conference {80111,
	title = {What{\textquoteright}s So Darned Special about Church Friends?},
	booktitle = {Altruism, Morality \& Social Solidarity Forum, American Sociological Association},
	volume = {3},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {1,19-21},
	edition = {2},
	url = {http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11105535},
	author = {Putnam, Robert D.}
}
@conference {67641,
	title = {In Search of Real Rigidities},
	year = {2010},
	note = {Presented at the NBER 25th Macroannual Conference, April 9-10, 2010.},
	month = {Apr 9, 2010},
	abstract = {The closed and open economy literatures work on estimating real rigidities, but in parallel. We bring the two literatures together to shed light on this question. We use international price data and exchange rate shocks to evaluate the importance of real rigidities in price setting. We show that consistent with the presence of real rigidities the response of reset-price inflation to exchange rate shocks depicts significant persistence. Individual import prices, conditional on changing, respond to exchange rate shocks prior to the last price change.},
	author = {Gopinath, Gita and Itskhoki, Oleg}
}
@conference {65916,
	title = {Limited Attention and Income Distribution},
	year = {2008},
	note = {Presented at the American Economic Association, January 4, 2008.Download PDF},
	month = {Jan 1, 2008},
	abstract = {Economists have long been interested in the idea that there is a direct circular relation
between poverty and low productivity, and not just one that is mediated by market failures,
usually in asset markets. The nutrition-based e{\textcent} ciency wage model (Partha Dasgupta and
Debraj Ray, 1987) is the canonical example of models where this happens: However it
has been variously suggested (see for example T. N. Srinivasan, 1994) that the link from
nutrition to productivity and especially the link from productivity to nutrition is too weak
to be any more than a small part of the story. Partha Dasgupta himself acknowledges this
when he writes \&quot;nutrition-productivity construct provides a metaphor... for an economic
environment harboring poverty traps.\&quot;},
	author = {Mullainathan, Sendhil and Abhijit Banerjee}
}
@conference {65911,
	title = {Why Don{\textquoteright}t People Insure Late Life Consumption? A Framing Explanation of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle},
	year = {2008},
	note = {Presented at the American Economic Association, January 5, 2008.Download PDF},
	month = {Jan 5, 2008},
	abstract = {According to standard economic models, a risk-averse consumer who faces uncertainty about
length-of-life should place a high value on life annuities that provide guaranteed income for life.
Yet numerous studies show that few consumers voluntarily annuitize their retirement savings. As
public and private pension systems around the world continue the ongoing shift from traditional
defined benefit plans, which typically pay benefits for life, to defined contribution structures
which rarely require annuitization, retirees find themselves increasingly exposed to longevity
risk{\textemdash}the risk of being unable to sustain their consumption should they live longer than average.},
	author = {Mullainathan, Sendhil and Brown, Jeffrey R. and Kling, Jeffrey R. and Wrobel, Marian V.}
}
@conference {65666,
	title = {Exchange-Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data},
	year = {2007},
	note = {},
	month = {Oct 19, 2007},
	abstract = {Analyses of the political economy of exchange-rate policy posit that firms and individuals in different sectors of the economy have distinct policy attitudes toward the level and the stability of the exchange rate. Most such approaches hypothesize that internationally exposed firms prefer more stable currencies, and that tradables producers prefer a relatively depreciated real exchange rate. Sensible as such expectations may be, there are few direct empirical tests of them. We offer micro-level, cross-national evidence on sectoral attitudes over the exchange rate. Using firm-level data from the World Bank{\textquoteright}s World Business Environment Survey (WBES), we find systematic patterns linking sector of economic activity to exchange-rate policy positions. Owners and managers of firms producing tradable goods prefer greater stability of the exchange rate: in countries with a floating currency, manufacturers are more likely to report that the exchange rate causes problems for their business. With respect to the level of the exchange rate, we find that tradables producers{\textemdash}in particular manufacturers and export producers{\textemdash}are more likely to be unhappy following an appreciation of the real exchange rate than are firms in non-tradables sectors (services and construction). These findings confirm theoretical expectations about the relationship between economic position and currency policy preferences.},
	author = {Frieden, Jeffry and Broz, J. Lawrence and Weymouth, Stephen}
}
@conference {65511,
	title = {Iraq and the Fox Effect: An Examination of Polarizing Media and Public Support for International Conflict},
	year = {2007},
	note = {},
	month = {Aug 30, 2007},
	abstract = {The causes and consequences of public support, or the lack thereof, for the overseas application of military force is a subject of longstanding scholarly debate. The most widely accepted explanations emphasize rational public responses to events as they unfold. Such {\textquotedblleft}event-based{\textquotedblright} explanations hold that a president{\textquoteright}s ability to sustain public support for a U.S. military engagement depends primarily on its degree of success, the number of or trend in U.S. casualties, or the U.S. goals in a given conflict. Yet, recent research into the framing of foreign policy has shown that public perceptions concerning, success or failure, the implications of casualties, and the offensive or defensive nature of U.S. military engagements are often endogenous to the domestic political circumstances surrounding them, including the efforts of political and media elites to frame events to their own advantage.
In this study, we develop and test a series of hypotheses concerning media coverage of, and public opinion regarding, the war in Iraq. In the former case, in prior research (Baum and Groeling 2004, 2005) we report evidence that journalists{\textquoteright} preferences lead traditional news programs to disproportionately feature instances of members of the presidential party criticizing their fellow partisan president and, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, of the opposition party praising him. Moreover, because they represent costly speech, presidential party attacks are highly credible to consumers, as is opposition party praise. In contrast, in more ideologically narrow {\textquotedblleft}new media{\textquotedblright} outlets, we anticipate that the balance will likely differ substantially.
