In this paper we present historical evidence and a theoretical analysis of the
origins of political stability and instability in Colombia for the period 1850-1950,
and their relationship to political, particularly electoral, institutions. We show that
the driving force behind institutional change over this period, specifically the move
to proportional representation (PR), was the desire of the Conservative and Liberal
parties to come up with a way of credibly dividing power to avoid civil war and
conflict, a force intensified by the brutal conflict of the War of a Thousand days
between 1899 and 1902. The problem with majoritarian electoral institutions was
that they did not allocate power in a way which matched the support of the parties
in the population, thus encouraging conflict. The strategic advantage of PR was that
it avoided such under-representation. The parties however could not initially move
to PR because it was not 'fraud proof' so instead, in 1905, adopted the 'incomplete
vote' which simply allocated 2/3 of the legislative seats to the winning party and
1/3 to the loser. This formula brought peace. The switch to PR arose when the
Liberals became condent that they could solve problems of fraud. But it only
happened because they were able to exploit a division within the Conservatives.
The switch also possibly reflected a concern with the rising support for socialism
and the desire to divide power more broadly. Our findings shed new light on the
origins of electoral systems and the nature of political con
ict and its resolution.
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and
consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different
political institutions because of the way they allocate political power
and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens,
but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when
citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when
the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of
concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy.
By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the
citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites
do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend
on the strength of civil society, the structure of political
institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of
economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and
extent of globalization.
Winner, John Bates Clark Medal, American Economic Association, 2005
Winner, Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, 2007
Winner, William H. Riker Award, Political Economy Section, 2007