We test our hypotheses concerning media coverage through a comprehensive content analysis of all coverage of the war from September 2004 through February 2007 appearing on the CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News and FOX{\textquoteright}s Special Report with Brit Hume. We test our public opinion hypotheses using that same dataset, as well as an expert survey on conditions in Iraq and national opinion toward the Iraq War broken down by party. We find significant differences in both the composition and impact of partisan messages on public opinion across outlets.},
	author = {Baum, Matthew and Groeling, Tim}
}
@conference {66086,
	title = {The Policy Context of International Crimes},
	year = {2006},
	note = {The paper draws extensively on two earlier publications (HC Kelman, "The Social Context of Torture: Policy Process and Authority Structure" in RD Crelinsten and AP Schmid (eds), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters (1993); HC Kelman, "The Policy Context of Torture: A Social-Psychological Analysis" (2005) 87(857) International Review of the Red Cross).Download PDF},
	month = {Oct 20, 2006},
	abstract = {Genocide, mass killing, torture, ethnic cleansing, and other gross violations of human rights are defined as war crimes or crimes against humanity under international law. To develop an adequate explanation of such actions, which is the task of social psychology, and an adequate legal response to them, which is the task of international law, requires going beyond the characteristics of individual perpetrators or even of the situations in which these practices take place. It requires close examination of the political system and of the policy process in which these actions are embedded and that provide the larger context for them.},
	author = {Kelman, Herbert C.}
}
@conference {64451,
	title = {Popular Perceptions of Distributive Justice in China: Local and Regional Variations},
	booktitle = {Creating Wealth and Poverty in Contemporary China},
	year = {2006},
	note = {},
	month = {Jan 6, 2006},
	address = {Yale University},
	abstract = {The reform era launched in 1978 has produced dramatic changes in Chinese society. The dismantling of centrally planned socialism and the transformation of China into a market{\textendash}based economy have fundamentally altered that society{\textquoteright}s social order. In many respects China{\textquoteright}s reforms have been extraordinarily successful, with sustained high levels of economic growth, rising income levels and consumption patterns, growing integration of China into the global economy, massive infusions of foreign investment, and sharp reductions in the proportion of the population that is desperately poor. However, this transformation from a socialist to a market{\textendash}based society has also had more divisive and less savory consequences. Older Chinese who had learned how to survive by playing by the rules of Mao{\textendash}era socialism had to adapt to a fundamentally changed distribution system in which there were plenty of losers alongside the many winners. Chinese society changed from being a society with relatively modest income disparities to one with large and in some periods escalating gaps between the rich and the poor. Many who felt they should be honored for their contributions to building socialism found themselves unemployed, while suspicion was rife that many of China{\textquoteright}s new millionaires were the beneficiaries of corruption and official favoritism. In recent years China has been rocked by a rising tide of public protests by peasants, workers, and others, with unfairness of the current social order repeatedly challenged.},
	author = {Whyte, Martin K.}
}
@conference {64471,
	title = {Economic Accountability and Strategic Calibration in Japan{\textquoteright}s Liberal Democratic Party},
	booktitle = {Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association},
	year = {2005},
	note = {},
	month = {Aug 1, 2005},
	address = {Washington},
	abstract = {I propose a new explanation for the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan using the notion of strategic calibration. Existing theories of LDP hegemony emphasize a favorable electoral system and strong economic performance, but neither of these factors is sufficient to explain the party{\textquoteright}s recent success. Using public opinion data from 1960 to 2004, I show that the LDP employed a strategy to prevent unpopular prime ministers from tainting the party{\textquoteright}s image. Time series analyses show that inflation and unemployment have modest effects on cabinet support ratings, but they have no effects on LDP ratings. LDP leaders are sensitive to the relative support levels of the prime minister{\textquoteright}s cabinet and the party because the former affects the latter, though not the reverse. Duration models demonstrate that when cabinet ratings fall below party ratings, cabinets are more likely to be reshuffled and prime ministers are more likely to be replaced to avoid having the cabinet{\textquoteright}s negative image {\textquotedblleft}rub off{\textquotedblright} on the LDP. Although electoral rules, culture, and other factors surely play a role in sustaining the LDP, I reveal for the first time that the party manages it cabinet personnel strategically to maintain suitable party support in the electorate.},
	author = {Barry C. Burden}
}
@conference {64461,
	title = {Popular Attitudes Toward Income Inequality in China},
	booktitle = {Income Inequality in China},
	year = {2005},
	note = {},
	month = {Jan 15, 2005},
	address = {Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences},
	abstract = {During the period of China{\textquoteright}s reforms since 1978, the income and consumption levels of the majority of Chinese families have improved considerably. However, it is clear that inequalities in the distribution of incomes in China have increased sharply as well, and that the {\textquotedblleft}rules of the game{\textquotedblright} that determine how people are paid in their jobs, what benefits they are entitled to, and whether or how they can get ahead (or experience downward mobility) have changed in dramatic fashion as well. On the latter point and oversimplifying things, socialist distribution principles and bureaucratic allocation of income and benefits have been replaced by market distribution and heightened competition and risk. How do ordinary Chinese citizens react to these changes in the pattern of income distribution and social mobility in China? In evaluating the altered terrain of income inequality, how do the laobaixing weigh the {\textquotedblleft}good news{\textquotedblright} of generally rising incomes against the {\textquotedblleft}bad news{\textquotedblright} of increased inequality and the at least {\textquotedblleft}problematic news{\textquotedblright} of having their lives governed by dramatically altered rules about what individuals and families have to do in order to get ahead or simply survive? How common is it for Chinese citizens to feel very angry about heightened inequalities and the altered pattern of who is rich and who is poor, despite awareness of the general increase in living standards in the past generation? How much nostalgia exists for the distribution principles and inequality patterns of the centrally planned socialist era? Is popular anger at inequality in China one of the most important problems that Chinese society and its leaders currently face, as some recent opinion polls suggest? Or on the opposite side of the question, how common is it for Chinese citizens to feel satisfaction or even gratitude for all of these changes, even though they may recognize the problems or even unfairness of the more unequal society in which they now live? How much popular acceptance is there of the current leadership{\textquoteright}s claims that inequalities are necessary or even desirable as a way to stimulate further economic growth?},
	author = {Whyte, Martin K.}
}
@conference {64456,
	title = {Rethinking Equality and Inequality in the PRC},
	booktitle = {50th Anniversary Conference for the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research},
	year = {2005},
	note = {},
	month = {Dec 9, 2005},
	address = {Harvard University},
	abstract = {The Fairbank Center for East Asian Research has been in business nearly as long as the People{\textquoteright}s Republic of China, and the Center has played a key role in research on all aspects of the world{\textquoteright}s most populous society. During that period China has experienced extraordinary changes, and our understanding of that society has also been notably altered and deepened. I was not present at the creation, either of the PRC or of the Fairbank Center, but I was privileged to begin my own academic study of China here at Harvard forty years ago, in 1965, just as the Cultural Revolution was about to explode. So I was the beneficiary of the accumulated wisdom of scholars such as John Fairbank and Benjamin Schwartz, and I am pleased that two of my teachers then are still my colleagues today, Ezra Vogel and Dwight Perkins. One of the topics I have struggled to understand over the course of my career of studying China is the changing contours of equality and inequality in the PRC, and particularly the contrasts between the Mao and reform eras. In my talk today I want to offer some of my current thinking on this subject. I will be arguing that there is a conventional wisdom regarding trends in equality and inequality in post{\textendash}1949 China, and that that conventional wisdom is oversimplified and misleading at best, and in some respects dead wrong. Our understanding of the nature of Chinese society after the revolution and even today will be hampered unless we can recognize the flaws in, and overcome the influence of, this conventional wisdom. In advancing my alternative view I will be relying not only on my own research but on the work of many other scholars, and I will attempt to synthesize a variety of kinds of evidence and arguments into an alternative way of thinking about inequality trends in the PRC.},
	author = {Whyte, Martin K.}
}
@conference {63661,
	title = {Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?},
	year = {2005},
	note = {},
	month = {Jan 18, 2005},
	abstract = {Consociational theory suggests that power{\textendash}sharing institutions have many important consequences, not least that they are most likely to facilitate accommodation and cooperation among leadership elites, making them most suitable for states struggling to achieve stable democracy and good governance in divided societies. This study compares a broad cross{\textendash}section of countries worldwide, including many multiethnic states, to investigate the impact of formal power{\textendash}sharing institutions (PR electoral systems and federalism) on several indicators of democratic stability and good governance. The research demonstrates three main findings: (i) worldwide, power{\textendash}sharing constitutions combining PR and federalism remain relatively rare (only 13 out of 191 states); (ii) federalism was found to be unrelated to any of the indicators of good governance under comparison; and (iii) PR electoral systems, however, were positively related to some indicators of good governance, both worldwide and in multiethnic states. This provides strictly limited support for the larger claims made by consociational theory. Nevertheless, the implications for policymakers suggest that investing in basic human development is a consistently more reliable route to achieve stable democracy and good governance than constitutional design alone.},
	author = {Norris, Pippa}
}
@conference {63556,
	title = {The Fundamental Importance of God{\textquoteright}s Character: Measuring Religious Effects and Differences},
	year = {2004},
	note = {},
	month = {May 31, 2004},
	abstract = {Social scientists often explain religious effects in terms of religious group affiliations. Typically, researchers identify religious groups by denomination or some broader popular categorization, such as "fundamentalist," or "evangelical." To better capture religious differences, Steensland et al. (2000) propose an intricate classification of American denominations which takes into account the theology and historical development of various American religious traditions. In response, we propose to replace the reliance on indirect denominational and other group membership as inferential measures of religiousness with a more appropriate direct measure: conceptions of God. This simple measure predicts church attendance rates, belief in biblical literalism, party identification, abortion attitudes, and sexual morality attitudes. In addition, this indicator provides a means to understand variation within religious traditions. God?s character proves the most straightforward way to describe religious differences and the most efficient way to demonstrate how religion impacts the world.},
	author = {Chris Bader and Paul Froese}
}
@conference {65751,
	title = {The Mysterious Case of Female Protectionism: Gender Bias in Attitudes Toward International Trade},
	year = {2004},
	month = {Sep 2, 2004},
	abstract = {We examine new survey data on attitudes toward international trade showing that women are significantly less likely than men to support increasing trade with foreign nations. This gender gap remains large even when controlling for a broad range of socio-economic characteristics among survey respondents, including occupational, skill, and industry-of-employment differences that feature in standard political-economy models of individuals{\textquoteright} trade policy preferences. Measures of the particular labor-market risks and costs associated with maternity do not appear to be related at all to the gender gap in trade preferences. We also do not find any strong evidence that gender differences in non-material values or along ideological dimensions have any affect on attitudes toward trade. The data do clearly reveal that the gender gap exists only among college-educated respondents and is larger among older cohorts. We argue that differences in educational experience{\textemdash}specifically, exposure to economic ideas at the college level{\textemdash}appear to be most plausible explanation for gender differences in attitudes toward trade. The findings suggest the possibilities of a renewed theoretical and empirical focus on the political roles played by ideas, not just among policymakers but also among the broader electorate. In practical terms, there are also implications for trade policy outcomes in different contexts and for how debates over globalization contribute to broader gender divisions in politics.},
	author = {Michael Hiscox and Burgoon, Brian}
}
@conference {64351,
	title = {Ties that Bind? International Linkage and Competitive Authoritarian Regime Change in Africa, Latin America, and Postcommunist Eu},
	year = {2003},
	month = {Aug 27, 2003},
	abstract = {Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 27{\textendash}30, 2003. The authors thank Alicia Llosa, Peter Schwartzstein, Hillel Soifer, and Jonathan Taylor for their assistance in carrying out the research for this paper.The post{\textendash}Cold War literature on regime change has drawn considerable attention to the \&quot;international dimension\&quot; of democratization (Whitehead 1996a). Whereas the dominant literature on democratization during the 1980s downplayed the importance of international factors (O?Donnell and Schmitter 1986), these factors are now widely seen to have played an important {\textendash} and even decisive {\textendash} role in shaping post{\textendash}Cold War regime outcomes (Huntington 1991; Starr 1991; Whitehead 1996a; Kopstein and Reilly 2000). Thus, scholars have highlighted the democratizing impact of the diffusion of democratic norms and institutions, the globalization of new technologies such as the internet, the increased propensity of the U.S. and other Western powers to encourage democracy abroad, the unprecedented use of political conditionality, the spread of transnational human rights and democracy networks, and an emerging international infrastructure of democracy promotion andelectoral observation.},
	author = {Levitsky, Steven}
}
@conference {64356,
	title = {Autocracy by Democratic Rules: The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era},
	year = {2002},
	month = {Aug 28, 2002},
	abstract = {This paper examines one type of hybrid regime, which we call competitive authoritarianism. Such regimes are authoritarian in that they do not meet standard procedural minimum criteria for democracy. Elections are often unfair and civil liberties are frequently violated. However, they are competitive in that democratic institutions are more facades. Rather, they permit opposition groups to contest seriously for{\textendash}and sometimes even win{\textendash}power. The combination of autocratic rule and democratic rules creates an inherent source of tension. Consequently, competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by periodic crises in which opposition challenges force incumbents to choose between cracking down and losing power. These crises have resulted in a variety of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian entrenchment (Malaysia, Zimbabwe) to incumbent turnover without regime change (Ukraine, Zambia) to democratization (Peru, Serbia).Paper prepared for Mapping the Great Zone: Clientelism and the Boundary between Democratic and Democratizing conference, Columbia University, April 4{\textendash}5, 2003. [This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2002.]},
	author = {Levitsky, Steven}
}
@conference {61611,
	title = {Comparative Perspectives on Immigrants in New York -- Across Time and Space},
	year = {2002},
	note = {Download PDF},
	month = {Jan 1, 2002},
	abstract = {This paper is a comparison across time of the two great waves of immigration to New York City in the last hundred years: the first wave, between 1880 and 1920, brought hundreds of thousands of eastern Europeans and southern Italians to the city; the recent influx of Asians, Latin Americans, and Caribbeans began in the 1960s and is still going strong. In the first wave, the African American community was insignificant, and the total black population did not even reach a hundred thousand. By time of the second wave, the city had been on the receiving end of a massive flow of African Americans from the South that began around World War I and continued until the 1960s. },
	author = {Nancy Foner}
}
@conference {61571,
	title = {Triangular Human Capital Flows between Sending, Entrepot and the Rest of the World Destinations: Lessons from Canada and Germany},
	year = {2002},
	month = {Jan 1, 2002},
	abstract = {We argue that their exist three initial sending regions, India, China, and Hong{\textendash}Kong (SAR) and two possible receiving regions, an entrepot destination (Canada{\textendash}Europe) and the ROW (USA). The home destination is of course the original sending country.Furthermore, we argue that three options or types of movement exist for each emigrant after the initial move to the entrepot country in two separate periods. These options include staying in the new entrepot country (Canada), returning to the origin country or sojourning on to a third country (ROW). In addition, multiple permutations over these types of immigrant movements can arise and complex patterns appear which will now blur the traditional categories of temporary (less than one year) and permanent movers.},
	author = {Don J. DeVoretz}
}
@conference {63106,
	title = {Coalition Parties versus Coalitions of Parties: How Electoral Agency Shapes the Political Logic of Costs and Benefits},
	booktitle = {Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association},
	year = {2002},
	month = {Aug 28-Sept 2},
	address = {Boston},
	abstract = {This paper argues that governments formed from post{\textendash}election coalitions (majority coalition governments in PR systems) and pre{\textendash}election coalitions (majority parties in SMD systems) aggregate the interests of voters in systematically different ways. We show that the multiple policy dimensional policy space that emerges from PR motivates parties in the government coalition to logroll projects among themselves without internalizing the costs in the way that a majoritarian party would. We further show that, although centrifugal electoral incentives dominate in PR systems, some incentives towards coalescence across groups and across parties exist through the greater likelihood that large parties have in becoming a member of a minimal winning coalition of parties. The model predicts that the size of the public sector should should be larger in PR systems. This prediction is tested using data from the 1970{\textquoteright}s{\textendash}90{\textquoteright}s in 17 European countries.},
	author = {Bawn, Kathleen and Rosenbluth, Frances}
}
@conference {62146,
	title = {Partisanship and Trade Policy: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?},
	year = {2002},
	month = {Aug 12, 2002},
	abstract = {Is there a noticeable difference among political parties in a country in their trade policy positions? Do left parties advocate different trade policies than right parties? In the advanced industrial countries where labor tends to be scarce, are left parties more protectionist than right ones, which represent capital owners? Political institutions within these democratic countries may affect the role of partisanship. We also investigate whether increasing globalization has led to more or less partisan polarization over trade policy. We examine 25 developed countries from 1945{\textendash}98 to see how their parties have competed over trade policy. Controlling for various factors, partisanship matters. In terms of position taking, right parties consistently take more free trade stances than do left ones. Globalization and other international forces have also shaped both the nature and the extent of the debate domestically over exposure to international trade.},
	author = {Helen V. Milner and Judkins, Benjamin}
}
@conference {63211,
	title = {The Perfect Dictatorship? Comparing Authoritarian Rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico},
	year = {2002},
	note = {},
	month = {Aug 29, 2002},
	abstract = {Prepared for delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29{\textendash}September 1, 2002, Boston, Panel 11{\textendash}25.
What is a "perfect dictatorship"? Such a regime provokes little societal resistance at installation. Its leaders act jointly to consolidate the regime and to broaden the support coalition by agreeing upon succession rules to rotate the presidency within the authoritarian regime. They delegate policy{\textendash} making authority to civilians in areas of their competence. They emphasize consultation, not open contestation, prefer cooptation to repression, eschew ideological appeals, compel social actors into regime{\textendash} licensed organizations, and deactivate civil society. South Korea under Park Chung Hee is compared on these dimensions to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, all at a time when authoritarian regimes governed them.},
	author = {Dom{\'\i}nguez, Jorge I.}
}
@conference {63006,
	title = {Religion and Terrorism Conference Paper: Excessive U.S. Military Action Overseas Breeds Anti-U.S. Terrorism},
	year = {2002},
	abstract = {As the cataclysmic events of September 11 have receded farther into the past, U.S. policymakers and the public should have been able to think more clearly about the causes of those events. But that has not happened. Just after the attacks, the initial wave of nationalistic feeling was understandable (similar sentiments held the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941). And the Bush administration{\textquoteright}s military action against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was equally understandable and justified, if not completely successful. After civilians were slaughtered so heinously on U.S. soil, the American people {\textemdash} recognizing the right to self{\textendash}defense {\textemdash} would have been willing to incur a significant number of military casualties in Afghanistan to round up and kill or capture al Qaeda fighters. Yet on two separate occasions, despite its bellicose rhetoric, the Bush administration {\textemdash} fearing casualties, much as the Clinton administration had {\textemdash} allowed al Qaeda fighters to get away by timidly relying on Northern Alliance and Pakistani allies to pursue them rather than putting enough U.S. boots on the ground. What was needed then and what will be needed in the future is a robust, narrowly focused military response against terrorist groups that focus their attacks on U.S. targets. Unfortunately, a wider, less effective U.S. policy of military and covert action is being pursued by the Bush administration and supported by the American people. In fact, that indiscriminate U.S. military interventionism is a major cause of terrorism against the United States in the first place. For example, unnecessary U.S. military interventions in Georgia, the Philippines and Iraq will most likely cause more additional terrorist attacks on U.S. targets than they will prevent.},
	author = {Ivan Eland}
}
@conference {63016,
	title = {Religion and Terrorism Conference Paper: Hearts and Minds},
	year = {2002},
	abstract = {The central purpose of American power is to provide security for the United States in a dangerous world. Before September 11, other states, especially other great powers, were perceived to be the main threat to the United States. To maximize its security, American policymakers worked assiduously to ensure that the United States held a favorable position in the global balance of power. This template for thinking about American security policy has been altered somewhat by September 11. The United States still has to be deeply concerned with great power politics, particularly with the rise of China. But now it also has to confront Al{\textendash}Qaeda, which has the United States in its gunsight and is determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction. President Bush has not yet devised a clear strategy for combating terrorism. Nevertheless, he has been under intense pressure to view September 11 as a transformative moment that calls for the United States to become much more actively involved around the world. Indeed, some conservatives argue that it is time to create an American empire, where the United States dominates the entire globe and shapes it according to its own interests. Presumably, this ambitious strategy would keep great power rivals at bay as well as eliminate the terrorist threat.},
	author = {John J. Mearsheimer}
}
@conference {63001,
	title = {Religion and Terrorism Conference Paper: Religion in the New Global War},
	year = {2002},
	abstract = {When Mohammed Atta boarded the airline on September 11, 2001 that soon thereafter slammed into the World Trade Center towers, he left behind a manual of instruction. Apparently prepared by his colleagues in the al Qaeda network, it instructed him and his fellow activists how to behave and what to do in preparation for their fateful act. What is interesting about this document is not only the text, but the subtext. Lying beneath the pious rhetoric of the manual and its eerie ties to the World Trade Center tragedy are hints about the perplexing issue of the role of religion in the contemporary world, and answers to the persistent question, how could religion be related to such vicious acts of political violence? The common sense way of putting this question about the September 11 attack and all of the other recent acts of religious terrorism is "what{\textquoteright}s religion got to do with it?" The common sense answers to this question are varied, and they are contradictory. On the one hand some political leaders{\textendash}along with many scholars of comparative religion{\textendash}have assured us that religion has had nothing to do with these vicious acts, and that religion{\textquoteright}s innocent images have been used in perverse ways by evil and essentially irreligious political actors. On the other hand there are the radio talk show hosts and even a few social scientists who affirm that religion, especially Islam, has had everything to do with it{\textendash}and not just ordinary religion, but a perverse strain of fundamentalism that has infected normal religion and caused it to go bad. A reading of the Atta manuscript shows both answers to be incorrect. In an analysis of this manual undertaken by a scholar of comparative religion, Bruce Lincoln, he leaves us with no doubt that Mohammed Atta and his eighteen accomplices on that dark morning of September 11 were filled with a religious zeal and undertook their hideous assignment in a ritualistic act of self{\textendash}sacrifice following traditional tenets. Moreover, although the ideology of their mentors was influenced by a certain strain of Islamic political thought characterized by the writings of Mawdudi, al Banna and Faraj, to which only a minority of Muslims subscribe, the religious practices and rituals were themselves not deviant. The actions prescribed for the nineteen on the morning of September 11 were well within the norm not only for Islamic belief and practice, but also for many other religious traditions. Skewed though their political views may have been, one could say on the basis of this text that Atta and his colleagues died as good Muslims. Had they been Christians or Hindus they would have died as good adherents of those faiths as well.},
	author = {Mark Juergensmeyer}
}
@conference {62996,
	title = {Religion and Terrorism Conference Paper: Terrorism and the Future of Global Politics},
	year = {2002},
	abstract = {The general topic of this conference points to the link between the concepts of religion and terrorism. The September 11th attacks {\textendash} and the previous and subsequent terrorist attacks in Bali and other parts of Asia {\textendash} highlight the importance of gathering as much information as possible on Islam{\textendash}related terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism has added new dimensions to the phenomenon of terrorism. Here I would like to mention two. First, the widespread potential or actual support for this terrorism: Muslims make up a large proportion of the world{\textquoteright}s population and this, along with the current level of technological advance, combine to make Islamic terrorism a truly global problem. Second, Islamic fundamentalism has brought a new lethality to terrorist actions through the suicide attack.},
	author = {Narcis Serra}
}
@conference {63011,
	title = {Religion and Terrorism Conference Paper: Terrorismo y el Futuro de la Pol{\'\i}tica Global},
	year = {2002},
	abstract = {El t{\'\i}tulo general de esta conferencia liga los conceptos de religi{\'o}n y terrorismo. Los ataques del 11 de septiembre {\textendash} y los anteriores y otros posteriores en a isla de Bali y otras partes de Asia {\textendash} muestran la necesidad de contar con el mayor conocimiento posible sobre el terrorismo vinculado a la religi{\'o}n isl{\'a}mica. El fundamentalismo isl{\'a}mico, en efecto, ha a{\~n}adido dimensiones nuevas al fen{\'o}meno terrorista. Quiero se{\~n}alar dos. En primer lugar la extensi{\'o}n de las bases de apoyo, potenciales o reales: los pa{\'\i}ses isl{\'a}micos son una proporci{\'o}n muy grande de la poblaci{\'o}n mundial y ello unido a las posibilidades tecnol{\'o}gicas actuales convierte a este terrorismo en un problema ciertamente global. En segundo lugar, el fundamentalismo isl{\textasciiacute}mico ha a{\~n}adido un enorme incremento de la letalidad de las acciones terroristas al incluir el suicidio como forma de llevar a cabo el ataque.},
	author = {Narcis Serra}
}
@conference {63501,
	title = {Tuned Out Voters? Media Impact on Campaign Learning},
	year = {2002},
	note = {},
	month = {May 3, 2002},
	abstract = {What are the consequences of the rise of mediated or indirect channels linking parties and the electorate in modern and post{\textendash}modern campaigns? Critics commonly blame the mass media (and particularly the role of television) for many of the supposed ills of representative democracy, from public disenchantment with elected leaders to increasing detachment from party loyalties, lack of awareness of public affairs, and half{\textendash}empty empty ballot boxes. The argument presented in this study has three core components. Firstly, long{\textendash}term evidence of trends in American elections over the last fifty years demonstrates that reports of the ill health, or even death, of traditional partisan channels of campaign communication are grossly exaggerated. Secondly evidence from the 2000 Bush{\textendash}Gore US presidential elections confirms that far from ?blaming the messenger?, the role of exposure to campaign information from parties, newspapers, television news, talk radio, and the Internet has been to strengthen civic engagement in America. Lastly, expanding upon previous work, the study considers the role of popular television entertainment in this process.},
	author = {Norris, Pippa}
}
@conference {62456,
	title = {Conflicting Visions for Korean Reunification},
	year = {2001},
	month = {Jun 1, 2001},
	author = {Ji Young-Sun}
}
@conference {62461,
	title = {Peacekeeping Exit Strategy: A Renaissance for the Deadline?},
	year = {2001},
	month = {May 21, 2001},
	author = {Jeffrey Stambaugh}
}
@conference {62466,
	title = {Transatlantic Security and the Taiwan Straits},
	year = {2001},
	month = {Jun 3, 2001},
	author = {Sebastian Wood}
}
@conference {62471,
	title = {The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the European Union-A Continental Perspective},
	year = {2001},
	month = {Sep 1, 2001},
	author = {Xenophon Yataganas}
}
@conference {62451,
	title = {Back to the West: The Reintegration of the Baltic Countries to the European Union and Other Western Structures},
	year = {2001},
	month = {May 1, 2001},
	author = {Erkki Huittinen}
}
@conference {62426,
	title = {Improving Forecasts of State Failure},
	year = {2001},
	month = {Jul 1, 2001},
	abstract = {We offer the first independent scholarly evaluation of the claims, forecasts, and causal inferences of the State Failure Task Force and their efforts to forecast when states will fail. State failure refers to the collapse of the authority of the central government to impose order, as in civil wars, revolutionary wars, genocides, politicides, and adverse or disruptive regime transitions. States that sponsor international terrorism or allow it to be organized from within their borders are all failed states. This task force, set up at the behest of Vice President Gore in 1994, has been led by a group of distinguished academics working as consultants to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. State Failure Task Force reports and publications have received attention in the media, in academia, and from public policy decision{\textendash}makers. In this article, we identify several methodological errors in the task force work that cause their reported forecast probabilities of conflict to be too large, their causal inferences to be biased in unpredictable directions, and their claims of forecasting performance to be exaggerated. However, we also find that the task force has amassed the best and most carefully collected data on state failure in existence, and the required corrections which we provide, although very large in effect, are easy to implement. We also reanalyze their data with better statistical procedures and demonstrate how to improve forecasting performance to levels significantly greater than even corrected versions of their models. Although still a highly uncertain endeavor, we are as a consequence able to offer the first accurate forecasts of state failure, along with procedures and results that may be of practical use in informing foreign policy decision making. We also describe a number of strong empirical regularities that may help in ascertaining the causes of state failure. Forthcoming in World Politics. You may also be interested in the last state failure task force report, the state failure data we used to write this paper, or the related paper, Nathaniel Beck, Gary King, and Langche Zeng. \&quot;Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture,\&quot; American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 1 (March, 2000): 21{\textendash}36 [Abstract] (winner of the Gosnell Prize). },
	author = {Gary King}
}
@conference {62446,
	title = {Religious Freedom and Foreign Policy: The U.S. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998},
	year = {2001},
	month = {Jun 1, 2001},
	author = {Dominique Decherf}
}
@conference {62436,
	title = {U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan},
	year = {2001},
	month = {Jun 1, 2001},
	author = {James Chang}
}
@conference {62361,
	title = {To Farms or Cities: An Historical Tension Between Canada and Its Immigrants},
	year = {2001},
	note = {Download PDF},
	month = {May 10, 2001},
	abstract = {For much of Canadian history, particularly during the critical era of mass migration that straddled the decades of the turn of the century, the government may have welcomed immigrants with an open hand, but that same hand was also forcefully pressing immigrants into a narrowly{\textendash}defined geographic and economic corner. Indeed, what distinguishes Canadian immigration history during the first half of this century, and makes it so different from that of the United States, is the degree to which Canadian immigration policy and practice was predicated on the notion that the place for non{\textendash}English speaking immigrants, foreigners as they were commonly called, and for their Canadian{\textendash}born children and children{\textquoteright}s children through the generations was in the Canadian hinterland, engaged in farming and extractive labor.},
	author = {Harold Troper}
}
@conference {62201,
	title = {Immigrant Success and the Expansion of Education in American and Canadian Cities, 1970-1990},
	year = {2001},
	note = {Download PDF},
	month = {May 1, 2001},
	abstract = {This research examines how the expansion of education, and its changing role in labor markets, has shaped employment experiences of newly{\textendash}arriving immigrants to American and Canadian cities over the period 1970 to 1990. Earlier expansion of education levels in the U.S., particularly in immigrant{\textendash}intensive cities, lowered the relative employment success of its immigrants compared to those in Canada in the 1970s, while the more recent rapid expansion of education in Canada has reduced this cross{\textendash}national difference and fostered convergence. Three potential aspects of these effects are examined: (i) higher native{\textendash}born educational levels create or increase an immigrant skills gap, (ii) the impact on immigrants is magnified by the lower relevance (actual or perceived) of their credentials to employers? requirements, and (iii) associated shifts toward knowledge{\textendash}based or professionalized occupations alters the credential validation processes in ways which disadvantage immigrants. These effects are conditional upon labor market institutions and processes. Data are drawn from U.S. and Canadian census microdata files for 1980/81 and 1990/91. The impact of educational change on immigrants is shown in inter{\textendash}temporal decomposition analysis.},
	author = {Jeffrey G. Reitz}
}
@conference {62136,
	title = {Immigrant Workers in Rural and Agricultural Areas},
	year = {2001},
	note = {Download PDF},
	month = {May 5, 2001},
	abstract = {Western US agriculture is an industry that has shaped and been shaped by a peculiar labor policy: the most numerous seasonal workers were assumed to be outsiders who would not remain employed in the industry or live in the community in which they worked for more than 10 to 20 years. Instead of integration policy, the emphasis of farm employers was on how to find new workers willing to accommodate themselves to seasonal employment.},
	author = {Philip Martin}
}
@conference {61391,
	title = {The Skills of Female Immigrants to Australia, Canada, and the United States},
	year = {2001},
	month = {Apr 30, 2001},
	abstract = {Census data for 1990/91 indicate that Australian and Canadian female immigrants appear to have higher levels of English fluency, education, and income (relative to natives) than do U.S. female immigrants. This skill deficit for U.S. female immigrants arises in large part because the United States receives a much larger share of immigrants from Latin America than do the other two countries. However, even among women originating outside Latin America, the proportion of foreign{\textendash}born women in the United States who are fluent in English is much lower than among foreign{\textendash}born women in Australia. Furthermore, immigrant/native education gaps are reduced but not eliminated by the exclusion of Latin American women from the analysis. In contrast, other evidence for men suggests that the gap in observed skills among male immigrants to the United States is completely eliminated when Latin American immigrants are excluded from the estimation sample (Borjas, 1993; Antecol, et al., 2001). The importance of national origin and the general consistency in the results for men (who are routinely subjected to the selection criteria of various immigration programs) and women (who are not) suggests that many factors other than immigration policy per se are at work in producing skill variation among these three immigration streams.},
	author = {Heather Antecol}
}
@conference {62421,
	title = {The Economic Impact of Demographic Change: A Case for More Immigration},
	year = {2001},
	note = {},
	month = {Jun 1, 2001},
	author = {Cooper, Richard N.}
}
@conference {61421,
	title = {Political Institutions, Ethnic Elites and the Civic Engagement of Immigrants: A Comparison of Canada and the United States},
	year = {2001},
	month = {May 10, 2001},
	abstract = {In this paper I argue that there is a significant isomorphism between a host country?s political system and newcomers? participation. During the "first wave" of mass migration to North America from 1880 to 1920 some immigrants brought radical new ideas, significantly influencing worker and socialist movements. The influence of "second wave" immigrants appears more subtle, a careful jockeying for space within existing political structures. I suggest that political institutions exert a selection effect on potential immigrant community leaders both before and after migration. These selection processes reinforce prevailing political discourses and ways of participating.},
	author = {Irene Bloemraad}
}
@conference {62491,
	title = {What Does the European Union Do?},
	year = {2001},
	note = {},
	month = {Dec 1, 2001},
	abstract = {We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy{\textendash}making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a selected number of policy domains. Our goal is to examine the division of prerogatives between European institutions and national ones, in light of the implications of normative models and in relation to the preferences of European citizens. Our data confirm that the extent and the intensity of policy{\textendash}making by the EU have increased sharply over the last 30 years. Such increase has taken place at different speeds, and to different degrees, across policy domains. In recent times the areas that have expanded most are the most remote from the EEC{\textquoteright}s original mission of establishing a free market zone with common external trade policy. We conjecture that the resulting allocation may be partly inconsistent with normative criteria concerning the assignment of policies at different government levels, as laid out in the theoretical literature.},
	author = {Alesina, Alberto}
}
@conference {62386,
	title = {The Sociology of Immigration and Host Societies: Second Thoughts and Reconsiderations},
	year = {2000},
	note = {Download PDF},
	month = {Apr 28, 2000},
	abstract = {The contemporary study of immigration has come a long a way {\textemdash} or at least so it seems to someone whose interests in the subject were first sparked in that prehistoric era we call the late 1970s. Others already knew better, but at the time it wasn{\textquoteright}t clear to me that there was a field to master, nor a subject that would live for long. Immigration had long since disappeared from the scholarly radar screen, and though it was quietly undergoing a renaissance, its rebirth was hard for this, admittedly obtuse, graduate student to discern. The older literature appeared truly antique. Yes, there was a relevant body of scholarship dating from the 1960s, but this seemed dated, and in any case, reeked of a melioristic liberalism so hopelessly passe that one couldn{\textquoteright}t take it seriously. It was also easy to succumb to the political correctness of the time: the authors of Beyond the Melting Pot were then at the height of their neo{\textendash}conservative phase, making theirs the type of book one read only after having wrapped it in a brown, paper cover.},
	author = {Roger Waldinger}
}
@conference {61881,
	title = {When Do Special Interests Run Rampant? Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information and Checks and Balances in Ba},
	year = {1999},
	month = {Nov 1, 1999},
	abstract = {This paper investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interests, and specifically government decisions to deal with banking crises. I find that governments make smaller fiscal transfers to the financial sector and are less likely to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions the more informed are voters, the closer are elections, and the larger the number of political veto players (conditional on the costs to voters of these policy decisions). The results suggest that policies that might be appropriate in the U.S. context for mitigating the magnitude of banking crises may be less efficacious in settings with other institutional arrangements.},
	author = {Philip Keefer}
}
@conference {63986,
	title = {Rent Appropriation and Sustained Growth},
	year = {1996},
	month = {Jan 1, 1996},
	abstract = {This paper demonstrates that the introduction of imperfect competition into the labor market can solve the problem isolated by Jones and Manuelli (Journal of Economic Theory, 1992, 58, 171{\textendash}197), and Boldrin (Journal of Economic Theory, 1992, 58, 198{\textendash}218), that in economies with convex technologies and finitely lived agents, real wages may not grow fast enough for unbounded growth to be sustained. I show that if wages are determined by a bargaining solution, and if the bargaining power of the workforce is sufficiently high (if they appropriate a sufficiently large proportion of rents), then growth is unbounded. Moreover, the growth path generated by such an economy may improve the welfare of all generation apart from the initial old.},
	author = {Robinson, James A.}
}
